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Synopsis 
The definitions of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’ in the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 
are, as is the case with their international counterparts, central to the Act’s regulation of insider 
trading.  It has long been recognised, however, that those definitions, inherited from repealed 
companies and market abuse legislation, are cumbersome and counter-intuitive.  This state of 
affairs obtains as the South African legislature has failed to undertake the most fundamental 
enquiry in formulating a coherent regulatory scheme aimed at prohibiting supposedly wrongful 
conduct: identifying a single theory of wrongfulness upon which to base its prohibitions. 
Instead, the definitions include elements of all possible regulatory bases for insider trading, 
including those having as their object the protection of proprietary rights in information and 
born out of the fiduciary doctrine.  It is argued that the definitions, part of legislation aimed at 
addressing a financial market wrong, should be formulated with reference to the rights and 
obligations at play in those markets and the legislature’s objectives for those markets.  A 
proposal is made in that regard. 
Sinopsis 
Die definisie van ‘insider’ (binnehandelaar) en ‘inside information’ (binnekennis) soos vervat 
in die Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, staan, soos in ander jurisdiksies, sentraal tot die 
regulering van binnehandel in dié Wet.  Dit word egter lank reeds erken dat daardie definisies, 
wat hulle ontstaan in herroepte wetgewing aangaande maatskappye en die misbruik van 
finansiële markte het, omslagtig en onlogies is.  Die stand van sake heers aangesien die Suid-
Afrikaanse wetgewer nie die mees fundamentele voorafgaande ondersoek onderneem het nie: 
Die wetgewer het nie een teorie van onregmatigheid geïdentifiseer waarop die verbod op 
binnehandel baseer kon word nie.  In plaas daarvan sluit die definisies elemente van alle 
moontlike regulatoriese basisse vir binnehandel in, ook die wat mik op die beskerming van 
eiendomsreg van inligting en wat hulle oorsprong in die fidusiêre beginsel het.  Dit word dus 
aangevoer dat die definisies, as deel van `n stuk wetgewing wat daarop gemik is om die 
finansiële markte te reguleer, formuleer moet word met verwysing na die regte en pligte 
relevant tot daardie markte, sowel as die wetgewer se doelwitte met betrekking to daardie 
markte.  `n Dienooreenkomstige voorstel word in die proefskrif gemaak. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2006 Jooste, considering the definitions of the terms ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’ in 
South African law, wrote as follows: 
Liability can be incurred only by an ‘insider’ who acts with knowledge of ‘inside 
information’.  The definitions of ‘inside information’ and ‘insider’ are accordingly of 
vital importance.  The definitions, which are interconnected, are, however, as in the 
Insider Trading Act, ‘cumbersome and counter-intuitive’.  They are in fact circular — 
to know whether information is ‘inside information’ one has to know who an ‘insider’ 
is; and to know who an insider is, one has to know what ‘inside information’ is.  ‘Inside 
information’ is information ‘which is obtained or learned as an insider’; and an ‘insider’ 
is a person who has ‘inside information’.  Since the provisions of the Act that impose 
criminal and civil liability turn on the meaning of ‘inside information’, the Act is 
‘fundamentally incoherent’.1 
Jooste wrote on the definitions as they stood in the Securities Services Act.2  That Act was 
repealed.  The South African insider trading provisions, including the definitions of ‘inside 
information’ and ‘insider’, are now to be found in the Financial Markets Act3 (the Financial 
Markets Act or Act).  Jooste’s criticism, however, was not heeded by the legislature and still 
rings true.  At the least, his criticism calls for a proper analysis of the definitions.  Specifically, 
what needs to be ascertained is whether the definitions cannot be clarified and, ultimately, 
whether the law on insider trading in South Africa cannot be simplified.  As the law stands, it 
is not clear and it is not simple. 
The overarching structure of the Act’s insider trading provisions is not novel, regardless of 
whether it is viewed comparatively or historically.  The Act, like most international insider 
trading regimes and like its historical counterparts, does three main things: it defines a genus 
                                                 
1  R Jooste “A critique of the insider trading provisions of the 2004 Securities Services Act” (2006) 123 
S African LJ 437 438. 
2  Act 36 of 2004. 
3  Act 19 of 2012. 
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of information, which it calls ‘inside information’; it defines a group of persons, which it calls 
‘insiders’; and it specifies prohibited conduct or ‘offences’.  The gist of the regime is that 
insiders (or those who deal for them) who deal with inside information in specified ways make 
themselves guilty of offences, which ultimately render them liable to the sanctions prescribed 
by the Act.  The definitions of insider and inside information are central to this legislative 
scheme.  All of the offences include the use of inside information; four of the five offences can 
be committed only by an insider, and the fifth by someone acting for him (or her). 
An insider is liable to harsh sanction4 if he makes himself guilty of one of four offences.5  
Firstly, if he knows that he has inside information and he deals for his own account in securities 
listed on a regulated market, he commits an offence.6  He will, however, not be guilty of that 
offence if he can prove that he became an insider only after he gave the instruction to deal, and 
the instruction was not changed after he had become an insider.7  He would also escape liability 
if he were acting in pursuit of a transaction, about which all the parties had the same inside 
information, the trading was limited to those parties, and the transaction was not aimed at 
securing a benefit from the movement in the price of the security, or a related security, as a 
result of inside information.8 
Secondly, if the insider knows that he has inside information and he deals for another person 
in securities on a regulated market, he commits an offence.9  He too can, however, escape 
liability by proving certain facts.  He will not be held liable if he is an authorised user and was 
acting on specific instructions from a client, and he did not know that that client was an insider 
                                                 
4  According to section 82(2)(b) of the Act he is liable to an amount up to R1 million, to be adjusted by 
the registrar annually to reflect the Consumer Price Index, as published by Statistics South Africa, plus 
three times the profit made or loss avoided through the offence. 
5  Section 78. 
6  Section 78(1)(a). 
7  Section 78(1)(b)(i). 
8  Section 78(1)(b)(ii). 
9  Section 78(2). 
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at the time.10  He will not be held liable if he only became an insider after he had given the 
instruction to deal to an authorised user, and the instruction was not changed after he became 
an insider.11  He can also escape liability by proving that he was acting in pursuit of a 
transaction to which all the parties had possession of the same inside information, the trading 
was limited to them, and the transaction was not aimed at securing a benefit from exposure to 
movement in the price of the security, or a related security, resulting from the inside 
information.12 
Thirdly, an insider, who knows that he has inside information, and who discloses it to another, 
is guilty of an offence.13  He will, however, be able to escape liability where he can prove that 
he disclosed the inside information because it was necessary to do so for the purpose of the 
proper performance of the functions of his employment, office or profession in circumstances 
unrelated to dealing in any security listed on a regulated market and that he, at the same time, 
disclosed that the information was inside information.14  Fourthly, an insider who knows that 
he has inside information and encourages or causes another person to deal or discourages 
another from dealing in securities listed on a regulated market, is guilty of an offence.15 
In addition to these four offences, any person ‘who deals for’ an insider in securities listed on 
a regulated market and to which the inside information possessed by the insider relates and 
who knew the person he is trading for to be an insider, is guilty of an offence.16  He too can, 
however, escape liability by proving certain specific facts.  He will not be guilty of an offence 
if the insider became an insider only after he had given the instruction to deal, and did not 
change the instruction in any manner after the insider had been clothed with that status.  And, 
                                                 
10  Section 78(2)(b)(i). 
11  Section 78(2)(b)(ii). 
12  Section 78(2)(b)(iii). 
13  Section 78(4)(a). 
14  Section 78(4)(b). 
15  Section 78(5). 
16  Section 78(3)(a). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 12 
 
he would not be guilty of an offence if the insider were acting in pursuit of a transaction about 
which all the parties had the same inside information, trading was limited to those parties, and 
the transaction was not aimed at securing a benefit from the movement in the price of the 
security resulting from the inside information.17 
The offences and their detailed defences do not present a simple legislative scheme.  The 
definitions of insider and inside information add to the interpreter’s burden.  This should be 
rectified.  For if it is accepted that something must be regulated (as is the case with insider 
trading), it must be regulated simply and intelligibly.  Having simple and intelligible legislation 
regulating financial markets is a positive characteristic of any modern society.  Our legislature 
of course has a constitutional duty to pass legislation that is clear and precise, enabling citizens 
to understand what is expected of them.18  It is also an important tenet of the rule of law that 
rules are stated in a clear and accessible manner.19  Bingham gives three reasons why legal 
rules, including those found in legislation, must be simple and clear.20 
The first, and perhaps the most obvious reason, is that a member of society must, without 
undue difficulty, be able to learn what he may and may not do.  If legislation is enforced by 
threat of prosecution, fines or even imprisonment, members of society must at least be able to 
know what they must or must not do, not to suffer those consequences.21  This is especially 
relevant to legislation aimed at regulating conduct in the financial markets.  It is a complex, 
high-paced environment into which the legislature wades.  It must tread carefully.  Additional 
                                                 
17  Section 78(3)(b). 
18  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 2001 (1) SA 545 
(CC) par. 24. 
19  Dawood and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) par. 47–48. 
20  T Bingham The Rule of Law (2010) 37. 
21  Ibid. 
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care must be taken to be clear and succinct in order to enable financial actors easily to tell right 
from wrong. 
The second reason is relevant to the claims the Act affords those affected by insider trading.22  
For people to be able to claim under these provisions, they must know what their rights and 
obligations in terms of the Act are.23  Only if this is truly the case, would those provisions be 
effective. 
The third reason is eminently relevant to financial market legislation: the successful conduct 
of trade, investment, and business, to realise economic growth, is promoted by a body of 
accessible legal rules that governs commercial dealings.24  Bingham makes the point 
succinctly: ‘No one would choose to do business, perhaps involving large sums of money, in 
a country where the parties’ rights and obligations are vague and undecided.’25  That 
proposition is equally applicable to the South African context. 
The South African financial markets play an important role in facilitating economic growth.  
Financial markets play a pivotal role in most national economies today.  Share markets 
specifically have grown tremendously over the last couple of decades.  More companies have 
been listed on stock exchanges and the values of shares have increased in the aggregate, both 
as a result of a general increase in share prices and through the listing of new shares.  An 
                                                 
22  Section 82(5). 
23  Bingham The Rule of Law 38. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid.  Lord Mansfield, recognised by many to be the father of English commercial law, wrote as follows 
more than 250 years ago: ‘The daily negotiations and property of merchants ought not to depend on 
subtleties and niceties; but upon rules easily learned and easily retained, because they are the dictates 
of common sense, drawn from the truth of the case” (Hamilton v Mendes (1761) 2 Burr 1198 1214) and 
‘In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more 
consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one way or the other.  
Because [investors and businessmen] then know what ground to go upon.’ (Vallejo v Wheeler (1774) 1 
Cowp 143 153). 
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increase in the intensity of trading and the general increase in value have also been seen in the 
bond market.  The private corporate bond market has become increasingly active due to a 
financial innovation of the 1980s: securitisation,26 whereby loans are turned into tradable 
securities. 
Having fair financial markets in which the rules are clear, encourages international investment.  
The South African capital market is now more exposed to international investment.  For 
international investors to be willing to play the South African investment game, however, they 
must be easily able to ascertain what the rules are.  South Africa competes with other 
jurisdictions to secure capital from sources outside its boundaries.  It is important that financial 
market legislation should, in relation to the qualities of specifically financial market 
legislation, be internationally competitive. 
The two main jurisdictions with which the South African provisions will be compared are the 
United States and Australia.  The United States can be seen as the father jurisdiction of insider 
trading regulation.  As will be shown with specific reference to the definition of insider in the 
Financial Markets Act, it has fathered some abstruse enactments.  It has also been doing so for 
a long time.  Some of the pivotal provisions in its regulation of insider trading date back to 
1933.  In that year, four years after Black Tuesday,27 the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted.  
In the following year, the United States Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act of 1934 (SEC Act), which established the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) with the purpose of regulating and overseeing the sale of securities in the 
primary market.  The 1934 Act also established the SEC’s powers to oversee and regulate 
trading in securities in the secondary market.  The SEC was empowered to pursue civil actions 
                                                 
26  See N Locke Aspects of Traditional Securitisation in South African Law 2010 LLD Thesis University 
of South Africa. 
27  Black Tuesday refers to Tuesday, 29 October 1929.  On that day the ‘Great Wall Street Crash of 1929’ 
happened.  It is recognised as the most devastating stock market crash in the history of the United 
States.  It marked the beginning of the ten-year Great Depression, which affected all Western 
industrialised countries. 
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or to refer a matter to the American Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.  The SEC 
Act’s provisions that deal with insider trading are formulated in broad terms.  They prohibit 
fraudulent and deceitful conduct in relation to trading in securities.  The SEC Act also 
empowered the SEC to promulgate regulations.  For the purposes of insider trading, the most 
important rule made was Rule 10b-5 in 1942. 
The United States courts have had much leeway in developing the law of insider trading.  A 
body of jurisprudence has developed, which is valuable, and perhaps indispensable, to any 
study in the field.  That, however, is not to say that it is an example of simplicity, clarity, 
rationality or even coherence. 
The Australian jurisdiction, on the other hand, has not developed the extended body of 
jurisprudence of the United States.  Its legislature has, however, like the South African 
legislature, enacted new provisions to address insider trading, including important changes to 
its definition of insider.  In contrast to its South African counterpart, at least as far as the 
definition of insider is concerned, the Australian legislature has made a clean break from the 
past.  It has enacted what amounts to a paradigm shift in its insider trading regulation.  The 
focus has shifted from regulating insider trading to regulating trading on inside information.  
This is not merely a semantic distinction.  The change has an important effect.  The focus of 
the legislative provisions changes.  It moves from trading with inside information by certain 
persons to trading with inside information per se and to the asymmetries of information 
between traders in the market. 
In South Africa the courts have been all but completely bypassed in this branch of the law.  
The legislature has thus not been constrained by judge-made law, made through the case-by-
case, fact-based context in which judgments are written.  This has provided the legislature with 
a clean slate on which to draft our provisions.  It has had ample opportunity to formulate a 
clear piece of legislation based on principle.  Yet, and not for a lack of trying, it has failed to 
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do so.  Rider and French have described an attempt by our legislature at insider trading 
regulation as an ‘unholy jumble and a downright mess’.28 
To be fair, the South African legislature has not been alone in its travails to find suitable rules 
to regulate insider trading.  Many jurisdictions’ attempts have been the object of academic 
scorn.  The regulation of insider trading lends itself to furious debate, even about whether there 
should be such regulation at all. 
Until now, the South African exchanges have also not delivered the same headline grabbing 
insider trading scandals as has been the case in the United States and, specifically, its New 
York Stock Exchange.  In the United States it has become a highly politicized issue and a bell 
in the hands of those who profess to set themselves against corporate abuses.29  South African 
traders, it has, however, been said, are not saints when it comes to this type of conduct.30  The 
                                                 
28  B Rider & H L French The Regulation of Insider Trading (1979) 398. 
29  In the United States insider trading has become an issue that has been said to go far beyond the scope 
of securities regulation aimed at investor protection.  It is said that the regulation has obtained a political 
dimension with corporate scandals fuelling populist calls on Congress to act.  Langevoort writes that: 
‘Congress had come to see the problem as a manifestation of undue greed among the already well-to-
do, worthy of legislative intervention if for no other reason than to send a message of censure on behalf 
of the American people.’ 
(D C Langevoort Insider Trading: Regulation, Enforcement & Prevention (2009) (Langevoort on 
insider trading) (Rel 7 4/2009) 1–2 et seq.) 
30  In works recounting the history of the JSE (at least up to 1987) very little mention is made of insider 
trading.  Bryant does, however, write:  
 One particular area of activity, or non-activity – the attempts to identify insider trading – was to 
become the perennial target of some of the media’s less flattering jeers against the committee’s 
toothlessness.  The Undue Price Fluctuations committee has been operating since 1963 and its 
function is to watch significant share price changes and volumes when no information has been 
released by the company concerned to warrant them.  When these occur, and companies can offer 
no reasons for them, brokers are instructed to make returns to the Inspectorate Division of all 
trading in such shares between specified dates.  Watertight evidence of insider trading hardly ever 
comes to light from these returns; not surprising, really, when the large amount of trading in the 
name of nominee companies is taken into consideration, and when the possible family connections 
and associates of ‘insiders’ could follow a spectrum of names as wide as a biographical dictionary.  
All such inquiries have died a natural death and no prosecution has ever been initiated.  The plain 
fact is that the JSE lacks the power to do this.  On those rare occasions when evidence of insider 
trading seems tangible, the only recourse is to refer the matter to the Registrar of Companies, whose 
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small number of successful prosecutions in South Africa for insider trading is to be put down 
to the difficulties inherent in detecting the offence.31  Even in the United States, with its highly 
active SEC, the ‘chances of being caught are not great’.32 
The dearth of successful insider trading prosecutions in South Africa, is certainly not a 
consequence of a lack of securities trading in the country or that trading in securities is not an 
established part of its investing community’s activities.  South Africa has a strong historic 
connection to share trading.33  It owes much of its development to that made possible by the 
capital contributions of many toward reaching one central goal: the Vereenigde Nederlandsche 
Geoctroyeerde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), the world’s first joint-stock company, would 
never have landed at the Cape had it not been for the power of centralised capital.34  As the 
world’s first big corporation, it was able to utilise the benefits of economies of scale.35  It grew 
out of several smaller local partnerships of merchants who, together with government, 
contributed toward its share capital.  Its operations four centuries ago are a true testament to 
what is made possible by the pooling of resources. 
                                                 
function it would be to investigate any apparent breach of the law. (M Bryant Taking Stock: 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange – The first 100 years (1987) 123–124.) 
31  W R Mclucas, J H Walsh & L L Fountain “Settlement of Insider Trading Cases with the SEC” (1992) 
48 Bus Law 79 84. 
32  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 6 4/2008) 1–9. 
33  The historians write that this history, at least in some way, dates back to the Middle Ages.  It is recorded 
that in 1291 a ‘joint stock company’ was formed with the object of discovering the Cape of Good Hope.  
An Italian merchant prince backed by wealthy Italian merchant families is said to have sought to end a 
Venetian monopoly in trade with the East.  They are said to have passed the Cape, but their ships sank 
off the East Coast of Africa.  (See E Rosenthal On ‘Change through the Years’ (1968) 9–10. 
34  The United East India Company or ‘Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagne’ was founded in the 
Netherlands.  It grew out of several smaller local partnerships of merchants in the major cities of the 
Low Countries, all of whom contributed to the Compagne’s share capital.  The government, too, 
contributed a hefty sum.  An investment in the VOC seems to have been one well made.  It is said that 
‘[n]ever in history has a company paid such vast returns over so long a period’.  (E Rosenthal On 
‘Change through the Years’ (1968) 11.) 
35  A M Carlos & S Nichols “‘Giants of an Earlier Capitalism’: The Chartered Trading Companies as the 
World’s first Multinationals” (1988) 62 Business History Review 398. 
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Around 1600 there were some six fledgling companies operating out of all the major Dutch 
ports who set themselves the trading of East Indian produce as goal.  The entities were granted 
a limited term, usually only for one voyage, after which investors’ investments were repaid.36  
These arrangements were, however, not sufficient to found the necessary bases truly to take 
the lead in trade with the East.  Consequently, the Dutch Staten-Generaal proposed that these 
smaller entities be merged.  The result was the VOC.  It was chartered in 1602 to enjoy a 
monopoly on all Dutch trade east of our Cape and West of the Straits of Magellan.37  All this 
was made possible by the community, who made available their funds in return for equity and 
the promise of profit sharing. 
Subscription to the VOC’s capital was open to all residents of the United Provinces.  
Merchants, artisans and servants alike acquired shares and took part in what was largely a 
novel idea.  The investments ranged in size.  In Amsterdam alone there were 1 143 subscribers, 
only 10 of whom invested more than 10 000 guilders.38  It was not long after the world’s first 
joint-stock company was born that its first true stock market saw the light of day.39  The 
ownership of shares required a secondary market for those shares to be sold.  In 1607 already 
one-third of the VOC’s shares had changed hands.  Further, as a result of the fact that the 
company’s share register was opened only once a month, a market for futures soon 
developed.40 
The first stock exchange was opened in Amsterdam in the early 1600s.  Initially, mostly VOC 
shares were traded.  The size of stock exchanges grew as the state granted corporate status to 
a growing number of companies whose activities were considered to be in the public interest.  
The advantage to these new corporations with their public interest purpose was clear: the 
                                                 
36  N Ferguson The Ascent of Money – A Financial History of the World (2008) 129. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 130. 
39  Ibid. 132.  
40  Ibid. 133. 
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limited liability enjoyed allowed the corporation to bring together the capital of a much larger 
number of shareholders than unincorporated partnerships could. 
On South African soil companies were floated and shares were traded at the Cape from the 
late eighteenth century onwards.41  South Africa experienced its first share boom in the 1850s 
brought about by the discovery of copper in the Namaqualand.42  The boom, as booms have 
become known to do, drew in almost all who had a penny to invest.  There were severe losses 
in what proved to be an ill-conceived venture.  Importantly, however, the losses seem to have 
been equally felt by all who invested.43 
                                                 
41  E Rosenthal On ‘Change through the Years’ (1968) 15–30. 
42  Ibid. 31.  Rosenthal quotes RW Murray:  
 It was the time of the Namaqualand copper mining mania, and I was reminded of it when the late 
Transvaal gold mining mania was at its height, and as seen from the Barberton mountain range and 
the Rand reefs, history was repeating itself with great fidelity.  The scrip thermometer showed about 
the same degree of mad fever in both cases.  In each case prospectors, company promoters and 
speculators went to working the same way, sinking shafts to add to their own pockets, raising capital 
on “centres”, which were nowhere to be seen but upon the diagrams of draftsmen, drawn upon 
broad sheets of drawing board, being facsimiles of nothing that had the colour of metal. . . .  New 
companies sprang up more suddenly than mushrooms – scrip flew around with a deftness that no 
bird could keep up with, and promissory notes flew with all the airiness of kites.  Promises to pay, 
made in Stephan’s Jet Black Ink and written with Gillott’s Seals, passed the currency with a 
readiness the Bank of England could not rival. 
43  R W Murray writes:  
 The mania was so contagious as any other disease.  It infected every class; even the clergy were 
not more exempt than they were here during the gold and diamond share booms; officials of every 
department of the service were bitten.  Even that man of huge intellect, Mr. Porter, the Attorney-
General, went into it ten-thousand strong, and became director of companies which hadn’t enough 
copper to make a George III penny piece.  He, of course, thought everything was all right.  His 
example encouraged others, and he came out of his scrip spec. lighter in pocket by thousands of 
pounds than he went into it; smaller men came out stumped.  One or two committed suicide.  More 
than one army pensioner lost not only his available property, but his pension into the bargain.  A 
crowd went through the insolvency court and, of the crown of miners and managers sent down by 
the companies, not a few had to remain there with no neighbours but penguins and ostriches, and 
nothing but penguin and ostrich eggs to subsist on.  (As quoted by Rosenthal On ‘Change through 
the Years’ 33.) 
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Shortly after the Namaqualand copper fiasco, it became possible for limited liability companies 
with freely transferable shares to be incorporated in South Africa.44  The stage was set for the 
escalation in share trading, which was to be brought about by the discovery of diamonds and 
gold.  The discoveries of these minerals led to the floatation of many companies.  As the 
number of companies grew, so did the number of investors and their portfolios.  The need to 
establish places where people could meet to trade their shares also grew.  Ultimately, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) was founded.  Although not South Africa’s first,45 it was 
for a long time South Africa’s only stock exchange.46 
The JSE was also for a long time allowed to regulate its own affairs.  It was not until the 
enactment of the Stock Exchanges Control Act47 in 1947 that Parliament imposed its legislative 
authority on the JSE.  The Act required the exchange to be licensed and it required all 
stockbrokers to become licensed members of the stock exchange.  The internal conduct of the 
                                                 
44  Act 23 of 1861 was enacted ‘[t]o limit the liability of members of certain joint stock companies’.  The 
preamble and the first section read as follows:  
 Whereas it is expedient to enable members of certain joint-stock companies to limit the liability for 
the debts and engagements of such companies to which they are, or may be, subject: Be it enacted 
by the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council 
and House of Assembly thereof, as follows:— 1. The term “joint-stock company” in this Act shall 
mean every partnership whereof the capital is divided, or agreed to be divided, into shares, and so 
as to be transferable without the express consent of all the partners; and also every partnership 
which had at its formation, or by subsequent admission, shall consist of more than twenty-five 
members. 
45  The Johannesburg Stock Exchange was founded on 8 November 1887.  The first stock exchange in 
South Africa was the Kimberley Share Exchange, Broking and General Agency Company Limited, 
brought into being on 26 August 1880.  (Rosenthal On ‘Change through the Years’ 58)  It was followed 
by the Kimberley Royal Stock Exchange and Barnato’s Exchange and the Mutual Share and Claim 
Exchange and Commercial Agency Company Limited in the 1880s. (Ibid. 57–74).  Other notable stock 
exchanges were the De Kaap Stock Exchange in Barberton (Ibid. 75–87), the Klerksdorp Stock 
Exchange (Ibid 88–96), the Potchefstroom Stock Exchange and Club Company Limited (Ibid. 97–91), 
the Pietermaritzburg Stock Exchange (Ibid. 102–111), the Durban Stock Exchange (Ibid. 112–117), the 
Cape Town Stock Exchange (Ibid. 118–129), the South African Share and Claim Exchange (Ibid. 130–
133) and the Rand Stock Exchange (Ibid. 188–190). 
46  The JSE’s only surviving competitor for some time, the Union Stock Exchange, was closed in 1958 
after its membership fell below the minimum requirement stipulated in the Stock Exchange Control 
Act 7 of 1947.  Two new exchange licences were granted in 2016.  Further licence applications are 
being considered at the time of writing. 
47  Stock Exchange Control Act 7 of 1947. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 21 
 
exchange was, however, to be regulated by its own rules and regulations.  The Act was 
amended numerous times.  Not one of the amendments related to insider trading.  On it the 
Stock Exchanges Control Act said nothing.  It seems at that point the legislature was not too 
concerned by some traders in the market enjoying unfair advantages. 
The South African legislature’s first steps toward finding a suitable legislative instrument for 
the regulation of insider trading were not taken in the Stock Exchange Control Act, the piece 
of legislation intended to regulate stock exchanges and the trading of securities.  They were 
taken in the Companies Acts, Acts primarily aimed at regulating the divide between ownership 
and control.  The South African legislature saw insider trading as a wrong perpetrated primarily 
by directors against shareholders, not share traders inter se.  The provisions relevant to insider 
trading remained in the Companies Acts,48 until the enactment of the Insider Trading Act.49  
Subsequently, the provisions were included in the South African financial market Acts:  First 
in the Securities Services Act50 and then in the current Act.51 
The first provision that is relevant is to be found in the 1926 Companies Act.52  It must be seen 
in its historical context.  In England both the Cohen and the Millin committees had found that 
requiring ‘directors’ to disclose their dealings in a company’s shares would be the best 
safeguard against insider trading.53  The English legislature made the necessary enactments.  
The South African legislature followed suit.  In 1952, section 70nov was inserted into the 1926 
South African Companies Act.  Its focus was again squarely on directors.  It required all 
                                                 
48  Companies Act 46 of 1926 and Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
49  Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998. 
50  Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. 
51  Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
52  Companies Act 46 of 1926.  See D Botha “Control of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Comparative 
Analysis” (1991) 3 SA Merc LJ 1 4.  The author is incorrect in stating that section 233 in the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 is the first provision that is relevant to insider trading in South Africa. 
53  See the Cohen Committee Report at par. 86 and the Millin Committee Report at par. 141–143. 
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companies to keep a register of directors’ share and debenture holdings, which had to include 
the details of all transactions that affected a change in them.54 
In 1970 the Van Wyk De Vries Commission found the provisions of section 70nov to be 
ineffective.  The Commission argued strongly against deregulation.55  According to the 
Commission the question was not whether the practice should be regulated, but what form the 
regulation should take.56  Its suggestions were enacted in the 1973 Companies Act.57  The focus 
remained on directors, while the provisions still required a register to be held that disclosed 
their interests in the shares and debentures of the company.58  It also went further.  The 
legislature made it an offence to trade on certain information that, on being made public, would 
materially affect the prices of the shares of a company. 
                                                 
54  Companies Act 46 of 1926 s 70nov.  The section reads in relevant part: 
(1) Every company shall keep a register in which there shall be recorded as respects each director of 
the company, within seven days of the receipt of the relevant notice under subsection 11, the 
number, description and amount of any shares in or debentures of the company or any other body 
corporate (being the company’s subsidiary or holding company, or a subsidiary of the company’s 
holding company) which are held by or in trust for him or of which he has any right to become the 
holder whether on payment or not: Provided that the register need not include shares in or 
debentures of any body corporate which is the wholly owned subsidiary of another body corporate, 
and for this purpose a body corporate shall be deemed to be the wholly owned subsidiary of another 
if it has no members but that other and that other’s wholly owned subsidiaries and its or their 
nominees. 
. . . .  
(11) It shall be the duty of every director of a company, and of every person deemed to be a director 
under paragraph (a) of subsection (10), to give notice to the company with respect to any shares or 
debentures held by him or in trust for him or of which he has any right to become the holder at the 
commencement of this section, within twenty-one days after the said commencement, and with 
respect to any shares and debentures of which he becomes the holder in trust for him or of which 
he acquires the right to become the holder after the said commencement, within twenty-one days 
after the date upon which he acquires the said right, as the case may be, of such matters relating 
thereto as may be necessary for the purposes of this section. 
55  Van Wyk De Vries Commission 85. 
56  Van Wyk De Vries Commission 85. 
57  Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
58  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 230. 
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For the first time in South Africa, insider trading by directors became a criminal offence.  The 
enactments rightly did not escape criticism.  The provisions were said to be ‘innocuous’59 and 
Rider and French subjected section 233,60 which contained the main substantive provisions, to 
harsh criticism.61  In 1989 the provisions were repealed and substituted.62  This was to be only 
another step in a drawn-out process of trial and error leading up to the enactment of the 
Financial Markets Act’s present provisions. 
The 1989 amendments were not, however, merely another attempt at regulating insider trading.  
The amendments also provided for the establishment of a Securities Regulation Panel,63 with 
the powers of subpoena and interrogation.64  Insider trading was retained as a criminal offence, 
while section 441 significantly increased the penalties applicable to contraventions.  
Substantively, the provisions completely broke away from those that had gone before.  They 
were now squarely based on Rule 10b-5 in the United States, leaving South Africa with a 
general anti-fraud provision.65 
There was also an important shift in focus.  Directors were no longer the only persons capable 
of being held liable for insider trading.  All people who received inside information from 
anyone in the main defined group of prohibited traders, so-called ‘tippees’, now fell foul of 
                                                 
59  Jooste (2000) S African LJ 284. 
60  Section 233 reads:  
 Every director, past director, officer or person who has knowledge of any information concerning 
a transaction or proposed transaction of the company or of the affairs of the company which, if it 
becomes publicly known, may be expected materially to affect the price of the shares or debentures 
of the company and who deals in any way to his advantage, directly or indirectly, in such shares or 
debentures while such information has not been publicly announced or a stock exchange or in a 
newspaper or through the medium of the radio or television, shall be guilty of an offence. 
61  Rider & French The Regulation of Insider Trading 398. 
62  Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989. 
63  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 440B. 
64  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 440D. 
65  S M Luiz ‘Insider Trading: A Transplant to Cure a Chronic Illness’ (1990) 2 SA Merc LJ 59 and see 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co 401 F2d 833 (1968) 848. 
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the prohibition.  These amendments were also not well received.66  Indeed, they were found to 
be wholly inappropriate67 and were repealed without ever coming into operation.68 
A new section 440F was enacted.69  Again, a complete break was made with the previous 
provisions.  In hindsight, the new section 440F provided a simple and logical solution to a 
problem area of the law, inclined to complexity.  The section provided that any person trading 
with inside information would be guilty of an offence if that person knew that the information 
being used was not acquired through legal means.  Essentially, the new section did away with 
circumscribing a group of persons who were not allowed to trade with inside information.  It 
rather prohibited all trading on inside information.70  It also provided for a more expansive 
definition of inside information.71 
                                                 
66  See R Du Plessis “Binnekennistransaksies: `n Evaluasie van die Huidige Statutêre Bepalings” (1995) 
7 SA Merc LJ 19 20, Luiz 1990 SA Merc LJ 66 and R Jooste “Insider Dealing in South Africa” (1990) 
107 S African LJ 588. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Companies Second Amendment Act 69 of 1990 s 1–2. 
69  Companies Second Amendment Act 69 of 1990 s 1–2. 
70  Section 440F(1) provided: 
Any person who, whether directly or indirectly, knowingly deals in a security on the basis of 
unpublished price-sensitive information in respect of that security, shall be guilty of an offence if 
such person knows that such information has been obtained— 
(a) by virtue of a relationship of trust or any other contractual relationship, whether or not the 
person concerned is a party to that relationship; or 
(b) through espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, misrepresentation or any other wrongful method, 
irrespective of the nature thereof. 
71  Section 440F(2) provided: 
 For the purposes of this section— 
(a) ‘unpublished price-sensitive information’, in respect of a security, means information 
which— 
(i) Relates to matters in respect of the internal affairs of a company or its operations, 
assets, earning power or involvement as offeror or offeree company in an affected 
transaction or proposed affected transaction; 
(ii) Is not generally available to the reasonable investor in the relevant market for that 
security; and 
(iii) would reasonably be expected to affect materially the price of such security if it were 
generally available; 
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However, as there had still not been a single successful prosecution for insider trading72 at a 
time when South Africa was experiencing a ‘re-integration into the international financial 
markets’ and the government had a ‘desire to create an environment conducive to foreign 
investment’, the King Task Group on Insider Trading found it necessary to dedicate an entire 
Act exclusively to insider trading.73  The legislature gave effect to its proposals.  The Insider 
Trading Act came into operation in January 1999.  The Insider Trading Act prohibited insider 
trading also in other financial instruments apart from shares and it provided for a civil remedy 
for those harmed by the prohibited conduct. 
The King Task Group’s report is still of importance even though the insider trading provisions 
were subsequently moved to the Securities Services Act74 and ultimately to the Act.  The 
definitions have largely stayed the same since the enactment of the Insider Trading Act.  The 
changes will be discussed in due course.  More importantly for this first part of the thesis is, 
however, the fact that the King Task Group saw the reason for prohibiting insider trading, 
albeit by implication, to be to promote the integrity of the capital markets.  This is in keeping 
with the objectives of the current Act. 
                                                 
(b) ‘generally available’ means available in the sense that such steps have been taken, and such 
time has elapsed, that it can reasonably expected that such information is not information as 
referred to in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (a). 
See D Botha (1991) SA Merc LJ 12; Jooste 1990 S African LJ 608; and Luiz 1990 SA Merc LJ 332. 
72  R Jooste “The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa – Another Attempt” (2000) 117 S African 
LJ 284. 
73  Final Report by The King Task Group into insider trading legislation, 21 October 1997 (King Final 
Report). 
74  Act 36 of 2004.  The Securities Services Act came into operation in February 2005.  It repealed the 
Stock Exchange Control Act 1 of 1985, the Financial Markets Control Act 55 of 1989, the Custody and 
Administration of Securities Act 85 of 1992 and the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998.  The trading on 
inside information provisions were found in chapter 7 of the Act under the heading ‘Market Abuse’.  
The Act purported to increase confidence in South African financial markets by ensuring that securities 
services were provided in a fair, efficient and transparent manner and contributed to the maintenance 
of a stable financial market environment (s 2(a)(i)–(ii)). 
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The current Act includes express objectives.  They provide some of the context in which the 
definitions of ‘inside information’ and ‘insider’ should be interpreted.  The Act, it is said, is 
legislation with the purpose of regulating the South African financial markets.75  Section 2 of 
the Act provides as follows: 
This Act aims to— 
(a) ensure that the South African financial markets are fair, efficient and 
transparent; 
(b) increase confidence in the South African financial markets by— 
(i) requiring that securities services be provided in a fair, efficient 
and transparent manner; and 
(ii) contributing to the maintenance of a stable financial market 
environment; 
(c) promote the protection of regulated persons, clients and investors; 
(d) reduce systemic risk; and  
(e) promote the international and domestic competitiveness of the South 
African financial markets and of securities services in the Republic. 
These lofty ideals cannot be faulted, but they are not where the Act’s problems lie. 
It will be argued that the Act’s definitions of ‘inside information’ and ‘insider’ fail to adhere 
to the single theory of wrongfulness in respect of insider trading that will best give effect to 
the legislature’s stated objectives.  Once that single theory of wrongfulness is identified, the 
definitions can be simplified.  It will also ensure that the South African insider trading 
legislative provisions reflect the paradigm shift occurring in insider trading law, especially 
notable in Australia.  This shift includes, but is not limited to, an increasing tendency to view 
trading on inside information as a market problem rather than wrongful conduct perpetrated 
exclusively by directors or officers of issuer companies. 
                                                 
75  See the Preamble to the Act. 
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2 1 Introduction 
It is now commonplace for the citizens of many countries to invest substantial portions of their 
savings, including their retirement moneys, in securities.76  This makes the regulation of the 
financial markets of vital importance.  In this chapter the bases for regulating insider trading, 
a form of financial market abuse, will be examined.  The basis for the regulation of insider 
trading in South Africa will also be identified. 
Financial markets are open to abuse.  The Financial Markets Act was, for instance, enacted 
shortly after the global crisis in the financial services industry sparked questions on the 
advance selling of securities (to unwitting purchasers) before the collapse of some of the 
world’s most prominent financial institutions.77  At times there somewhat ironically seems to 
be no fairness in the trading of, among other instruments, equity.78  This presents a danger to 
financial markets: they could be perceived as playing fields for an unfair game.  For people to 
be willing to participate in these markets, that cannot be the case.79  It is generally accepted 
that public confidence in financial markets is essential if they are to fulfil their important role 
in capitalist economies.80  The objectives of the Financial Markets Act most relevant to the 
regulation of insider trading are thus ensuring that financial markets are fair and increasing 
confidence in the South African financial markets.  These objectives are intertwined.  When 
markets are perceived as fair, the public will have confidence in them.  Fairness, it is said, is 
central to the integrity of, or the confidence people have in, the financial markets.81 
                                                 
76  B M Smith A History of the Global Stock Market (2004) 6. 
77  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel. 7 4/2009) 1–4. 
78  The word ‘equity’ derives from the Latin aequitas.  It, in turn, derives from aequus, meaning even or 
fair. (Smith A history of the global stock market 1.) 
79  S G Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets 2 ed (2008) 7. 
80  Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets 189. 
81  See Scott (1980) J Legal Stud 804 and the ‘fair play’ rationale.  Also see how this rationale runs into 
the ‘integrity of the capital market’ argument.  Also see L Herzel & L Katz “Insider Trading: Who 
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Insider trading, it is argued, causes damage to an economy as it erodes public confidence in 
the financial markets.82  The regulation of trading on inside information, on the other hand, is 
said to further investor confidence in the financial markets.83  At the least, as Loss observes, 
when it comes to investor confidence and insider trading, the legal principle that justice must 
not only be done, it must be seen to be done, applies.84  Especially perceived unfettered insider 
trading, it is said, has a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the financial markets.85  
Calls for the stricter regulation of insider trading are thus normally made by emphasising that 
trading on inside information threatens the very core of the securities markets as it undermines 
the public’s confidence in them.86  In R v Glynatsis87 the New South Wales Supreme Court 
captured the idea as follows: 
The acquisition or disposal of financial products by people having the unfair advantage 
of inside information is criminalised because it has the capacity to unravel the public 
trust which is critical to the viability of the market.  It is, as previously observed by this 
Court, a form of cheating.88 
In Spector Photo Group NV. Chris Van Raemdonk v Commissie Voor Het Bank-Fanancie- En 
Assurantiewezen (CBFA),89 the European Court of Justice in turn held as follows: 
                                                 
Loses?” (1987) Loyds Bank Review 15; and V Brudney “Insiders, Outsiders, and the Informational 
Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws” (1979) 93 Harvard LR 322. 
82  For authors arguing that insider trading is not damaging to capital markets see J D Cox “Insider Trading 
and Contracting: A Critical Response to the ‘Chicago School’” (1986) 628 Duke LJ 628; H Manne 
“Insider Trading and the Law Professors” (1969–1970) 23 Vand L Rev 547; H G Manne “Insider 
Trading and the Administrative Process” (1966–1967) 35 Geo Wash L Rev 473.  However, the majority 
of economists and financial experts agree that insider trading has a negative impact on a capital market 
and should be prohibited.  See M J Chimel “The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
of 1988: Codifying a Private Right of Action” (1990) 3 U Ill L Rev 645; S D Klein “Insider Trading, 
SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investor Confidence” (1988) 16 Hofstra L Rev 665; S 
Bainbridge “The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma” (1986) 38 Fla L Rev 35; 
H Wu “An Economist looks at section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934” (1968) 68 Colum 
L Rev 260. 
83  Botha (1991) SA Merc LJ 4. 
84  L Loss “The fiduciary concept as applied to trading by corporate ‘insiders’ in the United States” (1970) 
33 Mod L Rev 84 86. 
85  Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1440. 
86  W R McLucas, J H Walsh & L L Fountain “Settlement of Insider Trading Cases with the SEC” (1992) 
48 Bus Law 79 80. 
87  [2013] NSWCCA 131. 
88  Par 79. 
89  [2009] EUECJ C – 45/08 (23 December 2009) par. 50–52. 
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[I]nside information grants the insider in possession of such information an advantage 
in relation to all the other actors on the market who are unaware of it.  It enables that 
insider, when he acts in accordance with that information in entering into a transaction 
on the market, to expect to derive an economic advantage from it without exposing 
himself to the same risks as the other investors on the market.  The essential 
characteristic of insider dealing thus consists in an unfair advantage being obtained 
from information to the detriment of third parties who are unaware of it and, 
consequently, the undermining of the integrity of financial markets and investor 
confidence. 
The fundamental idea is not a novel one: people generally do not want to take part in activities 
if they believe their fellow participants to be cheating. 
It is to be noted, however, that notions such as the integrity of the capital markets and 
confidence in the financial markets, and the large role they play in securities regulation, have 
not been without their critics.  Manne harshly questions the merits of recognising something 
like the ‘integrity of the capital market’ and states that, apart from it being a ‘falsifiable 
proposition, it is devoid of the scantest economic or empirical content.’90  Langevoort has 
argued that the investor confidence argument is a founding myth of securities regulation.91  
There are also commentators who assert that notions of fairness have no place in legal 
arguments for the regulation of insider trading.  They say that the bare assumption that insider 
trading is unfair does not offer any great assistance in assessing whether insider trading should 
be prohibited or, indeed, in formulating prohibitions on insider trading.92  Whether inside 
information trading causes damage to the financial markets at all has also been questioned.  It 
is argued that regulating inside information trading bears a higher cost than a laissez faire 
approach.93  This last-mentioned argument is, however, of little import to this thesis.  The 
                                                 
90  H G Manne “Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark” (2005) 31 J 
Corp L 167 168 note 5.  Manne goes on to call the argument ‘enormously important in the propaganda 
campaign the SEC has waged for years to demonize insider trading’. 
91  D C Langevoort “Rereading Cady Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of insider Trading Regulation” 
(1999) 99 Colum L Rev 1319. 
92  Rider & French The Regulation of Insider Trading 1. 
93  U Bhattacharya & L H Daouk “The World Price of Insider Trading” (2002) 57 J Fin 75.  Also see L N 
Beny “Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence” (2005) 7 Am L & 
Econ Rev 144 and L N Beny “Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? 
International Evidence” (2007–2008) 4 J L Econ & Pol’y 267. 
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choice to regulate has been made by the South African legislature.  It is not the focus of this 
thesis.  The implementation of the choice is. 
Fairness, and specifically the assertion that it must be the basis for the formulation of legal 
rules, is not so easily dismissed in South African law.  It, for example, plays an important role 
in the analogous South African legal field of unfair competition.  In Atlas Organic Fertilizers 
(Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd94 Van Dijkhorst held that that the test to be applied in 
determining whether the conduct complained of was unlawful was an 
objective one of public policy, i.e. the general sense of justice of the community, the 
boni mores manifested in public opinion.  In determining and applying this norm in a 
particular case, the interests of the competing parties have to be weighed, bearing in 
mind also the interests of society, the public weal.  As this cannot exist in vacua the 
morals of the market place, the business ethics of that section of the community where 
the norm is to applied are of major importance in its determination.”95  (Emphasis 
added.) 
And, in Schutz v Butt96 it was held that in judging fairness and honesty, the boni mores and the 
general sense of justice of the community must be taken into account.97 
Fairness has long been a subject of legal and legal philosophical writing.  Aristotle developed 
the notion of a fair price for things bought and sold.98  St Thomas Aquinas declared that it is 
improper to ‘sell dearer or buy cheaper than a thing is worth’.99  Cicero also used the notion of 
fairness in his dealing with something akin to trading with inside information.  He posed 
especially one hypothetical situation, which is still being used to explore the difference 
                                                 
94  1981 (2) SA 173 (T). 
95  Ibid. 188G. 
96  1986 (3) SA 667 (A). 
97  See also Lorimar Productions Inc and Others v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1981 (3) SA 
1129 (T). 
98  Smith A History of the Global Stock Market 9. 
99  A E Monroe Early economic thought: Selections from economic literature prior to Adam Smith (1934) 
15. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 32 
 
between moral blameworthiness and that which should carry legal sanction.  It also illustrates 
the fluidity of the concept of fairness. 
Cicero used the stoic philosophers Antipater and Diogenes to tell a story of a merchant who 
was importing grain from Alexandra to Rhodes.  The facts are comparable to the typical insider 
trading scenario.  Famine prevailed in Rhodes, but not in Alexandra.  A merchant importing 
grain to Rhodes could expect to realise a healthy profit.  The merchant knows, however, that, 
although his ship is first to arrive in Rhodes, there are many ships on their way, soon to reach 
its shores.  He also knows that if the people of Rhodes were to know of those ships, the price 
they would offer for his grain would be much less.  Cicero poses the question: ‘[I]s he to report 
the fact to the Rhodians, or is he to keep his own counsel and sell his own stock at the highest 
market price?’100  He let Antipater argue for full disclosure and Diogenes for the moral right 
to silence: 
“I have imported my stock,” Diogenes’ merchant will say; “I have offered it for sale; I 
sell at a price no higher than my competitors – perhaps even lower, when the market is 
overstocked.  Who is wronged?” 
“What say you?” comes Antipater’s argument on the other side; “It is your duty to 
consider the interests of your fellow men and to serve society; you were brought into 
the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are duty 
bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and 
conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in 
view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies 
is close at hand for them?” 
“It is one thing to conceal,” Diogenes will perhaps reply; “not to reveal is quite a 
different thing.  At this present moment, I am not concealing from you, even if I am not 
revealing to you, the nature of the gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets 
would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down.  
But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be in your interest to be 
told.” 
“Yes,” Antipater will say, “but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you 
of the bonds of fellowship forged by nature and existing between man and man.” 
                                                 
100  M Cicero Cicero De Officiis. With a translation by Walter Miller (1913) 319–323. 
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“I do not forget them,” the other will reply; “but do you mean to say that those bonds 
of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property?  If that is the case, 
we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away.” 
Cicero supports Antipater.  He writes that it was the duty of the grain-dealer not to keep back 
the facts from the Rhodians.  He relies on the existence of a bond of fellowship between all 
people that has wide application and unites people.  He sees the failure to disclose as the 
conduct of a man who is not candid, sincere, straightforward, upright or honest, but rather one 
who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, fraudulent and deceitfully subtle.  He 
asks rhetorically, whether it is not better for a person not to subject himself to all these terms 
of reproach.  According to Cicero, it is against nature for one man (a neighbour) to take 
advantage of his fellow man’s ignorance.101 
Hugo De Groot considered Cicero’s grain merchant example.  De Groot makes a distinction 
about circumstances (or information) that do not affect the thing itself.  To give that 
information to your fellow man, says De Groot, may be kind and laudable.  Not to do so may 
violate the ‘rule of charity’.  However, says De Groot, the omission would not be unjust.  It 
would not be repugnant to the rights of the counterparty.  He emphasises the fact that the seller 
brought his goods to the market.  The seller chose to offer them for sale.  It is the seller who 
chose the price and the point when he set it.  He did not sell his goods at a greater price than 
for similar products at the time of the sale.  He might even have sold it at a cheaper price.  In 
that sense, in as far as the information did not relate to the thing itself, no one is wronged.  As 
such, concludes De Groot, Cicero’s rule is not to be applied too widely.  Only the concealment 
of facts that affect the thing itself should be prohibited.  He argues that in general Cicero’s 
conclusion, that the merchant’s conduct concerning the information about the other ships, 
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amounts to wrongful concealment, is not correct.  Cicero’s conclusion would be correct only 
in as far as the concealment relates to the thing itself.102 
Pufendorf103 largely agrees with De Groot.  He writes that the merchant did not act unjustly in 
saying nothing of the ships that were coming.  He submits that justice requires only the 
disclosure of facts that concern the thing itself.  For instance, where the seller is to sell a house 
by reason of it being infected and it had been commanded by a magistrate to be demolished, 
those would be facts that a seller of the house has to disclose to a prospective buyer.104  
According to Pufendorf, nothing of this nature was concealed by the grain merchant.  The 
goodness of the corn was clear for all to see.  At the time of the contract, it was worth as much 
as it was sold for, notwithstanding the fact that it was likely to be worth less in little time.105  
Pufendorf, like De Groot, looks to the rights of the purchasers in the market.  He submits that 
the Rhodians had no right, properly speaking, to obtain the information from the merchant as 
there existed at the time of the sale no ‘bargain’ between them.  As I interpret Pufendorf, the 
reasons for his opinion include a recognition of the fact that, at the time of the sale, there was 
no overarching or other agreement (other than the eventual agreement of sale) between the 
purchasers and the merchant. 
Pufendorf also goes further than De Groot.  He recognises, to start, that to ask what the law of 
courtesy and good nature forbids is wholly different from asking whether something must be 
prohibited by law.  He reasons that not even good nature obliges one person to do another man 
a courtesy gratis, except when that person is in desperate want of it.106  This was not so in the 
case of the Rhodians; they wanted corn, but not money.  They were famous among the 
                                                 
102  H Grotii De Jure Belli accompanied by an abridged translation by William Whewell Vol 1 (1853) Book 
II chapter XII par IX (158–160). 
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Athenians for their riches.107  Besides, says Pufendorf, a man is not obliged to do a kindness, 
when ‘tis like to tend more to the detriment of the giver than the benefit of the receiver’.108  In 
this case, the merchant would have lost more than the purchasers would have received.  For if 
the merchant sold to many purchasers at his price, each purchaser would have borne only a 
slight loss.  If one man had bought the lot, says Pufendorf, his loss is to be put down to avarice.  
And, it seems, that he incurred a large loss is just.109 
Pothier wrote about the grain merchant under the heading ‘whether good faith obliges the 
seller, at least in the forum of conscience, not to suppress any of the extrinsic circumstances, 
which the buyer has an interest in knowing’. 110  According to Pothier, the question belongs 
only to the forum of conscience.  For the buyer should not have a case against the seller in a 
court of law.111  The law of contract obliges a seller to do nothing more than to cause the buyer 
to know the thing for what it is.  He may, however, not conceal any of the merx’s defects and 
he is to sell it for the price that it bears at the time of the contract.112  He does not commit any 
injustice by selling for that price, notwithstanding the fact that he knows that price that could 
be realised for the thing will be much lower in due course.113  The seller is not obliged to tell 
the purchaser about the circumstances that could cause the lowering in price.  The buyer also 
has no right to require this information.114  In agreement with Pufendorf, Pothier writes that if 
the seller were to provide the information to the purchaser, it will be ‘a gratuitous act of 
beneficence’,115 which he is under no obligation to exercise, except in favour of those who are 
‘in need’.116  The Rhodians were not in that situation and had money to purchase that which 
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the merchant sold to them.117  Pothier also makes a new point: the profit the merchant made 
by selling his corn at its present value, though he knew that it would soon be worth much less, 
was not an unjust profit.  This is so, says Pothier, as it was a just reward for the diligence that 
enabled him to arrive at the market first, and for the risk that he ran of losing his merchandise, 
if any of the accidents, to which he was exposed, should have prevented his arrival at the 
time.118 
As a matter of interest, Pothier’s opinion changes when the hypothetical sale and the arrival of 
the boats, and the subsequent fall in the price for corn, are separated by only two days.  He 
writes: 
Notwithstanding these reasons and authorities, I should have some difficulty in 
excusing, from charge of injustice, the profit derived by a seller from the concealment 
of some fact, which must cause the price to fall, when such diminution of the price must 
be very considerable, and must happen at the end of a very short interval of time, such 
as the knowledge which the merchant had, that there was a fleet laden with corn ready 
to enter the harbour of Rhodes in a few days. . . . 119 
I struggle to make sense of this statement by Pothier.  It seems to me not to be based on any 
principle or to be part of the formulation of any principle.  If the statement is meant as the 
formulation of an exception to a rule, I am unable to find the principle underlying the 
exception.  How could the difference in the size of the loss or the extent of time between the 
sale and the fall in price make any difference to the simple question of whether a right or an 
obligation is owed to disclose the information or not to trade while his counterparties are 
unaware of it?  It should not. 
Much like the Rhodians, the insider’s counterparty is, at the point of sale, happy to accept the 
bargain as it stands.  He receives the price he asks for or the number of securities for the price 
he tenders.  It is only after the transaction that, much like the Rhodians again, he realises that 
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he has made a bad bargain.  Our courts have thus come close to comparing an insider trading-
like scenario with the subject of the Rhodian example.  In Pretorius v Natal South Sea 
Investment Trust120 Vieyra J was confronted with directors of a company who sold shares 
without disclosing certain information about those shares to their prospective shareholders.121  
The analogy was drawn between a latent defect (where the omission to disclose gives rise to 
the actio redhibitoria) and the situation where the seller of shares, in the circumstances of the 
case a director, holds non-public information that, if generally known, would detrimentally 
affect the market price of the share.  The court found that the case before it encompassed an 
involuntary reliance of one party on the frank disclosure of another.  A duty to disclose was 
recognised as the buyer’s ‘right to have such information communicated to him would be 
mutually recognised by honest men in the circumstances’.122  Pretorius,123 however, dealt with 
an over-the-counter sale of shares.124  Therein also lies the difference between insider trading 
in the financial markets and the Rhodian example.  First, the example does not tell us whether 
the Rhodians always bought grain at that market or whether and how the fact that they were 
duped by the first boat, affected their perceptions of the market for grain in general.  Second, 
it is not known whether the Rhodians had other markets where they could purchase grain. 
The financial market is of course not a case of a once-off sale, but is a continuous market.  In 
addition, it provides one place among many where people can invest.  An ordinary member of 
the public faces a choice between keeping his earnings in a cash deposit, or rather keeping it 
in other stores of value such as shares, houses, cars (which are examples of equity investments) 
or bonds (an example of a debt investment).  The latter options should be preferable to a 
prospective investor as stores of value in which to keep his earnings, as they offer to provide 
                                                 
120  Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 1965 (3) SA 410 (N) 418.  
121  Likely because of doubt whether directors owe fiduciary duties to prospective shareholders. 
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more benefits than keeping his earnings in cash.  For instance, bonds offer him the potential to 
earn more interest than keeping his earnings deposited at a bank, whereas stocks provide him 
with the opportunity to realise an appreciation in nominal value.125  Stocks and bonds, stores 
of value, hold the potential to generate larger increases in value and, therefore, larger increases 
in an owner’s wealth than other forms in which value can be stored (such as cash).  These 
higher payoffs are economically recognised as compensation for the larger risk the investor 
bears.126  The benefits provided by the financial market to investors can, however, be 
outweighed by factors that heighten the risks in trading in the financial markets.  Trading on 
inside information would be one such factor. 
If the financial markets are seen as places where bad bargains frequently occur, indeed, where 
it is impossible to strike a good bargain without inside information, the market would soon be 
empty.  At the least, outsiders are loath to invest in securities markets where trading on inside 
information is prevalent.127  As that is so, fairness128 in relation to financial markets is more 
than an explanation for the regulation of certain wrongs.  Fairness has an important role to play 
in the regulation of the financial markets129 as it is a prerequisite for the continued existence 
of the market.  It is a requirement for attracting investments from within a country’s borders, 
but also for attracting international investments.130  Indeed, it has been recognised that much 
                                                 
125  Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets 20. 
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of the difficulty in establishing capital markets in less developed countries arises from 
investors’ distrust and their reluctance to invest funds in those markets.131 
However, as Brand JA has observed with reference to the role of fairness in the law of contract, 
fairness, like beauty, often lies in the eye of the beholder.132  As an abstract value it does not 
constitute an independent legal rule.133  It cannot.  For its content will always depend on the 
idiosyncrasies of the particular individual assessing what is fair in a specific situation.134  
Fairness thus merely informs the exercise of the rule-making135 function of the legislature. 
The Rhodian example shows that one cannot easily determine what fairness dictates a legal 
rule must be.  While the Rhodian example and its market for wheat is distinguishable from 
insider trading and the market for securities, it does prove useful in giving content to the notion 
of fairness in a market setting.  First, in trying to ascertain what the legal rule is in a situation 
comparable to that of insider trading, the Rhodian example shows that it is helpful to consider 
the rights of the participants in the market, much like Pufendorf and De Groot did in their 
analyses.  Second, like Pufendorf, one asks whether there is something that binds the parties 
to the transaction.  Pufendorf asked: is there an overarching agreement that requires the 
merchant (the party who knows more about the transaction) to conduct himself in a certain 
                                                 
131  H Wu “An Economist looks at section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934” (1968) 68 Colum L 
Rev 260 264.  Also see the King Final Report 2 where it is stated that ‘[i]n the context of the Republic’s 
re-integration into the financial markets and the Government’s desire to create an environment 
conducive to foreign investment, there is therefore justified concern over the existing insider trading 
regulation in South Africa’.  Although this point is especially noteworthy to a country like South Africa, 
it is most certainly not only true for developing markets.  See S A Ramirez “Fear and Social Capitalism: 
The Law and Microeconomics of Investor Confidence” (2003) 42 Washburn L Rev 35 for the effect 
that corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom had on investor confidence in the United States. 
132  South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) par. 27.  Also F D J Brand’s 
“The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The Influence of 
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way?  Third, like Pothier, one is to keep in mind the interests of the seller and, specifically, 
whether his profit could be seen as ‘just’.  In other words, is there any rationally acceptable 
explanation for the profit realised by the seller (or perhaps the good deal struck by a buyer), 
that a rule-maker should consider in formulating the rule? 
These considerations, among others, will be used to determine a basis for the regulation of (or 
a theory of wrongfulness in respect of) insider trading in South Africa.  Fairness, the 
considerations it gives rise to in the financial markets, and the confidence held in financial 
markets are not all equally reconcilable with the recognised bases for the regulation of insider 
trading.  This is so as, at least, the oldest bases for regulation are not aimed at addressing a 
market wrong and fairness between traders in the market for securities inter se; they are rather 
concerned with enforcing the honouring of fiduciary duties and the protection of proprietary 
rights in information. 
Compared to wrongful conduct in general, it is difficult to identify the precise harm insider 
trading causes.136  It is for that reason that at least four theories of regulation exist.  Each theory 
has its own explanation for the wrongfulness of insider trading.  The theories could thus just 
as easily have been termed ‘theories of wrongfulness’.  Where the wrongfulness of insider 
trading lies, or what conduct is seen as wrongful in the context of insider trading, in turn 
determines who can be found to be guilty of insider trading or, at least, what is to be understood 
by ‘inside information’ and who can be found to be an insider.  The four theories are: the 
fiduciary duty doctrine, the misappropriation theory, the parity of information theory, and the 
equal access to information theory.  They can be divided into market and non-market theories. 
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2 2 Non-market related theories of regulation 
2 2 1 The fiduciary duty doctrine 
The fiduciary duty doctrine, as it has application to directors and officers of companies, only 
awkwardly manages to provide a basis for the regulation of trading on inside information.  
Among other things, the theory does not provide scope to cover all parties who have an unfair 
information advantage in securities trading.  As it will be shown and explained, this uneasy fit 
is not limited to the fiduciary duty doctrine in the South African context.  It is a problem that 
affects the development of the law in this area in the United States and other jurisdictions.  It 
has given rise to a legacy of eschewed thinking; a legacy that has laudably been discarded in 
Australia at least in as far as that country’s definition of ‘insider’ is concerned. 
The doctrine is typically invoked to recognise a relationship of trust and loyalty between two 
persons requiring the one to act in accordance with the duties flowing from that relationship.  
Typically, fiduciary duties flow from relationships where one party (the fiduciary) acts on 
behalf of another party (the beneficiary).  The fiduciary obtains a discretion to be exercised in 
relation to something of value belonging to the beneficiary.  In essence, the imposition of the 
duty of loyalty or trust serves to protect beneficiaries from opportunistic self-serving behaviour 
by fiduciaries.  In South Africa many of the founding principles of the fiduciary duty doctrine, 
as it has application to directors of a company, was formulated in Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates GM Co Ltd.137  The principle that underlies directors’ fiduciary duties are there said to 
be:  
Where one man stands to another in a position of confidence involving a duty to protect 
the interests of that other, he is not allowed to make a secret profit at the other’s expense 
or place himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty.138 
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We inherited this principle from Roman civil law, more specifically Digest 18.1.34.7.139  
Digest 18.1.34.7 provides ‘[a] tutor cannot buy a thing belonging to his ward; this rule extends 
to other persons with similar responsibilities, that is, curators, procurators, and those who 
conduct another’s affairs’.140 
According to Innes CJ, this principle must of necessity form part of every civilised system of 
jurisprudence.141  He formulated the basis for the doctrine as it has application in our law near 
on a hundred years ago, but it has been accepted as still good law quite recently by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal.142  What is clear from this founding principle, is the fact that the fiduciary 
duty of company directors is one that is aimed at precluding the director from competing with 
the company.143  He, the director, is barred from acting in self-interest while not maintaining 
the company’s best interests as his primary concern. 
The duty is, however, owed only to the company.  Directors conduct the company’s, not each 
individual shareholder’s, affairs.144  As Solomon J said in Robinson: ‘It is true that the board 
of directors is the agent of the company to manage its affairs and accordingly stands in a 
fiduciary relationship to it’.145  (Emphasis added.)  These sentiments were also accepted by 
Goldstone J in Howard v Herrigal146 where it was said:  
At common law, once a person accepts an appointment as a director, he becomes a 
fiduciary in relation to the company and is obliged to display the utmost good faith 
towards the company and in its dealings on its behalf.  (Emphasis added.) 
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And, when determining when his conduct is wrongful, ‘regard must be had to the relationship 
in which the director stood to the company’.147  He has a duty to safeguard and protect the 
affairs of the company.148  Whereas the possibility of owing a co-shareholder a fiduciary duty 
was alluded to in Bellairs v Hodnett,149 a director does not owe such a duty to a shareholder 
purely as a director. 
That has been the rule since Percival v Wright.150  When shareholders came to the English 
Chancery Division in 1902 to complain of directors who traded with information shareholders 
did not have access to, the court did not afford them a remedy.  The judgment is authority for 
the proposition that directors of companies are neither trustees for, nor do they owe fiduciary 
duties to, individual shareholders.151  It has also been taken to mean that directors with 
information not available to the shareholder, are allowed to purchase such shareholder’s shares 
without any prior disclosure.152  Directors could thus buy shares from shareholders without 
disclosing, for example, pending negotiations for the sale of the company, which would mean 
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LJ held that a ‘…relation of confidence as to property…’ existed between the seller and the two officers. 
(689)  Turner LJ held that ‘[a] more gross breach of duty, on the part of an agent towards his principal, 
cannot well be conceived…’ (690)  The case’s applicability to modern insider trading is limited.  It is 
distinguishable from the classic insider trading situation as it dealt with a situation where there was 
actual fraud committed by the buyer of the shares. (H L Wilgus “Purchases of shares of a corporation 
by a director from a shareholder” (1910) 8 Michigan LR 272.) 
152  Van Wyk De Vries 86 par. 4.51.  Also see Speight v Glass 1961 1 SA 778 (D) 781; Meskin v Anglo 
American Corp of SA 1968 4 SA 793 (W).  In Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom Percival v 
Wright has been cited as authority for the fact that insider trading by a director does not, without more, 
breach any duty owed to a shareholder (S Herne “Inside Information: Definitions in Australia, Canada, 
the U.K., and the U.S.” (1986) 8 J Comp Bus & Cap Market L 2.). 
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an imminent increase in the price of the shares, and would have left the shareholders in a much 
better bargaining position had they known. 
The facts of the case were as follows: it came to the attention of the plaintiffs that during their 
negotiations for the sale of their shares to the chairman of the board, the board was being 
approached by a person interested in acquiring the entire undertaking of the company.  All the 
offers presented to the board represented prices per share, which were considerably more than 
the offer made by the plaintiffs to the directors.  The negotiations for the sale of the whole of 
the company were unsuccessful and the transaction was never concluded.  However, an action 
was instituted to set aside the sale of the shares to the directors.  The shareholders argued that 
the directors ought to have informed the selling shareholders of the pending negotiations for 
the sale of the company. 
Swinfin Eady J did not uphold these arguments, finding that, quite aside from any duties owed 
to shareholders, there is a duty on directors to dispose of the company’s shares at the best price 
they are able to obtain.153  The judge accepted that directors may not allot shares either to 
themselves or their friends at a lower price in order to secure a personal benefit.  It was held, 
however, that while directors are to act in the best interests of the company, they do not stand 
in a fiduciary position towards individual shareholders.  Purchasing directors had no obligation 
to disclose the negotiations and such a disclosure, being premature in nature, might even have 
been against the best interests of the company.154  The fact that it was the shareholders who 
approached the directors to purchase the shares, and not the other way around, was emphasised.  
And the court attached significance to the fact that it was the shareholders that set the price at 
                                                 
153  Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch 401 425. 
154  Ibid. 426. 
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which the sale was to be made.155  Accordingly, it was found that there was no ‘unfair dealing’ 
on the part of the directors.156 
As a matter of interest, the ‘unpalatable nature’ of the Percival v Wright rule was soon 
recognised in England.157  It was lamented by the Cohen Committee in 1945158 and strongly 
rejected by the Jenkins Committee in 1962.159  Soon, in a White Paper on company law reform, 
                                                 
155  Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch 401 427.  This is an important point and is still relevant today.  The 
argument is that, at the time the transaction takes place, the seller is more than willing to accept the 
price offered and it is only after the transaction has been completed that the seller wants a better bargain, 
as he too becomes aware of the information previously known only to the buyer. 
156  Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch 401 426. 
157  Gower & Davies Principles of Modern Company Law 574.  
158  See the United Kingdom’s Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment presented by the 
President of the Board of Trade to Parliament by Command of His Majesty June 1945 (Cohen 
Committee), where it is said that: 
Whenever directors buy or sell shares of the company of which they are directors, they must 
normally have more information than the other party to the transaction and it would be unreasonable 
to suggest that they were thereby barred from such transactions; but the position is different when 
they act not on their general knowledge but on a particular piece of information known to them and 
not at the time known to the general body of shareholders, e.g., the impending conclusion of a 
favourable contract or the intention of the board to recommend an increased dividend.  In such a 
case it is clearly improper for a director to act on his inside knowledge, and the risk of his doing so 
is increased by the practice of registering shares in the names of nominees.  None the less we do 
not recommend a prohibition on directors holding shares in the names of nominees.  This is a useful 
convenience to the director and prohibition could be readily evaded, e.g., through the medium of a 
company controlled by the director.  We do, however consider that the law should be altered so as 
to discourage improper transactions of the kind we have indicated.  Even if the legislation is not 
entirely successful in suppressing improper transactions, a high standard of conduct should be 
maintained, and it should be generally realised that a speculative profit made as a result of special 
knowledge not available to the general body of shareholders in a company is improperly made.  We 
would add that some directors who would not themselves take advantage of inside information do 
not so clearly appreciate the impropriety of letting it be known to their friends that events as yet 
unknown to the shareholders have made the shares of the company an attractive purchase. 
159  See the United Kingdom’s Report of the Company Law Committee presented to Parliament by the 
President of the Board of Trade by Command of her Majesty June 1962 (Jenkins Committee), where it 
is said that: 
We have recommended the inclusion in the Act of a general statement of the director’s fiduciary 
duties to his company.  But the case of Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 401 421 provides authority 
for the proposition that no fiduciary duty is owed by a director to individual members of his 
company, but only to the company itself, and a fortiori that none is owed to a person who is not a 
member.  The result is that a director who has by reason of his office acquired in confidence a 
particular piece of information materially affecting the value of the securities of his company (or 
any company in the same group) will incur no liability to the other party if he buys or sells such 
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the wrongfulness inherent in insider trading started to be seen as distinct from that identified 
by the fiduciary principle.160  It did, however, take some time before the United Kingdom 
implemented legislation comprehensively addressing trading on inside information.161 
Until 1980, English insider trading law merely made it necessary to disclose directors’ 
holdings and dealings in securities while also prohibiting the trading in put and call options by 
directors.162  It was only in that year that insider trading was made an offence punishable by a 
                                                 
securities without disclosing that piece of information.  This seems to us to be wrong.  We have 
come to the conclusion that the law should protect a person – whether or not a member of the 
company or the companies concerned – who suffers loss because a director has taken unfair 
advantage at his expense of a particular piece of confidential information about the company or any 
other company in the same grouping any transaction relating to the securities in such companies.  
We realise that it might well be very difficult for the other party to establish that he was transacting 
with a director; this problem is particularly difficult in the case of transactions through the London 
Stock Exchange because of the method of settlement.  It may also be difficult for the other party to 
establish a case.  Nevertheless we think a remedy should be provided and we recommend 
accordingly below. (Emphasis added.) 
 Only some of the Jenkins Committee’s recommendations were implemented.  Directors’ duties to 
disclose their dealings in their company’s shares were expanded in the United Kingdom Companies 
Act of 1967, c 81. 
160  In the United Kingdom’s White Paper on Company Law Reform in England, Comnd. (1973) 8: 
Unfair profits can on occasion be made in share dealings by the improper use of confidential, price-
sensitive information that is not generally available to the investing public.  This is prima facie 
most likely to happen in a bid, or expected bid situation, but in principle it can happen at any time. 
The efficient operation of the market as a source of capital, as a measure of industrial success and 
hence as a means of achieving a desirable and efficient disposition of resources, requires that 
relevant information should be fairly available, and that all investors should be able to back their 
knowledge and judgement rather than that favoured individuals should be able to take private 
advantage of confidential information.  These requirements have so far been fulfilled by the 
application of the rules of the Stock Exchange and, in bid situations, by the Take-Over Panel.  
Without implying that malpractice has been widespread, the Government has concluded that it is 
necessary for the voluntary system to be reinforced by statue so as to ensure, as far as practically 
possible, that the market operates freely on the basis of equality between buyer and seller.  Care 
must be of course taken to avoid unduly inhibiting the flexibility of the market.  But the general 
desirability of ensuring equality of information to all potential or actual investors, and hence a 
proper disposition of the resources available to those investors, must have a high priority.  The 
successful operation of the system demands a high degree of confidence in fair dealing on the Stock 
Exchange, and indeed in securities generally, whether or not publicly quoted. 
161  As a result of political ructions two Bills specifically aimed at prohibiting insider trading were never 
signed into law.  These were the Companies Bill, 1973, and the Companies Bill, 1978. 
162  Gower & Davis The Principles of Modern Company Law 636. 
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penalty or a prison sentence.163  There were further enactments in 1980164 and 1985.165  Both 
evidenced strong fiduciary and misappropriation theory influence.166  The European 
Community directive on Insider Trading in 1989,167 however, necessitated a revision of the 
United Kingdom’s insider trading rules.168  This revision evidenced, it is said, a shift away 
from the fiduciary doctrine as the basis for the regulation of insider trading.169  
The notion that directors do not owe fiduciary duties to shareholders individually has, however, 
not been left completely unchallenged by our courts.  In Sage Holdings v Unisec Group Ltd170 
Goldstone J took issue with the principle laid down in Percival.  He referred to and agreed 
with criticism of the decision.  He further remarked that the rule, as it was formulated in the 
context of a face-to-face share sale contract, could not be applied without more to transactions 
done on the JSE.  Those transactions should be distinguished, according to the court.  And, it 
was remarked, that even if the directors were not guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty, one could 
                                                 
163  Companies Act 1980, c 22. 
164  Companies Act 1980, c 22. 
165  Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, c 8. 
166  A F Loke “From the fiduciary theory to information abuse: the changing fabric of insider trading law 
in the U.K., Australia and Singapore” (2006) 53 Am Journal of Comp Law 131 125; P L Davies “The 
European Community’s Directive on Insider Dealing: From Company Law to Securities Market 
Regulation?” (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 92.  
167  Council Directive 89/592/EEC of November 13, 1989, O.J. L334/30.  This directive has been repealed 
by Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of January 28, 2003 on insider 
trading and market manipulation (market abuse), art. 20, O.J.L 096 (effective date: April 12, 2003). 
168  Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 125.  The United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry produced a 
consultative document, The Law on Insider Trading (1989), which culminated in the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993, c 36. 
169  Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 125. Also see B A K Rider “The Control of Insider Trading – Smoke and 
Mirrors!” (2000) 19 Dick J Int’L 1.  Rider’s criticism against the approach was along the same lines as 
criticism levelled against the misappropriation theory generally.  The criticism has it against the 
connection sought with the source of the inside information before the act of trading on the inside 
information is considered unlawful.  Rider wrote: ‘It would seem that the relationship must also be such 
that it is proper for the individual to have access to the information’ before his trading could be found 
to be unlawful.  In other words, a thief or a chance overhearer would not be prohibited from trading on 
the information. 
170  1982 (1) SA 337 (W). 
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call into question the directors’ ‘propriety and morality’.  Criticism and moral judgements 
aside, however, Sage is not authority for the fact that Percival is not good law at common law. 
What is accepted is that directors may place themselves in a fiduciary relationship to 
shareholders individually.  This would be the case only where the directors act as agents 
specifically for those shareholders.  The duty can thus arise from the circumstances of a 
specific case.  The fiduciary doctrine therefore is not even properly adept at explaining the 
wrongfulness of insider trades between directors and individual shareholders. 
More fundamentally, however, as it will be explained below, the fiduciary duty doctrine fails 
to explain properly the wrongfulness of the conduct of all traders trading with inside 
information.  Its historic part in the formulation of prohibitions on insider trading did, 
nevertheless, have a great effect on the legal development in this branch of the law.  The wrong 
of insider trading was going to be one seen, at least when legislatures the world over started to 
intervene, as perpetrated by directors against their shareholders, instead of being seen as one 
perpetrated by share traders inter se trading in the financial markets. 
The large role the fiduciary duty doctrine plays in insider trading regulation171 is, in my 
submission, a remnant of outdated thinking on the subject.  It is largely a result of the United 
States federal securities regulation’s development, which has been at the forefront in 
developing the bases for the regulation of insider trading.172  It is especially the broad anti-
fraud section, found in the Securities Act, that has allowed the courts to have free reign in 
                                                 
171  See, for instance, Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 131 who writes that the fact that insider trading in the 
United States turns on fiduciary duty is ‘only because of how the case law built upon an open-textured 
anti-fraud rule’. 
172  See Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 123 on the historical development in United States law.  The author 
argues that ‘with its market capitalization and regulatory sophistication, U.S. federal securities laws 
continues to lead internationally in forging the norms of securities regulation’. 
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‘developing’ the law in this field.173  These developments have spilled over to other common 
law jurisdictions and have been considered by legislatures in drafting their respective country’s 
legislation.  Starting from a broad anti-fraud provision and initial fiduciary thinking on insider 
trading, the United States insider trading law development had an ill-founded starting point.174 
Prior to 1940, the majority of United States courts, especially the courts of what was at that 
time recognised as the financial and industrial states, also held, in line with the established 
common law, that specifically officers or directors of corporations did not owe fiduciary duties 
to individual shareholders.  Consequently, the mere fact that a director or officer of a company 
had not disclosed inside information to a seller shareholder, did not found an action.  A director 
or officer was free of any liability as long as he did not mislead, or perpetrate a fraud upon, a 
selling shareholder.175 
The general view was that directors and officers of a corporation were free to deal with their 
shares as any other shareholders in the market.  They did not owe any additional duties to their 
                                                 
173  Of Rule 10b-5, and the private rights of action to which it gives rise, the following was said by 
Rehnquist CJ in Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723 (1975): ‘When we deal with 
private rights of actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more 
than a legislative acorn.’  Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 126 writes as follows about Rule 10b-5: ‘As the 
legislative basis for the development of the rule against insider trading, the case law that it has spawned 
has been nothing less than remarkable.’  This is, of course, not necessarily a positive state of affairs. 
174  S M Bainbridge “Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights 
and Securities Fraud” (1999) 52 SMU L Rev 1589; Langevoort (1999) Colum L Rev 1319; D C 
Langevoort “Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future” 
(1995) 20 Del J Corp L 865; J R Macey “From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules 
on Insider Trading Regulation” (1984) 13 Hofstra Law Review 13–29; J Seligman “The Reformulation 
of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information” (1985) 73 Geo LJ 1083; J E Fisch “Start 
Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation” (1992) 26 Ga L Rev 179; D 
C Langevoort “Book Review – The Education of a Securities Lawyer (1985) 80 Nw U L Rev 261–262. 
175  See K L Yourd “Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act” (1939) 2 Michigan Law Review 139.  Also see the leading authoritative 
cases at that time: Carpenter v Danforth 52 Barb (NY) 581 (1868); and Board of Commissioners of 
Tippecanoe County v Reynolds 44 Ind 509 (1873). 
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counterparts in the securities markets.  The principle is said176 to have emanated from an 1847 
United States case where it was held that: 
There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connection between the holders of 
shares in a bank, in their individual capacity on the one side, and the directors of the 
bank on the other.  The directors are not the bailees, factors, agents, or trustees of such 
individual stockholders.177 
However, the odd judgment holding that directors and officers of a company owed a fiduciary 
duty to individual shareholders did emerge.  According to these judgments, directors and 
officers were prevented from trading at arm’s length in the market if they did not make a full 
disclosure of all the relevant facts pertaining to the value of the shares being sold.  In a 1903 
case, Oliver v Oliver,178 it was held that:  
It is a matter of common knowledge that the market value of shares rises and falls, not 
only because of an increase and decrease in tangible property, but also by reason of real 
and contemplated action on the part of managing officers; declaring or passing 
dividends; the making of fortunate and unfortunate contracts; the loss or gain of 
property in disputed profitable or disadvantageous sales or leases.  And to say that a 
director who has been placed where he himself may raise or depress the value of the 
stock, or in a position where he first knows of facts that may produce that result, may 
take advantage thereof, or buy from or sell to one whom he is directly representing, 
without making a full disclosure and putting the stockholder on an equality of 
                                                 
176  H L Wilgus “Purchase of shares of corporation by a director from a shareholder” (1909–1910) 8 Mich 
L Rev 267. 
177  Smith v Hurd 53 Mass. 371 (1847). 
178  The leading case at that time holding this viewpoint was said to be Oliver v Oliver 45 SE 232 (1903).  
(See Yourd (1939) Michigan Law Review 141).  In Oliver it was held that the fact that a director owes 
a fiduciary duty to the corporation that employs him and its body of shareholders, should not be 
perverted to mean that he is not under a duty to each.  Furthermore, the court held that the fact that a 
director must serve the corporation does not warrant him becoming an active opponent of the individual 
shareholder, especially if one considers the latter’s undivided interest in the property committed to the 
director’s care.  At the time, the approach in the Oliver case was championed by United States legal 
scholars.  See A A Berle “Publicity of Accounts and Director’s Purchases of Stock” (1927) 25 Mich L 
Rev 827; A H Bigelow “The Relation of Directors of a Corporation to Individual Shareholders” (1915) 
81 Cent L J 256; N C Collier “Liabilities of Directors and of Trustees of Beneficial Owners Compared” 
(1912) 74 Cent L J  74; C D Laylin “The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock” (1918) 27 
Yale L J 27; H R Smith “Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder” (1921) 
19 Mich L Rev 698; W W Thornton “The Trust Relation between Corporate Officers and Stockholders 
buying of, or selling their stock to them” (1908) 67 Cent LJ 67; and H L Wilgus “Purchase of Shares 
of a Director from a Shareholder” (1910) 8 Mich L Rev 267. 
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knowledge as to these facts, would offer a premium for faithless silence, and give 
reward for the suppression of the truth. 
Expositions such as those in Oliver were recognised by American scholars at that time as being 
evidence of an increasing social consciousness about the transactions of the corporate world.179  
The general rule, that directors were free to trade, was seen at the time as the epitome of laissez-
faire doctrine of free and unrestricted trading under all circumstances.180  Notwithstanding 
opposition to it, the general rule stood, but not without losing some ground.  The ‘special facts 
doctrine’ developed. 
The special facts doctrine is still good law in some states.181  The locus classicus of the special 
facts doctrine is the United States Supreme Court judgment of Strong v Repide.182  The doctrine 
applies to shareholders selling shares in face-to-face transactions to directors of the issuer 
company.183  The facts were as follows: Repide was the owner of more than two-thirds of the 
shares in the Sugar Estates Development Company, was one of five directors, and had been 
elected by the board as the agent and administrator general of the company.  The company 
owned a large part of the Philippine friar lands.  Repide was representing the board in 
negotiations for the sale of those lands to the United States government.  The plaintiff in the 
case, Mrs Strong, owned only a few shares in the company.  She placed her shares in the 
possession of her agent, Jones.  She gave Jones the power to sell the shares at a specified price. 
While Repide was negotiating with the United States government, holding out for a higher 
price for the company’s lands, he began taking steps to purchase Mrs Strong’s shares.  Jones 
                                                 
179  See Yourd (1939) Michigan Law Review 142. 
180  Ibid. 143. 
181  See Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 127 note 9.  Also see Treadway Companies Inc. v. Care Corp. 638 F. 2d 
357 (2d Cir 1980). 
182  213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
183  See for instance Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 73 F. Supp 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) and Kohler v. Kohler 
Co. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). 
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occupied an office right next door to Repide.  Instead of going to see Jones, however, Repide 
employed one of his relatives, who in turn employed a broker with an office some distance 
away, to purchase the shares from Jones.  The relative instructed the broker that the shares 
were for a family member.  On the facts, Jones never became aware of the true purchaser’s 
identity and it was common cause that, if he had become so aware, he would not have sold the 
shares at the price he did.  It was further common cause that no facts relating to the state of the 
negotiations with the United States government had been brought to the agent’s attention. 
The trial court found that Repide concealed from Strong’s agent ‘facts affecting the value of 
the stock which he in good faith was bound to reveal’.  Repide was ordered to return the shares 
to Strong.  The Philippine Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, holding that absent 
a positive act of fraud that includes either false promises or an abuse of confidence, the sale 
was good.  The Supreme Court of the United States, in turn, overturned the Philippine court.  
It held as follows: 
If it were conceded, for the purpose of argument, that the ordinary relations between 
directors and shareholders in a business corporation are not of such a fiduciary nature 
as to make it the duty of the director to disclose to the shareholder the general 
knowledge which he may possess regarding the value of shares of the company before 
he purchases any from a shareholder, yet there are cases where, by reason of the special 
facts, such duty does exist.184 
The court listed eight special facts that, in the case before it, caused a duty to be recognised: 
the defendant was a director; he owned three-quarters of the company’s stock; he was the 
administrator general of the company and had extensive powers; he was engaged in 
negotiations that finally led to the sale of the land at a price that greatly enhanced the value of 
the stock; he was the chief negotiator in that transaction; he was acting substantially as the 
agent for the shareholders by reason of his ownership of shares and by acquiescence of the 
other shareholders; the negotiations were for the sale of the whole of the property; and the 
lands were the only valuable asset of the company.  To prove these special facts was an onerous 
                                                 
184  213 US 419 (1909) 431. 
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onus to bear.  Furthermore, the anonymous nature of stock market transactions rendered the 
application of the special facts doctrine, at best, problematic.  The suggestion that a director 
owed a duty to disclose inside information in stock exchange transactions was therefore 
rejected.185 
After the United States stock market crash of 1929, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
was enacted.  The 1934 report of the United States Senate Banking and Currency Committee 
stated: 
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee 
was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of 
corporations who used their position of trust and the confidential information which 
came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities.  Closely allied to 
this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of large stockholders who, while 
not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their 
companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others.186 
The main provisions on insider trading in the United States were enacted in section 10(b) of 
the Securities and Exchange Act.187  Section 10(b) is a broad anti-‘fraud’188 provision.  It must 
also be noted that Congress has intervened on numerous further occasions189 and the SEC has 
                                                 
185  Goodwin v Agasiz 186 NE 659 (Mass 1933). 
186  As cited by W R McLucas, J H Walsh & L L Fountain “Settlement of Insider Trading Cases” (1992 – 
1993) 48 Bus Law 69 80 note 3. 
187  Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 1934 (United States). 
188  The section addresses a broader range of misconduct than what is normally recognised as ‘fraud’. 
189  Congressional Reaction of 1984: Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.  See in this regard T W Joo 
“Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s” (2007) 82 Ind LJ 575.  For 
an expression of doubt that the 1984 legislation had the desired deterrent effect see H N Seyhun “The 
Effectiveness of the Insider Trading Sanctions” (1992) 35 J L & Econ 149 and S Thel “Statutory 
Findings and Insider Trading Regulation” (1997) 50 Vand L Rev 1091.  See further the Sarbanes Oxley 
of 2002.  Its section 304 requires the company’s chief executive officer and chief financial officer to 
forfeit any profits made from the purchase or sale of stock during a twelve-month period if the company 
restates its financial reports.  Section 306 prohibits directors and executive officers from trading in 
shares in a ‘blackout period’ during which lower level employees are barred from trading in their 
company managed retirement or employee stock option plans (ESOP accounts).  Section 403 amends 
section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act to accelerate the deadline for the reporting of insider 
trading by officers, directors and large shareholders. 
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promulgated regulations in terms of the Securities and Exchange Act.190  Section 10(b) is 
supplemented by Rule 10b-5.  Section 10(b) provides in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange –  
. . .  
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security not so 
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
Rule 10b-5 reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security. 
Insider trading is not referred to expressly in either section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.  In addition, 
both the section and the Rule’s prohibition, on a plain reading, is aimed at ‘any person’.  It 
may therefore come as a surprise that a great part of United States jurisprudence on insider 
trading has focused on identifying who may be found guilty of insider trading.  The insistence 
furthermore on bringing insider trading regulation within the scope of the fiduciary duty 
doctrine has left the United States law, at best, complex.191  Doctrinal refinement and coherence 
                                                 
190  See Regulation FD or “Regulation Fair Disclosure.”  It addresses the problem of selective disclosure 
by companies and their senior executives. 
191  H Kripke “Note on insider trading: an example of how not to make a law” (1987) 39 Ala L Rev 349 
349 refers to the ‘mess [Americans] call insider trading law’ and L Loss “History of SEC Legislative 
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have given way to reactionary jurisprudential ingenuity to stretch the ambit of the restrictions 
on insider trading.192  The fiduciary doctrine also made its way into South African insider 
trading law, as it has done in many other branches of the law.  Most notably, it is recognised 
by the inclusion of ‘directors’ a specific type of insider in the definition of ‘insiders’. 
The fiduciary duty doctrine provides only a basis for the regulation of insider trading by 
directors and others who owe fiduciary duties.  If the doctrine is strictly employed, only they 
would be held liable for insider trading.  What is more, they would be held so liable only in 
instances where they are dealing with shareholders, and not with prospective shareholders.  In 
other words, directors and officers could be held liable only where they buy shares from 
incumbent shareholders as they owe a duty only to those already holding equity in their 
company.  When the directors sell shares, they are contracting with independent third parties 
who, at the time of the sale, are not owed any fiduciary duty, if those third parties do not yet 
own equity in the director’s company.  For a legal system thus to base its insider trading 
regulations on the fiduciary duty doctrine, it must implicitly recognise that the directors and 
officers owe fiduciary duties not only to incumbent equity holders, but also to prospective 
holders of equity: an untenable position. 
The doctrine also fails to explain the prohibitions on trading on inside information in securities 
other than equities.  The South African legislature has, for instance, since the enactment of the 
Insider Trading Act, made it clear that as far as trading on inside information is concerned, 
what is good for equity is good for debt securities and derivatives.  The King Task Group 
concluded that it was not clear from the definition of the then section 440A(1) of the 
                                                 
Programs and Suggestions for a Code” (1967) 22 Bus Law 795 796 asks, ‘How big a house of cards 
can we continue to build on rule 10b-5?’.  Also see D C Langevoort “Setting the agenda for legislative 
reform: some fallacies, anomalies, and other curiosities in the prevailing law on insider trading” (1987) 
39 Ala L Rev 399. 
192  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 5 4/2007) 2-2. 
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Companies Act193 whether financial instruments had had to be issued by a company for the 
insider trading provisions to apply.194  If it did not, only trading in derivatives issued by the 
company would have been included in the prohibition of insider trading.195  They advised that 
trading on inside information in ‘traded options and indices which are not “issued” by a 
company’ had to constitute an offence.196  They further advised unequivocally that the South 
African regulation of insider trading should regulate all markets, including the equity, 
derivative and bond markets.197  In view of the anonymity that characterises transactions on 
regulated markets as opposed to the over-the-counter market, trading on inside information in 
‘all securities and financial investments’ listed on a regulated market, whether they were issued 
by a company or not, should, according to the Commission, be regulated.198  They thus 
proposed a broad inclusive definition of ‘financial instrument’, which has been retained in the 
Act.199  It is a central provision in determining the ambit of the Act and the offences it creates. 
This expansive definition of ‘securities’ has resulted in an approach at odds with what was an 
accepted truth at the end of the previous century: that insider trading was a wrong perpetrated 
only in equity securities.  The Act’s definition includes derivative and debt securities.  The 
only way the definition is circumscribed in the market abuse section, is by way of its definition 
of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’.  The definitions limit the provisions’ application to 
                                                 
193  The 1973 Companies Act. 
194  King Final Report 10. 
195  Ibid. 
196  Ibid. 
197  Ibid. 
198  Ibid. 11. 
199  It defined ‘financial instrument’ as meaning a ‘financial instrument as defined in section 1 of the 
Financial Markets Control Act, 1989 (Act 55 of 1989), and any instrument or right bearing substantially 
similar characteristics to any such financial instrument and which is dealt with on a regulated market’.  
The Financial Markets Control Act defined ‘financial instrument’ as ‘(a) a futures contract; (b) an 
options contract; (c) loan stock; (d) or any other instrument declared by the Registrar by notice in the 
Government Gazette to be a financial instrument’. 
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securities listed on a regulated market.200  It is clear, however, that the prohibitions deal not 
only with trades in equity but also in debt instruments and derivatives. 
It seems to follow quite naturally that if a person is not allowed to trade with inside information 
in equities, he must not be allowed to trade with inside information in debt instruments and 
derivatives.201  It is, however, not so simple if the basis for the regulation of trading on inside 
information is the fiduciary doctrine.  The question to be answered for the purposes of 
determining whether the fiduciary duty doctrine could provide a basis for the regulation or 
prohibition of insider trading in derivatives is: where would one find the fiduciary link between 
a trader accused of trading with inside information and the company (if the derivative relates 
to a company at all) of the security being traded?  For the requirement of some fiduciary duty 
being owed to a counterparty before an insider can be held liable for insider trading, would 
rarely be fulfilled outside the equity market.202 
To understand the rights and obligations at play in the derivatives market and why requiring a 
fiduciary link in the regulation of insider trading in these instruments is nonsensical, it is first 
necessary to ask what a derivative is.  The Act defines ‘derivative instrument’ as meaning any 
‘(a) financial instrument; (b) or contract, that creates rights and obligations and whose value 
depends on or is derived from the value of one or more underlying asset, rate or index, or 
measure of economic value or on a default event’.203  Derivatives are thus financial instruments 
with certain specified characteristics.  As the name and the Act’s definition suggest, they derive 
their value from the values of other underlying securities or other variables.  Those variables 
                                                 
200  A ‘regulated market’ is in turn defined to mean ‘any market, whether domestic or foreign, which is 
regulated in terms of the laws of the country in which the market conducts business as a market for 
dealing in securities listed on that market’. 
201  In New Zealand, for instance, certain conduct by traders in futures contracts, and their advisors, are not 
regarded as contraventions of their insider trading preventions.  See the New Zealand Securities 
Markets (Insider Trading Exemption – Futures Contracts) Regulations 2010. 
202  H L Pitt & K A Groskaufmanis “A tale of two instruments” (1993–1994) 49 Business Lawyer 188. 
203  Section 1. 
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include an index, a reference interest rate, an equity instrument, a bond or even another 
derivative.  A significant amount of derivatives trading happens on the JSE.204  Exchanges, not 
companies, are free to create virtually any derivatives contract they please.  The only restraint 
on their power is demand.  Demand is in turn determined by, among other things, the 
envisioned instrument’s standardisation, market depth and liquidity. 
To illustrate the inherent difficulties the fiduciary doctrine has in providing a regulatory basis, 
it will suffice to discuss options as examples of derivatives.  What is known as an option 
contract on regulated exchanges is an agreement of sale having as the merx a right to buy or 
sell a specific quantity of an underlying asset (whether it be equity, an interest-bearing security, 
currency or commodity) or other derivatives (whether it be futures, swaps or other options) at 
a specified price at or before a date in the future.  In accordance with its classification as a 
derivative, the merx is not, for example, the commodity itself, but the right to buy the 
commodity. 
Economists, in assessing options, focus on the option’s ‘intrinsic value’.  The option is viewed 
relative to the underlying asset or derivative to which it relates.  Most important in this 
assessment, is the price at which the underlying asset or instrument can be bought by the holder 
of the option: the strike price.  The strike price will remain constant, but the price of the 
underlying commodity is bound to fluctuate.205  A price increase in the commodity will 
therefore result in an increase of the intrinsic value of the option as it now confers the right to 
buy something cheaper relative to market value.  Of course, option agreements confer not only 
rights to buy, but also rights to sell.206  A call option gives the buyer the right to buy (or call) 
a specified number of shares of a specific company from the option writer at a determined 
                                                 
204  161,1 million derivative contracts were traded on the JSE in 2010. (Goodspeed “The Derivatives 
market” in K Van Wyk, Z Botha & I Goodspeed Understanding South African Financial Markets 4 ed 
(2012) 387–415. 
205  Pitt & Groskaufmanis (1993–1994) Business Lawyer 192. 
206  Ibid. 
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purchase price at any time up to and including the strike date.  A put option is the converse.  It 
grants the buyer the right to sell (or put) a set number of a particular company’s shares at a set 
selling price at any time up to and including the strike date.207 
In all this the following is clear: neither the issuer nor its insiders necessarily play any role in 
the conclusion of an options agreement.  There is generally no fiduciary duty owed by an 
issuer’s insiders and an option holder.  Options are not even issued by the company, but by an 
option clearing corporation or exchange.  By purchasing an option, the purchaser does not gain 
an equity stake in the company, but merely the right to purchase or sell equity at a later stage.208  
In other words, options holders do not have equity, they merely have a right to buy or sell 
equity.  The fiduciary duty doctrine fails to explain the prohibition on trading on insider trading 
in options. 
These difficulties are well illustrated by the United States’ case of Laventhal v General 
Dynamics Corporation.209  The case concerned an action by the owner of options to buy shares 
in General Dynamics.  Leventhal filed a class action on behalf of all persons who sold options 
or other securities during a specified period.  He based his action on the allegation that General 
Dynamics traded on inside information during that period.  However, were call option holders 
competent to bring an action under an insider trading provision based on the fiduciary 
doctrine? 
Laventhal argued that the corporation’s trading in its own shares on inside information, caused 
him, an options holder, damage.  The court found, though, that there was no action for insider 
trading.  It reasoned that the options held by Laventhal were issued by an options clearing 
corporation.  The securities traded were call options, or options to purchase, and that these are 
                                                 
207  Ibid. 
208  Ibid. 197. 
209  Laventhal v General Dynamics Corporation 704 F.2d 407 (1983) 412. 
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contracts with a private brokerage firm to purchase shares, or any other security, of a specified 
company in the future at a specified price.210  It reasoned that options, as opposed to equity, 
are bought because they offer an investor the possibility of a high return for a minimal 
investment and that they are more speculative in nature.  Even though the target shares’ share 
price may increase, the option could expire worthless.  If the option is not exercised or it is not 
sold prior to its expiration, the option holder stands to lose his entire investment: the option 
purchase price.211  Accordingly, held the court, options trading can be seen as inherently risky, 
that investors voluntarily accept that risk by entering into the options market, and this means 
(as it was previously held by United States courts) that they do not to afford their holders the 
same fiduciary duty protection as traders in the share market.212 
The distinction between options and equity does not end there.  The relationship between the 
directors and officers of a company and its shareholders is wholly different from that between 
directors and officers and options holders.  Both shareholders and options holders rely on the 
general welfare of the company to a certain extent.  This much is true.  Options holders, 
however, unlike shareholders, do not hold equity in the company prior to exercising the 
option.213  Therefore they have no rights such as those of the shareholder, to bring an action 
against a director or officer of the company under the fiduciary duty doctrine, born out of 
holding equity in the company.  A fiduciary duty arises only once an options holder becomes 
a shareholder.214 
What further complicates the application of the fiduciary doctrine is the fact that where options 
are involved, trading happens in more than one market.215  When equity is purchased using 
                                                 
210  Ibid. 410. 
211  Ibid. 
212  See Pitt & Groskaufmanis (1993–1994) Business Lawyer 202. 
213  O’Connor & Associates v Dean Witter Reynolds Inc 529 F Supp 1179 (SDNY 1981) 1184–1185. 
214  Ibid. 1185. 
215  See Laventhal v General Dynamics Corporation 704 F.2d 407 (1983) 413. 
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inside information, damage could be caused to an options holder.  The shares are purchased in 
the share market, whereas the options holder trades in the options market.  The trade can be 
seen as too far removed from the loss by the options trader to prove a causal connection 
between the impugned conduct and the loss.216 
It can also be argued that options trading, and option traders, are at a certain level not that 
different from share traders, and shareholders.  That they too should enjoy fiduciary, or at least 
misappropriation, protection.  And that there is indeed such protection.  Those that take up this 
position argue idealistically, without reference to principle, that options reduce volatility and 
heightens the liquidity of equity markets, allowing shareholders the opportunity to hedge the 
risk inherent in their equity investment by shifting it to options holders.217  Trading in options 
are therefore not to be seen as gambling, but rather as risk allocation.218  The distribution of 
risk enhances the liquidity of the market for a company’s shares and, therefore, lowers the cost 
of capital to the company.219  The fiduciary duty as owed to shareholders, should therefore be 
extended to options holders as they also bear risk.220  It is further argued that options investors 
share many of shareholders’ expectations.221  They too rely on the integrity of the directors and 
officers of the company to whom their options relate.222  What is more, even though the initial 
purchase of an option, unlike the initial public offering of equity, does not result in an influx 
of capital to the company, the secondary markets for the two instruments have the same effect 
on the company’s coffers.  The trading of both instruments in the secondary market merely 
                                                 
216  Ibid. 
217  Moskowitz v Lopp 128 FRD 624 (ED Pa 1989) 633. 
218  Pitt & Groskaufmanis (1993–1994) Business Lawyer 208.  Also see E M Sacksteder “Securities 
Regulation for a Changing Market: Option Trader Standing under Rule 10b-5” (1998) 97 Yale L J 32 
– 633 where it is said: ‘The options market thus enhances the depth and liquidity of the stock market, 
maximizing stock prices and lowering the corporations cost of capital’. 
219  Pitt & Groskaufmanis (1993–1994) Business Lawyer 208.  Also see Tolan v Computervision Corp 696 
F Supp 771 (D Mass 1988) where it is said: ‘Studies have shown that options trading may decrease the 
price volatility of the underlying securities on which the options are written, and also that the presence 
of options may increase trading volume of the underlying security, thereby increasing stock liquidity’. 
220  Moskowitz v Lopp 128 FRD 624 (ED Pa 1989) 633. 
221  Pitt & Groskaufmanis (1993–1994) Business Lawyer 206. 
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serves to maintain the liquidity of the market for the company’s shares.223  This might all be 
true.  Considerations of equity, however, cannot give rise to a duty without more. 
The question whether options traders should be protected against insider trading, has been 
dealt with in South Africa.  The legislature has said yes.  What should now be clear is that the 
fiduciary doctrine faces at best considerable difficulties in providing a rationale for that 
protection.  At worst, it simply doesn’t. 
The fiduciary doctrine similarly fails to explain the prohibition of trading on inside information 
in bonds.  A bond in this context is a right to the repayment of a loan and interest.  A share, or 
equity stake, in a company, on the other hand, involves more than a claim for the repayment 
of a loan.  South Africa has had an active bond market since the mid 1970s.  The volumes and 
values of trades in this instrument increased dramatically in the 1980s through the 1990s.224 
Traditionally corporate bonds were viewed as an extremely safe investment.  It was believed 
that there was a less pressing need in the bond market to keep the same close eye on bond 
issuers than was kept on companies whose equity one holds.  So the market for suitably rated 
bonds also became a haven for institutional investors.225  Especially in large markets, such as 
that of the United States, a change has occurred, which makes bond markets more susceptible 
to insider traders.  Especially the development of high yield bonds (or junk bonds) has caused 
the traditionally held view of bond markets, that they hold the promise of a low risk steady 
investment, to change for the worse. 
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Basing the regulation of insider trading in bonds on the fiduciary doctrine flies in the face of 
the traditional perceptions of creditors’ rights.226  Traditionally, shareholders are seen as the 
corporation’s owners, whereas debt holders, like bond holders, are the company’s creditors.227  
It is a long-accepted rule that directors do not stand in a fiduciary relationship to their 
company’s creditors.228  Pitt & Grauskafmanis present a neat distinction between bonds and 
equity:  
The stockholders are the corporation’s owners; the debt holders are its creditors.  
Corporate law is for stockholders; contract law is for debt holders.’  Corporate directors 
are charged with protecting stockholder interests; the indenture represents the debt 
holders’ protection.229 
A corollary to this traditional view is that corporate officers do not owe fiduciary duties to 
corporate bondholders; the two groups are tied to each other only by way of a bond contract. 
There are two schools of thought about the role played by the bond contract in the relationship 
between fiduciaries and bondholders.  The one school argues that bondholders should not to 
be afforded fiduciary protection as they are able to protect themselves through the bond 
agreement.  They can negotiate for all the protection they desire.230  The other school argues 
that this is a fiction.  The bond contract’s terms, it is said, is determined by three principal 
actors: the corporation, the underwriters, and the bond trustee.231  The bondholder does not 
have the opportunity to negotiate anything because, quite simply, at the point of negotiation 
                                                 
226  Ibid. 220. 
227  M W McDaniel “Bondholders and Corporate Governance” (1986) 41 Bus Law 413. 
228  M S Blackman, R D Jooste, G K Everingham, M Larkin, C H Rademeyer & J L Yeats Commentary on 
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for this proposition: Re Whincham Ship building, Boiler, and Salt Co (Poole, Jackson, and Whyte’s 
case) 1878 9 Chd 322 328–329 (CA); Re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co (1978) 10 Chd 450 453; 
Wilson v Lord Barry (1880) 5 QBD 518 (CA); and Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 217–219; Spies v R (2000) 35 ACSR 500 526 (HC of A). 
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the bondholder is not in the picture yet.  He acquires the security, like the purchasers of equity, 
only on the market.  Bondholders therefore require the protections of the fiduciary doctrine. 
I do not agree.  The bondholder has a contract with the company according to the debt he has 
accorded it.  When he sells the rights and obligations under that contract in the market, the 
buyer buys those rights and obligations.  The situation is wholly different from the one where 
a shareholder purchases shares and knows that he is getting equity and will be treated in 
accordance with the company’s founding documents.  Bondholders are not owed fiduciary 
duties and therefore the fiduciary duty doctrine fails to explain the wrongfulness of insider 
trading in bonds.232 
The fiduciary duty doctrine as applicable to directors trading on inside information, is not a 
suitable basis for the regulation of insider trading, a financial market wrong.  It not only fails 
to explain the wrongfulness of insider trading where a director trades on the strength of inside 
information with a single incumbent shareholder, it also fails to explain the wrongfulness of 
directors trading with purchasing or prospective shareholders and insider trading generally in 
bonds and derivatives.  Indeed, Loke writes that ‘[i]f one were to start on a clean slate, it is 
doubtful whether one would adopt the fiduciary theory as the basis for constructing insider 
trading liability’.233  The South African legislature has had ample opportunity to excise the 
remnants of the fiduciary doctrine from the regulation of insider trading.  It has regrettably 
failed to do so. 
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2 2 2 The misappropriation theory 
According to the misappropriation234 theory it is wrongful for persons to trade in securities on 
the strength of inside information they obtained in the course of the performance of their 
corporate duties.235  It founds the wrongfulness of insider trading where information meant for 
a corporate purpose is received and employed to another end.236  The theory views inside 
information as the property of the corporation for whom the corporate duties are performed 
(which is not necessarily the relevant issuer).  The wrong perpetrated by the misappropriator 
is perpetrated against the person or entity who entrusted him with the information, the source 
of the information, and not the person with whom he trades.237  In other words, the 
wrongfulness is not found in the simple fact that one trader has an unconquerable information 
advantage over his counterparty; it is rather found in the fact that the one trader has an 
information advantage over the other by virtue of ‘an abuse of position, a violation of trust, or 
a betrayal of confidence’ owed to the source of the information.238 
The theory originated in the United States Second Circuit.  It was judicially conceived, firstly, 
as a result of the failings of the fiduciary doctrine to cover certain forms of insider trading, 
which were also perceived as worthy of prohibition and,239 secondly, as a result of the United 
                                                 
234  According to the Oxford Dictionary of English (C Soanes & A Stevenson Oxford Dictionary of English 
2 ed (2005)) to ‘misappropriate’ is to ‘dishonestly or unfairly take (something) for a wrong purpose or 
in a wrong way’. 
235  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 6 4/2008) 1–22 and B B Aldave “Misappropriation: A General 
Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information” (1984) 13 Hofsta Law Review 114.  The 
United States Supreme Court has described the breach as being found in ‘feigning fidelity to the source 
of the information without disclosure to the source’.  United States v O’Hagan 117 S Ct 2199 (1997) 
2207. 
236  Langevoort on insider trading (6/2004) 6-4.  Also see United States v Newman 664 F 2d 12 (1981), 
one of the first cases prosecuted in the United States under the misappropriation theory. 
237  See Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 7 4/2009) 6-1. 
238  Aldave (1984) Hofstra Law Review 121. 
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59 Alb L Rev 139.  The United States Supreme Court has held that the fiduciary theory and the 
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States Supreme Court’s reluctance in accepting the equal access to information theory as the 
basis for their insider trading prohibition. 
It is especially in the mid to late 1970s with the merger and acquisitions explosion in the United 
States that the SEC and the United States Department of Justice began looking for novel ways 
to stretch the broad anti-fraud provision on their statute book to capture parties in corporate 
deals who did not fit the traditional idea of a fiduciary insider.240  If a prohibition based on the 
misappropriation theory is available to a court, together with a prohibition based on the 
fiduciary duty doctrine, the misappropriation theory enlarges the scope of a prohibition on 
insider trading to include at least some of those traders who would traditionally not have been 
viewed as insiders.  The misappropriation theory covers people who do not owe any fiduciary 
duty to the company or its shareholders, but who possess inside information.  This theory of 
wrongfulness therefore provides for a limited extension for holding those liable for insider 
trading who do not owe duties to the issuer company. 
                                                 
misappropriation theory are complementary.  The classical theory focuses on a corporate insider’s 
breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts.  The misappropriation theory focuses 
on the trading on non-public confidential information by a corporate outsider in breach of a duty to the 
source of the information.  The misappropriation theory thus extends the protection of securities 
markets in that it also restricts trading on non-public information by persons who do not owe a duty to 
the company’s shareholders. (United States v O’Hagan 117 S Ct 2199 (1997) 2208). 
240  Brodsky (1998) Cardozo L Rev 42.  In a legislative history provided with the enactment of the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C. section 78 (1988) 
the United States Congress stated that: 
Insider trading has become a more widespread problem in recent years, with the increase in mergers 
and tender offers, which often result in immediate and dramatic price movements in the stock of a 
target company, and with the growth of the options market, where a small investment in options 
can yield enormous profits if the underlying stock increases in value as a result of a tender offer 
announcement or other news.  This potential for immense profits is a powerful lure to this illegal 
activity.  In one case, the Commission alleged that an individual purchased approximately $3 000 
in call options of a corporation, which was to be the subject of a takeover proposal and, in 48 hours, 
realised a profit of approximately $430 000. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 67 
 
It was first employed by the United States Justice Department in Chiarella v United States241 
in 1980.  There, only four justices of the Supreme Court endorsed the theory.  In United States 
v Newman,242 a year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit accepted 
the misappropriation theory.  It was only, however, until the O’Hagan decision that the 
Supreme Court, by reversing an Eighth Circuit decision that rejected the misappropriation 
theory, endorsed the theory and established it as a basis for insider trading regulation.  The 
development has pervaded thinking on insider trading globally. 
Our courts, albeit in contexts other than insider trading, have recognised principles that are 
akin to those recognised by the misappropriation theory.  Whether a legal person has, for 
instance, a right to privacy, is no longer open to doubt.243  The Constitutional Court has 
unequivocally stated in Hyundai that the exclusion of juridical persons from the right to 
privacy: 
would lead to the possibility of grave violations of privacy in our society, with serious 
implications for the conduct of affairs.  The State might, for instance, have free license 
to search and seize material from any non-profit organisation or corporate entity at will.  
This would obviously lead to grave disruptions and would undermine the very fabric 
of our democratic State.  Juristic persons therefore do enjoy the right to privacy, 
although not to the same extent as natural persons.244 
South African law also recognises the principle that information can be used in such a way that 
it amounts to unfair competition.  It is a duty that weighs more heavily on the top management 
of a company, but it also rests on the shoulders of mere employees.245  The duty is a corollary 
of the principle that states that an employee, or someone of higher rank, cannot obtain for 
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himself a business opportunity or a business advantage that would have been the company’s.  
It has been accepted in our law that an employee may not make use of information that has 
been entrusted to him in confidence in the course of his work and for the purposes of competing 
with his employer or former employer.  In this regard it has also been held, on the one hand, 
that one cannot protect what is ordinary information while,246 on the other, information is not 
necessarily protected simply because it relates to a trade secret.  It has been held that at least 
one of the wrongs sought to be addressed by the rule is that ‘if other competitors did not have 
equal access to such information, its unauthorised disclosure to and use by the defendant can 
be actionable unfair competition.247 
All this arises from companies’ entitlement as against all the world to carry on lawful business 
in a way that does not trespass upon the rights of others.  Intentional interference with the 
transaction of such business to the detriment of the person concerned is an actionable inuria.248  
And our law’s common law action for unlawful competition is to be found in, among other 
things, the filching of secret and confidential information by competitors249 and the unlawful 
use of secret information.250  Every person’s conduct that interferes with the trader’s right to 
carry on his lawful business may constitute unlawful competition.251  Further, in connection 
with this, a company’s right to trade without the wrongful interference from others 
encompasses the right to have the confidentiality of its internal communications respected.252 
Also in this context, of the company’s right to trade and carry on lawful business, a company 
is entitled to regard the confidential communications between directors and employees of the 
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company as confidential and sacrosanct.253  Companies may in appropriate circumstances 
enforce this right against whomsoever is in possession of confidential information and who 
seeks to utilise it.254  Directors and officers of companies are, in South African law, not allowed 
to use for their own purposes, or to disclose, confidential information entrusted to them 
concerning their company’s affairs.255  Confidential information in this common law context 
includes but is not limited to information with direct commercial value, such as trade secrets 
and customer lists.256 
The misappropriation theory, or at least principles akin to it, is therefore not foreign to our law.  
There are, nonetheless, other reasons why it must not be the basis for regulating insider trading, 
a market wrong, in our financial markets.  Firstly, the misappropriation theory fails to explain 
the wrongfulness of the misappropriator’s conduct relative to those with whom he deals.257  
The wrong is one committed against the company from which the information is 
misappropriated, not against the trader or traders with whom the misappropriator trades.  As 
such, or secondly, if there is no breach of duty between a misappropriator and the source of 
the information, there is no unlawful conduct.258  A person who, for instance, trades with the 
permission of the source of his inside information, whether it be an employee or otherwise, 
cannot fall foul of the misappropriation theory.  Further, where a trader discovers information 
by other means, without there being any relationship between a trader and a source, the trader 
                                                 
253  Ibid. 132I. 
254  Sage Holdings Ltd v Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd 1991 (2) SA 117 (W) 132–133; Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd 
v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 2 SA 451 (A) 464; Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd 
1995 4 SA 293 (A) 303. 
255  See Sibex Construction (SA) Pty Ltd v Injectaseal CC 1988 (2) SA 54 (T). 
256  See Coolair Ventilator Co v Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 686 (W); Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac 
(Pty) Ltd 1977 (1) SA 316 (T); Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Ltd 1980 (3) SA 687 (W); SA 
Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 (2) SA 84 (C); Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn 
Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T); Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 (3) SA 182 (D); 
Sibex Construction (SA) Pty Ltd v Injectaseal CC 1988 (2) SA 54 (T); Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 
1992 (3) SA 520 (W); Van Castricum v Theunissen 1992 (2) SA 726 (T); Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 
1995 2 SA 579 (W). 
257  Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act (Revision Service 6 2009) 5-376-1. 
258  J R Beeson “Rounding the peg to fit the hole: a proposed regulatory reform of the misappropriation 
theory” (1995) 144 U Pa L Rev 1077 1135–7. 
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would be free to trade.  For instance, where a trader would come upon information fortuitously, 
he would be free to trade.259  Even worse, were someone to steal the information, without there 
being any prior duty owed to the source, the thief would not be liable for his subsequent trade 
under the misappropriation theory.260 
Third, it is difficult to determine when and from what the duty owed to the source arises.261  
Whereas it is recognised that the duty to the source is not fiduciary in nature and that it arises 
in cases where an express confidentiality agreement is concluded, very little else is concrete.  
So the theory fails to provide a clear bright line for culpability.  That bright line, dividing 
lawful and unlawful conduct, is sorely needed in the financial markets.262  Fourth, the theory 
arbitrarily regulates some instances of unfair trading while turning a blind eye to others.  The 
misappropriation theory says, among other things, this: some persons may trade on inside 
information and others may not.  If there is no misappropriation vis-à-vis the source, the trader 
will be free to trade.263  In that way, much like the fiduciary doctrine, the misappropriation 
theory as basis for the regulation of trading on inside information, allows some to trade on 
inside information while others are barred.  The theory could be said to give rise to injudicious, 
irrational and indeed, in our jurisdiction, unconstitutional results: actions that are identical for 
all relevant purposes with the same level of culpability are treated differently by the law.264 
The misappropriation theory’s answer to the question ‘why are some allowed to trade on inside 
information and others are not?’ is unsatisfactory and arbitrary in a market context.  Its answer 
is: because some information was obtained in breach of a duty to the source of the information 
                                                 
259  Aldave (1984) Hofstra L Rev 122. 
260  Ibid. 101, 112 and 114–115. 
261  F H Easterbrook “Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of 
Information” (1981) 1981 Sup Ct Rev 309 321. 
262  Beeson (1995) U Pa L Rev 1357. 
263  It could be argued that trading with misappropriated information also damages the integrity of the 
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of all investors.  See B B Aldave “Misappropriation theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath” (1988) 49 
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and other information was not so obtained.  The misappropriation theory does not protect 
primarily investors; it protects the source’s property rights in information.  The 
misappropriation theory fails in providing a market-based theory.  Whereas it is not completely 
irreconcilable with a legislative commitment to the integrity of the capital market as it does, to 
a certain extent, address information asymmetries between traders, it does not address all of 
them.  At least, unlike the fiduciary doctrine, it is able to explain the liability of directors even 
if they buy securities from traders to whom they do not yet, at the point of their purchase, owe 
a fiduciary duty.  The misappropriation theory is also capable of extending the prohibition on 
trading on inside information to outsiders who are not fiduciaries of the company’s 
shareholders.265 
The misappropriation theory’s biggest failure is that it fails to address many scenarios in which 
an information advantage is obtained unfairly in a market context.266  This inevitably leads 
courts to find ways to circumvent the duty requirement.  An interesting example of this is 
found in a judgment by the Ontario Securities Commission in Re Paul Donald.267  The charge 
against Donald was that he had purchased the securities of a certain Certicom Corporation, 
while he stood in a special relationship to Certicom and while he had inside information about 
Certicom.  The facts are briefly as follows.  In 2008 Certicom was a provider of cryptography 
used by software vendors and wireless device manufactures, including Research in Motion 
(RIM), the well-known producer of BlackBerry devices.  Certicom’s technology added value 
to handheld communication devices as it provided for a high level of security.  Donald started 
                                                 
265  Brodsky 1998 Cardozo L Rev 42.  Also see Kidd 1993 Del J Corp L 106. 
266  S S Kunkel “Insider trading: A new equal access approach” (1989) 15 J Contemp L 51. 
267  In the matter of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, as amended and In the matter of Paul Donald: 
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http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Proceedings-RAD/rad_20120801_donaldp.pdf. (“Re 
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to work at RIM in May 1999 and held several positions during the course of his employment.  
When Donald made the impugned trades, he was a vice president of one of RIM’s divisions.268 
In August of 2008 RIM hosted a golf tournament and dinner for its executives.  During the 
dinner Donald had a conversation about Certicom with one of RIM’s other vice presidents, 
one Wormald.  During this conversation, it was alleged, Donald became aware of inside 
information relating to Certicom.  From the following day, for a period of about a month, 
Donald acquired securities in Certicom.269  Roughly five months later RIM announced that it 
would acquire all of Certicom’s shares.  Donald realised a handsome profit.270 
The Commission argued that Donald was a person in a special relationship with Certicom 
when he purchased Certicom securities in August 2008 and September 2008 as, firstly, Donald 
was an officer and employee of RIM at a time when it was a company proposing to make a 
takeover bid for Certicom’s shares.271  Secondly, Donald was an officer and employee of RIM 
at a time when it was a company proposing to become a party to a reorganisation, 
amalgamation, merger or arrangement or similar business combination with Certicom or to 
acquire a substantial portion of its property.272  Thirdly, it was argued that Donald was an 
officer and employee of RIM and that the company was engaging in or proposing to engage in 
business or professional activity with Certicom.273  Fourthly, it was alleged that Donald learned 
of a material fact about Certicom from Wormald, who was an officer and employee of RIM at 
                                                 
268  Re Donald par. 5. 
269  Re Donald par. 7. 
270  Re Donald par. 8. 
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the time that it was a company proposing to make a takeover bid for Certicom.274  Fifthly, 
Donald learned of a material fact about Certicom from Wormald, who was an officer and 
employee of RIM at a time when RIM was a company proposing to become a party to a 
reorganisation, amalgamation, merger or arrangement or similar business combination with 
the reporting issuer or to acquire a substantial portion of its property.275 
As to the first argument, the Commission found that, as of the date of the 2008 golf event and 
the day after it, when Donald placed his order to purchase the Certicom shares, RIM’s interest 
in acquiring Certicom had not evolved into a proposal to do so.  The evidence, therefore, did 
not establish that the company had made a decision that it should or would be proposing a 
takeover bid to acquire Certicom within the meaning of the Ontario Securities Act.276 
As to the second argument, the Commission placed specific emphasis on the fact that there 
were no active discussions underway between Certicom and RIM about a reorganisation, 
amalgamation, merger or arrangement or similar business combination.  The Commission 
found that RIM had not made a decision to propose a takeover bid or business combination 
with Certicom in order for the relevant section in the Ontario Securities Act to apply.277  On 
those facts, the Commission’s second argument for founding a special relationship too had to 
fail. 
Concerning the third argument, the Commission took note of the fact that RIM had an ongoing 
business relationship with Certicom since May of 2000, as it was then that RIM first started to 
license Certicom’s toolkits.  They had furthermore engaged in business when discussing the 
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possibility of an acquisition in the period following the initial meeting in February 2007.  The 
Commission found that the fact that RIM had been licensing Certicom’s technology since the 
year 2000 was not a sufficient basis on which to conclude that Donald was in a special 
relationship with Certicom.278 
The fourth and fifth arguments of the Commission to found a special relationship were dealt 
with shortly.  As to the fourth, the Commission found that, had it found that RIM was proposing 
to make a takeover bid for Certicom or proposing to enter into some other business relationship 
with Certicom, it would have concluded that Donald, as an officer and employee of RIM, was 
in a special relationship with Certicom.  As it, however, found that RIM was not in a special 
relationship with Certicom, it followed, according to the Commission, that it could not be 
concluded that Donald was in a special relationship with Certicom in his capacity as an officer 
or employee of RIM.279  Donald could also not be held liable as a tippee as Wormald was not 
in a special relationship with Certicom.280 
The Commission therefore found that Donald also did not stand in a special relationship with 
Certicom.  Should the wording of the Act, and its requirement for insider trading liability, or 
quasi insider trading liability, have been applied strictly, this should have been the end of the 
matter.  The Commission, however, did not stop there.  It was argued before the Commission 
that it had ‘public interest jurisdiction’ to make an order under the Ontario Securities Act 
‘regardless of whether there had been a breach of the Act.’.281  This argument was based on 
‘the principle that market participants should conduct themselves ethically and honestly’.282  
Despite the fact that Donald could not be found to have stood in some sort of special 
                                                 
278  Re Donald par. 239. 
279  Re Donald par. 240. 
280  Re Donald par. 242. 
281  Re Donald par. 289.  This argument was based on what was found in Re Canadian Tire Corp (1987) 
10 O.S.C.B. 857 and Re Biovail Corp (2010) 33 O.S.C.B. 8914. 
282  Re Donald par. 289. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 75 
 
relationship with the issuer, it was argued, his conduct was contrary to the public interest.283  
Among other things, Donald’s behaviour was said to fall below the ‘standard of ethical 
behaviour required of market participants’284 and that: 
Donald’s purchases of Certicom shares caused harm to the integrity of Ontario capital 
markets in general because he was an officer of a reporting issuer and a market 
participant who knew or should have known not to purchase Certicom shares in the 
circumstances. . . .  Donald made these purchases when he had information that the 
market did not have and his conduct accordingly lessened the confidence of the 
investing public in the marketplace, and is therefore a matter of public concern.285  
(Emphasis added.) 
The Commission concluded that although it did not technically find a breach of section 76(1) 
of the Ontario Securities Act, Donald’s purchases of the Certicom shares called for the 
application of the fundamental principles of securities regulation and the purposes of the 
Ontario Securities Act.  For even though there was no special relationship between Donald and 
the issuer, ‘[his] conduct was abusive of the capital markets and to confidence in the capital 
markets’.286 
The Commission’s finding is a clear recognition of the fiduciary doctrine and the 
misappropriation theories’ failure in regulating insider trading in the capital markets.  It 
recognises that a different theory, which prohibits all ‘conduct abusive of the capital markets 
and to confidence in the capital markets’, is required for the regulation of insider trading. 
In my submission, the misappropriation theory fails to provide a basis for the regulation of 
insider trading for the same reason the fiduciary duty doctrine fails to do so: both seek to 
address a market wrong by finding the unlawfulness of the conduct they seek to prohibit 
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outside of the market.  Both bases for regulation require artificial legal reasoning to connect a 
breach of duty unrelated to the market, to harm done to investors in the market and the market 
itself.287  For instance, if one were to recognise a civil action by an aggrieved trader, what 
would be his cause of action?  According to the misappropriation theory, the wrong was done 
to the source of the information.  The theory operates by holding x liable for an act that harmed 
y, whereas the wrongfulness is found in a breach of duty owed to z.  At most one could say 
that trading on misappropriated information is indirectly harmful to confidence in the financial 
markets, but this does not give the aggrieved trader an action – it merely affords an action to 
the regulatory body responsible for seeing to the integrity of the market.  It is a roundabout 
way of trying to ensure relatively equal access to information to all traders in the financial 
markets.  It brings at least some respite to fiduciary ‘doctrinal rigidity’.288 
The misappropriation theory was, however, never conceived or formulated with the object of 
creating a self-standing basis of regulation by a legislature seeking to address a market wrong.  
At most, the misappropriation theory can be seen as a corollary of the fiduciary doctrine,289 
but it is most properly seen as a compromise between the fiduciary doctrine and the equal 
access to information theory.290  As it has been said, it was rather born out of among other 
things a judicial obstinacy in not recognising a market-based theory to serve as the regulatory 
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basis for trading on inside information enactments.  Indeed, it could be said that it is purely the 
United States Supreme Court’s obstinacy, working through its strong influence on other 
jurisdictions in securities market law, that has contributed most to the convoluted state of 
insider trading law in Commonwealth countries.  It has led our legislative provisions, as others 
in the world, to be left stuck with one foot in the fiduciary duty doctrine and one foot in the 
misappropriation theory. 
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2 2 3 Reluctance to accept a market theory 
Unites States jurisprudence, including the judgments of its Supreme Court, evidences an 
obstinacy in accepting a market-based theory for the regulation of insider trading.291  The 
country’s jurisprudence is also testament to the anomalous results the fiduciary doctrine and 
the misappropriation theory give rise to. 
2 2 3 1  In Re Cady, Roberts & Co292 
In the SEC opinion in the matter of Cady, Roberts & Co (Cady, Roberts), the SEC dealt with 
an application to suspend a stockbroker from operating on a securities exchange.  The matter 
involved a selling stockbroker who traded for the accounts of others, including that of his wife.  
The question the commission considered was: what is required of a stockbroker (not a director 
or an officer of an issuing firm) when he receives inside information from a director employed 
by the same brokerage firm as the stockbroker? 
The proceedings were brought on the strength of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
and Rule 10b-5.  The impugned trading was that of Cady, Roberts & Co and more specifically 
one of its brokers, and a partner in the firm, Gintel.  In November of 1959, one Hurley, then 
                                                 
291  For the intellectual history of insider trading regulation in the United States see S M Bainbridge “Insider 
Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud” 
(1999) 52 SMU L Rev 1589; Langevoort (1999) Colum L Rev 1319; Langevoort (1995) Del J Corp L 
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292  In the matter of Cady, Roberts & Co 40 SEC 907 (1961).  For academic reactions to the decision see F 
A Daum & H W Phillips “The implications of Cady, Roberts” (1962) 17 Bus Law 939; E V Hines “A 
New Concept of Fraud on the Securities Exchange – A Comment on In Re Cady Roberts & Co.” (1962) 
15 SCL Rev 557; J M Whitney “Section 10b-5: From Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of 
Disclosure” (1965) 21 Bus Law 193.  For a discussion on the ideology underlying the SEC’s decision 
and the effect of the decision in general, see Langevoort (1990) Colum L Rev 1319 and C W Davis 
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(2004) 35 Seton Hall L Rev 263. 
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president of the board of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, invited representatives of the press, 
the United States military, and financial and business institutions for the public unveiling of a 
then new type of internal combustion engine the company had developed.  On 24 November 
1959 announcements about the new engine were made in the media.  Demand for Curtis-
Wright stock rose and its New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) share price rose considerably 
throughout the day. 
Of the 88 700 Curtis-Wright shares traded from 3 November 1959 through to the 23rd, Gintel 
had purchased approximately 11 000 shares.  Gintel was purchasing for certain discretionary 
accounts of customers of Cady, Roberts & Co.  After the rise in price on 24 November, he 
began selling the shares.  On the morning of the 25th, the Curtis-Wright directors met to 
consider the declaration of a quarterly dividend.  Sometime after the directors had decided to 
declare a lesser dividend than that declared in the immediately preceding quarters, a party to 
the directors’ meeting phoned Gintel and informed him of the decision.  Gintel proceeded to 
enter two further large sale orders for execution on the NYSE. 
In delivering its opinion, the SEC summarised the United States disclose or abstain rule, as 
follows: 
An affirmative duty to disclose material information has been traditionally imposed on 
corporate ‘insiders’, particularly officers, directors or controlling shareholders.  We, 
and the courts, have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which 
are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with 
whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.  Failure 
to make disclosure in these circumstances constitute a violation of the anti-fraud 
provisions.  If, on the other hand, disclosure prior to affecting a purchase or sale would 
be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to 
forgo the transaction.293 
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The Commission found both Gintel and Cady, Roberts & Co, in its capacity as Gintel’s 
employer, guilty of a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Importantly, in coming to its 
conclusion, it rejected Cady, Roberts & Co’s contentions that an insiders’ responsibilities are 
limited to existing stockholders and that an insider owes no special duties to non-stockholders.  
The Commission found that: 
[that] approach is too narrow.  It ignores the plight of the buying public – wholly 
unprotected from the misuse of special information.  Neither the statutes nor rule 10b-
5 establish an artificial wall of responsibility. . . . There is no valid reason why persons 
who purchase stock from an officer, director or other person having the responsibilities 
of an ‘insider’ should not have the same protection afforded by disclosure of special 
information as persons who sell the stock to them.  Whatever distinction may have 
existed at common law based on the view that an officer or director may stand in a 
fiduciary duty relationship to existing stockholders from whom he purchases but not 
the members of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to introduce 
these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities acts.294  
(Emphasis added.) 
The language used in Cady, Roberts pointed to an acceptance of the fact that one does not 
necessarily require a fiduciary relationship in order to found liability for trading on inside 
information.  The Commission relied on two factors to impose the duty to disclose on the 
corporate insiders: 1) ‘. . . access . . . to information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone’; and 2) the premise that it is inherently 
unfair to trade on information that is inaccessible to those with whom one is dealing.295 
The SEC’s opinion in Cady, Roberts was an important step in the development of the United 
States jurisprudence on insider trading.  Firstly, it was credited with the formulation of the 
‘disclose-or-abstain’ rule.  In essence the rule provides that, when in possession of inside 
information about shares in which an insider wants to trade, he must either disclose this 
information to a counterparty to a trade or abstain from trading.  Secondly, and more 
importantly for the purposes of this thesis, it was held that a broker-dealer and his firm, not 
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owing any fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the shares they traded in, violated section 
10(b), by selling the securities on the strength of undisclosed information received from a 
director of the issuer corporation.296  If the judgment is seen as a step toward the acceptance of 
a market theory of regulation in the United States,297 the journey has never been completed.  
The United States Supreme Court did not accept the reasoning in Cady, Roberts as it will be 
seen. 
2 2 3 2  SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur298 
The SEC’s approach in Cady, Roberts was, however, accepted and applied by the United States 
Court for the Second Circuit in SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur.299  The charge against Texas Gulf 
Sulphur (TGS) and several of its officers, directors, and employees, was essentially that they 
had traded with, encouraged to trade on, tipped and accepted inside information relating to 
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297  See for instance In re Blyth & Co 43 SEC 1037 (1969) where the principles set out in Cady, Roberts 
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Rev 944; A R Bromberg “Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?” (1973) 29 Bus Law 167; P M Nielson “So 
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drilling test results.  TGS began exploring the possibilities of mining on the Canadian Shield 
in 1957.  In the beginning of 1959 a group, including many of the defendants in the case, 
conducted aerial geophysical surveys over a large part of this area.  They found numerous 
anomalies, including extraordinary variations in the conductivity of rocks on a piece of land 
known as the Kidd 55 segment. 
The findings roused interest, and in October 1963 the men were back to conduct further tests 
on certain sections of Kidd 55.  They drilled, and large deposits of minerals were found.  TGS 
was therefore convinced that they had to acquire the remainder of the Kidd 55 segment.  In 
order to facilitate the purchase, the president of TGS instructed the group of explorers to keep 
the results of their drilling confidential.  As soon as TGS’s land acquisition plans had advanced 
far enough, the company resumed drilling.  Those who knew of the rich deposits and TGS’s 
success in securing the land, purchased TGS shares and share call options.  The court reasoned 
as follows: 
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the 
investing public or, . . . [if] he chooses not to do so, he must abstain from trading in or 
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains 
undisclosed.300  (Emphasis added) 
And, that:  
[b]y [the 1934] Act Congress proposed to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and 
to insure fairness in securities transactions and generally, whether face-to-face, over the 
counter or on exchanges . . . . [T]he Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation 
of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have 
relatively equal access to material information. . . .  The essence of the Rule is that 
anyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corporation has access, 
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone may not take advantage of such 
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.301  (Citations 
omitted and emphasis added.) 
                                                 
300  SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (1968) 848. 
301  Ibid. 
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With this endorsement of the equal access to information theory, a market related theory 
described below, the SEC pursued a more vigorous prosecution against non-traditional insiders 
trading on inside information.302  The United States Supreme Court stepped in, rejected the 
equal access theory and adopted a much narrower fiduciary duty standard in Chiarella v United 
States303 and Dirks v SEC.304  After these two decisions the United States legislative prohibition 
on insider trading was limited to traditional corporate insiders and certain tippees.  If 
confidence in the capital markets were the SEC’s main objective and that confidence were 
dependent on the prohibition of all trading on inside information, these two decisions severely 
hampered the SEC in pursuing its main objective.305 
2 2 3 3  Chiarella v United States 
Chiarella v United States306 deals with an ‘outsider’s’ liability for trading on material non-
public information.  The case presented the Supreme Court of the United States with the 
                                                 
302  Kunkel (1989) J Contemp L 51; R M Phillips & R J Zutz “The insider trading doctrine: a need for 
legislative repair” (1984) 13 Hofstra L Rev 65 74; and Investors Management Co 44 SEC 633 (1971) 
and United States v Chiarella 588 F 2d 1358 (1978). 
303  445 US 222 (1980). 
304  463 US 646 (1983). 
305  See for example SEC v Switzer 590 F Supp 756 (W.D. Okla 1984) and United States v Reed 601 F Supp 
685 (SDNY 1985). 
306  445 US 222 (1980) (Chiarella).  For discussions of the case see K C Feffer “Chiarella v United States” 
(1981) 15 Loy LAL Rev 177; W A Cann “A Duty to Disclose – An Analysis of Chiarella v United 
States” (1980) 85 Dick L Rev 249; M T Galero “Drawing the line on insiders and outsiders for rule 10b-
5: Chiarella v United States” (1981) 4 Harv JL. & Pub. Pol’y 203; H Heller “Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-
3 and Dirks: Fairness v Economic Theory” (1981) 37 Bus Law 517; P E Stem “Chiarella v United 
States: The Supreme Court’s Common Law Catch to Market Insider Liability under 10b-5” (1980) 14 
J Marshall L Rev 847; T L Hazen “United States v Chestman – Trading in Securities on the Basis of 
Nonpublic Information in Advance of a Tender Offer” (1991) 57 Brook L Rev 595; J R Macey “Good 
finance, bad economics: an analysis of the fraud-on-the-market theory” (1989) 42 Stand L Rev 1059; 
G Schneider “Chiarella v United States: An analysis of judicial approaches to the regulation of business 
conduct” (1981) 17 New Eng L Rev 61; B B Aldave “Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its 
Aftermath” (1988) 49 Ohio St LJ 373; A G Anderson “Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading” (1981–
1982) 10 Hofstra L Rev 341; J D Cox “Choices Paving the Road Toward a ‘Definition’ of Insider 
Trading” (1987–1988) 39 Ala L Rev 381; D C Langevoort “Words from on high about rule 10b-5: 
Chiarella’s history, Central Bank’s Future” (1995) 20 Del J Corp L 865. 
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opportunity to confirm the equal access approach set upon in Cady, Roberts & Co and Texas 
Gulf Sulphur.  The court did not do so.  Instead it restricted the basis of liability for trading 
with inside information, holding that there is no ‘general duty between all participants in 
market transactions to forgo actions based on material non-public information’307 and that such 
a duty ‘only arises from a specific relationship between two parties’.308 
Chiarella was a printer by trade.  In the mid-70s he worked as a ‘mark-up man’ in the 
composing room of a New York financial publications printer.  Among the documents that 
Chiarella came across, were five announcements of corporate takeover bids.  The identities of 
the acquiring and target corporations were concealed in the documents with which Chiarella 
dealt.  Names were redacted or replaced with false names.  The true names were sent to the 
printer only on the night of the final printing of the announcements. 
Chiarella nevertheless managed to find out the names of the target companies before the final 
printing, by deducing the names of the relevant corporations from other information in the 
documents.  He then purchased shares in the target companies and, as soon as the financial 
publication containing the takeover announcements was published, he sold his shares, realising 
a handsome profit.309  An SEC investigation followed, Chiarella was brought to trial, and he 
was convicted on all 17 counts of violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and 
Rule 10b-5.  His convictions were affirmed on appeal.310  The United States Supreme Court, 
however, reversed. 
Chiarella had traded on the information he gathered from documents received in the course of 
his employment and, when he traded, he traded on information that his counterparty had no 
                                                 
307  Chiarella 233. 
308  Ibid. 
309  Ibid. 224.  It is recorded in the judgment that Chiarella realised a gain of more than $30 000 in the 
course of 14 months.  
310  588 F 2d 1358 (1978). 
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lawful means to obtain.  He was not what is generally understood as a ‘corporate insider’ and 
he had not received any confidential information from any of the target companies.  Was 
Chiarella subject to an affirmative duty to disclose the information he held before trading?  Or, 
did the United States’ law recognise a broader duty, one that required Chiarella to make 
disclosure to the counterparties to his trades? 
The trial court and the court of appeal thought that United States law recognised such a broader 
duty.  In the trial court the jury had been instructed that Chiarella owed a duty to everyone, 
indeed to the market as a whole, along equal access lines.  All the jury had to decide was 
whether Chiarella traded using material, non-public information at a time when he was aware 
of the fact that other people trading in the market did not have access to the same 
information.311  The jury answered in the affirmative. 
The court of appeal affirmed the conviction and reasoned along the same lines.  It held that 
‘anyone—corporate insider or not—who regularly receives material non-public information 
may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to 
disclose’.312  It held that the United States federal securities laws had ‘created a system 
providing equal access to information necessary for reasonable and intelligent investment 
decisions’.313  (Emphasis added.)  Chiarella was found guilty of contravening the rules of that 
system. 
The United States Supreme Court strictly applied section 10(b).  It held that the proposition, 
supposedly found in the lower courts’ reasoning, that ‘[t]he use by anyone of material 
information not generally available is fraudulent … because such information gives certain 
                                                 
311  Chiarella 231. 
312  United States v Chiarella 588 F 2d 1358 (1978) 1365. 
313  Ibid. 1362. 
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buyers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers’,314 unacceptable.  Firstly, it 
held that not all forms of ‘financial unfairness’ constituted fraud.  Secondly, it reasoned that 
one of the elements required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to disclose—was absent.315  
Chiarella owed no duty to the sellers of the securities in the target companies, found the court, 
as he was in no way connected to them nor had he any prior dealings with them.316  Indeed, his 
trades were acceptable as, ‘[h]e was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person 
in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence.  He was, in fact, a complete stranger 
who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions’.317  The court wrote: 
We cannot affirm petitioner’s conviction without recognising a general duty between 
all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material non-public 
information.  The formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from the 
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties … 
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent. 
It held itself bound by the language of the statute, its legislative history and the congressional 
intent behind it, for ‘neither Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-
information rule’.318  The United States Congress’s careful conduct in the area of insider 
trading and the use of material non-public information was, it found, in contrast with the broad 
rule of liability that had been accepted by the lower courts in the case.319 
                                                 
314  That is not the equal access to information theory I am arguing for.  That summation would be better 
suited to a theory calling for information parity. 
315  Chiarella 232. 
316  Ibid. 
317  Ibid. 232–233. 
318  Ibid. 233.  The court held that instead of such a parity of information rule, the ‘problems caused by 
misuse of market information have been addressed by detailed and sophisticated regulation that 
recognizes when the use of market information may not harm operation of securities markets’.  At that 
time it gave the Williams Act as an example of such ‘sophisticated regulation’.  The Williams Act 
permitted a tender offer to purchase only 5% of the target company’s stock prior to the disclosure of its 
plan for acquisition. 
319  Ibid. 234. 
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Justice Stevens, in his separate concurring judgment, agreed with the finding that Chiarella 
owed no duty of disclosure to the sellers of the shares and further agreed with the majority of 
the court’s finding that it was not open to the court to enter into the enquiry of whether the 
breach of a duty to Chiarella’s employer could found liability under section 10(b).  Justice 
Stevens concluded his judgment with the following remark: 
I write simply to emphasize the fact that we have not necessarily placed any stamp of 
approval on what this petitioner did, nor have we held that similar actions must be 
considered lawful in the future.  Rather, we have merely held that petitioner’s criminal 
conviction cannot rest on the theory that he breached a duty he did not owe.320 
Justice Brennan, in a separate judgment, concurred with the majority’s holding that a duty to 
disclose did not arise from the mere possession of non-public material information.321  He, 
however, agreed with dissenting Chief Justice Berger’s statement of the United States 
substantive law that a person violated section 10(b) whenever he ‘improperly obtains or 
converts to his own benefit non-public information’, which he then used to enable him to 
profitable trade in shares.322 
Chief Justice Berger held that the jury instructions, being that the use of material non-public 
information in this case was enough to found liability, properly founded a violation of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  As a point of departure, the Justice noted that neither party to an arm’s 
length business transaction has an obligation to disclose information to the other unless the 
parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation to one another.  Accordingly, a 
businessman is permitted to capitalise on his experience and skill in securing and evaluating 
                                                 
320  Ibid. 238. 
321  Ibid. 238–239. 
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relevant information.323  His advantage, however, should be the result of hard work, careful 
analysis and astute forecasting.324 
But this rule that experienced and learned individuals should be allowed to reap the rewards 
of their expertise and learning cannot, according to Justice Berger, mean that those in the know 
have an unfettered right to trade with those that are not.  The rule should be limited in its scope: 
‘the rule should give way when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior 
experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means’.325  Therefore, held Justice 
Berger, ‘a person who has misappropriated non-public information has an absolute duty to 
disclose that information or to refrain from trading’.326  The Justice pointed out that the broad 
language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 negated the majority’s suggestion that the United 
States Congress’s concern was limited to trading by ‘corporate insiders’.  An investor who 
purchased securities on the basis of misappropriated information possessed an undue trading 
advantage, which served no useful function except self-enrichment at the expense of others.327 
Justice Blackmun,328 also finding it necessary to write, found that it was unnecessary to base 
Chiarella’s conviction on a ‘misappropriation theory’.  The Justice held that he would have 
been willing to convict Chiarella even if he had not been guilty of ‘stealing’ the information 
and even if Chiarella had obtained the information with his employer’s blessing.  For he held 
                                                 
323  Ibid. 239–240. 
324  Ibid. 240. 
325  Ibid. 240.  Justice Burger, in making this point, quotes a passage from W P Keeton “Fraud – 
Concealment and Non-Disclosure” (1936) 3 Texas L Rev 25–26 where the author deals with United 
States law on the subject.  I repeat the quote here:  
 [T]he way in which the buyer acquires the information which he conceals from the vendor should 
be a material circumstance.  The information might have been acquired as a result of his bringing 
to bear a superior knowledge, intelligence, skill or technical judgment; it might have been acquired 
by mere chance; or it might have been acquired by means of some tortious action on his part . . .  
Any time information is acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should be a duty to 
disclose that information. (Emphasis that of Justice Burger.) 
326  Chiarella 240. 
327  Ibid. 242. 
328  Justice Marshall concurred in Justice Blackmun’s opinion. 
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that Chiarella’s ‘brand of manipulative trading, with or without such approval, lies close to the 
heart of what the securities laws are intended to prohibit’.329  Justice Blackmun took a bold 
step towards a market-based theory of regulation.  He wrote: 
The Court continues to pursue a course, charted in certain decisions, designed to 
transform section 10(b) from an intentionally elastic “catchall” provision to one that 
catches relatively little of the misbehaviour that too often makes investment in 
securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor.  Such confinement in 
this case is now achieved by imposition of a requirement of a “special relationship” 
akin to fiduciary duty before the statute gives rise to a duty to disclose or to abstain 
from trading upon material, non-public information.330  (Footnotes omitted.)  
The failure to disclose could not amount to a breach of section 10(b) only when the duties 
flowing from a special relationship have been breached.  The majority, according to Justice 
Blackmun, unduly minimised the fact that Chiarella had used information that the honest 
investor, ‘no matter how diligently he tried’, could not obtain by employing legal means.  
Chiarella had access to material information and he knew the information was unavailable to 
those with whom he dealt.  He took the full and, for all intents and purposes, zero-risk 
advantage by selling the stock shortly after the takeover bid was announced.  For that and for 
that alone, found Justice Blackmun, should he be held liable for his conduct. 
Chiarella is said to have changed the once prevailing understanding of the United States 
disclose or abstain rule, to have given greater clarity to United States insider trading theory 
and to have narrowed the scope of its applicability.331  Yet, in effect, it was a judgment in 
which the Supreme Court failed properly to answer pressing questions surrounding the failings 
of the classic fiduciary and misappropriation insider trading theories.332  It could have taken a 
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progressive step in regulating insider trading.  Instead, Justice Blackmun cut a lone figure on 
the otherwise fiduciary-duty minded Bench. 
According to Branson333 many viewed the United States founding legislative enactments on 
insider trading as being based on the idea that all participants in the securities markets must be 
on the same ‘potential informational footing’.334  The enactments, specifically Rule 10b-5, 
were supposed to be a great leveller.  They were to promote public confidence in the ability of 
investors, especially individual investors, to participate in the securities market on an equal 
footing to their more sophisticated counterparties.335  According to this view, Chiarella was a 
missed opportunity for the Supreme Court to recognise as much.336  The court, instead, 
followed its previous judgments on the issue.337 
2 2 3 4  United States v O’Hagan338 
O’Hagan presented the court with a factual scenario wherein no traditional fiduciary duty was 
owed, while all else suggested that O’Hagan should be held liable.  The table was therefore set 
for the United States court to embrace the misappropriation theory.  It obliged. 
                                                 
333  D M Branson “Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule 10b-5 and Insider Trading” 
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334  Branson (1981) Emory LJ 271. 
335  Ibid. 
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337  Ibid. 
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trading after United States v O’Hagan” (1997) 84 Va L Rev 153. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 91 
 
O’Hagan was a partner in a Minnesota law firm, Dorsey & Whitney.  In 1988 a company based 
in London, Grand Metropolitan PLC, retained O’Hagan’s law firm as its local counsel in 
relation to a potential offer for the stock in the Pillsbury Company, a Minnesota corporation.  
O’Hagan was not part of the team within Dorsey & Whitney that represented Grand 
Metropolitan.  Both Dorsey & Whitney and Grand Metropolitan took precautions in keeping 
information relating to the offer confidential.  Less than three months after being appointed by 
Grand Metropolitan, Dorsey & Whitney terminated Grand Metropolitan’s appointment.  Less 
than a month after the termination, Grand Metropolitan announced its offer for Pillsbury’s 
shares. 
While Dorsey & Witney was still representing Grand Metropolitan, O’Hagan began 
purchasing call options for Pillsbury shares.  Each of these options gave him the right to 
purchase a 100 Pillsbury shares at a specified future date.  He continued to make additional 
purchases until he owned more Pillsbury options than any other individual investor in the 
market.  He also purchased a substantial amount of Pillsbury shares.  As soon as Grand 
Metropolitan made its announcement about their impending offer, O’Hagan sold his options 
and shares, realising a healthy profit.339  The SEC alleged that O’Hagan had defrauded his 
employer law firm and its client by using material non-public information about the tender 
offer ‘for his own trading purposes’.340  O’Hagan was convicted by the trial court.  The court 
of appeal overturned, rejecting the misappropriation theory on which the SEC’s case was 
based, setting the table for a Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject.341 
                                                 
339  O’Hagan purchased 2 500 call options as well 5 000 shares.  He bought the shares for $39 a share and 
sold them for $60.  He realised a total profit, selling both the call options and the shares, of more than 
$4.3 million.  See the Supreme Court’s judgment at 647–648. 
340  O’Hagan 648. 
341  The case also dealt with the promulgation of Rule 14e-3.  This discussion will, however, be limited to 
the court’s reasoning in relation to O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory convictions. 
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal, holding O’Hagan liable for 
his trading in Pillsbury stock.  It expressly held that liability under section 10(b) may be 
predicated on the misappropriation theory.342  Carefully distinguishing the two theories, and 
relying on the reasoning in Chiarella, the court held that under the traditional or classical 
fiduciary duty theory of United States insider trading liability, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
are not violated only when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation.343  It 
drew the net wider; it held that the classical theory applies not only to officers, directors, and 
other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants, consultants, and 
others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation.344 
The court defined the misappropriation theory, and its relationship with the fiduciary theory, 
as follows: 
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connection with” 
a securities transaction, and thereby violates section 10(b) and rule 10(b)5, when he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a 
duty owed to the source of the information. . . .  Under this theory, a fiduciary’s 
undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, 
in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive 
use of that information.  In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship 
between a company insider and a purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the 
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of 
those who entrusted him with access to confidential information. 
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalise on non-
public information through the purchase or sale of securities.  The classical theory 
targets a corporate insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider 
transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of non-public 
information by a corporate outsider in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but 
to the source of the information.  The misappropriation theory is thus designed to 
protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by outsiders to a 
corporation who have access to confidential information that will affect the 
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corporation’s security price when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to 
that corporation’s shareholders.345 
In Chiarella it was held that no ‘general duty between all participants in market transactions 
to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information’346 existed.  A duty arises only from 
a specific relationship between two parties.  The wrongfulness of O’Hagan’s conduct was to 
be found in the breach of the duty of trust and confidence that he owed to his law firm and to 
its clients.  He traded on information about Grand Metropolitan’s planned offer for Pillsbury 
shares.347  His wrongfulness was not found in the duty he owed to his fellow traders in the 
share market not to trade with information to which they could not legally have had access. 
The court remarked that the misappropriation theory was ‘well-tuned’ to a purpose of the 
United States Securities Exchange Act: ‘to ensure honest securities markets and thereby 
promote investor confidence.’  It held that: 
Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely 
would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on 
misappropriated non-public information is unchecked by law.  An investor’s 
information disadvantage vis-à-vis a misappropriator with material non-public 
information stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be 
overcome with research or skill.  If the market is thought to be systematically populated 
with . . . transactors trading on the basis of misappropriated information some investors 
will refrain from dealing all together, and others will incur costs to avoid dealing with 
such transactors or corruptly overcome their unerodable informational disadvantage.348 
It had not been pleaded nor had it been argued that the equal access theory would serve that 
purpose better.  Nor was it explained how holding only certain persons liable for trading on 
                                                 
345  Ibid. 652–653. 
346  Chiarella 233. 
347  O’Hagan 653–654. 
348  O’Hagan 659. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 94 
 
inside information and leaving others (who do not owe a duty to the source nor a duty to the 
companies’ securities in which he is trading), free to trade would promote investor confidence. 
2 2 3 5  United States v Carpenter 
The insistence on the misappropriation and fiduciary theory has given rise to strange results.  
There is no better example of this than some of the conclusions reached, although in obiter 
dicta, by the United States Second Circuit in United States v Carpenter.349  Winans and Felis 
were charged and found guilty under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for misappropriating 
material, non-public information from The Wall Street Journal.  Winans was a Wall Street 
Journal reporter.  He was one of the writers of a widely read and influential column in the 
journal, ‘Heard on the Street’.  Carpenter worked as a news clerk at the journal.  Felis was a 
stockbroker at a brokerage house.  Their main defence to the charges against them was that 
they had not been corporate insiders or quasi-insiders, nor had they misappropriated inside 
information from insiders or quasi-insiders.350 
The Dow Jones, the parent company of The Wall Street Journal, had a firm policy on possible 
conflict of interest violations by its employees.  It distributed a forty-page manual, with a total 
of seven pages devoted to conflicts of interest, to all its new employees.  Winans and Carpenter 
were found to have known that the company policy deemed all information learnt by an 
employee during the course of its employment to be company property and that the company 
required employees to treat non-public information learnt through their employment as 
confidential. 
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Winans and his co-conspirators did not heed the prohibitions in the company’s policy 
document.  Instead, they provided stockbrokers with securities related information that was 
scheduled to appear in ‘Heard on the Street’.  The stockbrokers would use this information to 
purchase and sell the subject securities.  It was common cause that the contents of the column 
had an influence on the price of securities traded in the market.351 
The question before the court was could a newspaper reporter, a former newspaper clerk and 
a stockbroker, not one either a true insider of the company or a tippee of a true insider, be 
found guilty of trading on inside information?  It was clear that Winans had breached a duty 
of confidentiality to his employer by misappropriating the confidential ‘prepublication’ 
information, which he learned in the course of his employment.352  Did it, however, amount to 
a contravention of section 10b-5, the United States insider trading section?  Winans argued 
that he could not be held liable under the misappropriation theory as it applied only to insiders 
and quasi-insiders.  He argued that it was not enough that he breached a duty of confidentiality 
to his employer in misappropriating and trading on material non-public information.  
According to him, a breach of a duty to the corporation or its shareholders in which he traded 
would have to be shown. 
The court held that United States law prohibits the misappropriation of information not only 
by insiders, but also by others.353  It held that liability arose for the mere fact that one 
misappropriates non-public information and trades on that information to his advantage.  The 
rule was not purely aimed at trading on inside information by corporate insiders.354  The court 
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referred with approval to ‘the commonsensical view that trading on the basis of improperly 
obtained information undermined the prophylactic intent of the securities laws’.355 
The court held that an employee’s unlawful misappropriation from an employer of material 
non-public information was indeed prohibited by section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  It found 
further that Winans and his conspirators were liable for ‘secreting, stealing, purloining or 
otherwise misappropriating material non-public information in breach of an employer-
imposed fiduciary duty of confidentiality’.356  Still, it was willing to accept that if it were 
Winans’s employers trading, they would not have been held liable.  It wrote as follows: 
Appellants argue that it is anomalous to hold an employee liable for acts that his 
employer could lawfully commit.  Admittedly, . . . [the] Wall Street Journal or its 
parent, Dow Jones Company, might perhaps lawfully disregard its own confidentiality 
policy by trading in the stock of companies to be discussed in forthcoming articles. . . .  
Although the employer may perhaps wilfully destroy its own reputation, its employees 
should be and are barred from destroying their employer’s reputation by 
misappropriating their employer’s informational property. . . .  Here, appellants, 
constrained by the employer’s confidentiality policy, could not lawfully trade by 
fraudulently violating that policy even if the journal, the employer imposing the policy, 
might not be said to defraud itself should it make its own trades.357 
To be sure, Carpenter was decided in 1986.  However, it is accepted that nothing said there is 
at odds with the current-day leading decision of O’Hagan.358  The misappropriation theory 
prohibits undisclosed trading in breach of a duty of loyalty to a principal; it does not prohibit 
the principal from trading on the same information. 
                                                 
355  Ibid., referring to what was said in SEC v Musella 578 F Supp 425 (SDNY 1984) 438. 
356  Carpenter 1031. 
357  Ibid. 1033–1034. 
358  Bainbridge (2010) J Corp L 2010. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 97 
 
2 2 3 6  Dirks v SEC359 
United States insider trading law, like South African insider trading law, recognises the 
concept of tipper and tippee liability, which I discuss in more depth in the insider chapter.360  
A tippee is a person who receives inside information from a tipper.  A tipper is a person who 
passes on inside information.  The main tippee liability case in the United States is Dirks v 
SEC.361  There the Supreme Court of the United States held that the mere receipt of confidential 
information from an insider does not impose a disclose or abstain duty on the recipient of the 
information.  A tippee can be held liable only if he knowingly collaborates with a tipper in 
breach of a duty.  The tippee’s liability depends on a breach of duty by the tipper.  The 
reasoning in Dirks is testament to the theoretical difficulties courts run into when they are 
confronted with applying a fiduciary or misappropriation duty-based theory to insider trading 
regulation. 
Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer firm who specialised in providing 
investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors.362  He received 
information from one Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding America.  Secrist told Dirks 
that Equity Funding’s assets were substantially overvalued as a result of corporate 
                                                 
359  463 US 646 (1983) (Dirks). 
360  See p. 275 et seq. below. 
361  Ibid.  For discussions of this judgment see B A Hiler “Dirks v SEC – A Study in Cause and Effect” 
(1984) 43 Md L Rev 22; H Heller “Chiarella, SEC rule 14e-3 and Dirks: Fairness v economic theory” 
(1981) 37 Bus Law 517; D R Fischel “Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis 
of Dirks v Securities and Exchange Commission” (1984) 13 Hofstra L Rev 127; M A Tripp “Access, 
Efficiency, and Fairness in Dirks v SEC” (1984) 60 Ind LJ 535; G Wang “Dirks v Securities and 
Exchange Commission: An Outsider’s Guide to Insider Trading Liability under Rule 10b-5” (1985) 22 
Am Bus L J 569; H Harp “Outsider Trading after Dirks v SEC” (1983) 18 Ga L Rev 593; M Farley “A 
Current Look at the Law of Insider Trading” (1983) 39 Bus Law 1771; G R Andre “Constructive Insider 
Liability and the Arm’s Length Transaction under Footnote 14 of Dirks” (1983) 52 Geo Wash L Rev 
872; R E Ratliff “Securities: Dirks v SEC – When insiders talk, should you listen” (1984) 37 Okla L 
Rev 194; and K Donelli “Dirks v SEC: New Guidelines for Tippee Liability under Rule 10b-54” (1983) 
4 Pace L Rev 631.  
362  The facts are stated here as they were accepted and recorded in the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 
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malpractices, and urged him to look into the matter.  Dirks investigated the allegations.  He 
visited Equity Funding’s headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and 
employees of the corporation.  Equity Funding’s senior management denied any wrongdoing, 
but some of its employees corroborated the charges of fraud.  Neither Dirks nor his firm owned 
any Equity Funding shares.  Throughout his investigation he openly discussed the information 
he had obtained with a number of clients and investors.  Some of these persons, including five 
investment advisers, sold more than $16 million worth of Equity Funding’s shares. 
While Dirks was busy with the investigation he also contacted The Wall Street Journal, urging 
them to write a story on the Equity Funding fraud.  The journal declined for fear that the 
publication might be libellous.  That notwithstanding, in the two-week period Dirks was busy 
with his investigation, and spreading word of the fraud, Equity Funding’s share price nearly 
halved.  This led to the New York Stock Exchange halting trading in its stock and the California 
insurance authorities impounding Equity Funding’s financial and other records.  Widespread 
evidence of the fraud was found.  The SEC filed a complaint against Equity Funding and The 
Wall Street Journal published a front-page story based to a large degree on the information 
assembled by Dirks. 
The SEC also began an investigation against Dirks.  He was found guilty of aiding and abetting 
the contravention of section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 by repeating the allegations of fraud to 
members of the investment community, who consequently sold their Equity Funding stock.  
The SEC concluded:  
Where “tippees” – regardless of their motivation or occupation – come into possession 
of material corporate information that they know is confidential and know or should 
know that it came from a corporate insider, they must either publicly disclose that 
information or refrain from trading.363 
                                                 
363  As quoted in Dirks par 651. 
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Dirks appealed to the District Court of Columbia, but lost.  The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari ‘in view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities industry’ of the 
question presented by the case.364  The court referred to Chiarella and its insistence on the 
requirement of a specific relationship between a buyer and a seller of shares before a duty to 
disclose is established.  It wrote:  
This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual 
trading on inside information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC and the 
courts in policing tippees who trade on inside information.  Unlike insiders who have 
independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical 
tippee has no such relationship.  In view of this absence, it has been unclear how a 
tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from trading on inside information.’ 
The court set out to clarify on what basis a tippee could be held liable.  The SEC had argued 
that Dirks was liable as he breached a duty, which he had assumed as a result of knowingly 
receiving confidential information from insiders.  Tippees such as Dirks, so the SECs argument 
went, who knowingly received non-public material information from true insiders, became 
subject to the same duty as the insiders from whom the information had been received.  It 
argued further that to establish a rule that insider-trading liability exists only when information 
is transmitted for an improper purpose, would enable the parties easily to fabricate some 
legitimate business justification for transmitting inside information. 
The court held that the SEC’s theory of tippee liability appeared to be rooted in the idea that 
United States financial market law requires equal information among traders.  The majority of 
the court,365 as in Chiarella, rejected this theory by holding that a duty to disclose arose only 
from a specific relationship between the two trading parties and not merely from the one 
party’s ability to acquire information because of his position in the market.366  Coming to the 
                                                 
364  Dirks 652. 
365  The majority judgment was written by Justice Powell. 
366  Dirks 658. 
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conclusion that the recipients of inside information do not invariably acquire a duty to disclose 
or abstain, the court held that: 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives 
material non-public information from an insider and trades on it could have an 
inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which … is necessary to the 
preservation of a healthy market.  It is commonplace that analysts [gather and analyse 
information] … and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate 
officers.  The analyst’s judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or 
otherwise to clients of the firm.  It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed 
of the markets themselves, that such information cannot be simultaneously available to 
all of the corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.367 
The court did hold that there was a need to ban some tippee trading.  About tippers, it reasoned 
that not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using 
undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but also they may not give such 
information to outsiders for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their 
personal gain.  This is so, held the court, as a contrary rule ‘would open up opportunities for 
devious dealings in the name of others that the trustee could not conduct on his own’.368  The 
tipper represents only one side of the wrong.  Thus, reasoned the court, certain tippees must be 
held to be subject to the insider’s duty to shareholders.  This is so not because of the mere fact 
that they receive inside information, but because the information is made available to them 
improperly.369 Accordingly, held the court: 
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to shareholders of a corporation not to trade on 
material non-public information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty 
to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or 
should know that there has been a breach. . . .  Tipping is thus properly viewed only as 
a means of indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 370  
(Emphasis added.) 
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The court held further that in determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose 
or abstain, it is necessary to determine whether the insider’s tip constituted a breach of his 
fiduciary duty.  All disclosures made by insiders of material, non-public information would 
therefore not be contrary to the fiduciary duty owed by the insider.  It held further that whether 
disclosure is made in breach of a duty will depend, to a large extent, on the ‘purpose of the 
disclosure’.371  So, absent a breach by an insider, there is no derivative breach.372  The tippee 
could not, in other words, be held guilty of knowingly trading on inside information, 
committing a wrong merely as a market participant against other market participants, without 
more. 
The court held that to determine whether the disclosure itself deceives, manipulates or defrauds 
shareholders, the initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.373  
To establish whether a breach occurred requires the assessment of objective criteria such as 
whether the insider receives a benefit, whether it be directly or indirectly, from the disclosure.  
This benefit, according to the court, could for example be for pecuniary gain or a ‘reputational 
benefit’ that will lead to future earnings.374  The court held that there would be objective facts 
and circumstances that often justify such an inference.  What is more, held the court, the 
‘elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of non-public information’ are also present where 
an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a relative or a friend.375 
In Dirks’s case, the court found there had been no actionable violation.  It found that Dirks 
was a stranger to Equity Funding and, as such, had no pre-existing duty to its shareholders.  
                                                 
371  Ibid. 663. 
372  For support for its reasoning, the court cited In re Investors Management Co 44 SEC 633 (1971) 648 
where the commission held that: ‘It is important in this type of case to focus on policing insiders and 
what they do ... rather than on policing information per se and its possession.’ 
373  Dirks 663.  See on this point also V Brudney “Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under 
the Federal Securities Laws” (1979) 93 Harv L Rev 322 348.  The author writes that ‘[t]he theory . . . 
is that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the information to its 
recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself’. 
374  Dirks 663. 
375  Ibid. 664. 
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Dirks had taken no action, either directly or indirectly, that induced the company’s 
shareholders or officers to found trust or confidence in him.  Furthermore, the court found that 
neither Secrist nor any other Equity Funding employee violated a duty to the corporation’s 
shareholders.  The tippers had not received any monetary or personal benefit for revealing 
Equity Funding’s secrets, nor did they make a gift of the information to Dirks.  The court found 
that Dirks had no duty to abstain from the use of the inside information he had obtained and 
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal. 
Justice Blackmun again wrote a minority judgment in which two other members of the court, 
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, concurred.  Justice Blackmun saw the majority’s 
reasoning as placing yet another limit376 on the protections provided to investors under the 
United States section 10(b).  The majority incorporated a special motivational requirement into 
the fiduciary duty doctrine, which was not justified.  It excused the knowing and intentional 
violation of an insider’s duty to shareholders where the insider does not act for personal gain.377 
The minority placed particular emphasis on the fact that Dirks chose to whom to disseminate 
information, selectively disclosing the information to only a few people.  One of Dirks’s first 
actions on becoming aware of Equity Funding’s troubles was to direct his associates at his firm 
to draw up a list of all their clients who were invested in Equity Funding.  As he gathered 
further information, he disclosed it to these clients.  The minority found that Dirks’s attempts 
to disclose information to non-clients were ‘feeble, at best’.  They reasoned that: 
The effect of Dirks’ selective dissemination of Secrist’s information was that Dirks’ 
clients were able to shift the losses that were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud 
from themselves to uninformed market participants. … Dirks [disseminated] 
information to [his] clients, who in turn dumped stock on unknowing purchasers.378 
                                                 
376  See the dissenting opinion in Chiarella. 
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The loss was shifted from those in the know to those not lucky enough to be connected. 
Justice Blackman concluded by finding that Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding’s 
shareholders by communicating the material, non-public information to Dirks with the 
intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that information.  The Court held that 
Dirks was under a duty to make the information publicly available or to refrain from actions 
that he knew would lead to trading.  As he caused his clients to trade, he fell foul of section 
10(b) and Rule 10(b-5).  ‘Any other result,’ said Justice Blackman, ‘is a disservice to [the 
United States’] attempt to provide fair and efficient capital markets’.379 
In the end, however, the majority of the court, albeit in the realm of tippee liability, reaffirmed 
Chiarella’s recognition of the classic insider trading theory as the basis for insider trading 
regulation in the United States.  The court did recognise an extension of insider trading 
liability: the liability of tippees; temporary insiders; and sellers of securities, along with the 
buyers.  But tippees, it was held, could be liable only under a theory of derivative liability; 
only if it were to be found that the tipper breached his fiduciary duty to the company, would 
the tippee be held liable for his trading.380  In this way, the court also extended the fiduciary 
duty owed to ‘temporary insiders’, creating two groups of insiders: permanent or proper 
insiders, such as directors and managers;381 and temporary insiders, such as underwriters, 
accountants, lawyers or consultants working for the corporation.382  Temporary insiders, 
according to the court, are held liable: 
not simply [because] such persons acquired non-public corporate information, but 
rather [because] they have entered into a special relationship in the conduct of the 
                                                 
379  Ibid. 679. 
380  Ibid. 659–60.  Also see M G Dworkin “Misappropriation Theory as a Corollary to the Classic Insider 
Trading Theory” (1996) 1996 Ann Surv Am L 315 327. 
381  Dirks 655. 
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business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate 
purposes.383 
In other words, their liability has nothing to do with a duty between the sellers and purchasers 
in the market as between each other. 
2 2 3 7  United States v Chestman 
In United States v Chestman,384  the relevant duty had to be found in familial relationships.  
Chestman was a stockbroker.  Keith Loeb was a client of Chestman.  Chestman had previously 
assisted Loeb and his wife to consolidate their holdings in Waldbaum Inc (Waldbaum’s).  In 
the course of the transaction Loeb told Chestman that Loeb’s wife was the granddaughter of 
Julia Waldbaum, a member of the board of directors of Waldbaum’s and the wife of its founder.  
Julia Waldbaum was also the mother of Ira Waldbaum, the president and controlling 
shareholder of Waldbaum’s.  For four years Chestman executed several transactions involving 
Waldbaum’s for Loeb.385 
Then Ira Waldbaum agreed to sell the company.  The resulting stock purchase agreement 
required him to tender a controlling block of Waldbaum’s shares to the buyer at a specified 
price.  Ira Waldbaum told his children and all Waldbaum’s employees, of the pending sale two 
days after concluding the agreement, at the same time admonishing them to keep the news 
quiet until the public announcement.  Ira Waldbaum also told his sister, Witkin, and a nephew, 
Karin, and offered to tender their shares along with his controlling block to enable them to 
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avoid the difficulties of tendering after the public announcement.386  He specifically cautioned 
them that the sale was to remain confidential. 
Witkin, however, told her daughter, Susan Loeb.  Witkin warned Susan not to tell anyone 
except her husband, Keith Loeb.  Susan told Keith, warning him not to tell anyone else.  Keith 
duly phoned Chestman, telling him that Waldbaum’s was about to be sold at a price 
substantially higher than market value.  Chestman, in turn, executed several purchases of 
Waldbaum’s shares.  Not only did he buy for his clients, including Loeb, he also bought shares 
for himself.387  Loeb turned state witness. 
To found Chestman’s liability Loeb would have had to be a misappropriator.  The prosecution 
argued that Loeb breached a fiduciary duty to his wife, Susan, and the Waldbaum family when 
he disclosed to Chestman information about the pending tender offer.388  The court 
acknowledged that the relationships involved in the case, those between Keith and Susan Loeb 
and between Keith Loeb and the Waldbaum family, were not that of traditional fiduciary 
relationships.389  It then discussed the misappropriation theory’s requirement of a ‘similar 
relationship of trust and confidence’.390  The court held that, 
the repeated disclosure of business secrets between family members may substitute for 
a factual finding of dependence and influence and thereby sustain a finding of the 
functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.391 
It found that there was insufficient evidence to establish a fiduciary relationship or its 
functional equivalent between Keith Loeb and the Waldbaum family or between Keith and 
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Susan.392  Because Keith owed neither Susan nor the Waldbaum family a fiduciary or some 
sort of equivalent duty, he was not guilty of a Rule 10b-5 contravention by disclosing the 
tender offer news to Chestman.  Absent the duty, held the court, Chestman could not be 
derivatively liable as Loeb’s tippee.393 
2 2 3 8  SEC v Cherif 
A rather tenuous link between the source of the information and the purported breach was 
found in SEC v Cherif.394  In Cherif the United States Seventh Circuit had to found 
misappropriation liability in a situation where the employment relationship of the insider had 
ended.  To this end the court held that even though the employment relationship ends, the duty 
to the source of the information, the employer, does not.  The misappropriation theory’s reach 
was extended to a former employee who had kept his access card and was so able to steal 
business related information.  Cherif was employed in the international financial institutions 
department of First National Bank of Chicago for almost ten years.395  He was retrenched.  
When his employment ended, Cherif kept his access card and managed to keep it activated 
through fraudulent means.  He was able to access the bank’s building freely in the late evenings 
and on weekends.  His main focus within the bank was the specialised finance department, 
which contained information about proposed takeovers and leveraged buyouts.396  A 
comparison of the bank’s security records and Cherif’s trading activity revealed that he had 
been trading in four company’s shares about which the specialised finance department held 
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information.  The factual evidence, comparing the timing of his trades with information in the 
department, was undeniable:397  Cherif was knowingly trading with inside information. 
If conduct such as that of Cherif were to be allowed in a securities market, the integrity of the 
market would surely suffer.  However, more is to be established in a jurisdiction wherein some 
duty is to be breached (or indeed where there is a closed definition of ‘insiders’) before liability 
for trading on inside information could be found.  As Cherif was trading in such a jurisdiction, 
he argued that he could not be held liable on the basis that he could not properly be branded a 
misappropriator.  He argued that the SEC wrongly relied on the misappropriation theory to 
found his conviction.  Among other things, he argued that the theory did not hold him liable 
as his employment relationship with the bank had ended prior to his trades and he therefore 
owed no duty to the bank. 
The bank had required all its employees to sign an ‘integrity policy’ restricting the use and 
disclosure of what the policy termed ‘material inside information’ for personal gain.  The 
policy furthermore warned employees that the improper use of inside information could result 
in criminal and civil penalties.  Cherif had signed this agreement on numerous occasions, but 
it was binding only for as long as Cherif was employed.  He accepted that he may have stolen 
information and traded on inside information, but denied, as it was open to him to do, that he 
was guilty of insider trading.  Notwithstanding the fact that the contractual link between Cherif 
and the bank contained in the bank’s integrity policy had ended, the court found that Cherif 
was bound by a ‘broader common law duty’.398  It found this duty in the United States law of 
agency, which obligated an employee to protect confidential information entrusted to him 
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during his employment, and after it comes to an end.399  The rule had been developed to prevent 
former employees from divulging trade secrets. 
The court found that Cherif had breached a ‘continuing duty’ to his former employer when he 
used the key card and obtained confidential information.  It held that it made no difference that 
he stole the information only after his employment had ended.  The information he had 
obtained while still in the bank’s employ enabled him to carry out his thefts successfully.400  
Cherif ‘used property and information belonging to First Chicago, and made available to him 
only through his fiduciary relationship, against the bank’s own interest’.401 
Cherif is a good example of the awkwardness of the misappropriation theory.  It may be 
considered to have given rise to an equitable outcome, but the misappropriation theory did not 
fit the cause.  As Langevoort points out, in an instance where it could not be shown that the 
employee conceived of the idea to steal the information while he owed a duty to the source of 
the information, it simply does not explain the trader’s liability.402 
2 2 3 9  SEC v Falbo 
In SEC v Falbo403 the court found a secretary to a key executive and her husband, an electrician 
hired by the company to work on its security system, to be liable for their insider trading.  In 
relation to the husband, the court emphasised that he had been in a position of trust and 
confidence, noting especially that he had been given a master key and had been given access 
to the company’s executives’ offices.  The Falbo litigation arose out of Grand Metropolitan’s 
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takeover bid for all the outstanding shares of The Pillsbury Company.  Following the 
announcement of the offer, Pillsbury’s share price rose by more than 40%. 
Theresa Falbo worked as a secretary for Grand Met’s senior executive vice president at the 
company’s head office.  She fulfilled general secretarial duties, but was included in a team of 
employees specifically working on the Pillsbury tender.  Her husband, Robert, was an 
electrician by trade who worked for himself.  He did work for Grand Met both directly and as 
a subcontractor.  He was responsible for the installation of a key-card system limiting access 
to the third floor of Grand Met’s building.  The installation was specifically aimed at separating 
Grand Met’s employees working on the Pillsbury offer, from those employees who were not.  
Robert retained a master key to access the third floor. 
Grand Met employed various means to keep their plans of making the offer secret.  They used 
code names in referring to themselves and the target company; they installed shredders on the 
cordoned off third floor to ensure that documents relating to the offer were destroyed rather 
than leaked; they limited access to the floor through the access cards; and the few people 
allowed access to the knowledge of the offer were instructed not to divulge any information 
relating to it, especially to their family members.  Grand Met was not very successful in 
keeping their plans secret.  Among other instances indicating leaks, news channel CNN’s 
programme Money Line commented that there were rumours of a takeover by Grand Met, and 
leading businessmen were seen making purchases of Pillsbury stock prior to the takeover. 
So did Robert Falbo.  Indeed, he made large purchases, bigger than any securities purchases 
he had made in his life, of Pillsbury stock just prior to the takeover.  The SEC claimed that 
Falbo, and his co-defendant, was liable under the misappropriation theory.  There was no doubt 
that Falbo had been in possession of inside information before his trades.  For it was found 
that he had eavesdropped on Grand Met’s executives while he worked on renovations and that 
he received information from his wife.  They had watched Money Line together, which led 
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Falbo to question his wife and get the information he needed.  But did he owe a duty to the 
source of his inside information?  The court found that Falbo, apart from his liability as tippee 
as a result of the information received from his wife, also had an independent duty not to reveal 
or trade with the information he had obtained during the course of his work with Grand Met. 
The court found that, as he was a contractor handling the electrical work of the renovations 
intended to prevent leaks of information concerning the planned tender offer for Pillsbury 
shares, he could still be held liable under the misappropriation theory.404  The court reiterated 
what was held in Chestman that to found liability under the misappropriation theory, the test 
is not whether there had been a fiduciary relationship, but whether there existed a ‘similar 
relationship of trust and confidence . . . which must be the equivalent of a fiduciary 
relationship’.405 
The court held that the duty required to found liability in terms of the misappropriation theory 
in United States law, is as follows: 
A fiduciary relationship involves discretionary authority and dependency.  One person 
depends on another – the fiduciary – to serve his interests.  In relying on a fiduciary to 
act for his benefit, the beneficiary of the relationship may entrust the fiduciary with 
custody over property of one sort or another.  Because the fiduciary obtains access to 
serve the ends of the fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to appropriate 
the property for his own use.  What has been said of an agent’s duty of confidentiality 
applies with equal force to other fiduciary relations: an agent is subject to a duty to the 
principal not to use or to communicate information confidentially given to him by the 
principal or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency.  These 
characteristics represent the measure of the paradigmatic fiduciary relationship.  A 
similar relationship of trust and confidence consequently must share these qualities.406 
                                                 
404  Ibid. 523. 
405  Ibid. 
406  Ibid. and Chestman 569. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 111 
 
The court found that Grand Met had placed Falbo in a position of trust and confidence.407  It 
emphasised the fact that Falbo had been handed a key specially to have access to certain 
restricted areas.  Falbo abused his position for personal benefit and for that, was held guilty of 
insider trading.408 
2 2 3 10 SEC v Willis 
In SEC v Willis409 the liability for a financial market wrong was found in the breach of a 
psychiatrist’s duty of confidentiality owed to his patient.  One Weill conceived of a plan to 
become the Chief Executive Officer of BankAmerica.  He had served as the CEO of a number 
of companies and had been the president of American Express.  As part of his quest to become 
BankAmerica’s CEO, he secured a commitment from one of his previous companies to invest 
$1 billion in the bank if he were successful in his negotiations. 
Weill met with several of BankAmerica’s directors to discuss his proposals.  The information 
relating to these meetings was strictly kept out of the public domain.  At that point the 
perception of BankAmerica’s shares in the market was largely unfavourable.  Among other 
things, Moody’s Investors’ Service had downgraded billions of dollars of debt owed by 
BankAmerica, and it had posted large quarterly and yearly losses.  Eventually Weill’s 
endeavours came to nought.  BankAmerica made a public announcement that he had offered 
to become its CEO, but that they were not interested in his offer. 
In the meantime, Weill had been discussing his efforts to become the bank’s CEO with his 
wife.  She was a patient of a psychiatrist, Dr Willis.  She discussed her husband’s efforts to 
become the bank’s CEO with Dr Willis, prior to the public announcements of Weill’s interest 
                                                 
407  Falbo 523. 
408  Ibid. 
409  737 F. Supp 269 (SDNY 1990). 
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in the bank.  She also disclosed the commitment her husband had secured from one of his 
previous companies to make the large investment in BankAmerica when he became its CEO.  
Dr Willis in turn disclosed this information to his broker.  The broker purchased large numbers 
of shares in BankAmerica for him and his children. 
The SEC charged Willis with insider trading in terms of the misappropriation theory.  The 
charges were based on his breach of a ‘physician’s traditional duty of confidentiality on which 
his patient was entitled to rely when he misappropriated for his personal profit [inside 
information] confided to him by his patient for her psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.410  The 
court reasons, it is to be remembered, in the field of financial market law.  Specifically, it deals 
with a wrong that is committed when one informed trader trades with an uninformed trader.  
Cederbaum DJ proceeded as follows: 
Central to the sufficiency of the indictment, and central to the misappropriation theory 
of securities fraud, is a breach of fiduciary duty or similar duty of trust and confidence.  
It is difficult to imagine a relationship that requires a higher degree of trust and 
confidence than the traditional relationship of physician and patient.  The “oath” of 
Hippocrates, which has guided the practice of medicine for more than 2000 years, 
concludes with the following words: 
“Whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance on the 
sick or even part therefrom, which ought not be noised abroad, I will keep in silence 
thereon, counting such things to be as sacred secrets.”411 
In this way, a breach of the Hippocratic Oath found liability for a financial market wrong. 
  
                                                 
410  Ibid. 272. 
411  Ibid. 
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2 2 4 Conclusion 
The fiduciary duty doctrine and misappropriation theory as theories of regulation of insider 
trading are based on premises related to companies and their inner workings.  They are born 
out of, in the case of the fiduciary doctrine, the divide between ownership and control and, in 
the case of the misappropriation theory, some other duty owed to the source of the information.  
Having fair financial markets and increasing confidence in the South African financial markets 
as the focus of financial market law, is to recognise that a breach of duty removed from 
relationships in those markets should not be the primary focus of regulating trading on inside 
information.  The regulation should rather focus on the regulation of the unfair use of inside 
information between market participants.412  For if this is not done, the legislature ends up 
criminalising employee work rules and the breaches of duties of trust, completely unrelated to 
the functioning of the market, while proclaiming its object to be market related.413 
                                                 
412  See D L Block & N E Barton “Securities Litigation: Insider Trading – The Need for Legislation” (1983) 
10 Sec Reg LJ 350 371 who make the same argument in a different setting in the United States in the 
early 1980s.  
413  See Beesom (1995) U Pa L Rev 1142. 
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2 3 Market theories of regulation 
A move from the fiduciary doctrine and the misappropriation theory to a market theory of 
regulation includes a shift in paradigm.  The move requires recognition that, in actual fact, the 
principle that requires the prohibition of insider trading, requires the protection of the public 
against all who have an unfair information advantage.414  Any financial market-related theory 
of prohibition will view the wrong committed through trading on inside information as one 
committed by one trader against another, whatever the identity of either the traders to a trade 
might be.  In this lies a distinction between a market theory of insider trading, and the fiduciary 
duty doctrine and misappropriation theory.  A market theory does not primarily deal with 
shareholders and managers; it deals with traders inter se.  Different from the fiduciary duty 
doctrine and the misappropriation theory, a market theory of regulation does not require a 
connection between the person with knowledge of inside information and the company whose 
securities are the subject of the information.  The Supreme Court of Western Australia has 
summed up its views on a market rationale for the regulation of insider trading as follows: 
According to the market fairness rationale, a person in possession of confidential price-
sensitive information should not be permitted to trade in securities of the corporation 
in question until the information has been publicly disclosed.  This prohibition should 
apply irrespective of the source of the information which the person possesses and 
irrespective of the presence or absence of any connection or association between the 
person and the relevant corporation.415 
                                                 
414  See Brudney (1979) Harv L Rev 360.  Brudney argued for an equal access to information approach in 
the United States under its general, broad anti-fraud provision. 
415  R v Mansfield 2011 WASCA 132 par. 53.  Also see the Australian Companies and Securities Advisory 
Committee’s Insider Trading Discussion Paper (June 2001) par. 1.20 to 1.21 where the notion of market 
fairness was dealt with as follows: 
All market participants bear trading and other risks in their market dealings.  These risks include 
that other participants have better skills to analyze the market, have access to better market research 
or respond more quickly to information as it comes into the public domain.  Market participants 
with superior skill, time or commitment will therefore inevitably have a trading advantage. 
Market fairness does not require elimination of these risks or advantages.  Likewise, market 
participants should not be discouraged from conducting research and analysis, which promote the 
efficiency of these markets.  Indeed, skill, acumen and diligence should be encouraged.  However, 
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Adopting this approach has consequences.  Firstly, the requirement that, for insider trading 
liability to follow, there must be a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty owed and breached, falls by 
the wayside.  The duty a court would look to is a duty owed to the market place as a whole, 
including each of its participants.  The recognition of that duty would establish the agreement, in 
the form of a societal compact, that Pufendorf declared would keep the first merchant from 
selling his wheat at the price at which he pleased.  This also means that the requirement, of a 
fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty owed and breached, no longer places a limit on the scope of a 
prohibition.  That consideration and the fear of some sort of limitless liability have weighed 
heavily with the United States courts in their constant rejection of a market-based theory for 
the regulation of insider trading.416  The United States courts’ approach is, however, not 
justifiable, and the fears should not be an impediment to the required paradigm shift.  It is not 
unknown in law for duties to be owed to wide categories of people.417  For instance, at the 
extreme, in criminal law, a duty is owed to society as a whole.418  A duty owed to the 
marketplace as a whole is akin to that kind of duty.419  Where these duties are recognised, 
liability is limited by concepts such as foreseeability420 and by requirements in respect of the 
knowledge of a trader at the time of her trade.  Secondly, as a consequence of leaving the 
fiduciary duty doctrine and the misappropriation theory behind, the considerations relevant to 
the formulation of a regulatory scheme are limited to those which are market related.  A 
legislature will exclusively have regard to the functions and characteristics of the financial 
markets in developing its regulatory scheme and in giving content to notions such as fairness 
and public confidence in the financial markets. 
                                                 
insider trading deals with situations where market participants, who hold confidential price-
sensitive information, can take the premium from trading without the same risks that are run by 
other market participants, who cannot gain access to that information by ordinary research, skill or 
analysis. 
416  Branson (1981) Emory LJ 280. 
417  Ibid. 
418  Ibid. 
419  Ibid. 
420  Ibid. 
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One of the financial system’s primary functions is the efficient channelling of resources from 
savers to borrowers.421  Through that function, the financial markets ensure that funding goes 
to firms based on the prospects of success of their proposed future endeavours.422  The financial 
system facilitates production, employment and consumption, as it ensures that financing is 
sown where it will produce the greatest harvest for an economy as a whole.  An economy’s 
financial development is thus linked to its economic growth.423 
Public confidence, when seen in the light of market-related considerations, is determined by 
recognising at least one fundamental premise and is influenced by at least one important factor.  
The fundamental premise is that information is the basis upon which rational economic actors 
(the ones, I would suggest, the legislature should be concerned with) make their investment 
decisions.424  The important factor is public perception. 
For the public to have confidence in the financial markets it has to perceive, firstly, the current 
quotations of share value to accurately reflect the value of an investment or a prospective 
investment.425  In other words, the investor knows that she will not be paying R10 for 
something worth R5, or selling something worth R10 for R5.  The financial markets, it is 
accepted, create a platform upon which the prices of securities are determined.426  The prices 
                                                 
421  Ibid. 329. 
422  Ibid. 
423  Ibid. 
424  Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets 6. 
425  Loss (1970) Mod L Rev 84 86. 
426  Indeed, markets form the core of the financial system.  Markets are where buyers and sellers meet, 
where firms issue their stocks and bonds, and where individuals and firms go to purchase assets.  
Economic theory heralds financial markets as essential to any economy, charging them with the 
fundamental role of channelling the resources in an economy and minimizing the cost of both the 
gathering of information and transacting.  It is accepted that well-developed financial markets is a 
precondition for healthy economic growth. (Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets 6). 
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of securities in turn summarise427 and convey information428 about an issuer, eliminating much 
of the time a prospective investor would have spent collecting information.  The information 
prices convey is of obvious importance to an investor.  She has to be able to use prices in her 
assessment of the bargain that she is striking.  On the other hand, as high stock prices indicate 
value, firms with high stock prices easily procure the financing they require with future 
issues.429  The price at which securities are traded reflects, to the issuing firm, the investing 
public’s willingness to take them up.  The higher the prices, the more likely the firm in question 
will be to go directly to the financial markets to obtain financing.430  Secondly, the public has 
to perceive the playing field the financial markets presents as relatively level. 
Notably, confidence in the financial markets relates to confidence in the markets and the 
relationships in those markets.  It does not relate to the inner workings of companies and the 
duties owed by directors or others who owe duties to the source of the inside information.431  
The public’s confidence in the financial markets does not depend on whether those trading 
with inside information are fiduciaries or missapropriators; it does not depend on the presence 
or absence of some formal historically recognised legal connection between the insider and 
                                                 
427  Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets 43.  The perceived value of a firm, and its securities, 
can be influence by many factors.  See G J De Bondt “Determinants of Stock Prices: New International 
Evidence” (2008) 34 J of Portfolio Management 81.  Among the most important determinants are a 
security’s earnings potential, a risk-free income stream and long-run equity risk (the difference between 
the rate of return in the prospective security and the return on government securities).  Any information 
relating to these variables will influence the stock price.  In the short run stock prices can be influenced 
by exchange rates, commodity prices, momentum (where investors buy stocks that were past winners 
while selling the losers (investors following the ‘trend is your friend mantra’), and seasonality 
(illustrated by the market saying ‘sell in May and go away, but remember to come back in September’). 
428  R Zeckhauser & V Niederhoffer “The performance of market index futures contracts” (1983) 39 Fin 
An Journal 59.  The investor is particularly interested in the characteristics of an instrument that are 
likely to influence its future value, such as the size of the payment that is promised or the realisation of 
the price in the case of equity; when the promised payment is to be made; the likelihood that it will be 
made; and the circumstances under which the payment is to be made. (Cecchetti Money, Banking and 
Financial Markets 45). 
429  Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets 189. 
430  Ibid. 6. 
431  This is based on the premise that one element in the definition of inside information would address 
access to information.  
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the company whose shares are the subject of the trade.  Nor should that connection play any 
role when it comes to giving content to fairness in a market setting.  That content should be 
determined with reference to information.  Information which has not yet been reflected in a 
security’s price is of especial importance.  It provides the means to predict movements in 
prices.  For if the true value of a security is not reflected in its price and requires a rise or fall 
in that price, knowing the information, which is not yet reflected in the share price, will allow 
an investor to predict a future price movement. 
It could be argued, of course, that the information disparities in the financial markets are 
inevitable, no matter what regulation is sought to be employed.  It is true, every securities 
trader runs the risk that, just after she has traded, some good or bad news will come to light, 
which could detrimentally affect the investment she has just made or which shows that she 
should not have sold the one she had.432  That is the normal risk run.  No legislature can relieve 
market participants of that burden.  There will always be uncertainties and risks in the market 
for corporate securities.  In financial terms this risk justifies the reward investors obtain.433  
Risk and unpredictability are part of investing in a regulated market. 
This, however, takes the matter no further.  If the same line of reasoning were to be employed 
in relation to murder, society would have to stop prosecuting murderers.  It is uncontentious to 
say that murder in a human society is, much like trading on inside information it seems, 
inevitable.  That does not mean that society, through its laws, should not strive for an ideal 
wherein people do not murder each other.  If information disparity in the financial markets is 
inevitable, this does not mean that society, through its laws, must not strive for an ideal in 
respect of information disparities.  The theory presents the ideal to be strived for; the legislative 
measures employed provide the means by which that ideal is pursued.  Two main ideals for 
                                                 
432  L C B Gower & P L Davies Gower & Davies Principles of Modern Company Law 7 ed (2003) 751. 
433  Rider & French The Regulation of Insider Trading 2. 
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equality of information are as follows: parity of information between traders and equal access 
to information by traders. 
2 3 1 The parity of information theory 
The parity of information theory requires two parties to a securities transaction to have the 
same information.  Only then would the trade be legal.  It does not take much consideration to 
realise that the theory is an unrealistic one.  It proposes a principle that would be detrimental 
to the financial markets in three ways. 
Firstly, a parity of information basis for the regulation of insider trading would raise transaction 
costs in the financial markets to an unacceptable degree.  If the theory were to be employed, 
transaction costs would rise beyond the point at which trade would be viable.  For parties 
would forever be busy trying to ensure that their counterparty has exactly the same information 
as they do.  Secondly, it would reduce incentives to trade to an unacceptable degree.  Thirdly, 
it would destroy the incentive of market participants to engage in research.  Market 
professionals would be obliged to disclose any information advantage, no matter how it was 
obtained, whether through research and experience or otherwise, to their counterparty to render 
the securities transaction lawful.  They would no longer ferret out information and this would 
have a negative effect on the price signalling function fulfilled by the financial markets. 
Insider trading regulation must find a balance between some level of equality of information 
for all investors and allowing market professionals (or anyone else) the opportunity to trade 
on information that they obtain through market research.434  The parity of information theory 
                                                 
434  R S Karmel “The Relationship between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions against Insider Trading: 
Why a Property Rights Theory of Insider Information is Untenable” (1993–1994) 59 Brook L Rev 149 
156. 
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does not strike the right balance.  It gives too much scope to the equality consideration.  It has 
therefore correctly been described as a theory that strives for an ‘egalitarian utopia’.435  One 
might add a ‘practically unworkable’ egalitarian utopia.  It would unreasonably restrict trade 
in securities. 
2 3 2 Equal access to information 
The equal access to information theory asserts that market participants should have equal 
access to information relevant to their security trading decisions.  According to this theory, the 
unfairness in insider trading does not lie in not having as much information as one’s 
counterparty, but rather in the inability to learn as much information as one’s counterparty 
through legal means.436 
A legislative prohibition on insider trading based on the equal access theory would thus 
prohibit trading on information not legally ascertainable by all and would lie against all 
lawfully unerodable information advantages.437  As to a knowledge requirement, the theory 
prohibits trading on information by a trader who knows, or at least has reason to know,438 that 
the information he is trading on is not and could not be known or learned by those with whom 
he is trading.439 
                                                 
435  Brudney (1979) Harv L Rev 340. 
436  Ibid. 346.  Cf. Rider & French The Regulation of Insider Trading 2 and K E Scott “Insider Trading: 
Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy” (1980) 9 J Legal Stud 801 804 
437  S S Kunkel “Insider Trading: A New Equal Access Approach” (1989) 15 J Contemp L 51 66. 
438  A legislative choice is to be made between prohibiting trading on inside information the trader knows 
not to be available to the persons he trades with, information he has reason to know is not available to 
them, or both.  To prohibit trading on information that the trader has reason to know that his 
counterparties do not have access to, is a broader provision. 
439  Kunkel (1989) J Contemp L 66. 
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While, according to the theory, it does not matter who the traders are, or whether they have a 
connection with the company in whose securities they are trading,440 the theory prescribes a 
nuanced approach to directors’ and managers’ liability for insider trading when they deal with 
incumbent shareholders.  It does not require a blanket ban against directors and managers 
trading with shareholders.  Rather, it  prohibits only directors and managers from trading with 
shareholders where those shareholders have no legal means of obtaining the information on 
which the director or manager’s trade is based.  Confidential information, for instance, known 
by directors and managers only, may therefore not serve as a basis for their trades.  Once a 
shareholder would have had to, for example, break into a company’s property, hack into its 
databases, or attend closed board meetings to obtain the information on which a trade is based, 
the director or manager’s trade would be forbidden. 
The implementation of the theory does present some challenges to the legislature.  The 
prohibition on insider trading has to be formulated without the benefit of the limitation placed 
on liability, which a definition of ‘insider’ (or the limitation of liability to a circumscribed 
group of people) establishes.  The determination of what conduct should be prohibited and 
what conduct should not, has to be done without the added certainty afforded by a prohibition 
aimed at addressing conduct by only a certain circumscribed group of people.  This may lead 
to difficult legislative line-drawing decisions, notwithstanding the fact that the legislature 
could employ a knowledge requirement to limit liability.  Particularly, ‘access’ is a fluid 
concept.  Easterbrook441 writes: 
People do not have or lack ‘access’ in some absolute sense.  There are, instead, different 
costs of obtaining information.  An outsider’s costs are high; he might have to purchase 
the information from the firm.  Managers have lower costs (the amount of a salary 
foregone); brokers have relatively low costs (the value of the time they spent 
investigating); Sherlock Holmes also may be able to infer extraordinary facts from 
ordinary occurrences at low cost.  The different costs of access are simply a function of 
the division of labour.  A manager (or a physician) always knows more than a 
                                                 
440  R F Kidd “Insider Trading: The Misappropriation Theory versus an ‘Access to Information’ 
Perspective” (1993) 18 Del J Corp L 102 118. 
441  Easterbrook (1981) Sup Ct Rev 309. 
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shareholder (or patient) in some respects, but unless there is something unethical about 
the division of labour, the difference is not unfair.442 
Easterbrook also argues that it is difficult to determine what type of ‘access’ the legislature 
must seek to ensure.443  To my mind, however, the answer is clear: the theory should afford 
access by ‘legal’ means.  A rule against the exploitation of inside information that could not 
be lawfully obtained by other traders, does not prohibit trading on an information advantage 
acquired through doing research or receiving investment advice based on financial market 
research.444  A trader would not be able to successfully challenge a trade simply because a 
counterparty had an information advantage over him.  If the claimant had been able to, through 
lawful means, place himself in as good a position as information can ensure, he would have 
no action.  An action arising purely out of an information disadvantage would arise only under 
the parity of information theory.  This equal access approach would, for instance,445 allow a 
portfolio manager with twenty years’ experience, to glean information from a certain set of 
events that X is going to happen and to trade on that information.  She would not be prohibited 
from trading, as any other person could have become a portfolio manager, worked for twenty 
years and been able to glean the necessary information to make a similar trade.  To avoid 
liability, a defendant would thus always be able to prove, as a defence, that the information 
she traded on was lawfully available to the counterparties in the market.  To continue with the 
example, when accused of insider trading, she would be able plead the defence that her 
information advantage was acquired through skill, expertise or research, or a combination of 
the three. 
Therein lies an important advantage of the equal access to information theory.  It encourages 
traders to research the market, gather information and gain experience.  This amounts to the 
                                                 
442  Easterbrook (1981) Sup Ct Rev 330. 
443  Also see G Lawson “Ethics of Insider Trading” (1988) 3 Harv J L & P P 727 752–758. 
444  Brudney (1979) Harv L Rev 361. 
445  See Lawson (1988) Harv J L & PP 757 where a similar example is provided. 
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encouragement of conduct that promotes the more efficient allocation of resources.  Brudney 
writes: 
Exploration for relevant corporate and economic information is a service of value in 
the functioning market.  If the information is related to the assets or expected 
performance of the enterprise, the sooner it is found, the more accurately it is appraised, 
and the more immediately it induces a purchase or sale, the more precisely will the 
market price of the securities correspond to the value of the enterprise.  The market will 
thus function efficiently to allocate savings to enterprises which are more profitable and 
divert them from enterprises which are less profitable.  Moreover, the faster that 
information about a firm’s value becomes available to the public, the less opportunity 
there will be for (and the less occasion for public fear of) trading on inside information. 
But for those who are not connected with a corporation to pursue or acquire such 
information requires expenditure of effort, time and money in research, and talent and 
training in analysis.  To meet the costs of thus pursuing and analysing information, a 
return must be offered.  One such return is the opportunity to capitalise on the value of 
being the discoverer of the information – the advantage obtained from having the first 
vision.  Hence, market efficiency will be enhanced if persons are encouraged (by 
receiving the rewards of the bargain resulting from information advantages thus 
obtained) to seek such advantages, for purposes of either buying or selling particular 
securities.446 
In this also lies Pothier’s notion of a just reward, which he allowed the merchant for the 
diligence that enabled him to arrive at the market first.  More than Pothier’s merchant, 
however, the market researcher does not simply beat all others and therefore receives a reward; 
the market researcher is rewarded for fulfilling an important economic function: facilitating 
the accurate price signalling role played by share prices in the economy.447  Once information 
relevant to the assets or the performance of a company who markets its securities is found, and 
a consideration of that information induces a purchase or sale, it means that the market price 
of the security will move closer to its underlying value.448  The sooner the information is found, 
the sooner the price will more accurately reflect the security’s true value and the market will 
                                                 
446  Brudney (1979) Harv L Rev 341. 
447  Ibid. 
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function more efficiently in allocating resources in accordance with the value of the relevant 
companies.449 
The current Act, as it has been said, aims at the promotion of confidence in the South African 
financial markets, especially through promoting financial markets that are fair.  That intention 
is irreconcilable with the notion that some traders, whether they be connected to the issuing 
company or not, are allowed to trade while knowing information that is not legally accessible 
to their counterparties.  The equal access to information theory will best suit the objects of 
promoting confidence and fairness in the financial markets.  Equal access has indeed expressly 
been recognised by the King Task Group.  In its final report, it is declared that: 
In insider trading legislation, a balance has to be struck between, on the one hand, the 
need for the markets to be transparent so that investors would have confidence that the 
market, as far as possible, is one based on equal access to knowledge and, on the other, 
that the legislation must not be so designed that the ability to trade is not unreasonably 
restricted.450  (My emphasis.) 
The theory will give rise to prohibitions more directly and coherently connected to the 
objectives that the legislature has set out to pursue.451  As it will be shown, prohibiting insider 
trading in pursuance of the equal access to information theory will also simplify the Act and 
specifically its definitions of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’.  All a prospective trader would 
have to do, to ensure that she does not fall foul of the law, would be to ask whether she is in 
possession of inside information and to refrain from dealing with the information if her answer is 
in the affirmative.  When a legal opinion is sought as to whether a proposed trade falls foul of the 
financial market laws, legal practitioners would have to address only one central issue: whether 
the trade is to be done on the basis of inside information. 
                                                 
449  Ibid. 
450  King Final Report 4 note 8. 
451  Cf. Kidd (1993) Del J Corp L 106. 
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The theory also fits well into the South African Constitutional dispensation.  All law, including 
financial market law, is subject to the Constitution.452  A law is valid only if it is consistent 
with the provisions of, and the values that underlie, the Constitution.  One of these provisions 
is section 9, which entrenches the right to equality.453  Equality is one of the founding values 
of the South African democracy.454  Section 9 of the Constitution provides: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit 
of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination, may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation must be enacted 
to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair 
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
The Constitution provides a blueprint for, among other things, the legislative regulation of 
society, not only in the public, but also in the private sphere.455  The equal access theory is in 
                                                 
452  Section 2 of the Constitution provides: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled’.  Section 
8(1) of the Constitution provides: ‘(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, 
the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state’.  Also see Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 
(CC) par. 15. 
453  Section 9 of the Constitution. 
454  Section 2 of the Constitution provides in relevant part:  
 ‘The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 
 (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.’ 
(Emphasis added.) 
455  D Moseneke “Transformative Constitutionalism: Its implications for the law of contract” (2009) 20 
Stell LR 4; Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC); Democratic Alliance v Masondo 
NO 2003 (2) SA 413 (CC); Van Rooyen v S 2002 (5)SA 246 (CC); Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC); S v Makwanyane 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  Also see K E Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” 
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harmony with the blueprint.  It overcomes the failings of the misappropriation theory and the 
fiduciary doctrine as it gives rise to a prohibition that would punish equally culpable behaviour 
equally:456 everyone one in possession of inside information is prohibited from dealing with it 
in the markets.  The theory therefore provides a meeting for the ‘public law guarantee’ of 
equality and the regulation of the situation where two parties enter into a contract of sale for 
shares on a state regulated exchange.457 
Equal access to information in the financial markets is a goal especially worth pursuing in a 
country which, first, has had a historically skewed distribution of wealth and income, 
combined with financial opportunities being limited to a few.  The theory will provide all 
investors trading on regulated markets with an acceptable degree of access to information.  
This would contribute to all members of the investing public having to bear similar risks.  
Secondly, through clarifying South Africa’s financial market law, the equal access theory 
would increase South Africa’s attractiveness to international investors.  The world’s securities 
markets are becoming increasingly globalised.458  Technological development has provided 
investors with nearly unfettered access to the securities markets of other countries.459  Seen 
from the individual businesses’ perspective, it now has the opportunity to attract capital 
investment from investors all over the world.460  The equal access to information theory 
provides the chance of a break from the outdated bases of regulation still adhered to in, for 
                                                 
(1998) 14 SAJHR 146; D Bhana & M Pieterse “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and 
Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) 122 SALJ 865; and D D Tladi “Breathing 
Constitutional Values into the Law of Contract: Freedom of Contract and the Constitution” (2002) 35 
DJ 306. 
456  Also see Kidd (1993) Del J Corp 135.  Kidd makes a further policy argument for the access to 
information theory: that investors should be discouraged from attempting to obtain non-public 
information illegally. 
457  For a discussion of ‘the intractable question of the intersection between public law guarantees, as 
provided for in sections 9 to 35 of our Bill of Rights, and the private law regulation of contract between 
private parties’ see Moseneke (2009) Stell LR 1; Bhana & Pieterse (2005) SALJ 865 and Tladi (2002) 
DJ 306. 
458  M I Steinberg International Securities Law: A Contemporary and Comparative Analysis (1999) 105. 
459  J A Kehoe “Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of US Insider Trading Law 
Internationally” (1995) 9 Emory Int’l L Rev 345. 
460  Steinberg International Securities Law: A Contemporary and Comparative Analysis 105. 
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example, the United States, and would provide a fair market that would, all other things being 
held constant, rightly entice more foreigners (and, for that matter, South Africans), to invest in 
South African securities.  The result is highly valued modern societal objectives: enlarging the 
pool of capital feeding the most promising companies and keeping the markets for their 
securities liquid. 
The challenges presented by the implementation of the equal access to information theory are 
negligible; the benefits would be significant.  The equal access theory is to be employed as the 
basis for the regulation of insider trading in South Africa. 
2 4 Conclusion 
An express or implied legislative choice of a single basis for the regulation of insider trading 
in South Africa will, in and of itself, go a long way in clarifying its insider trading provisions.  
That choice must be informed by the legislative objects of promoting confidence and fairness 
in the financial markets.  The theoretical bases for the regulation of insider trading include 
non-market related and market related theories of regulation.  The non-market related theories 
are the fiduciary doctrine and the misappropriation theory.  The market related theories are the 
parity of information and equal access to information theories. 
The fiduciary doctrine was never intended to address a market wrong.  It is a historic relic of 
outdated eschewed thinking on insider trading.  It fails to explain the wrongfulness of insider 
trading between directors and individual incumbent shareholders; the wrongfulness of insider 
trading between directors and purchasing or prospective shareholders; and the wrongfulness 
of insider trading in bonds and derivatives generally.  The misappropriation theory was born 
out of the failings of the fiduciary doctrine.  It enlarges the scope of a prohibition on insider 
trading to include those trading with inside information who do not owe duties to the issuer, 
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but rather to the firm with whose information the trade is being made.  At the least, if one were 
to be of the opinion that a prohibition on insider trading should be broader in its scope than 
merely prohibiting breaches of fiduciary duty, the misappropriation theory provides some 
answers.  Yet, it gives rise to numerous anomalous results in addressing a market wrong.  The 
theory still fails to explain the wrongfulness of the misappropriator’s conduct in relation to 
those he deals with in the financial markets.  If there is no breach of a duty owed to the company 
with whose information the trade is made, the misappropriation theory views the conduct as 
lawful.  The theory thus arbitrarily declares unlawful some instances of unfair trading, while 
turning a blind eye to others.  It does not prohibit all trades that, if allowed to proliferate, will 
be detrimental to market fairness and the confidence the public has in the financial markets.  It 
fails to prohibit all trades with inside information.  With whomever one agrees as to what is 
fair in Cicero’s grain merchant example, one thing stands above question:  not one of the old 
writers preferred to give some of the grain merchants the right to sell on the information not 
available to the Rhodians and others not.  The fiduciary duty doctrine and the misappropriation 
theory, as bases for the regulation of insider trading, are irreconcilable with the underlying 
principle this evidences: equally culpable conduct must be punished equally. 
The fiduciary duty doctrine’s and the misappropriation theory’s failures are the result of their 
seeking to address a market wrong by finding the unlawfulness of the conduct they seek to 
prohibit outside the market.  The fiduciary duty doctrine recognises a duty owed by directors 
to the shareholders of a company.  The wrongfulness of conduct in that context lies in the 
breach of the duty owed to the shareholders.  The misappropriation theory recognises a duty 
owed by the possessor of information to the owner of the information.  Neither of these duties 
is born out of the rights and obligations at play in the financial markets. 
Confidence in and the fairness of the financial markets relate to confidence in and fairness of 
the markets and the relationships in those markets.  They do not relate to the inner workings 
of companies or duties owed to sources of inside information.  To formulate a theory of 
wrongfulness in the financial markets, one has to consider those rights and obligations, and the 
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overarching object of regulating those markets.  If one were to keep to duty-speak, a duty must 
be recognised to the market as a whole, including all its participants. 
The market theories of regulation recognise as much.  The parity information theory is, 
however, not a suitable choice for the regulation of insider trading.  It will give rise to duties 
and prohibitions detrimental to, at least, market liquidity.  It has as its object a practically 
unworkable egalitarian utopia.  It would unreasonably restrict trade in securities.  The most 
apposite duty, I submit, would be one not to deal with information that is not lawfully available 
to all, as dictated by the equal access theory.  The equal access theory is also the regulatory 
basis that best suits the object of promoting confidence and fairness in the financial markets.  
It is reconcilable with Pothier’s idea of affording traders just rewards, and it fits well into the 
South African constitutional legal landscape.  The theory gives rise to prohibitions more 
directly and coherently connected to the wrongfulness inherent in insider trading.  It must be 
employed as the single basis for the regulation of insider trading in South Africa. 
Our legislature has recognised the need to promote confidence and fairness in the South 
African financial markets.  Yet it has left definitions, specifically those of ‘inside information’ 
and ‘insider’, dictated by the fiduciary doctrine and the misappropriation theory, in our 
legislative scheme.  I have submitted that the most suitable basis for the regulation of insider 
trading in South Africa is the equal access theory.  The definitions of ‘inside information’ and 
‘insider’ are to be formulated in accordance with that theory.  I address each definition below. 
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3 1 Introduction 
Information is central to investing successfully in the financial markets.  As Kaufman J writes: 
Our era has been aptly styled, and well may be remembered as the ‘age of information.’  
Francis Bacon recognized nearly 400 years ago that ‘knowledge is power,’ but only in 
the last generation has it risen to the equivalent of the coin of the realm.  Nowhere is 
this commodity more valuable or volatile than in the world of high finance, where facts 
are worth fortunes. . . .461 
The definition of inside information is an important part of any legislative scheme aimed at 
regulating insider trading.  For it is ultimately inside information (and not necessarily the 
position held by an insider) that enables a person to beat the market.  On publication, it is the 
inside information that affects the market price of a security.  The insider, by knowing this 
information to the exclusion of other traders prior to the information’s wider dissemination, is 
able to predict the market price movement that is likely to be brought about by that wider 
dissemination. 
Many different types of information influence the price of many different types of security.  The 
investor is particularly interested in the characteristics of an instrument that is likely to influence 
its future value.  This includes, for instance, the size of the payment that is promised to a 
prospective holder of a security in future or the price that will be realised on the sale of the security; 
when the promised payment is to be made; the likelihood that it will be made; and the 
circumstances under which the payment is to be made.462  De Bondt, dealing with equity, also lists 
the long-run equity risk premium (the difference between the rate of return on an investment in 
private equity and a largely risk-free investment, such as in government securities) as a factor that 
will be considered by investors.463  It is not clear why De Bondt would limit his submission to 
                                                 
461  Kaufman J in SEC v Materia 745 F 2d 197 (1984). 
462  Cecchetti Money, Banking and Financial Markets 45. 
463  See G J De Bondt “Determinants of Stock Prices: New International Evidence” (2008) 34 J of Portfolio 
Management 81 81. 
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equity and risk-free investments.  It seems to me that opportunity cost, relative to any other type 
of investment, would be a relevant consideration to any prospective investor.  Be that as it may, 
when people act rationally, any information relating to these types of variables will influence 
security prices in the long run.  In the short run they are also said to be influenced by exchange 
rates, commodity prices, momentum and seasonality.464  Whereas information can be grouped 
under different heads, to develop a closed list of types of information that will influence different 
types of securities, is a near impossible task.  What is rather required is the formulation of 
broader, principle-based requirements to define inside information. 
In regulating information asymmetries in the financial markets, a balance has to be found 
between over and under regulation.  The definition of inside information is important in 
performing this balancing act.  If the definition is too narrow, the ambit of the prohibition 
would be too narrow, the market would be perceived as unfair, and market liquidity would 
suffer.  If the definition is overbroad, the ambit of the prohibition would be overbroad and 
market liquidity would suffer.  In addition, care must be taken not to distort the incentives at 
play in the financial markets. 
Market actors do market research for the prize of being able to beat the market.  The research 
enables them to invest successfully.  At the same time, they promote the accuracy of market 
prices.  As it has been said,  when market actors purchase securities on the basis of information 
they have gathered, the demand for the security they trade in increases; this raises prices and 
incorporates the researched information into the market price of the relevant security.  It is 
through this gathering and analysis of information, and subsequent trading, that the market is 
able to correctly price a security.465  The majority (or at least some, depending on one’s 
worldview) of information acquired in financial markets comes to traders deservedly.  They 
lawfully engage in market research to gain an advantage over less informed traders.  Traders 
who come to know information in this way deserve their information advantage and must be 
                                                 
464  See De Bondt (2008) J of Portfolio Management 82. 
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allowed to trade freely with it.  The trader must be economically rewarded for the purpose he 
fulfils in the system.  The legislature must therefore be careful that the definition does not in 
effect prohibit a trader from trading in instances wherein his information advantage was 
acquired through lawful enterprise, hard work and endeavour.  It must take care not to distort 
the incentives that drive the process behind accurate market prices.466  A question that thus 
must be considered when formulating a definition of inside information is: where is the line to 
be drawn between information that resulted from lawful market research and inside 
information?  Or, how is the distinction to be made between inside information and, as it is 
phrased in the American decision of In re Cady, Roberts & Co,467 information ‘arrived at as 
result of perceptive analysis of generally known facts’. 
As a starting point I accept that a principle-based approach will in itself work to define the 
ambit of any prohibition.  If it is clear from a legislative scheme what the wrong sought to be 
addressed is, the definitions will be interpreted (and circumscribed) in that context.  If the 
underlying principles are clear, the ambit of the prohibition will be clearly determined.  The 
present definition of insider trading fails to evidence one, clear theory of regulation.  There is 
also no principle-related progression in the legislative history of the South African definition 
of ‘inside information’.  It has gone through many changes.  The 1973 Companies Amendment 
Act468 made it an offence for a person to deal in securities ‘on the basis of unpublished price-
sensitive information’.469  According to section 440F(2)(a) of that Act470 inside information 
had to be information that related to the internal affairs of a company or its operations, assets, 
earning power or involvement in a takeover.471  To qualify as inside information, the 
information had not to have been available to the ‘reasonable investor’ in the market, for the 
                                                 
466  J R Beesom “Rounding the Peg to the Fit the Hole: A Proposed Regulatory Reform of the 
Misappropriation Theory” (1995) 144 U Pa L Rev 1077 1142. 
467  In re Cady, Roberts & Co 40 SEC 907 (1961) 915. 
468  Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
469  Section 440F(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
470  Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
471  Jooste (2000) SALJ 290. 
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security in question and the information must have been reasonably expected to affect 
‘materially’ the price of the security if it were to become so available.472  General information 
that related to securities or their issuers did not qualify.  Obviously, this would have solidified 
the market.  Jooste gives examples of information that would not have qualified as inside 
information: information relating to the industry in which the company did business; 
information that applied to the economy in general; information of government’s diplomatic 
activities in, say, a country that presented a new market for a certain company’s goods; and 
information emanating out of a confidential reserve bank briefing.473 
The King Task Group on Insider Trading proposed a new definition for inside information.  
They made the following suggestions: 
3.2.1 Inside information is defined in section 1 of the proposed legislation as 
information which is obtained or learned as an insider, which if it were made 
public would be likely to have a material effect on the price or value of any 
security or financial instrument, which is specific or precise and which has not 
been made public. 
3.2.2 The task group decided that the impact of the information should be ‘material’ 
rather than ‘significant’ (which is the word used in the legislation in the United 
Kingdom) because of the extensive case law in South Africa on the meaning of 
material, particularly in relation to fraud. 
3.2.3 Section 3 of the proposed legislation defines the circumstances in which 
information is deemed to have been made public as well as the circumstances in 
which information may, in the discretion of the court, be treated as having been 
made public.  These circumstances are specifically stated not to be exhaustive.474 
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The suggestions were all adopted in the Insider Trading Act.475  The legislature, in enacting 
the Securities Services Act, kept the definition as is, with one minor adjustment.476 
3 2 Inside information in the Financial Markets Act 
The Act inherited its definition of inside information from the Securities Services Act.  It has 
been amended once to include information that would, if it were to be made public, have an 
effect on the price of a derivative instrument related to a security listed on a regulated 
market.477  The current definition of the term in South African law is as follows: 
‘Inside information’ means specific or precise information, which has not been made 
public and which— 
(a) is obtained or learned as an insider; and 
(b) if it were made public would, be likely to have a material effect on the price or 
value of any security listed on a regulated market or any derivative instrument 
related to such a security.478 
For it to be proved in a South African tribunal that something is inside information, the 
following requirements must thus be fulfilled.  There must be information; that is specific or 
precise; that has not been made public; that is ‘likely’ to have a ‘material’ effect on the price 
or value of any security listed on a regulated market or any derivative instrument related to 
such a security; and that was obtained or learned as an insider.  I deal with each requirement 
below.  I then briefly discuss the definitions of inside information in other jurisdictions, 
including the United States, Australia and the European Union.  I finally argue for a new 
approach in accordance with the equal access theory. 
                                                 
475  Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998. 
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3 2 1 If it were to be made public, would be likely to have a material effect on the price 
or value of any security listed on a regulated market or of any derivative 
instrument related to such security 
For the information to be recognised as inside information, the Act requires it to be likely to 
have a material effect on the price or value of a listed security, if it were to be made public.479  
Jooste and Blackman seem to interpret the materiality requirement in the previous Acts as 
requiring the information in itself to be material.480  Clearly, however, the Act requires the 
‘effect’ such information would have if it were to be made public, to be material. 
This requirement recently received the attention of the Gauteng Local Division of the High 
Court, Johannesburg, in Zietsman and Harrison and White Investments (Pty) Ltd v Directorate 
of Market Abuse.481  The case concerned a purchase of the securities of a company that was in 
financial difficulty because of being over indebted.  In reaching its conclusion, the court not 
only interpreted the provisions of the Act, but also made additions to the express words used 
by the legislature.  The judgment is badly written and open to much criticism, much of which 
falls beyond the scope of this work.  Where there is no basis for the court’s interpretation I do, 
however, say so.  The judgment is indicative of the mess that ensues when less than coherent 
legislative provisions fall to be interpreted and applied by inexperienced judges. 
During the middle of 2010 Harrison and White put into effect a strategy to begin operating in 
the renewable energy sector.  On 28 August 2010, the chairman of its board, Zietsman, opened 
an FNB share trading account, which he used to purchase 15 000 shares in a company by the 
                                                 
479  Section 72 of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. 
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name of AC Towers.  He continued to purchase shares in AC Towers at regular intervals.482  
From 31 August 2010 to 4 November 2010, Zietsman purchased 835 805 more shares in 23 
trades.  Both Zietsman and Harrison and White continued to purchase AC Towers shares up 
to 14 March 2011.483  In November 2010 Zietsman was instructed by Harrison and White to 
acquire AC Towers.  So was Ralston, Harrison and White’s managing director.484 
On 24 January 2011, the Industrial Development Corporation addressed a letter to AC Towers, 
which read as follows: 
The IDC has agreed to make available to your organisation a total funding package of 
R99 000 000 (Ninety-Nine Million Rands).  The funding has been approved 
substantially on the terms and conditions discussed with you.  Agreements are being 
prepared which will contain all the terms of the facilities and which will, when duly 
signed, form the agreement between the IDC and yourselves. . . . 
Attached to this approval letter was a term sheet setting out the details of the finance that had 
been approved, and certain conditions precedent that the Industrial Development Corporation 
required to be included in the envisioned agreement.485 
On 26 January 2011, a meeting was held between the respondents and members of the board 
of AC Towers, including a Mr Jacques De Villiers.486  This meeting was central to the issues 
that required resolution by the court.487  At the meeting De Villiers said that AC Towers had 
secured a possible loan facility of R99 million from the Industrial Development Corporation 
on an ‘approval in principle basis’.  The other AC Towers representatives present at the 
meeting also indicated that no contracts had been concluded for the facility and that no 
substantiating information had been made available in support of the grant of the funding.  De 
Villiers also disclosed that the Industrial Development Corporation had begun to do, or was 
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about to begin, a due diligence of AC Towers.488  However, the court specifically recorded that 
no documents were presented to the meeting about the alleged funding.  De Villiers also did 
not inform those present, even though he was specifically asked at the meeting, what the 
conditions precedent to the funding were, whether AC Towers was capable of complying with 
any conditions precedent, what the repayment terms were, and what any of the other terms of 
the funding were.489 
On 28 January 2011 a first Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) announcement was 
published by AC Towers in which shareholders and the market were informed that: 
the company was successful in securing debt funding and is in the process of finalising 
the terms of the debt facility with the potential funder which, when successfully 
concluded, could affect the price of the company’s shares. 
What would be the first of two relevant SENS announcements did not disclose the amount and 
other details of the facility to the market nor the details of the funder.  A decision had been 
made by the board of AC Towers that, although AC Towers had received the approval letter, 
those details ought not to be disclosed before the agreements with the Industrial Development 
Corporation were concluded.490  The publication of the first SENS announcement had no effect 
on the share price of AC Towers.491 
After the meeting of 28 January 2011, the appellants continued to acquire shares in AC Towers.  
On 10 March 2013, a day before a SENS announcement made public the amount of the loan 
and the identity of the lender, Harrison & White made a further purchase, far in excess of any 
prior ACT share acquisition, of 14 131 977 shares with a value of R1 554 517.492  The fact that 
final loan agreements were concluded, the amount of the loan and the identity of the lender 
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were made known to the public only by a further SENS announcement on 11 March 2011.493  
It advised shareholders that: 
AC Towers is pleased to announce that an agreement has been entered into with the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in respect of a R99 million funding facility, 
staggered over the next six years at market related rates to assist with capital 
expenditure and working capital requirements of the group.494 
Subsequent to but still on the same day as this further SENS announcement, the AC Towers 
share price jumped from 11 cents to 17 cents a share.495  As an aside, neither Zietsman nor 
Harrison and White sold their shares in time to make a profit.  They suffered losses, as AC 
Towers was subsequently placed in liquidation.496 
The case was brought before the enforcement committee in terms of section 99 of the Act.  It 
found that the amount of the loan (R99 million) and the identity of the lender (the Industrial 
Development Corporation) constituted inside information.497  Zietsman and Harrison and 
White were found guilty of the dealing offence and dealing for another.498  The dealing offence 
is contained in section 78(1)(a) of the Act, which provides that ‘[a]n insider who knows that 
he or she has inside information and who deals, directly or indirectly or through an agent for 
his or her own account, in the securities listed on a regulated market or in derivative 
instruments related to such securities, to which the inside information relates or which are 
likely to be affected by it, commits and offence.’499  The dealing for another offence is 
contained in section 78(2)(a) of the Act.  It provides that ‘[a]n insider who knows that he or 
she has inside information and who deals, directly or indirectly or through an agent for any 
other person, in the securities listed on a regulated market or in derivative instruments related 
to such securities, to which the inside information relates or which are likely to be affected by 
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it, commits an offence.’500  They were convicted, and an administrative penalty of R1 million 
was jointly and severally imposed.501  On appeal to the High Court, they argued that the 
disclosure of the amount of the loan during January 2011 was not specific or precise 
information.  They argued that the information was vague since: no loan agreement had been 
concluded in writing; there were unfulfilled conditions precedent; there was uncertainty over 
whether AC Towers would actually ever be able to access the funds, the loan only having been 
approved provisionally;  and lastly, that the information they had did not differ in any material 
respect from information that had already been made public in the first SENS Bulletin.502 
Concerning the requirement that the information would be ‘likely’ to have a material effect on 
the price or value of any security listed on a regulated market, the court adopted the definition 
of the word ‘likely’ in Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.503  In 
that judgment it was said that ‘likely’ means ‘less than a probability but more than a mere 
possibility’.  It further found, with reference to the Australian case of Boughey v R,504 that 
‘likely’ is synonymous with ‘probable’.  ‘Probable’, reasoned the court, means ‘more probable 
than not’ and is to be compared with a term referring to a lesser contingency such as 
‘possible’.505 
The court held that when information is assessed for the purposes of determining whether it 
would be ‘likely to have a material effect on the price or value of a security’, it is to be assessed 
in the context in which it is used.  The information about the loan, found the court, the fact that 
the identity of the lender and the terms of the loan being unknown notwithstanding, had the 
capacity to materially affect the share price.  This was the case as the loan represented a 
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significant lifeline to the embattled AC Towers.  The amount of R99 million would be viewed 
by the ‘reasonable investor’ as sufficient for a small company requiring funding.  The fact that 
the Industrial Development Corporation was the lender would, held the court, signify to the 
reasonable investor that the terms of the loan would be less onerous than those that a 
commercial bank would impose.506  The court furthermore considered the actual increase in 
the share price of the shares to conclude that the information released in the second SENS 
announcement indeed had the capacity to affect the share price.507 
Whether the information is price sensitive is further to be determined with reference to the 
reasonable investor and whether he would regard the information as relevant to a decision to 
deal in the securities or not.508  That one has to have reference to the reasonable investor and 
whether he would regard the information as relevant to deal in securities or not, is the court’s 
own invention.  It is not a requirement of the Act. 
3 2 2 Specific or precise 
For information to be recognised as ‘inside information’, the Act also requires that it must be 
‘specific or precise’.  The Oxford Dictionary of English defines ‘specific’ as ‘clearly defined 
or identified’509 whereas ‘precise’ is defined as ‘marked by exactness and accuracy of 
expression or detail.’510 
This phrase was also dealt with in the Zietsman judgment.  The court held that the mere fact 
that final loan agreements had not been signed, was not a reason why the information known 
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to the appellants cannot be described as specific and precise.  The prospect of the conclusion 
of a loan agreement with the Industrial Development Corporation for R99 million described a 
set of circumstances that could realistically, or on the probabilities, materialise,511 and, 
presumably, was specific inside information in itself.  In sum, the court held the following 
principles to apply to South African law: for information to be specific or precise it is not 
required that the circumstances or event to which it relates be final.  Information relating to 
circumstances or an event in an intermediate phase could still be specific and precise and 
constitute inside information.512 
3 2 3 Information 
The Act prohibits certain dealings with inside ‘information’.  ‘Information’ is something that 
is ‘conveyed or represented by a particular arrangement or sequence of things’.513  It is to be 
juxtaposed with ‘data’.  ‘Data’ is ‘facts and statistics collected together for reference or 
analysis’.514  The distinction between the two concepts lies in the fact that information is a 
refined form of data.  It is data converted from raw material and put into a meaningful form.  
In other words, that which is prohibited, as the prohibition relates to information, is trading 
with something that already has meaning to a certain degree. 
3 2 4 The non-public requirement 
The Act also includes a separate section, section 79, which deals specifically with what is to 
be understood under information ‘which has not been made public’.515  Section 79 provides: 
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For the purposes of the definition of ‘inside information’, information is regarded as 
having been made public in circumstances which include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
(a) When the information is published in accordance with the rules of the relevant 
regulated market; or 
(b) when the information is contained in records which by virtue of any enactment 
are open to inspection by the public; or 
(c) when the information can be readily acquired by those likely to deal in any listed 
securities— 
(i) to which the information relates; or 
(ii) of an issuer to which the information relates; or 
(d) when the information is derived from information which has been made public. 
The section provides an open list of situations in which information would be regarded as not 
having been made public.  In other words, information that falls within these categories, and 
some types not mentioned, is not inside information. 
3 2 5 Learned or obtained as an insider 
Inside information must be learned and obtained as an insider.  In other words, the person who 
learns or obtains the information must be an insider when he learns it or he obtains it.  When 
information, which would satisfy every other requirement for inside information, is obtained 
by someone who is not an insider at the moment when he obtains it, the information is not 
inside information. 
The two actions by which the inside information must come to the knowledge of an insider is 
provided as ‘learned or obtained’.  The two verbs are divided by ‘or’ rather than ‘and’, which 
means that either ‘learned’ or ‘obtained’, standing on its own, would suffice.  The mere fact 
that these verbs have been included to describe the way in which the person came upon the 
inside information, suggests that the legislature had it in mind that being in possession of inside 
information is not sufficient to satisfy this requirement in the definition. 
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To obtain is to ‘get, acquire or secure (something)’.516  To ‘learn’ is to ‘gain or acquire 
knowledge of or skill in (something) by study, experience, or being taught’.517  John M’Tali v 
R518 dealt with legislation where ‘obtained’ was used in relation to illegal beer.  The term was 
used in the following context: ‘shall obtain by purchase, barter or in any other manner’.  It was 
argued that ‘obtain’ must mean ‘obtain from someone else.’519  Maasdorp C.J. held, however, 
that:  
the word “obtain” has not this restricted meaning in the dictionary, and from the original 
derivation of the word we could not arrive at that meaning.  Anyone who holds anything 
has obtained it.  He may have acquired it through natural agencies.520 
S v Scher521 dealt with a provision in the regulatory scheme applicable to livestock and meat 
control, which provided that a retail butcher may sell meat ‘obtained’ only from specified 
sources.  Scher, a retail butcher, operated his butchery under a registration certificate 
containing the following provision: 
The holder shall obtain meat only from a public auction conducted in a controlled area 
under the supervision of the Board, or from the Board, or from a person registered with 
the Board as a person who may deal in the course of trade with meat in a controlled 
area.  (Emphasis added.) 
Scher also farmed with sheep and cattle.  From time to time, so it was testified, Scher 
slaughtered stock on the farm to satisfy his household needs and to feed his servants.522  For 
this, the meat would be brought from Scher’s farm to Durbanville, where he lived and 
conducted the retail butchery business.  As it happened, by accident on Scher’s version, meat 
from his farm was sold in his butchery.  He was charged for and convicted of contravening his 
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registration certificate.  On appeal Scher argued that ‘obtain’ as used in the share certificate 
should be interpreted as synonymous with ‘acquire’.  With reference to cases such as Wessels 
v De Klerk and Another523, S v Botha524 and Transvaal Investment Co. Ltd v Springs 
Municipality525 he argued that to ‘acquire’ meat postulated two parties; the one acquiring it 
from the other.  As such, Scher’s conduct was not governed by the condition in the registration 
certificate.  The court of appeal, after referring to the dictionary definitions of ‘obtain’ and 
‘acquire’, held as follows: 
For the purposes of the present case it seems to be unnecessary to determine whether 
the concepts conveyed by these two words are identical.  I shall assume for the purposes 
of this case that they are.  In their ordinary meaning, however, neither of these words 
necessarily convey that a person can only obtain or acquire an object if he does so from 
another person.  Nor is there anything in the context – otherwise than there was in the 
case of The Transvaal Investment Company Ltd v Springs Municipality, supra – of 
condition 5, or in the conditions read as a whole, or in the conditions read in the light 
of the regulations promulgated under Proc. R.200, to suggest that the word “obtain” 
was limited in its meaning to those cases where the obtaining was by one person from 
another.  Mr Levy conceded – indeed he had little option but to do so – that condition 
5 referred to the obtaining of the meat to be sold, and not to the obtaining of the animal 
from which the meat was derived.  Meat would be “obtained”, in one of the ordinary 
meanings of that word, as the result of the slaughter of a cow, irrespective of whether 
the slaughtered cow and the meat were owned by one and the same person.  Had 
condition 5 used the word “acquire” the meaning would have, in my view, been the 
same.526 
Minister for Provincial and Local Government of the RSA v Unrecognised Traditional Leaders 
of the Limpopo Province, Sekhukhuneland527 concerned the interpretation of section 44(1) of 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act,528 but also drew the court into a debate about 
what the word ‘obtain’ means.  That Act was enacted in accordance with the legislature’s 
obligation to enact legislation to give effect to the right to access to information enshrined in 
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the Bill of Rights.529  According to section 44(1) the information officer of a public body may 
refuse a request for access to a record of that public body should the record include information 
‘obtained or prepared’ for the purposes of assisting to formulate policy or take a decision in 
the exercise of a power or performance of a duty conferred or imposed by law.530 
The appeal court held that ‘obtained or prepared’ does not mean that the information had to be 
‘commissioned’ by the state.  The threshold was low, being that the state must merely have 
‘obtained’ the information.531  The Supreme Court of Appeal accepted that the word ‘obtain’ 
is capable of both a narrow and a wide meaning.532  The court found that the narrow meaning 
of ‘obtain’ was ‘to be preferred’ in the context.  The term thus was held to mean ‘procuring of 
information.’533  The term is thus open to a broad and more than one interpretation.  It is also 
able to include ‘acquire’ and ‘procure’. 
3 3 Inside information in other jurisdictions 
The Financial Markets Act’s requirements are similar to its international counterparts.  In fact, 
their formulation evidences the clear influence of other jurisdictions. 
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3 3 1 The United States 
As it will be shown, in the United States the concept of inside information has been developed 
and expanded by the courts.  The broad anti-fraud Rule 10b-5 does not contain a definition of, 
or even a reference to, inside information.  The jurisdiction’s duty to abstain from trading or 
to disclose information, in accordance with the Rule and commonly referred to as the ‘abstain 
or disclose duty’,534 has been developed to require abstention or disclosure of information only 
if the trader has information that is both ‘material’ and ‘non-public’.  These are the two main 
requirements for inside information. 
The requirement of materiality is more encompassing than in South Africa.  As it has been 
said, in South Africa the effect on the price of a security upon the release of the information 
must be material; according to the United States’ approach, the information itself must be 
material.  As it will be shown below, the test of materiality in the United States incorporates a 
test for the information’s effect on the price of the security, the specificity of the information, 
and a range of other factors. 
The development of inside information as a concept started in Speed v Transamerica Corp.535  
The case concerned three class actions brought in the District Court of Delaware by 
stockholders and former stockholders of a company called Axton-Fisher Tobacco.  Prior to 
April 30, 1943, Axton-Fisher had outstanding three classes of stock: preferred stock, class A 
stock, and class B common stock. 
In 1944 Speed instituted action on behalf of the class A and B stockholders who had sold their 
stock to Transamerica after a public offer made by Transamerica by letter in November 1942 
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at $40 and $12 per share, respectively.  The written offer for the shares had been made to all 
Axton-Fisher’s minority stockholders.  The sellers alleged that at the time of the sale the true 
value of the class A stock was more than $200 per share.  It was alleged that Transamerica 
deceived the sellers into selling their shares.  The sellers sought judgment for an amount equal 
to the difference between the sales price and the alleged true value of the shares.536 
The basis of their claim was that in accepting Transamerica’s offer, they had no option but to 
rely on the Axton-Fisher annual report for 1941, and a letter that accompanied the report, to 
determine the value of their shares.  Transamerica had caused the letter to be mailed to Axton-
Fisher’s shareholders.  The 1941 report showed the average value of Axton-Fisher’s tobacco 
inventory to be over seven and a half million dollars.  The accompanying letter created a 
negative image of the company.  It showed a decline in sales and net income since 1938. 
The complaint alleged that at the time when the plaintiffs sold their stock, the Axton-Fisher 
tobacco inventory had a real value in excess of seventeen million dollars and its earnings were 
improving.537  The sellers, it was argued, should have been informed of these facts before the 
sale.538  Transamerica therefore failed to disclose facts materially affecting the value of the 
stock.539  The sellers thus claimed the difference between the sales price and the alleged true 
value. 
The court found that Transamerica was, in addition to being a majority stockholder of Axton-
Fisher, also in control of the company, ‘at least in the sense that it possessed full power of 
control.’540  It possessed information that the cash realisation value of Axton-Fisher’s assets, 
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represented by its large tobacco inventory, was far greater than the book value recorded in 
Axton-Fisher’s financial statements, as the big increase in the market value of the tobacco, not 
shown in the published statements, confirmed.541  The information that related to the 
appreciation in value was known to Transamerica ‘by virtue of its inside position’ and was 
neither publicly disclosed nor made known to the plaintiffs.542 
The court further found that the price Transamerica paid for the shares that it purchased from 
the plaintiffs was far below the redemption or liquidation value of the shares.543  The court 
identified three requirements for inside information: that it comprises material facts that would 
influence the value of the stock if disclosed; that it would be known by the insider by virtue of 
his inside position; and that it would affect the judgement of traders.544 
Kohler v Kohler545 followed Speed and fleshed out these requirements.  An action was brought 
by Walter Kohler (Kohler) against the Kohler Corporation (Kohler Co).  Kohler sought 
damages, which he alleged he suffered as a result of a sale of Kohler Co common stock by him 
to Kohler Co.  He alleged that he was induced to sell his stock by ‘misrepresentation, half-
truths, and omissions’ made by insiders of the company and that, as a result, he sold his stock 
at $10 per share less than its ‘actual’ or ‘fair market’ value.546 
The transaction was one far removed from the anonymous type of transaction found on the 
stock markets.  Kohler had been a shareholder of Kohler Co from 1931 to 1953.  He owned 
more than 10% of the shares of the company’s common stock.  He was also employed by the 
company from 1925 to 1947 and had been a director for a large part of that time.  Kohler Co 
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was a closely held corporation, having had only twenty-six common stockholders at the time 
Kohler sold his stock, many of whom were related to Kohler. 
Kohler’s uncle was the president and chairman of the board of directors.  Kohler wrote to his 
uncle informing him of his plans to buy stock in Vollrath Company, of which Kohler was the 
president.  He intended to exercise an option to this effect, but in order to do so he had to sell 
his Kohler stock.  His uncle consulted with the directors and officers of Kohler Co.  It was 
decided that one Johnson, a partner in an accounting firm that handled Kohler Co’s audits, 
should act as an intermediary and meet with Kohler to negotiate the terms of the sale.  Kohler’s 
uncle informed Kohler that Johnson had ‘available the facts which might play a part in a 
discussion of values’.547 
Kohler informed Johnson that he had a price of $125 per share in mind.  Johnson mailed Kohler 
with statistical data and a letter including the following passage: 
At the time of our discussion last Friday afternoon, it was agreed that I would furnish 
you with statistical data that I had used in projecting the possible value of Kohler Co 
common stock.  These projections are based upon average earnings and other data of 
Crane Company and American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Mgf. Co.  I believe that 
these schedules are self-explanatory but should any question occur to you, I shall 
endeavor to answer it.548 
The data provided to Kohler included a series of ten projected values of Kohler Co stock.  The 
values ranged from $58.83 to $149.38.  They were based on certain comparative ratios of 
Kohler Co’s competitors, Crane and American Standard, whose stocks were publicly traded.  
Kohler identified three pieces of inside information that he contended had unlawfully not been 
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provided to him: the accounting practices relating to Kohler Co’s pension plan; certain 
financial data relating to the year of the sale; and a tax refund that accrued to the company. 
The court referred to the ‘underlying principles’ of Speed549 and then held as follows: 
honesty and fairness permit consideration of the actual and normal business acumen of 
the seller.  Here, the company could fairly deal with a person who had had many years 
of intimate acquaintance with the affairs of the corporation, who was closely related to 
many principals of the corporation, who had extrinsic sources of sound business advice, 
and who himself was promoting a speedy sale, in a manner that might not be fair if 
plaintiff had been a novice to stock transactions or the corporation’s activities. 
On the one hand, corporate insiders must scrupulously disclose to outsiders those 
material facts about a corporation’s business which in reasonable and objective 
contemplation might affect the value of the corporation’s stock or securities and which 
the insiders should reasonably believe are unknown to the outsider.  On the other hand, 
they are not required to search out details that presumably would not influence the 
person’s judgment with whom they are dealing. 
. . . . 
The statute and the rule basically call for fair play and abstention on the part of the 
corporate insider from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed outside or minority 
stockholder.  Such a standard requires the insider to exercise reasonable and due 
diligence not only in ascertaining what is material as of the time of the transaction by 
disclosing fully those material facts about which the outsider is presumably uninformed 
and which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect his judgment.550  (Emphasis added.) 
These principles, as laid down in Speed and Kohler, were developed and confirmed in the 
judgments that followed.  In List v Fashion Park Inc551 the undisclosed facts List claimed had 
been material, were that one of the buyers of his stock was a director of Fashion Park and that 
the Fashion Park board, with a potential purchaser on the horizon, had resolved to sell or merge 
the company.  The trial court had held that the plaintiff would have sold the shares even if he 
had known that one of the buyers was a director of Fashion Park and that, therefore, the 
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undisclosed possibility that Fashion Park might be sold was not a material fact.552  The court 
held: 
The basic test of “materiality,” on the other hand, is whether a reasonable man would 
attach importance  [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in 
the transaction in question. . . .  [“Materiality”] encompasses those facts “which in 
reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation’s 
stock or securities”.553 
The reasonable investor test has become firmly entrenched in United States law.554  The locus 
classicus in United Sates federal law, in respect of the reasonable investor test and the 
definition of material information, is found in the judgment in TSC Industries Inc v Northway 
Inc.555  The case dealt with materiality in proxy solicitation.  However, the formulation of the 
materiality standard in that context was accepted in subsequent insider trading judgments.556  
United States courts, in applying the materiality standard in relation to inside information, use 
the following test: 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to act . . .  Put another way, 
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” 
of information available.557 
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In Basic v Levinson558 the court had to consider the approach to be taken in a case of a merger, 
which was in itself an uncertain future event at the time of the trade.  In the final analysis, held 
the court, materiality, whether it relates to an uncertain future event or any other type of fact, 
will depend on the reliance the reasonable investor would place on the information.  It held as 
follows: 
Whether the merger discussions in any particular case are material therefore depends 
on the facts.  Generally, in order to assess the probability that the event will occur, a 
factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest 
corporate levels.  Without attempting to catalogue all such possible factors, we note by 
way of example that board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers, and actual 
negotiations between principals or their intermediaries may serve as indicia of interest.  
To assess the magnitude of the transaction to the issuer of the securities allegedly 
manipulated, a factfinder will need to consider such facts as the size of the two 
corporate entities and of the potential premiums over market value.  No particular event 
or factor short of closing the transaction need be either necessary or sufficient by itself 
to render merger discussions material. 
As we clarify here today, materiality depends on the significance the reasonable 
investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information.559 
The courts have made pronouncements about specificity and preciseness, but they are made 
within the context of this broader flexible test.  In SEC v Monarch Fund560 it was held that 
inside information must be specific and more precise than general rumour.561  From its 
approach, it is apparent that the court viewed ‘precise’ as an antonym for uncertainty about 
truth.  The specificity of a ‘tip’, it was also held in Elkind v Ligget and Myers Inc, is a factor 
in assessing its materiality.562 
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Other interesting and relevant issues, as they have come before the United States courts, 
include how to approach evidence of ex post trade price movements and false information.  
Evidence as to the actual movement of prices, through inside information being incorporated 
in them through trading, where that evidence is available, has not been universally accepted as 
a conclusive factor in the test for materiality.  Rather, the movement in the price of a security 
when the information in question becomes public, has been held to be but one factor in 
determining materiality563 or merely to support a finding of materiality.564  The strongest 
holding about this was made in United States v Carpenter,565 where it was held that once 
information has market impact, it is beyond question that the materiality standard is 
satisfied.566  All this being said, the materiality standard developed as a standard quite 
independent from the requirement of a movement of prices. 
The United States courts have been circumspect in establishing a firm principle on false inside 
information.  In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc v Berner567 the court found that it had 
material before it that strongly suggested that certain information conveyed to the respondent 
investor before the court was true, but that the information was deceptive by virtue of 
exaggeration and the failure to include additional information.568  The court reasoned as 
follows: 
If this was the case, and if the respondents otherwise acquired a derivative duty within 
the meaning of Dirks, there is no question that their trading on the basis of this 
information violated securities laws.  If the information was entirely false, the SEC and 
Bateman Eichler contend that the respondents, by trading on what they believed was 
material non-public information, are nevertheless guilty of at least an attempted 
violation of the securities laws if they otherwise believed that Neadeau had breached 
his fiduciary duties. . . .  The respondents, on the other hand, contend that they could 
not have inherited a duty to disclose false information, and that the case is properly 
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viewed as governed by the doctrine of legal impossibility, which would bar any 
liability, rather than factual impossibility, which would permit liability on an attempt 
theory. . . .  Because this issue has not been fully briefed and was not considered by the 
courts below, we express no views on it and simply proceed on the assumption that the 
respondents’ activities rendered them in delicto.569 
In United States v Myllet570 the United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, was 
equally careful not to make any holdings in relation to false inside information.  It wrote: 
We do not today hold that any predictions made by an insider can constitute the basis 
for insider trading simply because a tippee relies upon them and their source, and they 
subsequently come true.  It may well be that insider trading has not occurred, for 
example, in situations in which an insider has made categorical statements that are 
completely without foundation and these are used successfully by a trader.  We need 
go nowhere near such an extreme holding, for here the statement made by the insider 
was qualified, supported and credible.571 
SEC v Geon Industries572 dealt with prima facie immaterial pieces of information 
communicated in a seemingly innocent manner.  Geon Industries was engaged in the 
importation and distribution of repair and replacement parts for imported cars and trucks.  
Geon was founded, controlled and chaired by one Neuwirth.  He was a co-defendant in the 
case together with the company’s secretary-treasurer and financial vice-president, one Bloom.  
Geon Industries retained the services of Drexel Burnham & Co Inc to arrange discussions with 
a large British company, Burmah Oil Co, about a possible merger with it.  After some 
preliminary discussions Burmah asked Geon for a forecast on the future of the automobile 
parts industry, five-year balance and income sheet estimates, and a cash flow projection.  
Accordingly, Bloom received instructions to provide Burmah with what they needed.  
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Subsequently, Neuwirth and Bloom visited the British firm to further discussions.  The 
meetings took place but nothing definite was agreed to between the parties. 
Before leaving for England, Neuwirth met a friend and business associate, Alpert.  In the words 
of the court, they met ‘in the bar of a country club in Long Island, in accordance with a custom 
in which the Neuwirths and the Alperts would generally dine together on Wednesday 
nights’.573  At the dinner Neuwirth told Alpert that he was going to London and said that he 
would be ‘perhaps looking at some people in view of a merger’.574  Alpert, who at that point 
owned only a few Geon shares, started to buy Geon.  He bought shares until he held more than 
ten times what he did before the dinner. 
As a result of the uncertainty about the negotiations, the court found that Geon did not have to 
disclose the merger to the SEC.  However, the information about the state of the negotiations 
was found to be material inside information.575  The Geon court also held that, when applying 
the materiality standard, a slightly different approach might be applicable to cases involving 
mergers and acquisitions:  
Since a merger in which it is bought out is the most important event that can occur in a 
small corporation’s life, to wit, its death, we think that inside information, as regards a 
merger of this sort, can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case as 
regards lesser transactions — and this even though the mortality rate of mergers in such 
formative stages is doubtless high. 
Difficulties also arise when some facts that relate to a specific event or subject are public while 
other facts are not.  The defence will typically lead facts in an effort to show that all the 
information relevant to the trade was indeed public, while the prosecution will lead facts to 
show that the information in the public realm was not the information that actually afforded 
                                                 
573  SEC v Geon Industries 531 F 2d 39 (2d Cir 1976) 42. 
574  Ibid. 
575  Ibid. 47. 
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the trader his unfair advantage.  A good illustration of how the United States courts deal with 
this situation is found in the reasoning in the judgment of Sec v Mayhew.576  The court wrote: 
In sum, the aggregate of public information prior to November 15, 1989, was to the 
effect that Roror was willing to merge if it found the right partner and that Rorer was 
discussing this possibility with up to three companies.  Privately, Rorer executives took 
care to keep information about actual merger discussions secret by limiting the persons 
who knew about specific merger negotiations to top executives and by using codes in 
related documents. 
We agree with the district court that the information Piccolino conveyed to Mayhew 
went beyond that which had been publicly disseminated.  Mayhew learned from 
Piccolino that [the president of Rorer’s pharmaceuticals business] had confirmed that 
Rorer was “actually in discussions” towards a merger with a candidate or candidates.  
He also learned that these merger talks were at a “serious stage”— far enough along to 
warrant [Mayhew’s company’s] involvement in negotiating a new employment 
agreement for Rorer’s CEO.  To a reasonable investor, this combination of new 
information, acquired privately, transformed the likelihood of a Rorer merger from one 
that was certainly possible at some future time to one that was highly probable quite 
soon.577  (Emphasis added.) 
As to the non-public requirement, in United States v Libera578 it was said that information may 
be considered public for Section 10(b) purposes even though there has been no public 
announcement and only a small number of people know it.  The issue is not the number of 
people who possess the information but ‘whether their trading has caused their possession to 
be fully impounded into the price of the particular stock’.  At other times the courts have held 
that non-public information is, quite simply, information not generally available to the ordinary 
investing public.579 
                                                 
576  121 F 3d 44 (2d Cir 1996). 
577  SEC v Mayhew 121 F 3d 44 (2d Cir 1996) 50–51. 
578  U.S. v Libera 989 F 2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993). 
579  See In re Investors Management Co Inc 44 SEC 633 (1971) 643 and Dirks v SEC 463 US 646 (1983) 
653. 
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As to uncertain future events and how the materiality test is to be applied to them, it was said 
in SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co,580 that whether facts are material, depends at any given time 
upon a balancing of both the probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude 
of the event in light of the totality of the company’s activities.581 
3 3 2 Australia 
The Australian courts and legislatures have to a certain degree vacillated between a flexible 
and open approach to inside information, and a highly prescriptive and detailed approach.  At 
the same time they have allowed expert evidence to show whether the information in question 
would have influenced the market price of the relevant security at the time of the impugned 
trade. 
The legal development in inside information properly started in Commissioner for Corporate 
Affairs v Green.582  The Supreme Court of Victoria had to consider what constitutes 
information in this context.  The facts were as follows.  Green had been a director of two 
companies: Endeavour Oil Corporation NL (Endeavour) and Gwello Pty Ltd (Gwello).  
Gwello held shares in Endeavour. 
The possibility of making a call on Gwello shares was discussed at an Endeavour directors’ 
meeting.  The discussions were preliminary and informal in nature.  The matter had not been 
on the agenda and no resolution was taken to implement the idea.  One of Endeavour’s 
directors did, however, instruct an Australian share register company to draft and arrange for 
a call notice to be sent to the Melbourne Stock Exchange prior to the call being executed.  
                                                 
580  401 F 2d 849 (1968) 849. 
581  SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co 401 F 2d 833 (2d Cir 1968) 851. 
582  [1978] VR 505. 
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Green was unaware of these arrangements.  In the end, no final decision had been made to 
make the call, but a decision had been taken to discuss the matter further at a later stage. 
The court dealt with the following provision in what was then section 124(2) of the Victorian 
Companies Act 1961: 
An officer of a corporation shall not make improper use of information acquired by 
virtue of his position as such officer to gain directly or indirectly an advantage for 
himself or for any other person or to cause detriment to the corporation.583  
(Emphasis added.) 
Unrestricted by a legislative definition of ‘information’, the court had to give meaning to a 
much broader, less defined term than the one we find in our Act.  The court reasoned as 
follows:  
In many cases a hint may suggest information or may enable an inference to be 
drawn as to information.  Information about impending stock movements or share 
movements may often be veiled.  Discussion concerning such a movement may often 
take the form of ‘mooting’ but not deciding a matter.584 
The court therefore found that that which Green gained at the January 1975 board meeting was 
indeed information.  Information was to be found in the mere fact that the board of directors 
had considered whether to make the call and that they had decided not to make that decision 
for the time being.585  In coming to this conclusion, the court found that it was important that 
only a person familiar with and making a study of the movements of oil and mining shares 
might have deduced that a call would have been made in the future, detracting from the 
importance of the information.  However, it held that it was of even greater significance that: 
the respondent had advance knowledge that not only was it likely, objectively speaking, 
that such a call would have to be considered but, in addition, he knew then what the 
                                                 
583  Ibid. 510. 
584  Ibid. 511. 
585  Ibid. 
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outsiders did not know, namely, that the board had actually discussed the matter 
although it had decided to defer a decision for the time being.586 
 
Green’s information advantage lay not in his knowledge of a specific fact, but rather the fact 
that he knew with much greater certainty, to the exclusion of others in the market, that a call 
for Endeavour’s shares was on the cards. 
The court recognised that the information gave Green greater certainty about the trade than 
what a ‘person familiar with and making a study of the movements’ of the security in question, 
would have had.587 
There were also judgments that evidenced a relatively conservative approach to the scope of 
the definition of inside information.  In Ryan v Triguboff588 it was held that the term ‘specific 
information’, where it was found in section 75A of the New South Wales Securities Industry 
Act of 1970, did not merely mean that the information had to be ‘precisely definable’, but that 
‘its entire content [had to be] precisely and unequivocally expressed and discerned’.589 
In Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Brothers Halkerston & Partners Securities Limited590 
the meaning of information in section 128(1)591 of the New South Wales Securities Industry 
Act 1980 was considered.  The court struck out the plaintiff’s claim and granted leave for the 
filing of a further statement of claim.  In coming to its decision, the court reasoned as follows: 
                                                 
586  Ibid. 
587  Ibid. 
588  [1976] 1 NSWLR 588. 
589  Ibid. 596. 
590  (1986) 10 ACLR 462. 
591  That section reads: 
A person who is, or at any time in the preceding 6 months has been, connected with a body 
corporate shall not deal in any securities of that body corporate if by reason of his so being, or 
having been, connected with that body corporate he is in possession of information that is not 
generally available but, if it were, would be likely to materially to affect the price of those securities. 
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The next question is what is meant by “information”?  In the Ryan case I referred to 
earlier and in the Canadian cases to which I made reference, information was held to 
be material which itself affected the price, not information which a person could use to 
make calculations.  In Victoria in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Green . . . this 
line of reasoning was not followed and it seems to me that in view of the amendments 
made in 1980 that the definition given to information by McInerey J in that case comes 
close to what should be adopted here; that is, the factual knowledge either of a concrete 
kind or that obtained by means of a hint or a veiled suggestion from which one can 
impute other knowledge.  I wonder a bit, however, whether it is safe to equate 
information and knowledge.  Information is often defined as knowledge acquired, 
derived or inculcated by observation, reading or study or by what one is told; but in 
some cases information implies lack of knowledge such as, for instance, where one says 
he is informed of a thing but he does not know whether or not his information is true: 
see State v Simpson 118 SW 1187 at 1188. 
To my mind information in subsection (1) goes further than knowledge and includes 
the situation where someone has been informed of something which he does not know 
to be true nor does he care whether it is true or not.  In other words, information may 
include a rumour that something has happened with respect to a company which a 
person neither believes or disbelieves.592 
As will become apparent, the Australian legislature has, in the legislation currently in force, 
included specific provisions relating to matters of supposition and deduction.593  In the 1970 
Securities Industry Act no reference was specifically made to these matters.  The Act simply 
prohibited persons associated with a corporation who had ‘knowledge of specific information 
relating to the information’.594  It was in issue before a New South Wales court whether a 
deduction formed by a defendant accused of insider trading could be regarded as specific 
information?595  The court held that it could not.  It held that a deduction did not constitute 
specific information.  That phrase, held the court, required information that was capable of 
                                                 
592  Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Brothers Halkerston & Partners Securities Limited (1986) 10 
ACLR 462 467–468. 
593  See p. 165 below. 
594  As quoted in Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia 
Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 963 par. 527. 
595  Ryan v Triguboff [1976] 1 NSWLR 588. 
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being pointed at, identified and ‘capable of being expressed unequivocally’.596  Deductions 
have now been included in the Australian definition of inside information. 
The Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991 of Australia presented a paradigm shift in 
Australian insider trading regulation.  It, among other things, contained a new definition of 
what was to be understood under the term ‘information’ in relation to insider trading.597  This 
definition is also contained in the Australian insider trading provisions currently in force, to be 
found in section 1042A of the Corporations Act.  In dealing with the proposed Amendment, 
the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 provides 
as follows:598 
Doubt was also expressed as to whether the term ‘information’ would be interpreted as 
encompassing supposition, intentions and other matter sufficiently certain to require its 
release to the public, notwithstanding the broad interpretation given to the term in 
Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Green [1978] VR 505 at 511. 
 
The new definition599 provided that information also includes matters of supposition and other 
matters that are insufficiently definite to warrant being made known to the public, including 
matters relating to the intentions or likely intentions of the parties.600 
                                                 
596  Ibid. 597.  Also Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets 
Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 963 par. 528. 
597  See p. 165 below. 
598  Also quoted in Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia 
Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 963 par. 532. 
599  The new definition was contained in section 1002A(1) of the Australian Corporations Act but was later 
retained in section 1042A. 
600  The explanatory memorandum to the Corporation Legislation Amendment Bill (which became the 
Australian Corporations Amendment Act 1991) reads: 
Doubts was also expressed as to whether the term ‘information’ would be interpreted as 
encompassing supposition, intentions and other matter not sufficiently certain to require its release 
to the public, notwithstanding the broad interpretation given to the term in Commissioner for 
Corporate Affairs v Green [1978] VicRp 48; [1978] VR. 505 at 511. 
 Proposed amendment 
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‘Inside information’ is now defined in the Australian Corporations Act as meaning: 
information in relation to which the following paragraphs are satisfied: 
(a) the information is not generally available; 
(b) if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to 
have a material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial 
products.601 
The Act further defines ‘information’, ‘generally available’, and ‘material effect’.   
‘[I]nformation’ is: 
(a) matters of supposition and other matters that are insufficiently definite 
to warrant being made known to the public; and 
(b) matters relating to intentions, or likely intentions, of a person.602 
‘Generally available’ is defined as: 
 (1) For the purposes of this Division, information is generally available if: 
(a) it consists of readily observable matter; or 
(b) both of the following subparagraphs apply: 
(i) it has been made known in a manner that would, or would be likely 
to, bring it to the attention of persons who commonly invest in 
Division 3 financial products of a kind whose price might be affected 
by the information; and 
(ii) since it was made known, a reasonable period for it to be 
disseminated among such persons has elapsed; or 
(c) it consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences made or drawn from either 
or both of the following: 
(i) information referred to in paragraph (a); 
(ii) information made known as mentioned in subparagraph (b)(i). 
                                                 
Proposed section 1002A(1) provides definitions of ‘information’ and ‘securities’, in relation to a 
body corporate, to apply for the purposes of the insider trading provisions.  The definition of 
information is an inclusive one, with information being taken to include supposition and other 
matters insufficiently definite to warrant being made known to the public and matters relating to 
the intentions, or likely intentions, of a person. (319–320). 
601  Section 1042A of the Australian Corporations Act. 
602  Section 1042A of the Australian Corporations Act. 
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Section 1042D of the Australian Corporations Act also expressly sets out when a reasonable 
person would take information to have a material effect on the price or value of financial 
products.  It provides: 
For the purposes of this Division, a reasonable person would be taken to expect 
information to have a material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 
financial products if (and only if) the information would, or would be likely to, 
influence persons who commonly acquire Division 3 financial products in deciding 
whether or not to acquire or dispose of the first-mentioned financial products.603 
The Australian courts have as yet only to a limited extent considered the sections.  In R v 
Bateson,604 it was held that the provisions allow for expert evidence to be led about whether 
the information in question could at the time of trading have been expected to have a material 
effect on the price of the shares.605   
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia 
Pty Ltd (No 4)606 the court expressed its views on the definition of information in section 
1042A.  According to the court, even if information is non-specific, what is drawn from it by 
way of inference may be regarded as information in terms of the section.607  The court held 
that information can be communicated orally or by conduct — by the ‘observation of the words 
or conduct of others’.608  A supposition would, according to the court, be that which a person 
draws from the hint or other non-specific information received from another.609  Although a 
hint or other non-specific information must be communicated by words or conduct, the 
inference or supposition drawn from it would qualify as information.610  The kind of 
information that may affect the securities market may be imprecise, but if the information is 
                                                 
603  Section 1042A read with section 1042D of the Australian Corporations Act. 
604  [2011] NSWSC 643. 
605  R v Bateson [2011] NSWSC 643 par. 5(G). 
606  [2007] FCA 963 par. 526–544.  Also see p. 292 below. 
607  Ibid. par. 537. 
608  Ibid. 
609  Ibid. par. 538. 
610  Ibid. par. 542. 
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so imprecise that it is unlikely to affect the market, a charge of insider trading in relation to the 
information cannot be made out.611  The court had to assess a supposition.612 
A trader in Citigroup’s equity derivatives division had been trading heavily in the shares of a 
company that Citigroup’s investment banking division were advising about a takeover, Toll 
Holdings Limited (Toll).  When he came to know of this, the trader’s senior called him away 
from the trading desk.  Manchee, the trader, was asked how many shares he had purchased; 
why he had purchased them; and why he was being so aggressive in trading in Patrick stock.  
He replied that his actions were informed by hedge fund trading, charts, volume and rumours 
from outside the company.  He was instructed to cease trading in Patrick stock.  He however 
went back to his workstation and sold some of the Patrick shares.  The day after, Toll’s bid for 
Patrick was announced. 
The court undertook an analysis of ‘Mr Manchee’s thought process’.613  It found that Manchee 
had perceived the discussion with his superior as unusual.  His testimony was that he had sold 
the 200 000 shares because he thought his senior had meant that he was carrying too much 
                                                 
611  Ibid. par. 543. 
612  Ibid. par. 526.  At the time of the decision, the Australian insider trading provisions did not contain an 
express reference to supposition.  The definition of ‘inside information’ then read: 
 inside information means information in relation to which the following paragraphs are satisfied: 
 (a) the information is not generally available; 
(b) if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a 
material effect on the price or value of [certain] financial products. 
 (See Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd 
[2007] FCA 963 par. 247.)  
 The term ‘material affect' was defined as follows: ‘material effect, in relation to a reasonable person’s 
expectations of the effect of information on the price or value of [certain] financial products, has the 
meaning given by section 1042D’. 
 Section 1042D provides as follows: ‘For the purposes of this division, a reasonable person would be 
taken to expect information to have a material effect on the price or value of particular . . . financial 
products if (and only if) the information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly 
acquire [certain] financial products in deciding whether or not to acquire or dispose of the first 
mentioned financial products’.  
613  Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2007] 
FCA 963 par. 57. 
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risk.  When he was pressed about whether he supposed that ‘when he was telling you to stop 
buying it had something to do with these rumours about a Toll takeover?’ Manchee replied, ‘I 
probably assumed it did’.614  Manchee further testified that he might have thought that there 
was something that his superior could not tell him in relation to the Toll takeover.  Indeed, he 
stated: 
Perhaps at the time I thought he might have known something he couldn’t tell me, and 
the reason that he would know something but couldn’t tell me that Citigroup were 
involved somehow, perhaps he would have known, and I might have thought about that 
as a possibility.615 
The allegation was that the inside information acted on was a supposition made by Manchee 
during the conversation when he was pulled away from his trading desk.616  The court had to 
decide whether any supposition was made by Manchee and, if indeed he supposed anything, 
what it was.617  As required by the wording of the Australian provisions, the court, however, 
first had to determine whether Manchee could be regarded as an officer of Citigroup, for only 
the knowledge of ‘officers’ are attributable to a corporation.618  The court found him not to be 
an officer, and therefore his knowledge not to be attributable to the corporation. 
                                                 
614  Ibid. par. 58.  
615  Ibid. par. 59. 
616  Ibid. par. 466. 
617  Ibid. par. 467. 
618  Section 1042G(1) of the Australian Corporations Act provides in relevant part: 
 For the purposes of the insider trading provisions: 
(a)  a body corporate is taken to possess any information which an officer of the body corporate 
possesses and which came into his or her possession in the course of the performance of 
duties as such an officer; and 
(b)  if an officer of a body corporate knows any matter or thing because he or she is an officer 
of the body corporate, it is to be presumed that the body corporate knows that matter or 
thing; and 
(c)  if an officer of a body corporate, in that capacity, is reckless as to a circumstance or result, 
it is to be presumed that the body corporate is reckless to that circumstance or result. 
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In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2)619 the court reasoned that the defined 
term ‘information’ in section 1002A(1) of the Australian Act is inclusive rather than 
comprehensive, but that it expressly includes ‘matters relating to the intentions, or the likely 
intentions, of a person’.  Further, according to the court, the intention of natural persons or a 
corporation may be held with ‘varying degrees of certainty’.620  The court wrote as follows: 
The existence of such an intention is information.  If it is passed on to others, it is 
information in the hands of the recipients.  However, the intention may be inferred by 
others from the conduct of the directors.  The inference may be drawn with varying 
degrees of certainty as to its accuracy.  Nevertheless, such an inference remains 
information.  Indeed, there is no clear distinction between information conveyed orally 
and by conduct.  In the case where the director tells a third party of his or her intentions, 
the information is in fact inferred not merely from receiving the communication, but 
from a belief as to its veracity.621 
The court agreed with the reasoning of McInerney J in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v 
Green, where it was held that the kind of information that may affect a securities market may 
be ‘quite imprecise’.  The court qualified this statement by holding that: 
The source of the rumour may be of very considerable importance, despite the 
vagueness of the known details.  If the information in question is so imprecise that it is 
not likely to affect the market, the charge will not be made out.  But if it is sufficient to 
satisfy the element of the offence, there is no reason to import into the statutory 
definition an additional requirement of specificity or precision.622 
The Australian courts have also had occasion to tentatively address false inside information 
and whether such a concept exists.  In the unreported New South Wales Supreme Court 
decision of R v Rivkin623 a charge of insider trading under section 1002G of the Australian 
Corporations Act had been laid.  The accused argued that the indictment, together with the 
particulars, disclosed no breach of the insider trading provisions as the ‘information’ relied 
                                                 
619  [2006] NSWCCA 373. 
620  Ibid. 411. 
621  Ibid. 
622  Ibid. 416. 
623  Case 70065 of 2002 (NSWSC) 10 April 2003. 
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upon by the prosecution was not ‘information’ as that term is defined in section 1002A of the 
Australian Act.  The court held that a falsehood may fall within the definition of information.  
It reasoned as follows: 
While it is not necessary for me to express a concluded opinion, nor indeed is it 
desirable to do so for purposes of the present application, I must say that I incline to the 
tentative view that a statement as to the existence of a state of affairs – even though it 
may not be precisely accurate at all – may nevertheless be comprehended within the 
concept of information for the purposes of the insider trading legislation.  That is, 
information which is confidential, price sensitive and which may not be used in the 
prohibited manner may nevertheless extend to inaccurate or even baseless 
information.” 
In R v Mansfield624 Messrs Mansfield and Kizon were prosecuted for various offences as 
provided for by the insider trading provisions found in the Australian Corporations Act 2001.  
The inside information in the case related to two publicly listed companies, My Casino Limited 
(My Casino) and a company called Adultshop.com Limited (Adultshop).  The information 
consisted of statements that the prosecution alleged was made by either a managing director 
of Adultshop or a chairman of My Casino. 
After the prosecution presented its case, the defendants applied for absolution from the 
instance.625  They based their application, inter alia, on the fact that the evidence adduced by 
the prosecution, taken at its highest, would not have been able to satisfy the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the information relied upon for some of the charges was ‘factually 
correct.’  The issue the court had to determine was whether it was a necessary element of the 
offences in the Australian insider trading provisions that inside information be ‘truthful’ or a 
‘factual reality’.  In other words, must the inside information be true?  Or, conversely, can a 
falsity be regarded as information? 
                                                 
624  [2011] WASCA 132. 
625  The defendants made application pursuant to section 108 of the Australian Criminal Procedure Act 
2004, which is akin to the South African application for absolution. 
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When the court’s analysis is assessed, two characteristics of Australian insider trading 
regulation must be kept in mind.  Firstly, the Australian provisions do not require an insider to 
be connected in any way to the company to which the information relates.626  The ambit of the 
prohibitions is thus not circumscribed by a definition of insider.  It is circumscribed, apart from 
the defences provided by the Act, only by the definition of inside information.  Consequently, 
the definition of inside information in Australian legislation stands alone in curbing the ambit 
of the prohibitions. 
In support of the proposition that falsehoods cannot form part of information, it was argued 
that the Australian legislature could never have intended that falsehoods or lies could warrant 
being made known to the public, unless they were accompanied by information exposing their 
falsity.  If it were not so, the publication would lead to market distortion and unfairness.  The 
publication of a false statement would, so it was submitted, distort the market and lead to the 
very consequences the market manipulation provisions of the Australian Act were meant to 
address.627  It was further argued that the notion of equal access to information cannot be 
thought to include false statements.628 
Buss JA, after interpreting the legislation in question, held that: 
(a) a statement may be ‘information’, as defined, irrespective of whether or not the 
matters stated are reliable or have a sound factual foundation; 
(b) an opinion, a prediction and a forecast may each be ‘information’, as defined, 
irrespective of whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the opinion, 
prediction or forecast; and  
(c) a statement, opinion, prediction and forecast may each be ‘information’, as 
defined, even if the person who makes or repeats the statement, opinion, 
prediction or forecast knows or believes that: 
 (i) it is unreliable or has an unsound factual basis; or 
 (ii) it is not based on any reasonable grounds; or 
                                                 
626  See p. 302 et seq. below. 
627  R v Mansfield [2011] WASCA 132 par. 43. 
628  Ibid. par. 44. 
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 (iii) it is unreasonable, false or a lie.629 
Buss JA’s reasons for endorsing this broad definition of information were, apart from those 
connected to his contextual legislative interpretation,630 the following.  According to the judge, 
information that involves the expression of an opinion or a prediction, including opinions and 
predictions that are not based on reasonable grounds, are inherently uncertain, imprecise or 
speculative, at least to a certain degree.631  In effect, the court reasoned that should one exclude 
an untruthful statement, as the line between it and opinions and predictions are so fine, one 
would have to exclude opinions and predictions as well.  The court held that: 
 [T]he inclusion within ‘information’, as defined, of information that is not ‘truthful’ or 
not a ‘factual reality’ or not based on reasonable grounds is consistent with the market 
fairness policy rationale, and significant aspects of the market efficiency policy 
rationale, on which the [Australian] insider trading prohibitions are based.  It is 
consistent with the market fairness rationale in that a person who trades in securities 
while in possession of inside information (whether or not the information is ‘truthful’ 
or a ‘factual reality’ or based on reasonable grounds) will have information that is not 
available to the persons with whom he or she is dealing.  It is consistent with significant 
aspects of the market efficiency rationale that a person who trades in securities while 
in possession of inside information (whether or not that information is ‘truthful’ or a 
‘factual reality’ or based on reasonable grounds) is engaging in conduct of a kind which 
is likely to diminish the investing public’s confidence in the securities market.632 
Buss JA held that there was no difficulty in conceptualising how untruthful information could 
satisfy the test of materiality.  In the Australian provisions, materiality must be found in that a 
reasonable person would expect the information to have a material effect on the price or value 
of shares to which the information relates.  This evaluation would, according to Buss JA, be 
based on: 
                                                 
629  Ibid. par. 114 
630  As is clear from the definition provided above, the Australian Corporations Act has an extremely broad 
definition of ‘information’. This broad definition influenced Buss JA’s findings on whether information 
should be truthful. 
631  Ibid. par. 118. 
632  Ibid. par. 125. 
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(a) what is reasonably embodied in or conveyed by the relevant statements of 
alleged fact, opinions, predictions, forecasts, statements of intention or likely 
intention hypotheses, assumptions, hints, suggestions or conjecture etc, as the 
case may be; and 
(b) the identity of the person who generated or allegedly generated the matters, 
in the context of any other information which is (in contrast to the alleged inside 
information) generally available and which is relevant to the price or value of 
the . . . financial products in question.633 
Murray J, in concurring with Buss JA in his holding that information need not be true for a 
successful prosecution of an insider trading offence, found there to be no policy considerations 
underlying the Australian provisions, or any legislative contextual arguments, which required 
a rule that inside information be true.  In the judge’s view, information is: 
 (1) Something which is communicated by words or deeds.  Paragraph (a) of the 
definition shows that it may include matters of supposition, i.e., matters in 
respect of which information is conveyed by inference from statements made or 
conduct. 
(2) To be information, the thing communicated must concern a matter of fact.  
Paragraph (b) of the definition says that ‘information; includes matters relating 
to the intentions or likely intentions of a person.  A person’s intention is, of 
course, a matter of fact.634 
The judge found no policy basis or a reason arising out of the meaning of the word 
‘information’, which presupposed that a ‘factual communication’ ceases to be information 
because that communication is false or an invention.  In other words, ‘[t]he fact that 
information is untrue does not cause it to cease to be information’.635  
The judge made further interesting observations on what amounts to inside information.  He 
held that information in the context of the insider trading provisions could, at once, be a 
                                                 
633  Ibid. par. 130. 
634  Ibid. par. 307. 
635  Ibid. par. 308. 
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statement about the source of the information as well as a statement about that which was 
said.636  In other words, the information could relate to the one who made the statement: It was 
Mr X who said Y.  And, the information could relate to the substance of the statement: Y.  In 
addition, the ‘information may be price-sensitive, not only because of its nature, but also 
because of the source connected with the company concerned from which the information was 
said to be derived’.637 
McLure P did not agree with Buss JA and Murray J, that inside information need not be a 
factual reality for a successful prosecution.  His point of departure is that the Australian 
Corporations Act includes a wide definition of inside information.638  The Judge held that the 
word ‘information’, in both its natural and extended meanings, includes hearsay.639  As is clear 
from the Act, it also includes matters of opinion, actual or likely intention, and assumption.  
Therefore, the judge held that it was clearly implicated in the Australian legislation that 
information is connected with a person or entity.640  The Australian legislature’s intention641 is 
that inside information had still to originate as confidential information in possession of an 
entity entitled to act on it or have it.  Inside information must actually exist.  Something would 
not be inside information merely because a real insider communicated it to an accused. 
The judge held further that in order to establish that an accused is in possession of inside 
information for the purposes of the Australian section 1043A(1), there must be, although not 
necessarily ‘coextensive’, a ‘proven correlation or correspondence’ between the inside 
                                                 
636  Ibid. par. 309. 
637  Ibid. par. 311. 
638  Section 1042A of the Australian Corporations Act defines ‘inside information’ to include: 
 (a) matters of supposition and other matters that are insufficiently definite to warrant being 
made known to the public; and  
 (b) matters relating to the intentions, or likely intentions, of a person. 
639  R v Mansfield [2011] WASCA 132 par. 10. 
640  Ibid. par. 10. 
641  The judge deduced this ‘evident statutory intention’ from the definitions of ‘information’ and ‘inside 
information’ in the Australian Act. 
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information in the accused’s possession and that in possession of the entity.  Of course, the 
judge reasoned, inside information may the product of inferences, deductions or assumptions 
made by the accused, but that these inferences, deductions or assumptions in the accused’s 
possession must be based on inside information relating to ‘actual events or information’ from 
within the entity entitled to use that information.  These inferences and deductions can, 
according to the judge, be wrong or misleading even if they were to be based on inside 
information.642 
He held that an accused will be found to be in possession of inside information only if it is 
proven that that inside information corresponds, at least in part, with the actual internal affairs 
or internal workings of the entity entitled to possess it.  For instance, if it is alleged that the 
information was based on the reception of a rumour of what an officer of the company was 
said to have reported to the company’s board, the prosecution had to prove the existence of the 
rumour.  It does not have to prove the truth of the rumour.643  In the same manner, held McLure 
P, if the rumour contained a prediction, opinion or intention, it would not be necessary for the 
prosecution to prove that there were reasonable grounds for the prediction, opinion or 
intention.644  In the final analysis, McLure P found that, as the evidence adduced by the 
prosecution was incapable of supporting a finding that the information was based on 
                                                 
642  R v Mansfield [2011] WASCA 132 par. 15. 
643  R v Mansfield [2011] WASCA 132 par. 16.  In summary, McLure P held as follows: 
‘... it is an element of the offence of insider trading that the inside information in the possession of the 
accused correspondent in material part with actual inside information in the possession of the entity 
entitled to have used it.  Thus, a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the internal affairs of the entity, even 
if made by an officer thereof, is incapable of being inside information.’  The learned Judge held further 
that his ‘construction of the expression “inside information” is consistent with the statutory purposes 
of the insider trading provisions of the [Australian] Act, being to ensure market efficiency and market 
fairness, in the sense that all parties to a transaction have the opportunity to access the same information.  
It is also consistent with the 1989 Griffiths Report (Fair Shares For All, Insider Trading in Australia) 
on which the current statutory scheme is based.  The Griffiths Report concluded: 
‘The offence of insider trading must have its genesis in the use of information derived from within the 
company [4.3.5].’ 
644  R v Mansfield [2011] WASCA 132 par. 16.  
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information ‘in the possession of the bodies corporate whose shares were traded’, the appeal 
had to be dismissed.645 
As to the Australian Corporations Act’s requirement that the information must be ‘not 
generally available’,646 the Australian courts have held that it is a question of fact whether a 
matter is ‘readily observable’ or not.  It has an objective, hypothetical test.  Whether 
information is readily observable will, according to the courts, not depend on whether people 
have actually perceived the information.  The test is rather one that asks: has the particular 
information been ‘widely observed’.647  Where a court considers general availability in relation 
to suppositions, the court asks whether other investors would have been able to make the 
                                                 
645  Ibid. par. 21. 
646  See section 1043A of the Australian Corporations Act. 
647  R v Mansfield 2011 WASCA 132 par 147.  Buss JA, relied on a dictum of Mason P in the R v Firns 
(2001) 38 ACSR 223.  At par. 87–89 Mason P held as follows: 
I have endeavored to show why, in my opinion, a decision that a particular item of information is 
‘readily observable matter’ is a complex and nuanced one that takes into account the international 
ambit of Division 2A and the capacity for types of information to be relayed across the world 
instantaneously through modern means of telecommunications. 
As indicated already, the issues are par excellence a jury question [a question relating to fact], 
especially bearing in mind the presence of the ‘readily’ in the statutory definition.  This said there 
are some categories of information which by their nature and the circumstances of their revelation 
are inherently observable and readily so.  Observability does not depend upon proof that a person. 
or group of persons, actually perceived the information.  That is not to say that the depositing of 
information in an obscure portion of a public library would establish ready observability.  The issue 
is factual or one for the jury.  But the point of present relevance is that the objective and hypothetical 
circumstances are to be looked at, not merely the actualities in the particular case.  Ready 
observability cannot be located a priori in the Australian capital cities where the ASX has a physical 
presence. 
In some cases the matter may be so clear that a court could determine that there was no evidence 
capable of grounding a conviction based upon proving the negative proposition that the information 
used by the insider was not ‘readily observable matter’.  In other situations, there would be evidence 
fit to go to the jury but the Crown case would be so weak that any conviction would be unreasonable 
in the sense expounded in Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439.  Thirdly, an appellate court 
considering whether to direct a new trial would have regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
bring about a verdict that would not be unreasonable.   
Also see Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty 
Ltd [2007] FCA 963 par. 546 and 551. 
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supposition from readily observable matter or information that had been generally known.648  
The Australian Corporations Act also does not require a consideration of whether the market 
has had a reasonable time to absorb the information in question when it comes to matters of 
deduction, conclusion or inference.649  Jacobson J in ASIC reasons that this is the case as the 
Australian legislature did not want to ‘penalise individual initiative and diligence’.650 
A further interesting example emanating from the Australian courts is that of R v Hartman651.  
The case makes clear that, in Australia, inside information does not necessarily have to relate 
to the securities in question themselves, but could be information relating to a subject distinct 
from the security in question, such as information about trading in those securities.  Hartman 
pleaded guilty to insider trading and tipping offences contained in the Australian Act.652  
Hartman had bought and sold contracts for difference in shares (CFDs) of an entity while in 
possession of inside information obtained during his employment. 
His offences related to what is commonly known as ‘front running’.653  Front running occurs 
when a person, typically a trader who is aware of a pending offer for shares, trades in the share 
or its derivative prior to the execution of the order.654  Typically, he trader trades shortly after 
                                                 
648  Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2007] 
FCA 963 par. 547. 
649  Australian Corporations Act section 1042C(1)(c). ASIC at par. 552.  Also see the analysis of the 
extrinsic evidence in the case of R v Firns (2001) 38 ACSR 223 par. 55–56.  
650  This quote from Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets 
Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 963 was in turn quoted from the judgment of Mason P in R v Firns (2001) 
38 ACSR 223. 
651  2010 NSWSC 1422.  The sentence imposed in Hartman was taken on appeal.  The judgment in the 
appeal is reported at Hartman v R [2011] NSWCCA 261. 
652  See sections 1043A(1) and 1043A(2) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
653  R v Hartman 2010 NSWSC 1422. 
654  Ibid. par. 1. 
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the offer is made, with the intention to take advantage of an anticipated rise or fall in the share 
price. 655 
Hartman worked for Orion Asset Management Limited.656  He was employed as an equities 
dealer and, as such, had the mandate to buy and sell securities listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange.  He did so according to instructions provided to him by Orion’s stock 
portfolio managers.  The securities were bought and sold by Orion as a fund manager on behalf 
of its clients.657  The number of securities held by Orion in any particular security was 
determined by Orion’s portfolio managers.  They set targets for the acquisition or disposal of 
specific stocks in order for Orion to maintain the best possible portfolio on behalf of its clients.  
The company’s ‘target portfolio weights’ determined the desired level of acquisition or 
disposal of particular securities.658  Hartman’s role at Orion involved buying and selling shares 
to align the target and actual weights of shares held on behalf of Orion’s clients.  The target 
portfolio weights for each of Orion’s investment options were recorded by Orion’s portfolio 
managers in an electronic spreadsheet linked to Orion’s trading system.  Using this system, 
Hartman was able to see the difference between the target quantity and the actual quantity of 
shares held on behalf of Orion’s clients.659  Hartman was also able to monitor the general level 
of trading in particular shares, while monitoring the execution of orders that he had previously 
placed with brokers. 
To reach the portfolio targets, Orion’s trading would often involve buying and selling 
significant volumes of particular companies’ shares.  These purchases, as Hartman came to 
realise, had the effect of raising and lowering the price of a stock within a short time frame.660  
Hartman thus began to trade in CFDs.  CFDs’ value, as they are derivative securities, is 
                                                 
655  Ibid. 
656  Ibid. par. 9. 
657  Ibid. 
658  Ibid. 
659  Ibid. 
660  Ibid. 
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determined by the price of an underlying share.  Trading in CFDs, like trading in all 
derivatives, is to be distinguished from trading in equity.  The CFD trader has to pay only a 
margin, usually around 10%, of the total value of the underlying value of the share.  When a 
CFD is sold, the CFD trader does not have to acquire the underlying shares for transfer to the 
purchaser at settlement.661  Once a CFD’s position is opened, it can be held open for as long 
as a trader wishes.662 
Buying or selling CFDs is economically similar to buying or selling the underlying security 
on the stock market in that, firstly, the perceived price at which the CFD is traded is the same 
price the underlying share is traded for on the stock market.  Secondly, the CFD trader, when 
a CFD is bought, receives the benefit of all the increases and bears the cost of all the decreases 
in the price of the underlying share.  On the other hand, when the CFD is sold, the trader 
receives the benefit of all the increases and bears the cost of all the rises in the price of the 
underlying share.  Third, commission or brokerage is paid on the trading.  Fourth, the CFD 
trader’s account is credited with an amount equal to any cash dividend paid on the underlying 
share.663  As a result, investing in CFDs is high-risk, high-reward.  The potential profits gained 
or losses incurred in CFD trading are much greater than trading in the underlying 
instruments.664  The trader pays approximately 10% of the total value of the CFDs he acquires, 
but receives either the total benefit (or the loss) resulting from the sale of the underlying 
securities. 
A ‘buy CFD’ on an individual share is purchased when a person expects the share price to rise.  
What Hartman did, was to buy CFDs in connection with the particular share at a time when he 
was directed by Orion’s target portfolio weights to purchase those shares.  A ‘sell CFD’ on a 
specific share, on the other hand, is bought when a person expects the share price to fall.  
                                                 
661  Ibid. 
662  Ibid. 
663  Ibid. 
664  Ibid. 
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Accordingly, Hartman traded in sell CFDs in the shares that Orion’s target portfolio weights 
indicated had to be sold.665  He would open CFD contracts in the shares of the entity to which 
the information related.  He would then place his orders to buy or sell as dictated by the target 
portfolio weights.  Not only was Hartman throughout aware of the approximate quantity and 
directions of the securities traded, he also knew how much of the order was completed or 
outstanding at any time.  Once the buying or selling in a particular share on behalf of Orion 
was approaching completion, Hartman would close out his CFD position by placing an 
opposing trade on his personal account.666 
Hartman also admitted to having passed information to Curtis.667  Hartman and Curtis were 
best friends and worked in the same industry.668  Curtis let Hartman know whether he had 
traded in the CFDs or was unable to trade.669  This indicated to Hartman when to start trading 
on behalf of Orion in the shares in which Curtis had taken a CFD position.  Once Hartman was 
sure that his trading on behalf of Orion was nearing completion, he would send Curtis another 
message telling him to sell or ‘get out’ of the entity’s CFDs in which they were trading.670 
The inside information, found the court, was the information that Orion intended to purchase 
or sell a large number of particular securities on the Australian Stock Exchange and, in relation 
to Curtis, that Hartman himself would control the conduct and monitor the order.671 
                                                 
665  Ibid. 
666  Ibid. 
667  Ibid. par. 21. 
668  Ibid. par. 22. 
669  Ibid. par. 28. 
670  Ibid. par. 30. 
671  Ibid. par. 16. 
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3 3 3 European Union 
Much like in Australia,672 the European Union began with a relatively broad and flexible 
definition of inside information.  It has recently, however, started on a reactionary course.  It 
is adding layers to its definition of inside information almost, it seems, as a result of every 
relevant European Court of Justice judgment.673 
When a commission of the European Community first started deliberating a possible insider 
trading directive in 1976, only France had  enacted a prohibition against insider trading.  That 
prohibition was rarely, if ever, enforced.674  Prior to the 1980s, securities regulation in the 
European Union, outside Great Britain, was virtually non-existent.675  In 1989 the Council of 
the European Communities issued a directive coordinating regulations on insider dealing.676  
The directive recognised that a fluid secondary market in transferable securities played an 
important role in financing economic agents.  It further recognised that for the market to 
operate efficiently, it had to inspire confidence in investors.  The factors on which that 
confidence depends, it recognised, ‘include the assurance afforded to investors that they are 
placed on an equal footing and that they will be protected against the use of inside 
                                                 
672  See p. 159 et seq. 
673  See p. 183 et seq. 
674  M G Warren “The Regulation of insider trading in the European Community” (1991) 48 Washington 
and Lee Law Review 1037 1040. 
675  Warren (1991) Washington and Lee Law review 1040. 
676  Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing 
(‘1989 Directive’).  For discussion of the 1989 Directive see T L Hazen “Defining illegal insider trading 
– Lessons from the EEC Directive on Insider Trading” (1992) 55 Law & Contemp Probs 231; R 
Fornasier “The Directive on Insider Dealing” (1990) 13 Fordham Int’l LJ 149; Z J Winner “A 
Comparative Analysis of the European Community’s Insider Trading Directive” (1990) 3 Trans L 231. 
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information’.677  By benefiting only certain investors, insider dealing was said to be likely to 
undermine that confidence.678 
The preamble to the 1989 Directive promised that its focus was on trading on inside 
information,679 but in actual fact it employed a misappropriation approach.680  It did recognise 
that insider trading essentially involves the ‘taking advantage of inside information’.681  The 
Directive defined inside information simply as ‘information which has not been made public, 
of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one or 
several transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the price of the transferable security or securities in question’.682 
The Council of the European Communities Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament 
and of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (2003 
                                                 
677  See the preamble to the 1989 Directive. 
678  Ibid. 
679  The preamble provided that ‘the secondary market in transferable securities plays an important role in 
the financing of economic agents’ and that ‘for the market to play its role effectively’, every measure 
should be taken for it to operate ‘smoothly’.  The smooth operation of the market was, in turn, said to 
depend ‘to a large extent on the confidence it inspires in investors’ and that ‘the factors on which such 
confidence depends include the assurance afforded to investors that they are placed on an equal footing 
and that they will be protected against the improper use of inside information’.  It went further to state 
that ‘by benefiting certain investors’ as opposed to others, ‘insider dealing is likely to undermine that 
confidence and may therefore prejudice the smooth operation of the market’. 
680  Article 2(1) of the Directive read:  
 Each Member State shall prohibit any person who: 
- by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the 
issuer, 
- by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or 
because he has access to such information by virtue of his exercise of his employment, 
profession or duties, 
possesses information from taking advantage of that information with full knowledge of the 
facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account of a third party, either directly or 
indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which the information relates. 
681  Preamble to the 1989 Directive. 
682  Article 1(1) of the 1989 Directive. 
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Directive) replaced the 1989 Directive.683  The 2003 Directive defined inside information, also 
with relative brevity, as follows: 
Inside information is any information of a precise nature which has not been made 
public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments or 
to one or more financial instruments.  Information which could have a significant effect 
on the evolution and forming of the prices of a regulated market as such could be 
considered as information which indirectly relates to one or more issuers of financial 
instruments or to one or more related derivative financial instruments.684 
The Commission of the European Communities Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003, 
that implemented the 2003 Directive, further defined the concepts of precise and public inside 
information.  Information was to be deemed to be of a precise nature if, firstly, it indicated a 
set of circumstances that existed or may reasonably have been expected to come into existence, 
or an event had occurred or may reasonably have been expected to have occurred.  Secondly, 
it was specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn about the possible effect of the set 
of circumstances or event on the prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial 
instruments.685  Information which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant 
effect on the prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial instruments, was 
defined as information that a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of 
his investment decisions.686 
These definitions have recently been substantially amended.  The amendments were brought 
about by the cases of Spectar Photo Group NV,687 Getl v Daimler AG688 and Lafonta v ANF.689  
                                                 
683  Preamble to the Council of the European Communities Directive 2003/6/EC of the European 
Parliament and of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) par. 13 
and article 20. 
684  Preamble to the 2003 Directive par. 16. 
685  Article (1) point 1 of the December 2003 Directive. 
686  Article (1) point 2 of the December 2003 Directive. 
687  [2009] EUECJ C – 45/08 (23 December 2009). 
688  [2012] EUECLI C – 19/11 (28 June 2012). 
689  [2015] EUECLI C – 634/13 (11 March 2015). 
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In Spectar Photo, the European Court of Justice was approached by the Belgian Hof van 
Beroep te Brussel for a preliminary ruling.  One of the questions the court was asked to answer 
was when the disclosure of inside information must be deemed to have influenced the price of 
a financial instrument and, if that is found, what the threshold is at which that influence should 
be regarded as significant.690 
The court noted that the capacity of information to have a significant effect on the price of 
financial instruments to which it relates, is one of the characteristic elements of the concept of 
inside information.691  In accordance with the objectives of the 2003 Directive, held the court, 
that capacity must be assessed in the light of the content of the information at issue and the 
context in which it occurred.  It is not necessary, in order to determine whether information is 
inside information, to examine whether its disclosure actually had a significant effect on the 
price of the financial instruments to which it relates.692  The investigation is a hypothetical one, 
rather than an actual one, done at the time of the trade. 
In Getl v Daimler AG,693 following Daimler AG’s annual meeting on 6 April 2005, Mr 
Schrempp, Chairman of the Board of Management, began to consider resigning his 
appointment before 2008, the year set for his retirement.  He first conveyed this to his wife, 
who was the manager in charge of his office.694  On 17 May 2005, Mr Schrempp also informed 
the chairman of Daimler AG’s Supervisory Board of his intentions.695  On 1 June 2005, his 
                                                 
690  Spector Photo Group NV. Chris Van Raemdonk v Commissie Voor Het Bank-Fanancie- En 
Assurantiewezen (CBFA) [2009] EUECJ C – 45/08 (23 December 2009) par. 66. 
691  Ibid. par. 67. 
692  Ibid. par. 69. 
693  [2012] EUECLI C – 19/11 (28 June 2012). 
694  Ibid. par. 9. 
695  Ibid. par. 10. 
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plans were made known to two other members of the Supervisory Board and, on 15 June 2005, 
to Mr Zetsche, who was to succeed Mr Schrempp as chairman.696 
On 6 July 2005, the head of the secretariat was also informed.697  On 10 July 2005, the head of 
communications, together with Mrs Schrempp and the head of the secretariat, began preparing 
a press release, a public statement, and a letter to the company’s employees.698  On 18 July 
2005, Mr Schrempp and the chairman of the Supervisory Board agreed to propose Mr 
Schrempp’s early retirement and the appointment of Mr Zetsche as his successor at the meeting 
of the Supervisory Board.  A meeting had already been scheduled for 28 July 2005.699  A 
meeting of the Presidential Committee of the Supervisory Board had also already been 
scheduled for 27 July 2005.  Neither of the notices circulated about these meetings made any 
reference to Mr Schrempp’s retirement.700 
On 25 July 2005, Mr Schrempp considered the issue with a member of the Supervisory Board 
who was also chairman of the General Works Council and the Group Works Council.701  On 
27 July 2005, that member of the Supervisory Board, having spoken about the issue with other 
staff representatives and with Zetsche, informed Mr Schrempp that the staff representative 
would vote in favour of the replacement of the chairman of the Board of Management.702  The 
two other members of the Presidential Committee were informed of what was happening 
before their meeting began.703  The Presidential Committee decided later in the day to propose 
to the Supervisory Board the following day to approve Mr Schrempp’s early retirement at the 
                                                 
696  Ibid. par. 11. 
697  Ibid. par. 12. 
698  Ibid. par. 13. 
699  Ibid. par. 14. 
700  Ibid. par. 15. 
701  Ibid. par. 16. 
702  Ibid. par. 17. 
703  Ibid. par. 18. 
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end of 2005 and his replacement by Mr Zetsche.704  At 18:30 Mr Schrempp informed one of 
the three members of the Board of Management of the proposed change, and at 19:00 he 
informed the other two members.705  At 19:30 a dinner was held for the shareholders’ 
representatives on the Supervisory Board, during which the Presidential Committee’s proposal 
was discussed.706 
On 28 July 2005, at approximately 09:50, the Supervisory Board resolved that Mr Schrempp 
would step down at the end of the year and that Mr Zetsche would replace him.707  At 10:02, 
Daimler AG sent a communication, about what had taken place, to the stock market authorities 
and the Federal Office for the Supervision of Financial Services.708  The communication was 
published at 10:32, in the database of the German ad hoc disclosure company.709  The price of 
Daimler AG shares, which stood at EUR 36.50 at market opening on 28 July 2005, rose 
substantially.  First to EUR 40.40 and then to EUR 42.95.710 
Numerous investors who had sold shares before the increase in the share price sparked by the 
announcement of Mr Schrempp’s retirement at the end of 2005, initiated proceedings for 
damages.  They based their claim on a statutory requirement that inside information be made 
public without delay and insisted that the announcement had been made late.711  The case came 
before the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart.  It found that inside information had not come into 
existence until the Supervisory Board took its decision at 09:50 on 28 July 2005.  The 
Bundesgerichtshof, however, quashed that judgment and referred the case back to the 
                                                 
704  Ibid. par. 19. 
705  Ibid. par. 20. 
706  Ibid. par. 21. 
707  Ibid. par. 22. 
708  Ibid. par. 23. 
709  Ibid. par. 24. 
710  Ibid. par. 25. 
711  Ibid. par. 26. 
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Oberlandsgericht Stuttgart.712  The Oberlandsgericht once again dismissed the claim for 
damages, holding that in the period between 17 May 2005 and the resolution adopted by the 
Supervisory Board on 28 July 2005, there had been no inside information to the effect that Mr 
Schrempp had stated to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board that it was his intention 
unilaterally to abandon his duties.713  Specifically, the Oberlandsgericht did not, in reaching its 
decision, regard as inside information the information relating to the various intermediate steps 
that had eventually led to Mr Schrempp’s resignation and his replacement by Mr Zetsche. It 
considered that Mr Schrempp’s actual retirement, in relation to his expressed intention, while 
capable of influencing share prices, could not be regarded as sufficiently probable in the eyes 
of a reasonable investor.714  Being called on to hear an appeal challenging the later judgment 
of the Oberlandsgericht, the Bundesgerichthof took the view that it required an interpretation 
of 2003 Directive and Directive 2003/124.715 
It referred two questions to the Court of Justice for a ruling. First, it asked whether inside 
information includes information relating to the specific events leading to the conclusion of a 
protracted process, and which therefore causally precede the occurrence of a future set of 
circumstances or future event, where such information is capable of significantly affecting the 
prices of those financial instruments or the prices of derivative financial instruments.716  The 
court held that information relating to the intermediate phases of a process, which brings into 
being future sets of circumstances and events capable of significantly affecting the prices of 
financial instruments, may be regarded as inside information, not only the future sets of 
circumstances and events themselves which, hypothetically, will come about.717  Relevant to 
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the enquiry, held the court, were the facts that, firstly, the definition of inside information 
required information to be precise.   
Secondly, in addition to its not having been made public, it must be capable of significantly 
affecting the prices of the financial instruments or the prices of related derivative financial 
instruments.718  Whether a fact is a ‘concluding fact’ or something antecedent to what could 
be described as a ‘concluding fact’ is of no moment.719  The court wrote: 
. . . The importance of sets of circumstances which came about in the course of a process 
involving several temporal phases cannot be ruled out a priori.  What is required is 
simply that the public be informed of any fact which – clearly even in the case of a 
protracted process – is precise in nature and capable, if disclosed, of significantly 
affecting the prices of financial instruments or the prices of related derivative financial 
instruments.720 
What is relevant is not a fact’s chronological location in a process giving rise to an event, but 
its precision, whether it is public and whether it will affect market prices.721 
Lafonta v AMF concerned the interpretation of point (1) of Article 1 of the 2003 Directive and 
the definition of, among other things, ‘inside information’.722  The referral was born out of 
proceedings between Mr Lafonta and the Autorite des marches financiers (the AMF, the 
French markets authority or regulator).  The Penalties Commission of the AMF had ordered 
Mr Lafonta to pay a financial penalty for failing to make public, among other things, 
information relating to a financial operation that enabled Wendel SA to acquire a significant 
shareholding in the Saint-Gobain group.723 
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Between December 2006 and June 2007, Wendel, a company of which Mr Lafonta was 
chairman of the Board of Directors, concluded with four credit institutions total return swap 
agreements.  The underlying assets were shares in Saint-Gobain.  In order to hedge their 
positions, the credit institution acquired a total of 85 million shares in Saint-Gobain.  At the 
same time as its entry into the total return swap agreements, Wendel obtained financing from 
a bank and another credit institution, for a total amount close to that of the total return swap 
agreements.724 
Between September 2007 and the end of November 2007, after having decided to phase out 
the total return swap agreements progressively, Wendel acquired 66 million shares in Saint-
Gobain, representing 17.6% of its share capital.  Wendel informed the AMF in both September 
and March 2008 that it had exceeded certain thresholds for the number of shares it held in 
Saint-Gobain.725 
Following an inquiry into the increase in Wendel’s capital holding in Saint-Gobain, the AMF 
found that, although Wendel had officially taken the decision on 3 September 2007 to 
transform the economic exposure to Saint-Gobain into an actual shareholding, the evidence 
showed that Wendel had intended from the outset to acquire a significant shareholding in 
Saint-Gobain’s capital and that it was primarily for that purpose that the operation in question 
had been carried out.726 
The AMF accused Wendel and Lafonta of failing to make public, among other things, the 
principal characteristics of the financial operation aimed at Wendel acquiring a significant 
shareholding in Saint-Gobain’s capital and of failing to make that information public at the 
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latest on the date the total return swap agreements had been concluded.727  The AMF’s 
Penalties Commission held these complaints to be well founded and imposed a substantial 
financial penalty on Wendel and Mr Lafonta.728  The Cour d’appel de Paris dismissed an appeal 
by Mr Lafonta.729 
Lafonta argued that only information that enables a person to predict whether the price of a 
security is going to increase or decrease allows him to know whether he should buy or sell.  It 
is only then that he is afforded an advantage relative to the other traders in the market.  On the 
facts, Lafonta argued that it was impossible to predict whether the disclosure of the information 
about Wendel’s acquisition of shareholding in Saint-Gobain would result in an increase or 
decrease in Wendel’s share price.730 
The AMF argued, however, that the 2003 Directive contained no reference to the direction of 
the possible effect on the prices of financial instruments.  According to it, any information that 
evidences a likelihood of a change in the price of a security, constitutes precise information.  
The distinction between precise information and imprecise information, they said, lies in the 
likelihood of the information having an effect on the market.731  The crisp point referred to the 
European Court of Justice was whether the 2003 Directive should be interpreted to mean that 
only information that indicated the particular direction of the movement of the prices of the 
financial instruments would constitute inside information.732 
The court held that the 2003 Directive did not require that inside information should make it 
possible to determine the direction of a movement in prices.733  The court wrote: 
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The increased complexity of the financial markets makes it particularly difficult to 
evaluate accurately the direction of a change in the prices of those instruments, as was 
stated in recital 1 to Directive 2003/124, which refers to several factors likely to affect 
those prices in a given situation.  In those circumstances — which can lead to widely 
differing assessments, depending on the investor — if it were accepted that information 
is to be regarded as precise only if it makes it possible to anticipate the direction of a 
change in the prices of the instruments concerned, it would follow that the holder of 
that information could use an uncertainty in that regard as a pretext for refraining from 
making certain information public and thus profit from that information to the detriment 
of the other actors on the market.734 
The 2003 Directive was soon repealed.  The authoritative European Union insider trading 
directive is now found in Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of 16 April 2014 (2014 Regulations) 
on market abuse.  The 2014 Regulations records that the 2003 Directive completed and updated 
the Union’s legal framework to protect market integrity.  However, given the legislative, 
market, and technological developments since the entry into force of the 2003 Directive, which 
had purportedly resulted in considerable changes to the financial landscape, it had to be 
replaced.735 
Interesting developments include the European Union’s resolution that information available 
to a tribunal that had not been available at the time of a trade, may be used to determine whether 
the purported inside information was price sensitive at the time of the trade.  This is made 
subject to the caveat that a conclusion about price sensitivity may not be made against persons 
who drew reasonable conclusions from ex ante information available to them at the time of 
and prior to the making of their trades.736  In addition, and apparently as a direct result of the 
Getl case and judgment, it was resolved that where inside information concerns a process that 
occurs in stages, each stage of the process, as well as the overall process, could constitute 
inside information.  An intermediate step in a protracted process may in itself constitute a set 
of circumstances or an event.  An intermediate step should be deemed to be inside information 
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if it, by itself, meets the criteria laid down in this Regulation for inside information.737  It is 
specifically provided that information that relates to an event or set of circumstances that is an 
intermediate step in a protracted process, may relate, for example, to the state of contract 
negotiations, terms provisionally agreed in contract negotiations, the possibility of the 
placement of financial instruments, conditions under which financial instruments will be 
marketed, provisional terms for the placement of financial instruments, or the consideration of 
the inclusion of a financial instrument in a major index, or the deletion of a financial instrument 
from such an index.738 
It was further resolved that legal certainty for market participants should be enhanced through 
a more detailed definition of two of the elements essential to the definition of inside 
information: the precise nature of that information and the significance of its potential effect 
on the prices of securities.739 
The 2014 Regulations further provide that it is not intended to prohibit discussions of a general 
nature about business and market developments between shareholders and management.  
These discussions and the relationships that underlie them are, according to the Regulation, 
essential for the efficient functioning of markets and should not be prohibited.740  Research and 
estimates based on publicly available data, should not per se be regarded as inside information, 
and the mere fact that a transaction is carried out on the basis of research or estimates should 
not therefore be deemed to constitute use of inside information.  However, where, for example, 
the publication or distribution of information is routinely expected by the market, and where 
such publication or distribution contributes to the price-formation process of financial 
instruments, or the information provides views from a recognised market commentator or 
institution that may inform the prices of related financial instruments, the information may 
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constitute inside information.  Market actors must therefore consider the extent to which the 
information is non-public and the possible effect on financial instruments traded in advance of 
its publication or distribution, to establish whether they would be trading on the basis of inside 
information.741 
The 2014 Regulation provides: 
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, inside information shall comprise the 
following types of information: 
(a) information of a precise nature, which has not been made public, relating, 
directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one or more financial 
instruments, and which, if it were made public would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the 
price of related derivative financial instruments; 
(b) in relation to commodity derivatives, information of a precise nature, 
which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly to one or 
more such derivatives or relating directly to the related spot commodity 
contract, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the prices of such derivatives or related spot 
commodity contracts, and where this is information which is reasonably 
expected to be disclosed or is required to be disclosed in accordance with 
legal or regulatory provisions at the Union or national level, market rules, 
contract, practice or custom, on the relevant commodity derivatives 
markets or spot markets; 
(c) in relation to emission allowances or auctioned products based thereon, 
information of a precise nature, which has not been made public, relating, 
directly or indirectly, to one or more such instruments, and which, if it 
were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
prices of such instruments or on the prices of related derivative financial 
instruments; 
(d) for persons charged with the execution of orders concerning financial 
instruments, it also means information conveyed by a client and relating 
to the client’s pending orders in financial instruments, which is of a 
precise nature, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issues or to 
one or more financial instruments, the price of related spot commodity 
contracts, or on the price of related derivative financial instruments. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, information shall be deemed to be of a precise 
nature if it indicates a set of circumstances which exists or which may reasonably 
be expected to come into existence, or an event which has occurred or which 
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may reasonably be expected to occur, where it is specific enough to enable a 
conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set of circumstances or 
event on the prices of the financial instruments or the related derivative financial 
instrument, the related spot commodity contract, or the auctioned products based 
on the emission allowances.  In this respect in the case of a protracted process 
that is intended to bring about, or that results in, particular circumstances or a 
particular event, those future circumstances or that future event, and also the 
intermediate steps of that process which are connected with bringing about or 
resulting in those future circumstances or that future event, may be deemed to 
be precise information. 
3. An intermediate step in a protracted process shall be deemed to be inside 
information if, by itself, it satisfies the criteria of inside information as referred 
to in this Article. 
4. For the purposes of paragraph 1, information which, if it were made public, 
would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of financial instruments, 
derivative financial instruments, related spot commodity contracts, or auctioned 
products based on emission allowances shall mean information a reasonable 
investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of his or her investment 
decisions. 
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3 4 Inside information according to the equal access theory 
In equal access legislation aimed not at trading by insiders, but rather at trading with inside 
information, the definition of inside information is all important.  It determines the ambit of 
the prohibition and it will be the single most important concept legal practitioners have to be 
cognisant of when they provide advice.  In a legislative regime consisting of definitions and 
prohibited conduct, the definition describes the information that, when known by a person at 
the time of the trade, should disqualify her from dealing with the information.  That 
disqualification will obtain regardless of the position in which the trader stands to the issuing 
company or the company to which the securities relates. 
3 4 1 If it were to be made public would be likely to have a material effect on the price 
or value of a security 
Kunkel writes about the requirements of inside information under the equal access to 
information theory.742  According to him, the duty to abstain from trading under the equal 
access theory should be triggered by information that has four characteristics: the information 
must be material; it must be non-public; it must not be derived from analysis; and the person 
who has knowledge of the information must either know or have reason to know that the 
information is non-public.743  His requirement of ‘materiality’ requires the information, if it 
were to be made public, to affect the security’s price.  In other words, were the dissemination 
of the information not to affect the security’s price, the prohibition on trading would not be 
triggered.744  He does not require the information to have an effect on the ‘value’ of a security. 
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The South African definition’s provision that inside information is information that will, upon 
becoming public, affect a security’s ‘value’, is a stopgap provision.  If information upon 
becoming public affects a security’s value, it will also affect its price through the change in 
value’s effect on the demand for the security.  It may thus seem as if the provision relating to 
information that increases a security’s value (as it is included as an alternative to the provision 
that relates to an increase in the security’s price) is superfluous.  However, practicalities dictate 
that information that affects a security’s value will, on becoming publicly accessible, not 
immediately influence the security’s price.  It will take time for the information to be accessed, 
absorbed and traded on.  The inclusion of the ‘or value’ provision is thus aimed at not allowing 
insider traders the advantage of trading on information which, upon becoming public, will 
immediately affect the security’s value but will affect the security’s price only after the passage 
of some time.  It should remain a part of the definition. 
The King Task Group was of the view that the impact of the information on the price or value 
of a security should be ‘material’ rather than ‘significant’ (which was the word used in the then 
corresponding legislation in the United Kingdom).745  In the United States, the information 
itself is required to be material.746  That test incorporates an enquiry about whether the 
information would have an effect on the price of the security if it were disclosed.  Importantly, 
however, the test for materiality and whether information would have an effect on the market 
price of the security, encompasses any fact that, in the reasonable and objective contemplation 
of a hypothetical reasonable investor, might affect the value of the corporation’s securities.  
This would include an analysis of whether the information, having the level of specificity that 
it does, would in reasonable and objective contemplation of that hypothetical investor, affect 
the value of a corporation’s securities or the securities related to a corporation.  The Australian 
provisions also require a hypothetical test and ask whether a reasonable person would expect 
the information to have a material effect on the price or value of the financial product.747  The 
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European Union also requires that, if it were made public, the information would be likely to 
have a significant effect on prices.748 
The South African requirement that information must be ‘likely’ to have an effect on the prices 
of securities and the hypothetical reasonable investor test employed in other jurisdictions, are 
related.  They are alternatives to requiring information that, simply, ‘affect’ security prices.  In 
addition, ‘likely’ incorporates a foreseeability requirement into the definition.  In South 
African the ‘reasonable person’ test used to determine whether a person was negligent for the 
purposes of delictual and criminal liability, includes a foreseeability element.749  Generally, a 
person is negligent if a reasonable person would have foreseen the possibility that her conduct 
might bring about a particular result, would have taken steps to guard against such occurrence, 
and failed to take such steps.750  The ‘likely’ requirement relates to whether the trader foresaw 
that, if the information was to be made public, it would be likely to affect the price of the 
security.  There is no reason, however, why this foreseeability test must be included in the 
definition of inside information.  If the legislature is of the intention to include such a test into 
the legislative scheme, it would best be done either as an element of prohibited conduct or as 
a defence afforded to a trader who is prima facie guilty of insider trading.  There is also no 
reason why this foreseeability requirement must be limited to the price-sensitivity factor in the 
definition of inside information.  The test, if it were to be included, must provide the insider 
with the defence that she, at the time of the trade, could not have reasonably concluded that 
the information in her possession was inside information. 
The King Task Group’s decision in respect of material was made on the basis that there is 
extensive case law in South Africa on the meaning of ‘material’, particularly in relation to 
fraudulent misrepresentation.751  This reason for the inclusion of the materiality standard does 
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not make much sense.  Materiality in respect of fraudulent misrepresentation is found in a 
different context, was developed in a different context, and performs a different function in 
that context.  In the test for fraudulent misrepresentation, materiality is one of five 
requirements: a precontractual incorrect statement; which was material or wrongful (and 
unlawful); made by the other party to the contract; with the intention of inducing the contract; 
and which induced the contract or caused the representee to suffer a loss.752 
Importantly, what is meant by ‘material’ in relation to the misrepresentation, is that the 
misrepresentation must have induced the contract.753  In the context of insider trading, there is 
no misrepresentation by a counterparty.  The trade takes place on a stock exchange, where 
traders do not communicate.  At the time of the trade, the information known to the insider, 
which would have been the subject of the misrepresentation in the normal contractual context, 
is neither known by the innocent party nor communicated to him.  What is an immaterial fact 
for the purposes of fraudulent misrepresentation, might have a material effect on the price or 
value of a security.  Materiality in relation to the definition of inside information, relates to the 
‘effect on the price or value of any security listed on a regulated market or of any derivative 
instrument related to such a security’.  The wrong underlying insider trading on stock 
exchanges, whichever theory of wrongfulness one would support, is not found in a 
misrepresentation made with the intent to induce a transaction.  Questions about 
misrepresentations are irrelevant for the purposes of insider trading.  So is the test relating to 
the effect of such a misrepresentation. 
The materiality requirement as it is found in the South African definition, can relate to only 
the size of the change in the price of the relevant security.  In other words, where that effect 
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would be material, as opposed to negligible, the requirement is fulfilled.  In this also lies the 
most elementary problem with the materiality requirement in the South African insider trading 
context.  When would a movement in securities’ prices not be material?  It is difficult to 
imagine.  For if a trader acquires enough securities of a low value (say 1 cent shares) and of a 
particular kind, a 1 cent increase in the value of the security will double the investment.  In 
other words, what is a material movement in the price of a security, depends on the extent of 
the position the specific trader takes in that security.  A broader requirement that relates simply 
to ‘a movement in the price of the security’, rather than a ‘material movement’ would be better 
suited to the definition.  There is no reason why insiders should be afforded the advantage of 
a defence that he or she foresaw only a movement in prices, as opposed to a material 
movement. 
In any event, the de minimis principle and the leading of expert evidence to show that the 
information would have been able to move prices, render redundant the necessity for a 
materiality requirement.  In addition, evidence about actual price movements in securities 
would assist in determining the nature of the information in a trader’s possession at the time 
of the trade.  This type of evidence is allowed in the United States.  It is also allowed in 
Australia.  The European Union allows for ex ante information to determine whether the 
information was price sensitive at the time of the trade.  This is made subject to the caveat that 
a finding about price sensitivity may not be made against persons who drew reasonable 
conclusions from ex ante information available to them at the time of and prior to making their 
trades.  There is no reason why South African litigants should not be able to lead ex post facto 
evidence on whether, at the time of the trade, the information in question would have moved 
the relevant security’s price had the information become lawfully accessible to the public, for 
the purposes of showing that the information was not inside information at the time of the 
trade.  There is also no reason why parties would not be allowed to lead expert evidence in 
terms of Uniform Rule of Court 35(9) to that effect. 
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3 4 2 Learned or obtained as an insider 
The source of the information and the way in which it was obtained might play a role in the 
enquiry as to whether information was lawfully available to the public, but they are not 
requirements in themselves.  The requirement in the Financial Markets Act that for information 
to be recognised as inside information, it must be learned or obtained as an insider, is neither 
to be found in the Australian, European Union or United States definitions, nor in Kunkel’s 
theory.  The inclusion of this requirement in the South African definition of inside information 
has attracted well-deserved criticism.754  It is here, within the definition of inside information, 
that the extra link between a corporation and the insider trader is made part of our law.  The 
requirement endorses the notion that some sort of duty (or other link), which connects the 
possessor of the inside information to the corporation to which the inside information relates, 
is required to establish an insider trading offence.  The requirement further only serves to found 
the circularity Jooste complained of more than a decade ago.  It has no place in a South African 
regulatory regime based on the equal access to information theory. 
The requirement that the information must have been ‘learned or obtained’ is equally 
problematic.  In the broader regulatory regime, knowledge of the information at the time of 
the impugned trade is important, not necessarily the means by which that knowledge was 
obtained.  In any event, the word ‘obtained’ is, as it was explained in M’Tali755 and Scher756 
and as it is clear from the word’s dictionary definition, a word of the widest connotation.  
Obtained does not necessarily require any positive action on the part of the person that received 
the information.  Even if information is given to a person without that person necessarily 
asking for it or making any effort to acquire it, he would have obtained it.  The term therefore 
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covers all means by which a person could come into possession of inside information and adds 
nothing to the possession requirement. 
Leaving aside the fact that the inclusion of ‘learned’ is ill-considered as ‘obtained’ includes 
‘learned’ within its ambit, ‘learned’ specifically leaves the definition open to an interpretation 
that information obtained by experience or study is included within the definition.  Traders 
should not be prohibited from trading with an advantage attributable to their own, legally 
employed, ‘greater insight or expertise in evaluating … a company’s prospects’.757  I therefore 
partly agree with Kunkel’s758 and Steinberg’s arguments that inside information must not be 
derived from analysis.759  The consideration, that market analysts and their clients must be 
allowed to trade with information obtained through experience and skill, should not be taken 
too far.  To exclude from the definition information obtained by analysis without more would 
do so.  It implies a blanket endorsement of trades made with the help of analysis.  That would 
condone the conduct of traders who analyse data not available to the public, to trade freely 
with information others cannot have had access to.  This is irreconcilable with the protection 
and promotion of the economic role of market makers and researchers, who gather their 
information by experience and study.  While the legislature should incentivise trade on 
information obtained by study, experience and research, it should guard against giving market 
professionals free reign in trading on information they obtained through employing some skill 
or expertise.  The express inclusion of ‘learned’ should be taken out of the definition, but there 
is no express exclusion required in the definition either. 
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3 4 3 Data, information and non-information 
A further issue is whether the equal access theory requires the definition to be limited to 
information or whether raw data should be included within the definition.  All the jurisdictions 
considered use the term ‘information’.  It is one-half of a term of art (inside information) used 
widely in financial market regulation.  Data is something which is generally understood to be 
converted into information by way of the employment of some skill. 
It is not necessary to include in the regulatory framework a provision specifically aimed at 
addressing data not accessible to the public.  If the definition of inside information includes a 
requirement that inside information is information not lawfully accessible to the public, it 
would include in its scope information that is learned through the evaluation of data that cannot 
be lawfully accessed by all. 
The same reasoning is applicable to information obtained by supposition or deduction.  If the 
information, or data for that matter, which was required to make the supposition or deduction, 
was lawfully accessible to all, the information in question is not inside information.  In other 
words, if it was lawfully possible to any member of the public to make the supposition or the 
deduction, the information would not be recognised as inside information. 
Salbu also deals with a concept he calls ‘noninformation’.760  He describes it as 
something less than factual information, such as factual suspicions, shrouded or veiled 
information, and sensations communicated without language but rather by attitude, 
implication, enthusiasm, or a figurative wink.761 
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Noninformation would be involved where an insider assures someone that inside information 
exists, but does not actually communicate factual information.762  He says that noninformation, 
although not to the same degree as inside information, also tends to lower the risk of the 
relevant share trade.763 
Salbu’s distinction serves to overcomplicate the enquiry.  What he calls noninformation, such 
as the figurative wink, can be classed as information in and of itself.  The concept is simply 
information that is not as directly related to the security as other types of inside information.  
This type of indirect information remains information.  If, on its becoming accessible to the 
public, it would have an effect on the price of securities listed on a regulated market, and it 
was not so accessible at the time of the trade, it is included in what I propose the definition of 
inside information should be. 
The inclusion of the term ‘information’, as opposed to ‘information and data’, suffices. 
3 4 4 The non-public requirement 
The United States has a non-public requirement.764  The test is sometimes aimed at the number 
of people who possess the information, sometimes at whether the trading of those who possess 
inside information has caused the information to be fully reflected in the price of the particular 
security, and sometimes at whether the information is not generally available to the ordinary 
investing public.  The United States courts, as it is evidenced in the judgment of Speed, are not 
always clear whether part of their enquiry into inside information includes an enquiry into the 
                                                 
762  Salbu (1993) Wash L Rev 328. 
763  Ibid. 330–331. 
764  See par. 3.3.1 above. 
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information’s source.  In Australia, the requirement is that the information is not to be generally 
available.765  The European Union requires the information to have not been made public.766 
So does Kunkel.  He includes within this requirement three sub-elements: the information has 
to emanate from a non-public source; it has to be confidential; and it must not be available to 
the general public through another source.767  According to Kunkel, information that originates 
from a public source, such as the public release of a geographical survey that identifies iron 
ore deposits, should not activate the prohibition.768  For the information to be inside 
information, it must also not be generally available from another source.769  The second non-
public element, that the information has to be confidential, includes a sub-element that focuses 
on whether the source of the information intended for the information is to be kept 
confidential.770  According to Kunkel, only where the original source intended for the 
information to be kept confidential, should the prohibition obtain.771 
I disagree with Kunkel.  Peremptory requirements as to the information’s source and the 
intention of the source, are incompatible with the equal access theory.  They are merely some 
of the factors that go to whether the information in question was accessible to all at the time 
of the trade.  In other words, the facts that go to the information’s source or the source’s 
intentions in respect of the information could be relevant only in as far as they may assist a 
factfinder in the circumstances of a particular case to conclude that the information was not 
accessible to all at the time of the trade.  The test as to whether information is inside 
information is to be done in relation to the facts as they existed at the time of the trade.  
Information that originated at a non-public source, which the source intends to keep 
                                                 
765  See par. 3.3.2 above. 
766  See par. 3.3.3 above. 
767  Kunkel (1989) J Contemp L. 68. 
768  Ibid. 69. 
769  Ibid. 
770  Ibid. 68. 
771  Ibid. 69. 
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confidential, could become public subsequent to its production, but prior to the trade.  The 
information’s source and the source’s intentions at the time of its production, can therefore not 
be self-standing requirements. 
Steinberg identifies two views about when inside information becomes public.772  The first 
view is that when information is disseminated and absorbed by the investment community, it 
is public.  According to the second view, information is only deemed to be public when the 
‘active’ investment community becomes aware of the information.773  Equality of access 
cannot, however, be limited to the investment community, nor the active investment 
community.  It will defeat the very purpose of drawing further funds, previously unavailable, 
to the financial markets.  In addition, any concerns about overregulation are addressed by the 
fact that ‘lawful’ access is protected.  It will always be open to the established trader or a 
member of the ‘active’ investment community to argue that her counterparty could have had 
lawful access to the information (and traded successfully with its benefit) if the counterparty 
had the education, experience and skill of herself. 
The inclusion in the definition of the requirement that the information must not be lawfully 
accessible to the public, replaces the ‘non-public’ requirement.  The Financial Markets Act’s 
section 79 (and its non-exhaustive list of situations where information would be regarded as 
having been made public) should be removed for that reason, but also for two others.  First, if 
such a section is to be included at all, it would be a section about information not capable of 
being accessed by the public.  Second, the section forms part of the definition of inside 
information.  Yet, it provides a non-exhaustive list.  It is therefore not definitive.  That destroys 
the very purpose behind the section: to define inside information.  If the legislative regime is 
based on principle, capable of application to all factual scenarios, what sense does it make to 
have a section setting out some of those scenarios?  None, barring perhaps to assist the insecure 
                                                 
772  Steinberg International Securities Law: A Contemporary and Comparative Analysis 110 footnote 39. 
773  Ibid. 
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lawyer who looks to match his client’s case to an example, rather than arguing which outcome 
a principle supports. 
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3 4 5 Specific, precise, and related requirements 
The United States courts deal with preciseness and specificity within the context of their broad 
flexible test for materiality.  The European Union also requires information to be precise.  It 
includes a requirement of specificity within its definition of precise.  Its courts stumble over 
this requirement.  Take, for example, the Lafonta judgment, which caused an amendment of 
the European Union definition of inside information.  The court grappled with the question 
whether information relating to circumstances or an event in an intermediate phase could still 
be specific and precise to constitute inside information.  One has to ask why this is relevant.  
Whether the information is specific or precise, or whether it is in an intermediate phase or not, 
is of no import; it is whether that information is capable of moving market prices that remains 
the relevant issue. 
Kunkel does not require inside information to be specific or precise.  In Australia specificity 
and preciseness are not requirements.  In that jurisdiction, as it has been said, the definition of 
information includes matters that are ‘insufficiently definite to warrant being made known to 
the public’; and at least one court recognised that information that may influence securities 
markets, may be quite imprecise.  I agree with that approach. 
Once it has been ascertained that the information, once made public, would have an effect on 
the price or value of a security, why is it necessary that it must be specific or precise?  Who is 
to say that, in certain circumstances, vague and imprecise information will not have a material 
effect on the price of a listed security once published?  Surely traders should also fall foul of 
the prohibition if they have information that is not accessible to the public, that will have an 
effect on the price of the security once it becomes so accessible, but that is vague and 
imprecise.  As is evidenced by the United States Mayhew case,774 information not available to 
                                                 
774  See p. 159 above. 
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the public is analysed in the context of related information that is already public.775  The 
question in each instance would be whether the additional information, having been made 
public, would have an effect on the price of the security.  There is nothing to say that the 
additional information, which gives the insider his edge, is specific and precise.  It quite simply 
does not have to be in instances where much information is already accessible to the public. 
The purpose of the specificity and preciseness requirements are intended to guard against 
overregulation.  This motive cannot be faulted.  The legislature must, however, also be careful 
of producing arbitrary provisions that, while they may guard against overregulation, have no 
foundation in principle and could serve only to unnecessarily encumber the application of the 
regulatory scheme.  If the Zietsman judgment is indicative of anything, it is that having these 
requirements in the definition takes the court’s attention away from what should be the true 
factual enquiry.  Whereas the court in Zietsman held that, in enquiring whether or not a fact is 
inside information, significance must be attributed to its ability to affect market prices,776 that 
inquiry gets lost in the court’s grappling with the specificity and preciseness requirements. 
The  specificity and preciseness of information are merely among the indicators that 
information may affect market prices on becoming legally accessible to all, but they are not 
                                                 
775  See in this regard R C Sauer “The Erosion of the Materiality Standards in the Enforcement of the 
Securities Laws” (2007) 62 Bus Law 317 321–322 where the author writes:  
Determining which facts if added, singly or in combination, to the “total mix” of available 
information would have been important to investors in a specific stock on a particular day is a 
highly circumstantial enquiry.  First, investors apply different criteria to different market sectors.  
Changes in dividend rates, for example, may be of paramount importance to investors in utility 
stocks but less significant to investors in growth stocks.  Investors also weigh differently various 
performance factors among companies in the same sector.  Top line revenue may matter more than 
earnings for a recent entrant trying to build market share as opposed to a more mature company.  
Cash flow from operations may take on greater significance for a thinly capitalised venture.  Such 
distinctions are endless and may change rapidly and without warning.  Indeed, professional stock 
analysts often find themselves at a loss to explain the market’s response to particular corporate 
developments. 
776  Zietsman 28. 
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the only indicators to that effect.777  Proof that the information was specific or precise might 
even be a good indicator of the fact that the information in question is price sensitive, but there 
is no reason to be found in the principles of the equal access theory that price sensitivity could 
not be proved in some other manner. 
A court needs room to assess information outside the strictures placed on it by the requirements 
that information must necessarily be specific or precise.  The requirements should be removed 
from the South African definition of inside information.  A requirement that the information 
must be capable of affecting the price of a security, suffices. 
The same reasoning applies to many other types of information that have occupied the minds 
of courts and legislators.  Once it is accepted that the information in question is not lawfully 
accessible to the public, the only remaining enquiry must be: will the information affect market 
prices on becoming so accessible?  Whether the information be false or true, it is not a primary 
consideration.  Whether the false or true information in question affects or would affect the 
market price of the security, is.  Whether the information is part of a larger mosaic of 
information, is not of primary importance; whether the information in question forms 1 per 
cent of a larger whole, of which 99 per cent was already accessible to the public, is not of 
primary importance.  Whether the market price will be affected on the 1 per cent being made 
public, is.  Whether the information relates to uncertain future events, is not of primary 
importance.  Whether the information in question will move market prices on becoming 
accessible to the public is.  Whether the information relates to someone’s intention, can be 
classed as rumour, eventually proves to be false, or could be qualified as opinion, or predictions 
or forecasts, the test remains the same. 
                                                 
777  For similar reasoning in the wholly different context of rectification, see the judgment of De Wet CJ in 
Meyer v Merchants’ Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 253. 
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Should the information inform the prospective trader of the direction in which the share price 
is to move?  I submit not.  It should be sufficient to know that the price will move.  Whether 
the information allows the trader to correctly or incorrectly predict a movement in the price of 
a security is irrelevant to the wrongfulness of the trade. 
3 5 Conclusion 
The equal access to information theory requires inside information to have two characteristics.  
First, the information must not be lawfully accessible to the public.  Second, on the information 
becoming lawfully accessible to the public, it must have an effect on the price or value of a 
security listed on a regulated market.  The first characteristic replaces the misappropriation 
theory or the fiduciary duty doctrine’s requirement of a link between the entity in whose 
securities a trade is being made and the trader.  That link is not a self-standing peremptory 
requirement; its existence might be one of many facts that go to show that the information was 
not lawfully accessible to all.  The second characteristic is to replace all the other intrinsic 
characteristics currently required for inside information by the Act.  The other intrinsic 
characteristics contained in the definition are intended to describe information that, upon 
becoming public, moves security prices.  The price sensitivity requirement renders those other 
requirements redundant. 
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4 1 Introduction 
The Act defines the term ‘insider’ as: 
a person who has inside information— 
(a) through— 
(i) being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities listed 
on a regulated market or an issuer of derivative instruments related to 
such securities to which the inside information relates; or 
(ii) having access to such information by virtue of employment, office or 
profession; or 
(b) where such person knows that the direct source of the information was a person 
contemplated in paragraph (a).778 
If a person who has inside information falls within one of the categories of insider created by 
the definition, she will be recognised as an insider.  If a person who has inside information 
does not fall within one of those categories she, even though she has inside information, will 
not be recognised as an insider for the purposes of the Act.  This gives rise to questions.  Should 
everyone not be allowed to participate in the financial markets with inside information?  If not, 
should everyone be prohibited from doing so?  If not, who should be prohibited from doing 
so?  What underlies the Act’s categories of insider that identify who is prohibited from 
participating in the financial markets with inside information?  And, lastly, what role does the 
definition of insider have to play in a regulatory regime based on the equal access to 
information theory? 
                                                 
778  Section 77 of the Act. 
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4 2 Should everyone be allowed to trade with inside information? 
Ever since the advent of insider trading regulation, it has been argued that certain economic 
actors should be allowed to trade with inside information.  Some, such as Manne, have argued 
primarily that insider trading should not be regulated at all.  In other words: everyone should 
be allowed to trade with inside information.  He wrote in the context of the early stages of the 
great insider trading debate, with both academic and judicial discourse focusing on managers 
and directors.  Manne’s arguments provide the context for the enquiry into who must be an 
insider. 
Manne challenged established academic views with his 1968 book, Insider Trading and the 
Stock Market.779  His broad thesis is that earlier works on insider trading failed to appreciate 
the wider analysis undertaken by economists and that, if that were done, analysts would 
inevitably realise that trading on inside information contributes to market efficiency.780  He 
accepts that when one focuses on the sale between the buyer and the seller of shares, trading 
on inside information could be seen as unfair.  He argues, however, that a broader perspective 
is needed for insider trading’s positive effects to become apparent.  Trading on inside 
information, specifically by managers and directors of firms, has an impact on all traders (not 
only the insider’s counterparty), and on the efficiency of the allocation of resources and the 
productivity of the economy generally.  Manne’s book, subjected to a great deal of 
counterargument, led the debate about insider trading out of the realm of morality and into that 
of economics.781 
                                                 
779  H G Manne Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966). 
780  R A Schotland “Unsafe at any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market” (1967) 
53 Va L Rev 1425 1440. 
781  Ibid. 1430. 
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He advances three main arguments.782  Firstly, he argues that insider trading contributes to the 
efficiency of stock market pricing.  Secondly, he argues that the practice of insider trading 
does not do significant harm to long-term investors.  Thirdly, he makes the compensation 
argument, which holds that insider trading and the returns it offers to managers and directors 
are to be viewed as a component of executive compensation.  The first two arguments are 
relevant to all economic actors with inside information.  The last is relevant to whether 
directors and managers are to be held liable for insider trading. 
As to the first two arguments, according to Manne trading on inside information always has 
the effect of moving the price of a security in the ‘correct’ direction.783  The argument proceeds 
from the generally accepted economic truth that trading on positive information in a company’s 
securities, increases the demand for a particular security, putting upward pressure on its price, 
moving the price of the security closer to its underlying value.  A trade on inside information 
effects an incorporation of the information into the price of the security.  Manne argues that, 
although the volume of insider trading is small relative to the total trading in the financial 
markets, it affects securities’ prices by inducing others to mimic the initial slight market 
movement and to join in the trading of the primary insiders.784  The initial trades happening on 
the basis of inside information, although small in volume, would have a bandwagon effect.  In 
addition, argues Manne, insider trading not only renders the pricing of securities more 
accurate, it causes gradual instead of sudden and erratic security price movements.  Each trade 
on inside information moves the price of the security incrementally closer to its ‘efficient’ 
level. 
                                                 
782  H G Manne “Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark” (2005) 31 J Corp L 168. 
783  Manne (2005) J Corp L 169.  For empirical evidence that supports Manne’s assertion see J Lin & M S 
Rozeff “The Speed of the Adjustment of Prices to Private Information” (1995) 18 J Fin Res 143 and L 
K Meulbroek “An Empirical Analysis of Insider Trading” (1992) 47 J Fin Res 1661. 
784  Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1443. 
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This is Manne’s least controversial argument.  At least the assertion that insider trading moves 
market prices, is not only supported empirically, it is generally accepted as correct.785  The 
extent of the effect and the time lag between the incidence of the trade and the effect are, 
however, questioned.786  Manne also fails to take account of two considerations.787  Firstly, the 
extent to which persons with inside information could affect market prices is limited because 
they have limited resources, including a limited ability to obtain credit.  Secondly, the increase 
in the price of a security brought about by traders using inside information could have more 
than one effect.788  The initial trades could well induce traders on the buying side, as Manne 
suggests, to buy the securities, as the initial effect could be interpreted as indicating further 
possible price increases.  Insider trading could, however, also affect the selling side.  Just as 
an unexplained price rise may convince some to buy, it will convince others that the share is 
overpriced, and they may be persuaded to sell their shares, or to sell short.789 
Insider trading could also prove detrimental to the efficiency of the pricing mechanism through 
causing the prices quoted by market makers not to reflect the securities’ underlying value.  This 
proposition is supported by Treynor’s adverse selection argument.790  The adverse selection 
argument is based on two main concepts: market makers and the bid-ask spread.  A market 
maker facilitates a market for securities.  He holds a certain number of securities in stock in 
                                                 
785  Lin & Rozeff (1995) J Fin Res 143 and Meulbroek (1992) J Fin 1661. 
786  S Chakravarty & J J McConnel “Does Insider Trading Really move Stock Prices?” (1999) 34 J Fin & 
Quantitive Analysis 191. 
787  Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1446. 
788  Ibid. 1445. 
789  Ibid. 1445.  The short seller sells securities that he does not own, but has, for instance, borrowed, at the 
price that obtains at the time of the sale.  His inventory is then short the number of securities sold.  The 
short position is closed by the trader buying the securities at a lower price at a later stage, returning 
them to their owner, and retaining the profit. 
790  Dolgopolov (2004) Cap U L Rev 92. 
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order to enable immediate trading in that security.791  The market marker buys securities when 
they are offered and sells securities when they are demanded. 
The bid-ask spread explains how market makers earn their profits.  The ‘bid’ is the offer made 
by the market maker for the security.  The ‘ask’ is the price the market maker is willing to 
accept for the particular security.  The difference between the bid price and the ask price is the 
‘bid-ask spread’.  For example, if the market maker offers to buy a specific security at R100 
and he offers to sell that specific security at R105, the bid-ask spread is R5.  This difference is 
the market maker’s profit.  The bid-ask spread is due compensation to market makers as they 
fulfil a valuable function in the securities markets.792  They absorb the risk of keeping securities 
in their inventories to provide a continuous supply and demand of securities, keeping the 
market liquid.793 
The adverse selection argument is based on the proposition that market makers will deal with 
both traders with inside information and traders without inside information.  It accepts that 
market makers do not generally have inside information.  It further accepts that market makers 
are aware of the fact that they will deal with insiders and that they, the market makers, will 
                                                 
791  H Demsetz “The Cost of Transacting” (1968) 82 Quarterly Journal of Economics 33 35 writes:  
On the NYSE two elements comprise almost all of the transactions cost – brokerage fees and ask-
bid spreads.  Transfer taxes could be included, but it is expedient to concentrate our attention on 
the two major components. 
The inclusion of the ask-bid spread in transaction costs can be understood best by considering the 
neglected problem of “immediacy” in supply and demand analysis.  Predictable immediacy is a 
rarity in human actions, and to approximate it requires that costs be borne by persons who specialize 
in standing ready and waiting to trade with the incoming orders of those who demand immediate 
servicing of their orders.  The ask-bid spread is the markup that is paid for predictable immediacy 
of exchange in organized markets; in other markets, it is the inventory markup of retailer or 
wholesaler. 
792  Dolgopolov (2004) Cap U L Rev 88 note 27.  G J Stigler “Public Regulation of Securities Markets” 
(1964) 37 J Bus 117 129 note 16 held that the bid-ask spread is a cost society endures for the benefits 
of ‘(1) immediate availability of a buyer and seller; (2) the elimination of short run fluctuations in 
price’. 
793  Dolgopolov (2004) Cap U L Rev 89. 
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make corresponding adjustments to the spread.  As the market maker is aware that she will, on 
occasion, trade with insiders and that she will suffer a loss as a result of those trades, she will 
lower the prices she offers for securities and increase the prices she asks for them.  In other 
words, she widens the bid-ask spread of all the securities she trades in.  That insider trading 
leads to a widening of the bid-ask spread, has been widely accepted as correct.794  Market 
makers shift the harm they perceive will be caused to them by the use of inside information, 
to all the traders they deal with.795  The amount by which the bid-ask spread is widened is 
referred to as the ‘insider trading tax’.  All other things held constant, the insider trading tax 
will cause some traders to leave the market, while some will not trade on the prices on offer, 
affecting market liquidity.796  More pertinently, when market makers perceive insider trading 
as prevalent in a market, the consequent adjustment, the effort to protect themselves, causes 
market prices to move away from their efficient level. 
Insider trading also detrimentally affects companies’ cost of capital.797  According to Gower 
and Davies, where insider trading happens in a market, outsiders (people who have neither 
inside information or an inside position) will know that the market prices fail to reflect 
companies’ true value and that dealing on the quoted prices will cause them harm.798  Outsiders 
will build this risk into their investment analysis and will accordingly lower the price that they 
will be prepared to pay for a company’s securities.  This will increase all companies’ cost of 
capital as they have to offer securities to the market on less favourable terms.799 
                                                 
794  Ibid. 83. 
795  Bagehot (1971) Fin Analysts J 12. 
796  Z Goshen & G Parchomovsky “On Insider Trading, Markets, and ‘Negative’ Property Rights in 
Information” (2001) 87 Va L Rev 1229 1251. 
797  Gower & Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 751. 
798  Ibid. 
799  Ibid. 
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The insider trading tax and insider trading’s effect on companies’ cost of capital provide an 
answer to Manne’s insistence that, if one were to assert that insider trading is unfair or that it 
harms someone, one has to be able to identify that someone.800  Manne argued: 
Ultimately the complaint must be that some individuals are being harmed by insider 
trading.  It is not enough to simply say that insider trading is unfair.  If it is unfair, it 
must be unfair to someone.801 
The widening of the bid-ask spread has a negative effect on market liquidity generally and 
leads to an increase in the cost of capital to companies.  Seeing these effects of insider trading 
in the light of the financial markets’ role in society, leads to the conclusion that trading on 
inside information affects economic growth and hurts society as a whole.  Leaving aside the 
unfairness inherent in a specific trade, there is unfairness in traders making insider trading 
profits at the cost of society. 
Manne’s reply to the adverse selection argument and the consequent insider trading tax is as 
simple as it is unconvincing.  According to Manne, the adverse selection argument exists more 
in theory than in practice.  Liquidity providers in the stock markets, says the author, ‘are not 
generally concerned about the presence of insiders in securities in which they make a 
market’.802  For this argument to hold any sway, it must be accepted that liquidity providers 
‘are not generally concerned’ about whether they, who depend on research to ply their trade, 
have access to all the information some of their fellow market participants have access to.  That 
cannot be accepted.  If a rational market maker has considered all the information available to 
her and has determined the prices she is willing to offer and accept, and then becomes aware 
that there is still information that she cannot have access to and that there will be other market 
participants trading on that information, she will of course adjust her prices.  There is no reason 
why she would be willing to make less of a profit or suffer a loss on some of her deals, without 
                                                 
800  See Bagehot (1971) Fin Analysts J 12; T E Copeland & D Galai “Information Effects on the Bid Ask 
Spread” (1983) 38 J Fin 1457; L R Glosten & P R Milgrom “Bid, Ask and Transactions Prices in a 
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders” (1985) 14 J Fin Econ 17. 
801  H G Manne Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966) 93.  
802  See H G Manne “Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark” (2005–
2006) 31 J Corp L 169 note 9. 
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compensating for those shortfalls or losses with a general price adjustment.  That adjustment 
will move securities’ prices away from their underlying value, rendering the pricing 
mechanism less efficient. 
Manne also argues that the practice of insider trading causes no significant harm to the long-
term investors in the stock market.803  In essence, the argument is that insider trading would 
not cause fluctuations in share prices of such a magnitude that it would lead to significant harm 
in the long run.  He accepts that short-term traders would be harmed when dealing with 
insiders.  He asserts, however, that as short-term trading is comparable to gambling, a 
legislature’s focus should rather be on the effect insider trading has on long-term investors.804 
This argument also does not hold.805  It is based on the incorrect assumption that time is the 
only factor for consideration in the investment decisions made by investors in long-term 
investments.806  It is implied that an investor evaluates the overall market to assess only when 
the specific investment is to be made, ignoring the fact that the price of a particular security, 
at the time of the purchase, will also be taken into account by the investor.807  In addition, in 
practice, many investors own more than one security in one firm.  When they need funds, 
investors assess all the securities they hold.  In that assessment they compare the different 
securities’ prices to their values.  Price is therefore an important factor for long-term investors 
to manage their portfolios in the short-term.808  Managing a portfolio is in any event an ongoing 
process by investors who may, in some shares, be long-term investors, and in respect of others, 
short-term investors.  Price remains a major factor to consider by all investors in all their 
security transactions.809  Trading by insiders with information to which other investors cannot 
                                                 
803  Ibid. 167–174. 
804  Ibid. 
805  Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1447–1452. 
806  Ibid. 1430. 
807  Ibid. 
808  Ibid. 1447. 
809  Ibid.  
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not have access, hurts investors, whether they are to be described as long- or short-term 
investors. 
Unfettered insider trading will also create the impression that the securities’ markets are unfair 
and would detract from the securities’ markets integrity generally.810  This affects not only 
short-term investors; it affects investors across the board.  In circumstances in which an 
investor knows, or at least is assured, that insider trading is under control, he would know that 
the losses that he does suffer, are not suffered because of some unerodable advantage held by 
his counterparties in the securities markets.  Schotland writes: 
[b]y no means do I suggest that a long-term investor will consider the presence of 
insider trading to be as important to his investment decisions as are the security’s 
fundamental soundness, dividends and growth potential.  But the investor can choose 
from among many stocks and several markets, and all things being equal, his decision 
may well be influenced by his view of the “fairness” he is likely to find.  Surely, of all 
the people we want to encourage to participate in the stock market, the long-term 
investor comes first, and we should allow no practices that discourage his participation, 
unless such practices bring demonstrable overriding benefits.811 
Insider trading is not a suitable means by which the efficiency of the price mechanism is to be 
promoted.  To require the timeous disclosure of information would be better suited to that 
objective as it does not come at the price of market integrity.812  Nor does insider trading affect 
only short-term investors.  It affects all investors.  Our legislature cannot be faulted for having 
chosen to prohibit trading on inside information.  Has it, however, correctly identified who is 
to be prohibited from doing so? 
  
                                                 
810  Ibid.  
811  Ibid. 1440. 
812  R J Gilson & R H Kraakman “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency (1984) 70 Va L Rev 549 and R J 
Gilson & R H Kraakman “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight 
Bias” (2003) 20 J Corp L 715. 
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4 3 The closed group approach 
The legislature creates two main types of insider in the Financial Markets Act.  As a point of 
departure, it creates a closed group of insiders, or primary insiders, in section 77(a).  Second, 
as a result of the apparent inability of section 77(a) to incorporate all persons who should be 
prohibited from participating in the markets with inside information, section 77(b) creates 
tippees.  In what follows, the different insiders recognised by the definition are set out and the 
arguments whether each type of insider should be prohibited from participating in the financial 
markets with inside information are considered.  Ultimately it is asked whether this closed 
group approach is the most appropriate to achieve the legislature’s objectives with financial 
market regulation. 
4 3 1 Primary insiders 
Primary insiders, identified in subheading (a) of the definition, are divided into two 
subcategories.813  The first category’s insiders, found in subsection (a)(i), are directly 
connected to the issuer.  A person who has inside information is an insider if she, in terms of 
subsection (a)(i), has inside information through being a director, or an employee, or a 
shareholder of an issuer of securities listed on a regulated market, or an issuer of derivative 
instruments related to such securities to which the inside information relates.  The subsection 
includes traditional fiduciaries and quasi-fiduciaries.  The second category’s insiders, found in 
subsection (a)(ii), are not directly connected to the issuer.  The subsection includes 
missapropriators.  Subsection (a)(ii) does not mention ‘issuers’.  The employees, officers and 
                                                 
813  Section 77 of the Act. 
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professionals it includes are recognised as insiders through having access to inside information 
‘by virtue’ of their ‘employment office or profession’.814 
4 3 1 1  Directors and managers 
The Financial Markets Act recognises as insiders persons who have inside information through 
being directors of issuers of securities listed on a regulated market or issuers of derivative 
instruments related to such securities to which the inside information relates.815  Directors are 
also generally recognised as ‘insiders’ in as far as they have access to inside information by 
virtue of their ‘employment’ as directors or by fulfilling the ‘office’ of a director.816 
The Financial Markets Act does, however, not contain a definition of the term ‘director’.817  
The term is to be given the meaning it has in the South African Companies Act.  For present 
purposes it suffices to say that the South African Companies Act defines a ‘director’ as a 
‘member of the board of a company’.818  The board, in turn, is that entity which must manage 
the business and affairs of a company, and that has the authority to exercise all of the powers 
and perform any of the functions of the company.819  While the Companies Act’s definition 
does not specifically distinguish between ‘executive’ and ‘non-executive’ directors, it is clear 
that the distinction continues to exist.  The Companies Act, for instance, requires public 
companies to have audit committees whose members must be directors who are independent 
and non-executive.820  In the words of the Act, the directors who are members of audit 
                                                 
814  Section 77(a)(ii) of the Act. 
815  Section 77(a)(i) of the Act. 
816  Section 77(a)(ii) of the Act. 
817  The market abuse section of the Act does contain a definition of ‘executive director’.  The term is 
defined to mean a ‘person appointed as such in terms of section 85(12)’.  Section 85(12) deals with the 
composition of the Directorate of Market Abuse and is irrelevant for present purposes. 
818  Section 1 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
819  Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
820  Section 94(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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committees must ‘not be . . . involved in the day-to-day management of the company’s 
business or have been so involved at any time during the previous financial year’,821 they must 
‘not be . . . a prescribed officer, or full-time employee, of the company or another related or 
inter-related company, or have been such an officer or employee at any time during the 
previous three financial years’,822 must ‘not be . . . a material supplier or customer of the 
company, such that a reasonable and informed third party would conclude in the circumstances 
that the integrity, impartiality or objectivity of that director is compromised by that 
relationship’,823 and must not be ‘related to any person who falls within’ any of those 
descriptions.824 
‘Director’, as that term is used in the Financial Markets Act, therefore includes executive and 
independent non-executive directors.  Both types of director are subject to the prohibitions 
against insider trading.  This is in keeping with the United States approach.825  The enactment 
of legislation such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act826 puts onerous duties on non-executive directors, 
including members of audit committees, increases the likelihood of their learning inside 
information, and requires them to be recognised as insiders. 
In SEC v Happ,827 Happ, an audit committee member and a non-executive director, was found 
guilty of insider trading.  Just before the end of a company, Galileo’s, third fiscal quarter, two 
executive directors, Gregory and Hanley, met to discuss its financial difficulties.  They decided 
to seek Happ’s advice.  Hanley phoned Happ.  Although he could not reach Happ directly, he 
left two voicemail messages.  The gist of Hanley’s voicemails was that the company was 
having some difficulties in the third quarter and that he wanted to meet with Happ.  Happ, after 
                                                 
821  Section 94(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
822  Section 94(4)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
823  Section 94(4)(b)(iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
824  Section 94(4)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
825  See Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 7 4/2009) 3–5 at note 1. 
826  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30 2002. 
827  392 F 3d 12 (1st Cir 2004). 
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having phoned Hanley’s assistant to schedule a meeting, sold all of his shares in the company.  
Two days later Galileo issued a press release making public their financial difficulties.  While 
Galileo had forecast net profits of $160 000 for the quarter, it had to report losses of $3.3 
million.  The day after the announcement, Galileo’s stock price fell by 63%.  The court a quo 
found Happ guilty of contravening Rule 10b-5.  He was ordered to pay a disgorgement for the 
losses he avoided and an additional sum as a civil penalty.828  His appeal failed.829 
Does the Financial Markets Act’s definition of insiders include only directors that are in the 
employ of a company at the moment when they perpetrate the prohibited conduct?  The words 
used in the definition of insider are open to the interpretation that, even though a person 
receives inside information as a director, she would not be an insider if she perpetrates the 
prohibited conduct after her directorship ends.  The ambiguous phrases are ‘through . . . being 
a director’, ‘through having access to such information by virtue of employment’ and ‘through 
having access to such information by virtue of . . . office’.830  Not only would this interpretation 
be irreconcilable with a regulatory regime based on the equal access to information theory, it 
would be irreconcilable with the objectives of the Financial Markets Act, specifically to 
‘ensure that the South African financial markets are fair, efficient and transparent’ and to 
‘increase confidence in the financial markets’.831  Those objectives will not be served by an 
arbitrary legislative line between incumbent directors with inside information and former 
directors with inside information, that will prohibit only incumbent directors from dealing with 
the information.  Circumventing the insider trading prohibition cannot be made as easy as to 
simply relinquish one’s post as a director.  A purposive interpretation of the definition leaves 
directors who obtain inside information through being directors liable for insider trading 
notwithstanding the fact that they are no longer directors when they commit the statutory 
offence.  That is the interpretation which must obtain.  Even in strictly fiduciary doctrine and 
                                                 
828  See SEC v Happ 295 F Supp 2d 189 (D Mass 2003) 200. 
829  SEC v Happ 392 F 3d 12 (1st Cir 2004) 35. 
830  Section 77(a) of the Financial Markets Act. 
831  Section 2(a) and (b) of the Financial Markets Act. 
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misappropriation-based jurisdictions it does not matter whether the person with inside 
information was no longer a director at the time when she traded with the inside information. 
In US v Causey and Others832 the charges arose out of the Enron debacle.  More specifically, 
they were born out of the now well-known scheme designed to deceive the investing public, 
including Enron’s shareholders, the SEC, and others, about the true performance of Enron’s 
business.  The defendants, Causey, Lay and Skilling, served respectively as chief executive 
officer, chief operating officer, and chief accounting officer in the corporation.  Causey and 
Skilling both had to answer to many charges, including several counts of insider trading.  It 
was alleged that they knew of the misleading portrayal of Enron’s financial position, that its 
share price was inflated, and that its credit rating painted an inaccurate picture of the 
company’s ability to service its debts.  They sold their Enron shares and passed on the losses 
to an unsuspecting public before the corporation’s true financial position was made public and 
its share price collapsed. 
Skilling moved to have one of the counts of insider trading against him struck out as the trade 
in question had occurred after he had resigned as chief executive officer.  The court dismissed 
his motion.  It reasoned that Skilling’s duty to refrain from trading on inside information, 
flowing from the fiduciary duty he owed to Enron’s shareholders, did not cease upon his 
resignation.  Indeed, found the court, the duty continued to be owed for as long as the 
information remained inside information. 
Manne argues that directors of issuers, whether non-executive or executive directors, should 
be allowed to trade on inside information as the inside information profits they earn provide 
an important component of executive compensation.833  Inside information would allow 
                                                 
832  US v Causey and Others (Unreported) Case no H-04-025-SS (29 December 2005). 
833  Manne (2005) J Corp L 170.  Also see Manne (2005) J Corp L 171 and the discussion of stock options 
as remuneration for directors and managers.  The timing of the exercise of the option will undoubtedly 
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executives to set and adjust their own rewards quickly.  In this way, so the argument goes, 
inside information could contribute to reducing the costs of the renegotiation of their 
remuneration, as the renegotiation is rendered unnecessary.834  Manne is not alone in making 
this point.  Carlton and Fischel agree that insider trading may present a solution to ‘the cost of 
renegotiation dilemma’.835 
The argument is based on the premise that managers are agents whose actions cannot be 
perfectly monitored by security holders.  Managers have the ability and the incentive to act in 
their own interest rather than in the interest of the firm.836  They, for instance, have room to 
have a company pursue investment projects that would maximise their personal benefit rather 
than that of the firm.  The natural safeguards, which ensure that managers’ and security 
holders’ interests are not completely misaligned, are imperfect.  These safeguards are 
protective mechanisms found in various markets, including the markets for managerial 
positions, for corporate control, for products and services, and for securities.  Rational 
shareholders, for instance, offer less for shares exposed to irresponsible management.  This, in 
turn, limits the managers’ compensation because the lower the value of the shares of the 
companies they manage, the less the managers would be able to charge for their services.837  
So too does the market for managerial positions provide redress where managers are 
overcompensated.  A bad track record has a negative effect on a person’s ability to negotiate a 
compensation package at a new firm.  As these markets do not, however, function perfectly, 
room remains for managers to shirk their responsibility to act in a way other than in the firm’s 
best interest, without penalty.838  There is therefore an incentive on the part of both managers 
and security holders to reach agreements that align their interests.839  Reaching these types of 
                                                 
be influenced by information that is to a certain extent, inside information.  Also see D W Carlton & D 
R Fischel “The Regulation of Insider Trading” (1983) 35 Stan L Rev 857 861. 
834  Carlton & Fischel (1983) Stan L Rev 861. 
835  Ibid. 870–871. 
836  Ibid. 869. 
837  Ibid. 869. 
838  Ibid. 
839  Ibid. 869–870. 
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agreements are costly.  They have to be renegotiated often.  They are also subject to a 
shareholder asymmetry of information. 
To allow managers to trade on inside information is to provide a solution to this problem.840  
Carlton and Fischel argue that it will incentivise managers to pursue valuable opportunities 
benefiting the firm.  As a manager has the opportunity to trade in his firm’s securities before a 
rise in the value of a security, she will have an incentive to engineer events that produce 
valuable information.  Trading on inside information has, therefore, the ability to align 
management’s interests with those of their incumbent shareholders, who will also benefit from 
these events.841  When managers or directors are successful in doing so, the company’s shares 
will increase in value and their prices will rise, allowing directors and management the 
opportunity to earn insider trading profits as they can trade before the information is made 
public.  Directors and management’s remuneration is therefore automatically increased when 
their companies’ achieve corporate successes.  What is said to be a lengthy and costly 
remuneration renegotiation process is avoided.  As Carlton and Fischel put it, ‘the manager, in 
effect, renegotiates each time he trades.’842  The ability to trade on inside information is 
therefore put forward as a mechanism to reduce corporate agency costs.843 
Haddock and Macey argue also that allowing directors to trade on inside information (and in 
the process, set their own compensation) is to allow the production of market information at a 
low cost.844  The authors premise their argument on the fact that there are mainly two sets of 
providers of information to ‘complete outsiders’ (ordinary traders without any access to inside 
or even very recent information): ‘true insiders’ (managers and directors) and market 
                                                 
840  Ibid. 871. 
841  Ibid. 
842  Ibid. 870. 
843  Ibid. 870–871. 
844  D D Haddock & J R Macey “Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to 
Insider Trading Regulation” (1987) 30 JL & Econ 311 318. 
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professionals.845  True insiders have access to information as a result of their employment or 
the office they fill.  They have access to new firm-specific information, which enables them to 
buy securities while having an information advantage.  If regulatory measures were to deny 
them that opportunity, the rents will just be moved on to the second group, the market 
professionals.  Market professionals spend their careers perfecting methods to obtain 
information about certain firms or industries and to evaluate that information.846  After an 
evaluation, they put the information to use in executing speedy market transactions before 
other traders drain the information of its value.847  True insiders, on the other hand, are dealing 
with the information they impart to the market directly: they receive the information, trade on 
it, and it is incorporated into the security’s price.  True insiders do not expend resources to 
gather information; they provide information at a low cost to the market.848  It follows, say the 
authors, that allowing inside information trading by primary insiders or directors is to allow 
outsiders, those traders other than insiders or market professionals, access to low cost 
information.  Not to allow it, would be to increase the price of information to outsiders.  In 
other words, whereas allowing insider trading by directors may work against market 
professionals, it works to the benefit of outsiders.849 
The arguments for allowing directors and management to trade on inside information are met 
with strong opposition.850  This is the result of the fact that the profits offered by trading on 
                                                 
845  Haddock & Macey (1987) JL & Econ 317. 
846  Ibid. 318. 
847  Gilson & Kraakman (1984) Va L Rev 571–572. 
848  Haddock & Macey (1987) JL & Econ 318. 
849  Ibid. 
850  J D Cox “Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the ‘Chicago School’” (1986) 1986 
Duke LJ 651–652; F H Easterbrook “Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information” (1981) 1981 Sup Ct Rev 309 332; R J Haft “The Effect of Insider Trading 
Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation” (1981–1982) 80 Mich Law Review 1053-
56; Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1435.  
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inside information would not be subject to the normal constraints put on management when 
they determine or renegotiate their compensation.851 
In South African company law, for instance, a company may pay remuneration to its directors 
only in accordance with a special resolution approved by the shareholders or in terms of the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation.852  It is a recognition that directors and managers 
must not have the power, outside of the company’s founding documents and its shareholders’ 
approval, to determine their own compensation.853  To give directors and managers the right 
to trade on inside information would be to allow them to circumvent the constraints of a formal 
bargaining process.  While this may lower transaction costs, it would be detrimental to the 
oversight role shareholders (including institutional investors) are able to play in the bargaining 
process.  Managers will also consequently be incentivised to rather earn their remuneration 
through trading with inside information than through more formal methods of compensation.  
Why would they go to the trouble of negotiating and justifying higher earnings, whether it be 
to shareholders, creditors or perhaps even the public in general, when they could simply raise 
their income by increasing their trades with inside information?  In addition, and in any event, 
even if directors would go to the trouble of somehow disclosing their insider trading profits to 
their security holders, insider trading as a compensation mechanism would be ‘ripe with 
informational asymmetries’ between shareholders and management.854  To allow managers to 
trade on inside information is to allow them a way of compensating themselves, about which 
shareholders (or anyone else for that matter) have very little information and therefore very 
little control. 
Insider trading, as a means to compensate management, also does not necessarily align 
shareholders’ interests with that of management.855  If directors are allowed to trade on inside 
                                                 
851  Easterbrook (1981) Sup Ct Rev 333. 
852  Section 66(8) read with section 66(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
853  R C Clark Corporate Law (1986) 273. 
854  Cox (1986) Duke LJ 657. 
855  Ibid. 658.  
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information and to set their own compensation, managerial performance, objectively assessed, 
is no longer the determinant of compensation.  Management, setting their own compensation, 
will be in a position to reward themselves in ways bearing no relation to their performance.  
Whereas management should be focused on maximising their shareholders’ return and growth 
in their equity, their focus would instead be on seeking profits from trading on inside 
information.856 
For instance, the opportunity to gain from insider trading may induce managers to increase the 
volatility of the firm’s stock prices.857  They may also become prone to higher risk investment 
as higher risk investments and volatile stock prices offer them the opportunity to quickly 
realise high returns.  Should the risk pay off, they would be in a position to capture a portion 
of the gains through insider trading.  If the project flops, management will be able to avoid the 
losses consequent upon their failures by, as Enron showed, selling their shares before 
information detrimental to the prices of their companies’ securities is made public, whereas 
their investors would have to suffer all the losses.858 
The prospects of earning insider trading profits also create the incentive for managers to delay 
the release of information at a cost to the firm.859  Firms incur expenses to protect valuable 
information.  A delay in disclosure means the firm has to protect the valuable inside 
                                                 
856  Easterbrook (1981) Sup Ct Rev 332–333 and Cox (1986) Duke LJ 659. 
857  Easterbrook (1981) Sup Ct Rev 333. 
858  Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1453.  Manne, at 102, was of the opinion that:  
 There are reasons to assume that good news is more important than bad news for our purposes.  
First the long-term trend of stock prices is upward, so that, all other things being equal, occasions 
of good news should exceed those of bad.  Perhaps more important, substantial good news seems 
often to develop quickly, as with the news of a new product, a favorable merger offer or an 
important government contract.  Bad news on the other hand tends to unfold in a more gradual 
fashion, or perhaps to be anticipated, as with a low earnings report or a dividend cut.  Bad news 
may also more frequently be information affecting an entire industry and thus not be susceptible to 
insider trading at all. 
859  Ibid. 334.  Also see D Ferber “The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor Manne” 
(1970) 23 Vand L Rev 621 623. 
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information for longer.  This additional cost of protecting information may not have a large 
effect, especially as firms expend resources on protecting information in the normal course,860 
but it illustrates that when management pursues its insider trading objectives, the efficient 
operation of the firm suffers.861  Company resources are diverted from legitimate destinations 
and used for personal gain.862 
Insider trading is also an inefficient form of compensation as there is no reason why the 
compensation would bear any relation to the size of the director’s investment of time and 
labour in the firm.863  It would be difficult to isolate, and consequently properly evaluate and 
gauge, the managerial contribution.  How valuable was the director’s contribution?  How much 
trading on inside information should she be allowed?  It is, in addition, highly doubtful that 
the profits from insider trading would compensate the person responsible for adding value to 
the company.  For example, where a revolutionary product is developed, the discovering 
scientist (probably an employee under a contractual obligation to surrender her ideas to the 
company, whose remuneration is limited to her salary) would be much less likely to benefit 
from the insider trading profits, than the manager in control of the research and development 
department the employee works in, or the director of the company the employee works for.864 
                                                 
860  Easterbrook (1981) Sup Ct Rev 334. 
861  Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1452. 
862  Cox (1986) Duke LJ 659.  
863  S Bainbridge “The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma” (1986) 38 U Fla L 
Rev 46–49. 
864  Schotland uses the apt example of the once ‘supremely innovative’ inventor and the head of research 
for the American motor vehicle production company, General Motors, Mr Charles Kettering.  
Kettering, notwithstanding the fact that he was a brilliant inventor in a company at the forefront of the 
motoring revolution, was said to have lost money in making his investments as he had always been 
‘unable to attend meetings, and said that he did not understand investments; adding, what interested me 
greatly, that he saw life through [a] laboratory window’.  Testimony of Judge Healy, and SEC member, 
in the Hearings on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies before the Senate Banking & Currency 
Committee 1940 as cited by Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1456 at note 86. 
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The considerations weighing against an insider trading compensation system are further not 
limited to directors’ and management’s ability to overcompensate themselves.  Nothing is to 
say that insider trading profits would be able to compensate them sufficiently when they 
perform well, securing the optimal levels of return and expansion for the corporation and its 
shareholders.865  The amount of remuneration a director or manager is able to earn would rather 
be a function of their financial ability at the time that they receive the inside information and 
their ability to put the information to use.866  There are therefore restraints on a manager’s 
ability to earn profits from trading on inside information: she has limited resources; she has 
limited knowledge of the overall health of the corporation; there could be an infrequency of 
events significant enough to trade on; she may not be able to act quickly enough to realise her 
deserved rents; and, perhaps rather less likely, she may suffer from ethical compunctions, 
which would restrain her in compensating herself sufficiently.867 
4 3 1 2  Shareholders 
The Financial Markets Act recognises as insiders persons who have inside information through 
being shareholders of issuers of securities listed on a regulated market to which the inside 
information relates or of derivative instruments related to such securities to which the inside 
information relates.868  The same language that is used for employees and directors, is used for 
shareholders.  By a parity of reasoning, former shareholders are insiders, as former directors 
are insiders.  There is empirical evidence that the owners of large blocks of shares more often 
trade with inside information than any other type of market participant.869  There is also a 
correlation between the incidence of insider trading by shareholders and the firm specific risk 
                                                 
865  Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1430.  This is acknowledged by Manne himself.  (Manne (2005) J Corp L 
173). 
866  M Mendelson “The Economics of Insider Trading Revisited” (1969) 117 U P L Rev 470 488. 
867  Schotland (1967) Va L Rev 1430. 
868  Section 77(a)(i) of the Act. 
869  H Demsetz “Corporate Control, Insider Trading, and Rates of Return” (1986) 76 Am Econ Rev 313 
314. 
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they are exposed to.  In other words, the higher investors’ exposure to a certain firm, the more 
likely it is that those investors will trade on inside information about that firm.870  The Act does 
not, however, distinguish between minority, majority or other types of shareholders.  They are 
all included within the definition. 
Demsetz argues that specifically controlling shareholders should be allowed to trade on inside 
information.  He emphasises the role concentrated ownership plays in monitoring 
management.871  Insider trading profits are said to be effective compensation to controlling 
shareholders for the higher risk they take as a result of being less diversified and because they 
perform important monitoring functions. 872  The argument is similar to Manne’s executive 
compensation argument.873  It fails to convince for some of the same reasons. 
It would be impossible to measure accurately the controlling shareholders’ contribution to the 
firm and to ensure that their reward is commensurate with their contribution.  In addition, if 
the legislature were to allow controlling shareholders to trade on inside information, how 
would it ensure that sharing of information is to happen only among the controlling 
shareholders?  Once some economic actors are allowed to trade with inside information, it 
would be very difficult to stop others from doing so.  To allow specifically the holders of big 
blocks of shares to trade on inside information, would also provoke conflicts between groups 
of shareholders.874 
                                                 
870  Ibid. 315. 
871  Ibid. 315. 
872  Ibid. 
873  Manne (2005) J Corp L 169.  A term used by the author to describe his own argument thirty-nine years 
after he first made it. 
874  E Maug “Insider Trading Legislation and Corporate Governance” (2002) 46 Eur Econ Rev 1569 1570. 
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It would leave small investors with smaller shareholdings vulnerable.875  Maug argues that in 
an environment where people are free to trade on inside information, dominant shareholders 
will collude with management to share inside information between them.  The author provides 
an example of managers warning the company’s major shareholders in advance of negative 
developments in the company, urging those shareholders to sell their shares at higher prices 
rather than seeking to intervene in the running of the company.876  This is, of course, beneficial 
to those shareholders, as it allows them to realise the higher selling price before the market 
price incorporates the negative information.  Profits from insider trading become the 
opportunity costs of monitoring and intervention.877  As long as the profits are sufficiently 
lucrative, management remains free to run the company, protecting larger shareholders’ 
interests.  In other words, managers, in an environment where insider trading is not regulated, 
are free to use inside information to render the controlling shareholders beholden to them.  This 
type of conduct has been described as the ‘dark side of shareholder activism’.878  To align 
smaller shareholders’ interests with those of dominant shareholders, dominant shareholders 
must be prohibited from trading with inside information.879 
In the United States, as in South Africa, controlling shareholders are recognised as insiders.  
In the United States the basis for their liability is an extension of directors’ fiduciary 
obligations.  The reasoning is that controlling shareholders also control corporate activity, 
which affects the shares of others, as a result of the size of their shareholding.880  In addition, 
it is said that it is fair also to hold controlling shareholders liable as insiders as they have the 
same type of access to inside information as would an officer or director of the company.  This 
approach was adopted by the Delaware District Court in 1951 in Speed v Transamerica 
                                                 
875  Ibid. 1572. 
876  Ibid. 1570. 
877  Ibid. 
878  Ibid. 
879  Ibid.  Also see E B Rock “Controlling the dark side of relational investing” (1994) 15 Cardozo L Rev 
987. 
880  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 7 4/2009) 3–5. 
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Corp.881  Transamerica was a dominant shareholder of a company that manufactured tobacco 
products, Axton-Fisher.  Speed, who sold Axton-Fisher shares to Transamerica, alleged that 
Transamerica was in a process of buying out other shareholders in an effort to earn more in 
relation to an increase in the value of leaf tobacco that Axton-Fisher had in stock. 
The court put majority shareholders of issuers on par with officers and directors.  It held that 
a majority shareholder, just like an officer or director, occupies an inside position.  In dealing 
with Rule 10b-5, the court held as follows: 
The rule is clear.  It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to 
purchase the stock of minority shareholders without disclosing material facts affecting 
the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside position 
but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which information would have 
affected the judgment of the sellers.  The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity 
of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take advantage of the 
uninformed minority stockholders.882 
Non-controlling shareholders are not treated as owing fiduciary duties, unless they step into 
some additional fiduciary relationship or if they are tippees.  In Feldman v Simkins Industries 
Inc883 a shareholder, although having inside information in his possession, was not regarded as 
an insider for the reason that he had only a 14% shareholding.  Between 1974 and 1977 Simkins 
acquired 14% of a company called Fibreboard Corporation.  Simkins became convinced, 
however, that Fibreboard was poorly managed.  The president of Simkins and the Fibreboard 
management had also become openly hostile toward each other.  Simkins sold to Feldman his 
shares in Fibreboard.  Feldman instituted an action against Simkins, but he failed to show that 
Simkins was an insider.884  As a starting point the court recognised that insider status is 
normally reserved for officers, directors, and controlling shareholders of the corporation, and 
for those having some kind of special relationship with the corporation that affords them access 
                                                 
881  99 F Supp 808 (D D 1951). 
882  Ibid. 828–829. 
883  679 F 2d 1299 (9th Cir 1982). 
884  Ibid. 1303. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  234 
to inside information.  Emphasising that in determining insider status, one should ask whether 
a person has access to confidential information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose, the court found that Simkins was not an insider.885 
SEC v Talbot886 highlights the tension, present also in South African law, between holding 
shareholders liable for insider trading, and the fiduciary duty doctrine.  The tension is found in 
the anomaly that, once it is accepted that shareholders owe a duty to the issuer, it becomes 
rather more difficult to explain how they could also be beneficiaries of a fiduciary relationship 
between themselves and true fiduciaries.  The court in Talbot held that shareholders are not to 
be held liable for insider trading as they did not owe a fiduciary duty, ‘rather, [they were] owed 
such a duty’.887 
  
                                                 
885  Ibid. 1304. 
886  430 F Supp 2d 1029 (CD Cal 2006). 
887  Ibid. 1051. 
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4 3 1 3  Employees 
Subsection (a)(i) of the definition of insider in the Financial Markets Act, includes employees 
of issuers of securities listed on regulated markets or issuers of derivative instruments related 
to such securities to which the inside information relates, who have the inside information 
‘through being’ employees.888  Subsection (a)(ii) includes persons who have inside information 
‘through having access to such information by virtue of employment’.889  As most of the 
professions, including law, accounting and medicine, can be practised as an employee,890 the 
two terms ‘through . . . employment’ and ‘through . . . profession’ overlap considerably. 
Employment, as used in the subsection, is to be given its ordinary meaning, which is ‘the state 
of having paid work.’891  As the legislature has chosen not to limit the definition to 
‘employees’, but rather to include persons who have information by virtue of their 
‘employment’, the definition covers persons working under contracts of service (locatio 
conductio operarum) and contracts in which one person undertakes to perform or execute a 
particular piece of work to produce a certain specified result (locatio conductio operis).  A 
purposive interpretation of the definition would, as is the case with directors and managers, 
include former employees who learned inside information during their employment.  The (a)(i) 
subcategory covers issuer’s employees such as those in SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur892 who 
traded in the securities of their employer (the issuer) because they knew (to the exclusion of 
the market) that it had discovered rich mineral deposits on a piece of land it was about to 
                                                 
888  Section 77(a)(i) of the Act. 
889  Section 77(a)(ii) of the Act. 
890  S L Buhai “Profession: A definition” (2012) 40 Fordham Urb LJ 241 281. 
891  Soanes & Stevenson Oxford Dictionary of English. 
892  See par. 2 2 3 2 above. 
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purchase.  The (a)(ii) subcategory covers, for instance, parties such as the defendant in SEC v 
Materia.893 
The case dealt with an employee not employed by an issuer, but working at a New York City 
firm specialising in the printing of financial documents.  These documents included many used 
in connection with takeovers by its corporate clients.  The firm went to great lengths to guard 
the confidential information with which it dealt: code names were used, blanks were left, and 
misinformation was included in documents from time to time.  This did not, however, deter 
Materia.  Within hours of learning inside information, he would purchase stock and within 
days of a tender offer being made public, he would sell the stock.  The court a quo found that 
Materia had breached a duty to his employer and its clients.894  The court of appeal upheld this 
finding.  The court of appeal further held that a financial printer’s most valuable asset is its 
reputation as a safe repository for its clients’ secrets.  By stealing these secrets from his 
employer, Materia was said to have undermined his employer’s integrity and was guilty of 
insider trading.895  In the United States, one of the more common manners of founding liability 
under the misappropriation theory is to establish a breach of an employee contract. 
The South African definition of insider does not distinguish between lower- and higher-level 
employees.  The definition therefore includes all levels of employees and someone such as the 
secretary in SEC v Falbo,896 who obtained inside information in helping her husband, an 
electrician, to steal the information of the company for which she was working.  The Financial 
Markets Act cannot be faulted for including employees of all levels within the definition.  In 
large corporations information passes through several layers in the corporation’s hierarchal 
structure before it reaches the decision makers who rely on the information.  To allow insider 
trading in the corporation’s structure (below management) would impair corporate decision 
                                                 
893  745 F 2d 197 (1984). 
894  Ibid. 200. 
895  Ibid. 202. 
896  See par. 2 2 3 9 above. 
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making at all hierarchal levels.897  If lower level employees are allowed to trade on inside 
information, there is a potential for information to get distorted.898  The insiders at every level, 
as information rises through the hierarchal structure, would trade on the information and hold 
onto it for as long as possible, to delay their fellow insiders from trading on the information, 
thereby maximizing their own gains.899  The employee at each level would not be able to effect 
too much of a distortion or delay, as this would have disciplinary consequences.900  However, 
it is the total delay and distortion brought about, if one considers the intricate and multiple 
layered nature of the modern corporation, that rebuts the argument that employees should be 
allowed to trade with inside information. 
4 3 1 4  Professionals 
Subsection (a)(ii) of the Act recognises as insiders persons who have inside information through 
having access to such information by virtue of their ‘profession’.901  Seen in isolation, the term has 
a vaguely delineated meaning.902  In the Act, it is found after ‘employment’ and ‘office’.903  The 
Act, however, does not provide any assistance in distinguishing between those three terms.  The 
Constitution recognises the distinction between a ‘trade’, an ‘occupation’ and a ‘profession’,904 
but it also does not assist in distinguishing between those terms. 
The Oxford Dictionary of English defines ‘profession’ as a ‘paid occupation, especially one 
that involves prolonged training and a formal qualification’.905  Sociologists, however, argue 
                                                 
897  Ibid. 1054. 
898  Haft (1982) Mich L Rev 1053. 
899  Ibid. 1055. 
900  Ibid. 1057. 
901  Section 77(a)(ii) of the Act. 
902  R A Posner “Professionalisms” (1998) 40 Ariz L Rev 1 1. 
903  Section 77(a)(ii) of the Act. 
904  See section 22 of the Constitution. 
905  Soanes & Stevenson Oxford Dictionary of English. 
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that the word has little value for distinguishing among analytically different types of 
occupations except insofar as it confers a mark of social prestige or status.906  South African 
case law is equally unhelpful.  One South African judgment, Die Prokureursorde van die 
Oranje-Vrystaat v Schoeman, recognises that the term is open to a broad and a narrow 
interpretation.907  According to the narrow interpretation, a profession is a vocation in which a 
professed knowledge of some department of learning is used in its application to the affairs of 
others, or in the practice of an art founded upon it.  This interpretation includes law and 
medicine.  The broad interpretation includes any calling or occupation by which a person 
habitually earns his living.908 
The author Buhai made a useful study of the professions of law, accounting and medicine to 
identify their common characteristics.909  The author concludes that: 
Each profession provides a service that requires specialized education and the exercise 
of independent judgment.  They all have substantial expertise that reveals the disparities 
in the information available to the professional and the client, and therefore the client’s 
ability to trust the professional is essential.  Each requires its professionals to put 
someone else’s interests ahead of their own and therefore requires an ethos different 
from business’s standard profit maximization norm.  Such an ethos supports 
internalized codes of conduct and occupational self-regulation.  Finally, they all have 
duties to the public in addition to duties to their individual clients.910 
An important element to consider in distinguishing the professions from other occupations or 
normal employment (found under what Buhai calls ‘internalized codes of conduct and 
occupational self-regulation’) is control: who controls or commands the determination of what 
work shall be done by the members of the profession and how that work shall be performed or 
                                                 
906  E Freidson “Theory and the Professions” (1989) 64 Ind LJ 423. 
907  Die Prokureursorde van die Oranje-Vrystaat v Schoeman 1977 (4) SA 588 (O) 592–594. 
908  Ibid. 592. 
909  S L Buhai “Profession: A definition” (2012) 40 Fordham Urb LJ 241 281. 
910  Ibid.  Also see M C J Bobbert “Advertising of Attorneys’ Services in South Africa” (1986) 103 S 
African LJ 461 465 referred to in Prokureursorde van die Oranje-Vrystaat v Schoeman 1977 (4) SA 
588 (O) 592. 
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evaluated?911  Control, in respect of professions, normally lies in a near-exclusive jurisdiction 
by members of the occupation over particular tasks so that only they have the right to perform 
them.912  A certification by an accepted agent representing the occupation that approved 
training was successfully completed is therefore a common prerequisite for being admitted 
into a profession.913 
Posner identifies a set of occupations most commonly referred to as professions and 
occupations that are not commonly referred to as professions.  Apposite examples of the former 
are law, medicine (and its related fields), engineering, the clergy, teaching, architecture, 
actuarial services, librarianship, social work, journalism and accounting.914  Apposite examples 
of the latter are business management, business generally, advertising, public relations, 
farming, politics, fiction writing, the civil service, entertainment, construction (other than 
architecture and engineering), police and detective work, computer programming, and the 
majority of positions of employment in transportation.915  Considering the context of the 
definition of insider, stockbrokers and other financial market practitioners regulated by the 
South African Institute of Stockbrokers and the South African Institute of Financial Markets, 
are to be included in Posner’s list of professions. 
Some professionals have better access to inside information than other market participants.  
Mergers and takeovers, for instance, provide professionals, including lawyers and accountants, 
and firms housing professionals, access to inside information.  In SEC v Clark,916 Clark was 
the president of Rolyan Manufacturing Company.  It sold medical supplies.  A London based 
multinational corporation, Smith & Nephew, acquired Rolyan, but kept Clark as president.  
After having acquired Rolyan, Smith & Nephew resolved to take over other medical supply 
                                                 
911  E Freidson “Theory and the Professions” (1989) 64 Ind LJ 423 425. 
912  Ibid. 426. 
913  Ibid. 
914  R A Poser “Professionalisms” (1998) 40 Ariz L Rev 1–2. 
915  Ibid. 
916  915 F 2d 439 (9th Cir 1990) 453 and footnote 26. 
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manufacturers in North America.  It employed an acquisitions team to look for promising 
takeover targets.  Clark was a member of this team.  He attended regular meetings to discuss 
possible candidates for acquisition.  The team members were aware of the fact that Smith & 
Nephew considered all information about takeovers as confidential and that the company 
forbade the disclosure or personal use of any of the information.  Clark became aware of a 
company that Smith & Nephew was interested in purchasing.  He learned how much they 
intended to offer for the shares and how much the shares were worth at that point.  He 
instructed his stockbroker to purchase 2 000 of the shares of the target company.  He also 
instructed his stockbroker to hide his trading from Smith & Nephew.  The trading would be 
done under Clark’s wife’s maiden name.  After the takeover bid was made public, Clark sold 
his shares and realised a substantial profit.  The SEC instituted action and he was held liable 
under the misappropriation theory.  On appeal, Clark argued that the misappropriation theory 
did not apply to his case.  The court, however, affirmed the use of the misappropriation theory 
for employees and found Clark guilty of having misappropriated information from his 
employer. 
In United States v Newman,917 an employee of an investment bank was held guilty of insider 
trading.  Morgan Stanley & Co and Kuhn, Loeb & Co, today better remembered as Lehman 
Brothers, were investment banks who represented companies in corporate mergers, 
acquisitions, tender offers, and other takeovers.  One Courtois and a co-conspirator not before 
the court, Antoniu, had been employed by Morgan Stanley.  Antoniu left Morgan Stanley and 
joined Kuhn Loeb.  For not less than five years, Courtois and Antoniu stole confidential 
information concerning proposed mergers and acquisitions that was entrusted to their 
employers by corporate clients.  This information was conveyed surreptitiously to Newman, a 
securities trader and manager of the over-the-counter trading department of a New York 
brokerage firm. 
                                                 
917  664 F 2d 12 (1981). 
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Newman passed along the information to Carniol and Spyropoulos.  Carniol was a resident of 
Belgium and Spyropoulos was a Greek who lived in both Greece and France.  Using secret 
foreign bank and trust accounts and spreading their purchases among different brokers to avoid 
detection, the three purchased stock in companies that were merger and takeover targets of 
clients of Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb.  They realised their gains when the takeovers were 
announced and the market price of the stocks rose.  The profits were shared with Courtois and 
Antoniu.  The charges alleged that Courtois and Antoniu breached the trust and confidence 
placed in them and their employers by the employers’ corporate clients and the clients’ 
shareholders, and the trust and confidence placed in the two by their employers.  Courtois, 
Newman, and Carniol were furthermore charged with having aided and participated in 
violating the fiduciary duties of ‘honesty, loyalty and silence’ owed to Morgan Stanley, Kuhn 
Loeb, and the clients of those investment banks.918 
The court held that Newman’s conduct constituted a criminal violation of section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 despite the fact that neither Morgan Stanley, Kuhn Loeb, nor their clients were at 
the time a purchaser or seller of the target company securities in any transaction with 
Newman.919  The court held: 
Had [Newman] used similar deceptive practices to mulct Morgan Stanley and Kuhn 
Loeb of cash or securities, it could hardly be argued that those companies had been 
defrauded. . . .  By sullying the reputations of Courtois’ and Antoniu’s employers and 
safe repositories of client confidences, appellee and his cohorts defrauded those 
employers as surely as if they took their money. . . . [Newman] and his cohorts also 
wronged Morgan Stanley’s and Kuhn Loeb’s clients, whose takeover plans were key 
to target company stock prices fixed by market forces, not artificially inflated through 
purchases by purloiners of confidential information.920 
                                                 
918  Ibid. 16. 
919  Ibid. 
920  Ibid. 17. 
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United States’ Rule 14e-3 was promulgated to specifically prohibit trading on inside 
information in the context of mergers and takeovers.921  The Rule’s prohibitions are additional 
to those promulgated under Rule 10b-5.922  Prosecutions have been instituted alleging 
violations of both the rules where the conduct not only amounted to a breach under Rule 14e-
3, but also to a misappropriation of confidential information under Rule 10b-5.923  Rule 14e-3 
provides: 
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has 
commenced, a tender offer (the “offering person”), it shall constitute a 
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of 
section 14e of the Act for any other person who is in possession of material 
information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has 
reason to know is non-public and which he knows or has reason to know it has 
been acquired indirectly from: 
(1) The offering person, 
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, 
or 
(3) Any officer, director or partner or employee or any other person acting 
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or 
cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities convertible or 
exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or 
to dispose of any foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time 
prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly 
disclosed by press release or otherwise. 
(b) A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of 
this section.924  (Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
921  For discussions of this rule, see B G Stahl “Rule 14e-3: Invalid in the Criminal Context” (1988) 16 Am 
J Crim L 367; E L B Haskell “‘Disclose-or-Abstain’ Without Restraint: The Supreme Court Misses the 
Mark on Rule 14e-3 in United States v. O'Hagan ” (1998) 55 Wash & Lee L Rev 1055; J Lobb “SEC 
Rule 14e-3 in the Wake of United States v O’Hagan: Proper Prophylactic Scope and the Future of 
Warehousing” (1998) 40 William & Mary Law Review 1853; W J Cook “From insider trading to unfair 
trading: Chestman II and Rule 14e-3” (1992) 22 Stetson Law Review 171; S Thel “Statutory Findings 
and Insider Trading Regulation” (1997) 50 Vand L Rev 1091; M F Hill “Trading on Material Non-
public Information under Rule 14e-3” (1981) 49 George Washington Law Review 539; and T L Hazen 
“United States v Chestman – Trading in Securities on the Basis of a Nonpublic Information in Advance 
of a Tender Offer” (1991) 57 Brooklyn L Rev 595.  
922  See Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 7 4/2009) 7-2 footnote 2. 
923  See SEC v Maio 51 F 3d 623 (1995) and SEC v Musella 578 F Supp 425 (1984). 
924  The rule goes on to create certain exceptions for corporations.  Rule 14e-3(b) provides: 
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A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of this section if such person 
shows that: 
(1) The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of such person to purchase or 
sell any security described in paragraph (a) of this section or to cause any such security to be 
purchased or sold by or on behalf of others did not know the material non-public information;  
(2) Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies and procedures, reasonable 
under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature of the person’s business, to 
ensure that individual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate paragraph (a) of 
this section, which policies and procedures may include, but are not limited to, (i) those which 
restrict any purchase, sale and causing any purchase and sale of any such security or (ii) those 
which prevent such individual(s) from knowing such information. 
 The rule also makes certain exceptions for specific types of transactions.  Rule 14e-3(c) provides: 
Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (a) of section 14 to the contrary, the following transactions 
shall not be violations of paragraph (a) of this section: 
(1) Purchase(s) of any securities described in paragraph (a) of this section by a broker or by 
another agent on behalf of an offering person; or 
(2) Sale(s) by any person or any security described in paragraph (a) of this section to the offering 
person. 
 The rule provides expressly that tipping shall be unlawful in certain circumstances, Rule 14e-3(d) 
provides: 
(1) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or 
practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, it shall be unlawful for any person 
described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section to communicate material, non-public 
information relating to a tender offer to any other person under circumstances in which it is 
reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in a violation of this 
section except that this paragraph shall not apply to a communication made in good faith. 
(i) To the officers, directors, partners or employees of the offering person, to its advisors or to 
other persons, involved in the planning, financing, preparation or execution of such tender 
offer, or 
(ii) To the issuer whose securities are sought or to be sought by such tender offer, to its officers, 
directors, partners, employees or advisors or to other purposes, involved in the planning, 
financing, preparation or execution of the activities of the issuer with respect to such tender 
offer, or 
(iii) To any person pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule or regulation promulgated 
hereunder. 
(2) The persons referred to in paragraph (d)(1) of this section are: 
(i) The offering person or its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors; 
(ii) The issuer of the securities sought by such tender offer or its officers, directors, partners, 
employees or advisors; 
(iii) Anyone acting on behalf of the persons in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section or the issuer or 
persons in paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section; and 
(iv) Any person in possession of material information relating to a tender offer which information 
he knows or has reason to know is non-public and which he knows or has reason to know 
has been acquired directly or indirectly from any of the above. 
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The United States’ legislature has therefore decided that, in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions, an individual’s liability is determined with reference to what he knows rather than 
who he is.  There is no breach of duty requirement, although knowledge of the information’s 
source is a prerequisite for liability.  If ‘any’ person trades while in possession of material non-
public information (in connection with a tender offer by another party), she may be subject to 
prosecution for insider trading under Rule 14e-3. 
As opposed to the United States Supreme Court’s reluctance in accepting the equal access to 
information theory, Congress has recognised equal access as necessary, at least in certain 
specific factual scenarios.  This is important in at least two respects.  Firstly, it shows that 
whereas in the main, the jurisdiction is still insisting on having the fiduciary and 
misappropriation theories as the bases for the regulation of trading on inside information, it 
does recognise that in certain situations the operation of an equal access to information-like 
prohibition is required.  The United States courts acknowledge this.925  Secondly, the rule 
provides an example of what is required for liability in an equal access regime.  Determining 
whether certain conduct falls foul of the rule involves a series of factual enquiries.  As that 
determination does not include an enquiry as to the trader’s, or the tipper’s, identity, other 
parameters are needed to limit liability.  The knowledge requirement is especially relevant in 
that regard. 
  
                                                 
925  See SEC v Mayhew 121 F 3d 44 (2d Cir 1997) where it was said that: ‘Rule 14-e3 imposes liability . . 
. without regard to whether the trader owes a fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the 
information’.  Also see K A Tallman “Private Causes of Action under SEC Rule 14e-3” (1983) 51 Geo 
Wash L Rev 290 295–296. 
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4 3 1 5  Politicians 
The South African definition of insider does not expressly include politicians.  It does include 
persons who have access to inside information ‘through having access to such information by 
virtue of . . . office’.926  The dictionary definition of ‘office’ includes ‘a position of authority 
or service, typically one of a public nature’.927  South African politicians are therefore also 
recognised as insiders by the definition. 
A 2004 United States study showed that senators beat securities market indexes by, on average, 
12% a year.928  This statistic is especially interesting if it is viewed against two others: for the 
same period households underperformed against the market by 12% and traditional corporate 
insiders beat the market by only 6%.  Bainbridge makes the reasonable inference that some 
senators must have had access to, and were using, inside information about the companies in 
whose securities they traded.929  He concludes that it is highly probable that the misuse of 
inside information by politicians is common.930  There is no reason to believe that South 
African politicians conduct themselves differently.  To the contrary. 
It is of little doubt that politicians have an exploitable advantage when it comes to trading in 
the securities markets.  Manne already recognised this fact near on sixty years ago.931  
                                                 
926  Soanes & Stevenson Oxford Dictionary of English. 
927  Ibid. 
928  A J Ziobrowski, P Cheng, J W Boyd & B J Ziobrowski “Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock 
Investments of the US Senate” (2004) 39 J Fin & Quant Analysis 661. 
929  S M Bainbridge “Insider Trading Inside the Beltway” (2010) 36 J Corp L 281 282. 
930  Bainbridge (2010) J Corp L 297 citing Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski (2004) J Fin & 
Quantitative Analysis 670. 
931  H G Manne Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966) 171–179.  Manne recognised that the ‘federal 
government is the largest producer of information capable of having a substantial effect on stock-market 
prices’. (Ibid. 171)  Government is not only a producer of valuable securities markets information, it is 
also the ultimate recipient.  Vast amounts of information must be disclosed to government before it is 
made public. (172)  Politicians therefore have access to extremely valuable information. (Ibid. 179) 
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Situations in which politicians have access to inside information abound.  Among other things, 
they have access to inside information when corporations disclose information in the 
confidential setting of congressional or parliamentary hearings and investigations.932  They 
also have access to draft white papers on, say, tax legislation yet to be tabled.  This enables 
them to know which companies may face a tougher or a more lenient tax regime in future.  
They further have information about government contracts and the approval of, say, a new 
drug, sure to make the developer company’s securities’ prices rise.933 
The problem in the United States was that under Dirks and Chiarella, the classical theory did 
not prohibit senators from trading on inside information.  While Dirks recognised that certain 
types of outsiders, with an especially close relationship to issuing firms, could become 
constructive insiders, these circumstances could be found only in scenarios where corporate 
information was legitimately revealed to underwriters, accountants, lawyers, or consultants 
working for the corporation.  Only they could become fiduciaries of the corporation and could 
therefore be held liable as insiders.934  Second, Dirks recognised that tippees could be held 
liable only when the tipper, the insider, breaches a fiduciary duty through his disclosure of the 
information to the tippee, and the tippee knows or has reason to know of the breach.935  
Members of Congress’s information, however, did not typically come by the way of a breach 
of a duty to an issuer or some other firm.  In addition, members of Congress and their senior 
staff are prohibited from serving as officers or senior members of the boards of associations, 
                                                 
932  Bainbridge (2010) J Corp L 286. 
933  Ibid. 
934  Dirks 655 footnote 14. 
935  Ibid. 660. 
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corporations or other entities.936  They are therefore unlikely to be categorised as a classical or 
a constructive insider.937 
The misappropriation theory was considered to be a bad fit.938  Under the misappropriation 
theory, as it was formulated in O’Hagan, a person is prohibited from trading only where he 
owes a duty to the source of the information.  His trade must be in breach of that duty.939  The 
difficulty is that congressional agents owe different duties to their employer.  While 
congressional aides and other government employees, for instance, have definite fiduciary 
relationships with their employer and they have duties arising out of their employment 
contracts, Members of Congress are merely bound by implied obligations created by 
congressional ethics rules.940  Typically then, Members of Congress owe no duty to the source 
of the information in which they trade. 
The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (also referred to as the ‘Stock 
Act’) was thus enacted.  As the name suggests, the Act is aimed at prohibiting members of 
Congress from using non-public information derived from their official positions for personal 
benefit.941  It enjoins the Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate and the Committee on 
Ethics of the House of Representatives to issue interpretive guidance to clarify that members 
and employees of Congress942 may not use non-public information derived from their positions 
                                                 
936  Bainbridge (2010) J Corp L 290.  He refers to the “Restrictions on Outside Employment To Members 
and Senior Staff” United States government document. It is available at 
http://ethics.house.gov/subjects/topics. 
937  Bainbridge (2010) J Corp L 290. 
938  Bainbridge (2010) J Corp L 293. 
939  Ibid. 
940  Ibid. 
941  See the preamble to the Stock Act. 
942  The Stock Act also touches on the conduct of other federal officials, including judicial officers and 
employees.  Section 9(2) to (3) provides: 
 (2) Judicial officers — The Judicial Conference of the United States shall issue such 
interpretive guidance of the relevant ethics rules applicable to Federal judges, including the 
code of conduct for United States Judges, as necessary to clarify that no judicial officer may 
use non-public information derived from such person’s position as a judicial officer or gained 
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or gained from the performance of their official responsibilities as a means of making a private 
profit.943  The Act further expressly states that members and employees of Congress are not 
exempt from section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5944 and it addresses various reporting duties.945  It 
determines that a duty arises from the relationship of trust and confidence owed by each 
member and employee of Congress.946  It amends the Securities and Exchange Act947 to 
provide expressly that: 
each member of Congress or employee of Congress owes a duty arising from a 
relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the United States Government, 
and the citizens of the United States with respect to material, non-public information 
derived from such person’s position as a member of Congress or employee of Congress 
or gained from the performance of such person’s official responsibilities.948 
  
                                                 
from the performance of such person’s official responsibilities as a means for making private 
profit. 
 (3) Judicial employees — The Judicial Conference of the United States shall issue such 
interpretive guidance of the relevant ethics rules applicable to judicial employees as necessary 
to clarify that no judicial employee may use non-public information derived from such person’s 
position as a judicial employee or gained from the performance of such person’s official 
responsibilities as a means for making a private profit. 
943  Section 3 of the Stock Act. 
944  Section 4(a) of the Stock Act. 
945  See sections 6 to 8 of the Stock Act. 
946  Section 4(b)(1) of the Stock Act. 
947  The amendment was inserted into section 21 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
948  Section 4(b)(2) of the Stock Act. 
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4 3 2 Tippees 
As the South African definition’s closed group fails to include all market participants with 
access to inside information, the legislature has had to create a further main group of insiders: 
‘tippees’.  The recognition of the concept is a consequence of the legislature’s failure to find a 
single basis for the liability of all market participants who deal with inside information.  It 
contributes to the South African insider trading legislation’s complexity.  In addition, as United 
States law shows, the search for and determination of a basis for the liability of tippees are not 
conducive to the development of accessible, coherent and consistent jurisprudence.949 
4 3 2 1  Knowledge of the source 
In the Financial Markets Act, primary insiders are recognised as such with reference to the 
way ‘through’ which they have access to inside information.  Tippees are recognised as 
insiders purely because of their knowledge.  According to subsection (b) a person who has 
inside information is an insider of this category if she ‘knows that the direct or indirect source 
of the information was a primary insider.950 
There are three reasons why this knowledge requirement should not be in the definition of 
‘insider’.  Firstly, it leaves the legislative scheme complex.  All the elements of the prohibited 
conduct section are not contained within one easily accessible section.  Two elements that 
relate to the same subject matter (knowledge) are split over two sections: the definitions section 
(section 77) and the prohibited conduct section (section 78).  The term ‘insider’, and therefore 
potentially ‘tippee’ and its knowledge requirement, is used in four of the five prohibited 
                                                 
949  For the proposition that these are the characteristics of ‘good jurisprudence’ see T Etherton “Contract 
Formation and the Fog of Rectification” (2015) 68 Current Leg Prob 367 385. 
950  Section 77(b) of the Act. 
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conduct subsections.  Each type of prohibited conduct described in section 78 of the Act, 
however, already includes a knowledge requirement.  ‘Persons’ who deal for insiders, are 
required to know that the person that they are dealing for is an insider.951  All the other types 
of prohibited conduct use the term insider.  An insider who knows that he or she has inside 
information may not deal in securities to which the inside information relates.952  An insider 
who knows that he or she has inside information may not trade for another.953  The tipping 
offence requires an insider to know that he or she has inside information.954  The 
encouragement and discouragement offence requires an insider to know that he or she has 
inside information.955 
Secondly, and more importantly, the knowledge requirement contained in the definition makes 
knowledge of the information’s source a prerequisite to the liability for insider trading of some 
of the participants in the financial markets.  It should not be.  Knowledge of the source of 
information serves only as one of many possible indicators that a trader has knowledge of the 
fact that the information he possesses is not legally accessible by the public.956  To make 
knowledge of the source a prerequisite to liability, is to potentially allow some participants 
who know that they have inside information to deal with the information, for so long as they 
do not have knowledge of the direct or indirect source of the information.  This means that 
even if that person has knowledge of the fact that she has inside information she would be free 
to deal with the information for so long as she does not have knowledge of its source and she 
is not a primary insider. 
                                                 
951 Section 78(3) of the Act. 
952 Section 78(1) of the Act. 
953 Section 78(2) of the Act. 
954 Section 78(4) of the Act. 
955 Section 78(5) of the Act. 
956 See above p. 204. 
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Thirdly, to include this knowledge requirement in one of the definitions is to make the liability 
of some of the participants in the financial markets dependent on whether the direct or indirect 
source of the information is indeed a primary insider.  The knowledge requirement in the 
definition uses the phrase ‘[t]o know’.  ‘[T]o know’ is to ‘be aware of through observation’, 
‘to have knowledge or information concerning’ or to be ‘absolutely certain about’.957  It is to 
be compared to ‘to believe’, which is to ‘accept that (something) is true, especially without 
proof’, ‘to have confidence in’ or to ‘hold (something) as an opinion’.958  ‘To know’ something, 
as opposed to ‘to believe’ something, suggests knowledge of an existing fact.  The distinction 
is important: ‘to know’ connotes the actual existence of a primary insider who is the source of 
the tippee’s inside information.  The tippee’s recognition as an insider therefore depends on 
the actual existence of a primary insider who is the source of the tippee’s inside information.  
This makes one person’s liability, the tippee, dependent on the conduct of another, the primary 
insider. 
4 3 2 2  Derivative liability 
In the United States tippee liability also depends on the existence of the primary insider and 
her conduct.  Its courts’ judgments provide examples of the arbitrary results this type of 
derivative liability leads to.  The cause of these arbitrary results is obvious: a court is made to 
look to the conduct of one person, the primary insider, to determine the liability of another, the 
tippee. 
In Dirks,959 the Supreme Court of the United States set out the test for tippee liability as 
follows: 
‘[T]he tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derived from [the] insider’s duty . . . [T]he 
test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
                                                 
957  Soanes & Stevenson Oxford Dictionary of English. 
958  Soanes & Stevenson Oxford Dictionary of English. 
959  Dirks 659–662.  See p. 97 et seq. above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  252 
disclosure.  Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders. . . .  This requires courts to focus, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct 
or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or reputational 
benefit that will translate into future earnings.  There are objective facts and 
circumstances that often justify such inference.  For example, there may be a 
relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the 
latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.  The elements of fiduciary duty 
and exploitation of non-public information also exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.  The tip and trade resemble 
trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.960 
Tippee liability was therefore made dependent at least on whether the insider breaches her duty 
to the holders of securities and whether she gains personally from making the tip.  The 
application of the first mentioned requirement is illustrated by SEC v Switzer.961  Switzer was 
a football coach at a university in Oklahoma.  Platt was the chief executive officer and 
chairman of the board of Texas International Corporation and a director of Phoenix Resources 
Company.  Phoenix was not doing well and its future was uncertain.  For some time, Platt had 
sought either to split Phoenix from Texas International, to merge the two companies, or to sell 
Phoenix and liquidate its assets.  Throughout the course of a sports day, Platt remained in one 
place in the stands.  Switzer moved around, at times speaking to his son or other participants 
and their families, watching different events, and signing autographs.962  He also spoke to Platt 
on a number of occasions.  They talked about their sons’ participation in sports, the oil and gas 
business, the economy in general, football, and their investments.  They did not have a 
conversation about any mergers, acquisitions, takeovers or possible liquidations of Phoenix in 
which Morgan Stanley would play a part.  Platt further did not make any stock 
recommendations to Switzer, nor did he intentionally communicate inside information to him.  
The information Switzer gathered was overheard and was not, it was found, the result of an 
intentional disclosure by Platt. 
                                                 
960  Dirks v SEC 463 US 646 (1983) 662–64 (citations omitted). 
961  SEC v Switzer 590 F Supp 756 (WD Okla 1984). 
962  Ibid. par. 39. 
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At one point Switzer was lying behind Platt in the stands.  Switzer overheard Platt talking to 
his wife about his trip to New York the previous day.  Platt mentioned Morgan Stanley and its 
desire to dispose of or liquidate Phoenix.  He also heard Platt talking about several companies 
bidding for Phoenix and that an announcement of a ‘possible’ liquidation of Phoenix might 
occur.  Switzer remained behind the Platts for twenty minutes.963  Platt was not aware of 
Switzer’s presence behind him in the stadium, nor that Switzer had overheard anything that he 
had said.964 
The court focused on Platt’s conduct.  It was found that Platt had returned home late the 
previous day from his meetings in New York.  His wife was to leave town for an entire week 
the following day.  As they had minor children, it was their practice to arrange for Platt to be 
at home when his wife was out of town.  The sports day provided the Platts with an opportunity 
to discuss their respective plans for the upcoming week.  The evidence was that during these 
discussions, Platt mentioned his prior business activities in New York and his resultant 
obligations and appointments.  The court further recorded it was also the practice that when 
Platt appeared distracted he would talk to his wife about his problems, even though she did not 
have an understanding nor interest in business matters.965  On the sports day, Phoenix was 
weighing on Platt’s mind, as it had been for several years, prompting Platt to talk to his wife 
about it.966 
Subsequent to overhearing the information, Switzer returned home and looked up the price of 
Phoenix’s securities.  Switzer then met with his investing partner, discussed the information 
he had overheard, and decided to purchase Phoenix stock.967  It was common cause that Platt 
                                                 
963  Ibid. par. 41. 
964  Ibid. par. 43. 
965  Ibid. par. 44. 
966  Ibid. par. 44. 
967  Ibid. par. 46. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  254 
was an insider at Phoenix.  Switzer was not an insider of Phoenix, nor did he owe any fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders of Phoenix.968 
The court emphasised the fact that the information was given from spouse to spouse and that 
it was merely one spouse informing the other of his upcoming business schedule in order for 
arrangements to be made for a child to be cared for.969  The information was, furthermore, 
inadvertently overheard.970  The court accordingly found that Platt did not intentionally give 
the information to Switzer, nor did Platt make the disclosure for an improper purpose.971  The 
court found that as Platt had not breached any fiduciary or other duty to the stockholders of 
Phoenix when he told his wife of the possible liquidation of the company972 Switzer was not 
guilty of insider trading.973 
Another example of the results consequent upon a requirement of a breach of duty by the 
source of the information, is found in R v Fischer.974  The defendants in the case were 
prospective buyers of a controlling block of shares in a company.  They traded with inside 
information, but were not found guilty of insider trading as no duty to the source of the 
information had been breached.  The owners of the controlling block of shares had contacted 
a merchant banker to find a suitable purchaser for their stakes in the company.  Despite the 
defendants’ expression of interest, the owners sold to another purchaser, whom they 
considered more suitable.  The owners instructed the merchant bankers to inform the 
defendants that the deal was not to proceed.  The instruction was carried out.  The defendants 
then bought shares in the target firm before the public announcement of the deal was made in 
                                                 
968  Ibid. par. 67.4. 
969  Ibid. par. 44.10. 
970  Ibid. par. 44.11. 
971  Ibid. par. 44.13. 
972  Ibid. par. 44.9. 
973  Ibid. par. 44.16. 
974  (1988) 4 B.C.C. 360.  As discussed by Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 141. 
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the financial press.  As the merchant banker had not breached a duty in the disclosure of the 
information to the defendants, the defendants were free to trade.975 
4 3 2 3  Remote tippees 
The fact that tippee liability is made dependent upon, or is derived from, the conduct of a 
primary insider not only gives rise to arbitrary results, it also leads to evidentiary difficulties 
as the conduct of the primary insider may be far removed from the impugned conduct.  Tippees 
receive their information, according to the South African definition, either ‘directly’ or 
‘indirectly’ from a primary insider.  In other words, the primary insider does not have to be the 
direct source of the information.  The tippee could receive the information from another tippee, 
who could have received the information from another tippee, and so on.  These tippees, that 
do not receive their inside information from a primary insider, but from another tippee, are 
‘remote’ tippees. 
The South African definition requires that also remote tippees have knowledge of the fact that 
the source of the inside information was a primary insider and, as it has been explained, the 
source must actually have been a primary insider.  This means that, even in situations where 
the disclosure of the information by the primary insider are far removed from the wrongful 
trade (a trade with knowledge that the trader is in possession of inside information) the focus 
remains on the conduct of the primary insider.  The United States legal position suffers from 
the same defect. 
                                                 
975  Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 141. 
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In U.S. v Falcone976 the McGraw-Hill company published a weekly article in Business Week 
magazine.  The column evaluated three companies with the intention of giving its readers an 
insider look at certain securities on Wall Street.  The writer of the column gathered information 
by talking to CEOs, money managers and securities analysts.977  The article was released on 
the internet at five o’clock on Thursdays.  It was available on newsstands on Fridays.  To 
ensure that these release times were adhered to, Business Week followed stringent security 
procedures.  Evidence was led that at Business Week’s headquarters the article was protected 
by way of limiting the number of people who had access to it before its publication.  The names 
of the relevant securities were not inserted until late the Wednesday before publication.  In 
addition, it was Business Week’s policy that no writer, editor or reporter would be permitted 
to buy or sell stock on subject matter that he had worked on until two weeks after the 
information had been made public.  If an employee regularly reported on a particular stock, 
the individual was barred indefinitely from purchasing the stock.978 
After the article was completed, there were various people in possession of the information 
contained in the article.  The article was also sent to a graphics company and then to three 
printing plants.  The graphics company and the printing plants had security procedures in 
place.979  After the printing process, the magazine was sent to a national distributor, the Curtis 
Circulation Company (Curtis).  Curtis in turn sold the magazines to various wholesalers.  One 
such wholesaler was Hudson News (Hudson).  Curtis distributed policy documents to all its 
wholesalers, including Hudson, to the effect that the magazines were not to be distributed 
before five o’clock on Thursdays.  Hudson also had its own security and confidentiality 
procedures in place.980 
                                                 
976  97 F Supp 2d 297 (EDNY 2000).  Affirmed on appeal in U.S. v Falcone 257 F 3d 226 (2nd Circuit 
2001). 
977  Ibid. 298. 
978  Ibid. 
979  Ibid. 299. 
980  Ibid. 
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All these security measures notwithstanding, the senior editor of Business Week noticed an 
abnormal trading pattern among the securities mentioned in the column: those securities’ 
prices would rise before the publication of the article.  The following scheme was discovered:  
Gregory Salvage was a foreman at Hudson and had been employed by the company for more 
than twenty years.  There was no question that he was aware of the security policies of 
Hudson.981  Nevertheless, out of the prompting of a neighbourhood friend and broker, Larry 
Smath, Salvage arranged for Smath to receive a copy of the ‘Inside Wall Street’ article before 
it was made available to the general public so that he could trade on the stock and make a 
profit.982 
To facilitate this, Salvage drew in one of his subordinates on the day shift, Mohammed, and 
requested him to fax the article to Smath at his workplace, before the close of the market on 
Thursdays.  Salvage was paid two hundred dollars for each article.  Salvage paid Mohammed 
twenty-five dollars for each copy he faxed.983  In the planning stages of the scheme, Smath 
also phoned Falcone, the defendant in the case, who was a securities broker.  He was told to 
simply ‘write down these symbols’ and not to ‘ask any other questions’.  At some point Smath 
and Falcone met at the latter’s house.  Smath then informed Falcone of the intricacies of the 
scheme concerning the receipt of the information.984 
Based on this evidence, Falcone was convicted of insider trading.985  The court, however, 
raised its concern about the boundless expansion of liability.  The court’s unease about 
convicting Falcone lay in the fact that it was highly questionable whether the participants 
breached a duty to the source of the information.  Salvage and Mohammed were after all 
employees of Hudson and were therefore far removed from the source of the inside 
                                                 
981  Ibid. 300. 
982  Ibid. 
983  Ibid. 
984  Ibid. 300. 
985  Ibid. 301. 
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information.  In fact, remarked the court, no less than three intermediaries preceded Hudson’s 
participation in the process in which the information was disseminated.986 
In SEC v Musella987 the United States District Court of New York was confronted with a 
factual scenario where a stock market layman was used to purchase securities for his 
instructors.  That layman, Musella, passed inside information on to a broker, DeAngelis.  The 
tipper in the case was Ihne, a manager of the office services department of a New York law 
firm.  Ihne came to know information about proposed and anticipated tender offers, mergers, 
and leveraged buyouts as a result of his firm giving legal advice in that regard.  Ihne admitted 
to his wrongdoing, was found guilty, and was sentenced accordingly.  Ihne, however, was not 
operating alone.  He had shared his information with a friend, Stivaletti, and his stockbroker, 
Palomba.  These three men formed a pact in which Ihne would steal confidential information 
and pass it on to Stivalleti, who would ultimately make their investment decisions.  Palomba 
would use his account to purchase the securities for the group.  Palomba, however, became 
uncomfortable with the fact that he had to purchase the securities with his own account.  
Another plan was made.  This is where Musella entered the picture.  Stivalleti enlisted Musella, 
the brother of a college classmate, to purchase the securities for the group.  The profits would 
be divided evenly.  The securities purchase, which Musella made according to the scheme, was 
the first of his life.  Evidence was led that he had an extremely limited knowledge of the 
securities markets.  He was a beautician by profession and the owner of the Swirl & Curl 
beauty salon in Brooklyn.  He had been given instructions on what to buy and bought 
accordingly.  Musella also relayed the information to a friend, one DeAngelis.  He in turn 
purchased securities based on the information for his own account.  DeAngelis could thus 
properly be described as a remote tippee. 
                                                 
986  Ibid. 302. 
987  SEC v Musella 748 F Supp 1028 (SDNY 1989).  See Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 6 4/2008) 4-
29. 
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Among the issues before the court was whether Musella’s lack of being fully informed about 
the transactions could allow DeAngelis to be acquitted.  Was the information chain broken to 
a sufficient degree to render DeAngelis not guilty of inside information trading?  Musella did 
not know who the original source of the information given to him was.  The court emphasised 
the fact that he did know he was receiving stolen, confidential information.  He ‘candidly 
understood’ that the information he was receiving was based on material, non-public 
information.988  He knew that the information was illegally obtained.  He referred to the source 
as ‘the Goose who laid the Golden Egg’.989  What is more, it was clear that Musella knew that 
he was busying himself with a wrongful scheme.990  The court concluded as follows: 
Material, inside information about a pending tender offer is likely to come from the 
acquiring company or someone acting on its behalf.  Thus, even assuming Musella did 
not know the specific source of the inside information he passed along to DeAngelis, 
DeAngelis was a sufficiently sophisticated investor to know or have reason to know 
that the source of Musella’s information was either the ‘offering person’ or someone 
acting on its behalf. . . .991 
Traders like Musella and De Angelis, if they are found not to be primary insiders, would not 
be tippees in South African law. 
4 3 2 4  Temporary insiders 
The arbitrariness inherent in making one person’s liability dependent on that of another, where 
the wrongfulness of the first mentioned’s conduct and the irrelevance of the last mentioned’s 
                                                 
988  Ibid. 1035. 
989  Ibid. 1038. 
990  Ibid. 1035.  Evidence was led that Musella, on one occasion, showed Stivaletti a magazine article about 
insider trading.  The article described different sorts of people who could get access to inside 
information, including lawyers, secretaries and printers.  It contained a cartoon depicting various 
possible sources of illegally obtained confidential information.  Musella pointed to the cartoon and 
asked Stivaletti which one of the people in the cartoon depicted Stivaletti’s source.  Stivaletti replied: 
‘it’s one of those’. 
991  SEC v Musella 748 F Supp 1028 (SDNY 1989) 1042. 
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conduct is apparent, leads to judicial ingenuity at the cost of legal certainty.  In SEC v Lund,992 
for instance, the Court was confronted with a situation in which there was clearly no fiduciary 
duty breached by the information being communicated to Lund, the tippee.  The facts were as 
follows.  Lund stood at the helm of a company called Verit Industries.  One Horowitz was a 
member of Verit’s board and had been for more than seven years.  Horowitz also held the 
office of chief executive officer, president, as well as chairman of the board in another 
company, P&F Industries Inc.  Prior to the events that led to Lund’s indictment, Lund and 
Horowitz regularly spoke and exchanged information about the two companies. 
In the course of 1979 Horowitz, acting on behalf of P&F, entered into negotiations with another 
corporation with the intention of entering into a joint venture.  When it became clear that there 
was a good chance of the joint venture coming to fruition, Horowitz approached Lund about 
the prospect of a capital investment into the joint venture.  Shortly after Horowitz spoke to 
Lund, the latter placed an order for a large amount of P&F stock with his stockbroker.  The 
order was executed.  The joint venture was approved by P&F board and a letter of intent was 
signed.  On the date of the signature the American Stock Exchange delayed trading until a 
public announcement about the joint venture could be made.  When trading reopened, the 
trading volume and price of P&F stock rose dramatically and remained high for weeks.  Lund 
sold his stock and realised a substantial profit. 
The court acknowledged the fact that it had long been established in United States federal law 
that tippees could be held liable for trading with inside information.  It acknowledged, further, 
the qualification the United States Supreme Court had placed on tippee liability in Dirks, that 
‘tippee liability cannot be imposed unless the “tipper” has breached a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know 
that there has been a breach.’993  So, reasoned the court, Lund could not be held liable as a 
                                                 
992  570 F Supp 1397 (CD Cal 1983). 
993  Ibid. 1402. 
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tippee as Horowitz had not breached a fiduciary duty in communicating the material, non-
public information to him.  Horowitz’s disclosure of the information had been done within his 
authority as a director of the company.  But, surprisingly and incorrectly in light of Dirks, the 
court held that this was not the end of the enquiry.  A further question needed to be asked: 
could Lund be held liable as an insider proper? 
To answer this question the court embarked on an analysis of what is to be understood under 
the term insider.  It held that ‘[a]lthough corporate insiders are traditionally defined as officers, 
directors and controlling shareholders of the corporation, a consistent body of case law makes 
clear that the scope of the concept “insider” is flexible.’994  Therefore, held the court, ‘[p]ersons 
who, although not traditional “insiders”, nevertheless become fiduciaries of the corporation 
and the shareholders could be called “temporary insiders.”’  They, it was said, assume the 
duties of an insider temporarily, by virtue of a special relationship with the relevant 
corporation.995 
The court concluded that Lund was a ‘temporary’ P&F insider when he traded on the basis of 
the information concerning the joint venture.  It found that the exchange of information 
between Horowitz and Lund about their corporations took place within the confines of a long-
term friendship.  What was more, Horowitz had sat on the Board of Verit and Horowitz had 
told Verit, through Lund, of the joint venture because of this special relationship.  It found that 
‘the information was made available to Lund solely for corporate purposes’.  The court further 
remarked that Lund had known that the information was to be kept confidential and that it was 
not to be used for ‘personal gain’.996  Under these circumstances, the court found, Lund became 
a temporary P&F insider on receipt of the information about the gambling project and assumed 
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an insider’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading based on that information, and therefore 
that Lund’s trading on the information was actionable under section 10(b).997 
4 3 2 5  The personal benefit requirement 
As it is clear from the quotation from Dirks above,998 that the United States Supreme Court 
requires a tipper personally to benefit from making a tip to establish the tippee’s liability.  The 
requirement was developed in fear of open-ended tippee liability.999  The court is concerned 
about friendly cooperative meetings between corporate officials and outsiders.  These types of 
meetings, it is said, occur all the time and should not be seen as a ‘co-venture’ that would 
extend the fiduciary obligation to the outsider.1000  If that were to be the case, there would be 
few cases of confidential information flow from within the corporation that would not be 
covered by the theory.1001  The court is also concerned about situations in which investment 
analysts conduct meetings for the purpose of gathering information.1002  The investment market 
analysts’ essential function of promoting marketplace efficiency by ‘ferreting out’ issuer-
related information is to be protected.1003 
A propensity to open-ended liability in this context is rather the result of not having a single, 
clear basis for regulating insider trading.  The personal benefit test is a stopgap, superficial 
solution to that fundamental underlying problem.  If it is not absurd in itself, it has given rise 
to absurd results.  In the typical tipping situation, there is no actual pecuniary benefit to an 
                                                 
997  Ibid. 
998  Above p. 256. 
999  Langevoort on insder trading (Rel 6 4/2008) 4-7. 
1000  Ibid. 
1001  Ibid. 
1002  Ibid. 4-7 – 4-8. 
1003  Ibid. 4-8 footnote 3. 
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insider.1004  There is no kickback or expectation that there will be a reciprocal tip sometime in 
the future.  For this reason the United States courts have had to extend the meaning of ‘benefit’ 
to situations where the insider is, for instance, seeking to enhance his own reputation or to 
obtain the ‘warm glow’ that purportedly comes from giving tips to friends.1005  This gives rise 
to a situation wherein the person who comes into contact with the insider is forced to engage 
in some kind of ‘motivational analysis’ in respect of the insider under circumstances that defy 
prediction.1006 
Three types of personal benefit can satisfy the Dirks test: pecuniary benefit, reputational 
benefit, and the ‘Santa Claus’ benefit.  Pecuniary benefit is taken to include any sense in which 
the insider tangibly profits from the tippee’s insider trading.1007  This would include kickback 
and profit-share arrangements, but also trades made by a spouse whose income becomes 
available to the whole household.  A reputational benefit would accrue where an insider 
provides inside information to another, say an investment analyst, in the hope that the 
investment analyst may say favourable things about the tipper in the future.1008  The Santa 
Claus benefit has been described as follows: 
The most interesting type of personal benefit is that which comes from making a gift.  
According to the court, tipping just to do something nice for someone else resembles 
trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the proceeds to the other person. . . 
.  Here doctrinal consistency has apparently given way to the recognition that the typical 
tip is neither for pecuniary nor reputational benefit, but is nonetheless a misuse of 
corporate information by the insider.  Thus, the concept of benefit has been expanded 
to include the satisfaction that comes from playing ‘Santa Claus’ with inside 
information.1009 
                                                 
1004  Ibid. 
1005  Ibid. 
1006  Ibid. 
1007  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 6 4/2008) 4-11. 
1008  Ibid. 4-12 – 4-13. 
1009  Ibid. 4-12 – 4-13. 
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In SEC v Downe1010 Warde stood accused of trading in the securities of Kidde Inc while in 
possession of inside information.1011  Warde was alleged to have received the information from 
a director of Kidde, Downe.  The court heard testimony that Warde and Downe were good 
friends.  They would socialise regularly and each would visit the other at his family home.  
They played cards and shared interests in art and the stock market.  They were also both 
professional investors.  The court a quo found Downe had relayed inside information to Warde.  
As to whether there was personal benefit to Downe, the court wrote: 
With respect to this element, little need be said.  A benefit to the tipper can be shown, 
inter alia, by the relationship between the insider and the recipient in which the tip is 
part of an exchange of benefits, or can constitute the benefit enjoyed by the giver of a 
gift. . . .  Here, Downe testified that Warde had mentioned Golden Nugget and Bank of 
America to him.  While Warde argued that this comment could hardly have been a 
recommendation from Warde or a quid pro quo exchange, Downe later invested 
approximately $1.4 million in Golden Nugget securities.  Moreover, Downe testified 
that ‘it was ego’ that motivated him to invest his friends; and relatives’ money without 
financial compensation.  From this the jury could reasonably infer that Downe enjoyed 
the benefits of being viewed as a successful investor in the eyes of his peers – including 
Warde – as well as the gratification of bestowing the ‘gift’ of his investment 
expertise.1012  (Emphasis added.) 
In SEC v Sargent1013 Shepard was a co-owner of a consulting firm.  His co-owner, Aldrich, 
was also the member of a board of directors for Purolator Products Co., a manufacturer of 
automotive parts.  A company called Mark IV Industries Inc offered to purchase all of the 
outstanding shares of Purolator.  Purolator accepted the offer.  Shepard and Aldrich’s 
consulting business was run from a single-room office in Shepard’s basement.  Shepard could 
at all times hear what Aldrich said on the telephone and would occasionally retrieve voice mail 
messages and faxes for Aldrich.  After Mark IV had made its offer for Purolator, Aldrich took 
Shepard into his confidence and advised him that Purolator was being pursued.1014  Aldrich 
                                                 
1010  969 F Supp 149 (SDNY 1997). 
1011  Ibid. 151. 
1012  Ibid. 156. 
1013  229 F 3d 68 (1st Cir 2000). 
1014  Ibid. 71. 
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told Shepard that this fact needed to be kept confidential, and Shepard agreed not to disclose 
the information. 
Less than a month before Purolator accepted Mark IV Inc’s offer, Shepard, Sargent, and their 
wives met for dinner.  The reason for their meeting for dinner, so found the court, was to 
smooth out some problems that had developed between them.1015  During dinner, Shepard 
informed Sargent that Purolator was to be bought.1016  In the following weeks Sargent bought 
20 400 Purolator shares. 
One of the questions the court had to answer was whether Shepard benefited from the tip to 
Sargent.  The court found that sufficient evidence had been presented to found his benefit.  The 
relevant facts were that Shepard and Sargent were ‘friendly’,1017 Shepard tipped Sargent about 
Purolator in an ‘effort to effect a reconciliation with his friend and to maintain a useful 
networking contract’, Shepard had referred over 75 people to Sargent’s dental practice, 
Shepard often went to Sargent for help in connection with Shepard’s service to the local 
chamber of commerce; Shepard’s sister-in-law owed Sargent money; and one of Shepard’s 
relatives was threatening to harm Sargent’s business.1018 
  
                                                 
1015  Ibid. 72. 
1016  Ibid. 
1017  Ibid. 77. 
1018  Ibid. 77. 
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4 3 3 A critique 
To summarise, primary insiders include directors and managers, shareholders, employees, 
professionals and politicians.  In the category ‘directors’, it includes directors and managers.  
It also includes executive and independent non-executive directors, not only of issuers but also 
directors of companies whose position would allow them to have access to inside information.  
It also includes not only incumbent, but also former directors.  In the category ‘shareholders’, 
the definition includes current and former shareholders, and minority and majority 
shareholders.  In the category ‘employees’ the definition includes incumbent and former 
employees, persons who work under contracts of service and who are contracted to produce a 
specified piece of work, and issuers as well as other companies’ employees who learn inside 
information through having access to the information by virtue of their employment.  In the 
category ‘professionals’, the definition includes people with occupations in law, medicine (and 
its related fields), engineering, the clergy, teaching, architecture, actuarial services, 
librarianship, social work, journalism, accounting, stockbroking and other financial market 
professionals.  In the category ‘politicians’, the legislature includes those politicians who hold 
public office and who have access to inside information through that office.  ‘Tippees’ includes 
anyone who has inside information and who has knowledge of the fact that the direct or indirect 
source of the information is a primary insider.  It also includes remote tippees. 
The arguments as to whether any of these persons or entities should be allowed to trade on 
inside information are in the final analysis to be viewed against the relevant legislative 
objectives underlying the Financial Markets Act.  As it has been said, the Act aims to ensure 
that the financial markets are fair, efficient and transparent and to increase confidence in the 
South African financial markets.1019  Importantly, the legislature’s focus is on the financial 
markets, not on the divide between ownership and control or the efficiency of the market for 
management.  Arguments that insider trading profits present an efficient form of executive and 
                                                 
1019  See p. 26 above. 
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majority shareholder compensation, emphasise the positive effects of the compensation on 
matters outside the financial markets, whether they be the health of the market for management 
or a solution to the separation between ownership and control in firms.  These arguments lose 
sight of the rights and obligations in the financial markets and fairness between the parties in 
those markets. 
The arguments that do relate to the operation of the financial markets, are equally incompatible 
with the legislature’s objectives.  To argue, for instance, that directors and managers (as 
opposed to market professionals) must be allowed to trade on inside information as it would 
enable the production of low cost market information, is irreconcilable with the fact that 
‘confidence’ in the financial markets depends heavily on notions such as the public’s belief or 
faith in the fact that those markets are fair.  What member of the public would believe the 
markets to be fair if only some participants are prohibited from trading with information others 
do not have access to (while some others are allowed to earn insider trading profits) for the 
greater good?  Surely if there are burdens to be borne for the greater good, they must be borne 
equally.  The legislature cannot be faulted for any of its inclusions into the primary insider 
category. 
The tippee category, on the other hand, whereas it also represents an attempt at inclusivity, is 
entirely misconceived as it makes knowledge of the source a prerequisite to liability.  To do 
so is to allow some participants who know that they have inside information to deal with the 
inside information, for so long as they do not have knowledge of the direct or indirect source 
of the information.  This means that even if a person has knowledge of the fact that she has 
inside information, she would be free to deal with the information for so long as she does not 
have knowledge of its source and she is not a primary insider.  Apart from the possibility that, 
as a result of the comprehensive nature of the list of primary insiders and the broad language 
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used by the legislature in that regard,1020 the definition of insider does not fail to cover any 
persons with inside information, this is a flaw in the definition. 
The definition also suffers from more fundamental defects.  The South African legislature’s 
closed group approach is inappropriate for the regulation of a financial market wrong.  The 
closed group approach is based in the fiduciary doctrine and misappropriation theory which, 
as it has been explained in chapter 2 of this work,1021 are not appropriate for the regulation of 
insider trading in South Africa.  The definition of ‘insider’ presents a key point in the 
legislative regime where the legislature must establish the equal access theory of regulation.  
If there is to be a definition of insider in the legislative regime,1022 it must simply recognise 
that an insider is a person with inside information. 
The distinction drawn by the legislature between the different traders is in any event irrational.  
To be rational, it would have had to be rationally connected to the objects sought to be achieved 
by the Financial Markets Act.1023  Instead, the distinction is based on the fiduciary duty doctrine 
and the misappropriation theory, theories employed with the objective of respectively 
addressing the divide between ownership and control and protecting property rights in 
information.  The definition mirrors the United States paradigm that distinguishes among 
fiduciaries, missapropriators, and tippees.  The distinction did not develop with the objective 
of ensuring that the financial markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and to increase 
confidence in them; it developed as a result of the fact that the founding basis of insider trading 
is a makeshift one: the fiduciary doctrine.1024  It is nothing but an historic relic in the financial 
                                                 
1020  This argument is dealt with at p. 330. 
1021   See above p. 27 et seq. 
1022   For the argument that there should not be such a definition in the legislative regime, see p. 325 et seq. 
below. 
1023   Ronald Bobroff & Partners Inc v De La Guerre 2014 (3) SA 134 (CC) par. 7; Albutt Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC) par. 51; Democratic Alliance 
v President of South Africa and Others 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) par. 32. 
1024   See p. 128 above. 
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markets, unable to explain the wrongfulness of the conduct of all traders trading with inside 
information in a market setting.1025  The further ‘development’ that occurred in United States 
law, had very little to do with objectives such as those intended with the Financial Markets 
Act, and was rather focused on providing hotchpotch solutions to the fiduciary doctrine’s 
failures to explain a financial market wrong.  Missapropriators had to capture insiders who did 
not fit the idea of a traditional fiduciary insider1026 and tippees provided the overall stopgap.  
There is no reason why this distinction must be maintained in the South African Financial 
Markets Act. 
  
                                                 
1025   See p. 55 above. 
1026   See p. 66 above. 
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4 4 Corporations 
The Financial Markets Act does not expressly provide that companies are capable of being 
insiders.  It does so by implication.  The lead-in phrase of the definition of insider provides 
that an ‘insider’ is a ‘person’ who has inside information.1027  A ‘person’ is defined as including 
‘a partnership and any trust’.1028  If this is read with the definition of ‘person’ in the 
Interpretation Act1029 an insider may also be a juristic person.1030 
This interpretation is reconcilable with the rest of the definition of insider and the three types 
of insider for which it provides.1031  The enquiry into the legislature’s intention behind the 
definition is, however, slightly bedevilled by the words used in the prohibited conduct section.  
Four of the five subsections (that contain the dealing for oneself, the dealing for another, the 
tipping, and the encouraging or discouraging offences) refer to an insider as ‘he’ or ‘she’, not 
pronouns normally associated with corporations.  Subsection 78(3) (that contains the dealing 
for an insider offence), does not use those pronouns to refer to the perpetrator.  It does, 
however, contain the pronoun ‘who’.  ‘He’, ‘she’ and ‘who’ are of course not entirely incapable 
of referring to things other than natural persons.  ‘She’ is, for instance, commonly used to refer 
to ships.  The use of these terms in the prohibited conduct section, when viewed in the context 
of the Financial Markets Act and particularly its objects, must not affect the fact that ‘insiders’ 
may also be juristic persons. 
                                                 
1027  Section 77 of the Act. 
1028  Ibid. 
1029  Section 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957. 
1030  R Cassim “Some Aspects of Insider Trading – Has the Securities Act 36 of 2004 Gone too Far?” (2007) 
19 SA Merc LJ 44. 
1031  Section 77 of the Act. 
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It is in any event not novel for South African legislation to consider juristic persons as insiders 
for the purposes of insider trading provisions.  Section 440F of the 1973 Companies Act1032 
also did so.  So did the Securities Services Act1033 which, it can be said, merely effected a 
return to the position prior to the Insider Trading Act.1034 
The substantive question whether companies should be recognised as insiders, is slightly more 
complicated.  Firstly, a company can trade wearing more than one hat.  Secondly, companies 
are inherently different in character from natural persons.  As to the first complicating factor, 
a company can trade as an issuer making an initial public offering of its own shares; as a 
‘repurchaser’ of its own shares; or as a trader like any other.1035  As to the second complicating 
factor, a company can be large with many different divisions.  What may be common 
knowledge in one division, may be completely unknown in another.  If the trading in shares is 
conducted by the latter division, should the company be held liable as an insider trader? 
4 4 1  Issuers 
Issuers cannot misappropriate their own information, nor can they owe a fiduciary duty to 
themselves.  That notwithstanding, they are constantly repositories of a wealth of non-public 
information that, if it were to be made public, would materially affect the trading price on the 
secondary market for their securities.1036  Issuers, as opposed to normal market participants, 
have the resources and the knowledge to engage in at least a great deal of repurchasing activity 
based on inside information.1037  The New Zealand Law Commission has gone as far as to call 
                                                 
1032  Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
1033  Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. 
1034  Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998. 
1035  Loewenstein & Wang (2005) Del J Corp L 74. 
1036  S J Choi & E L Talley “Playing Favourites with Shareholders” (2002) 75 S Cal Rev 271 307. 
1037  M J Loewenstein & W K S Wang “The Corporation as Insider Trader” (2005) 30 Del J Corp L 74. 
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a company purchasing its own shares the ‘ultimate insider’.1038  Should companies buying their 
own shares be seen as insiders at all?  If so, should there be exceptions to their liability? 
Loewenstein and Wang submit that some of the traditional rationales against insider trading 
do not apply, or apply with less force, to ‘issuer insider buying’.1039  They argue, firstly, that 
equitable principles may be one basis for prohibiting a corporation from purchasing its own 
shares while in possession of inside information.  A corporation purchasing its own shares 
while having inside information goes against ‘the fundamental principle which good morals 
exact, that men should act in honesty and fairness’.1040  A corporation, say the authors, should 
act in ‘honesty and fairness’ when repurchasing its own shares, and disclose material 
information to the selling shareholder.1041  The countervailing arguments are that the 
corporation buying its own shares using inside information would be acting in the best interests 
of the non-selling shareholders.  They might prefer that no disclosure be made.1042 
The authors then look at the economic effects of issuers repurchasing shares with inside 
information.1043  When a corporation trades on inside information, it and its non-selling 
shareholders, gain an immediate benefit.  However, there is simultaneous harm to the selling 
shareholders.  This harm done to the selling shareholders is said to be equal to the benefit that 
accrues to the company and the non-selling shareholders.1044  But, imply the authors, it may be 
deceptive to view this proposition in isolation.  Investors are risk averse.  The possibility of 
being a victim of a corporation when it uses inside information to repurchase shares may, in 
                                                 
1038  See the New Zealand Law Commission, Company Law Reform and Restatement (June 1989) (“New 
Zealand Law Commission Report”) 100. 
1039  Lowenstein & Wang (2005) Del J Corp L 75 72. 
1040  Ibid. 73. 
1041  Ibid. 
1042  Ibid. 
1043  Ibid. 74. 
1044  Ibid. 
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the prospective investors’ minds, ‘override’ the possibility of indirectly gaining as a non-
selling shareholder.1045 
Furthermore, they reason, ‘outside shareholders’ may not have an equal chance of benefiting 
indirectly from the inside information repurchase.1046  Corporate managers and large 
shareholders, perhaps institutional shareholders, could have access to the same information as 
the company.  These managers and large shareholders might not be selling their shares when 
the corporation places its order, as they would know the inside information on which the order 
is based.1047  They would know that it would be in their favour to retain their shares.  So, they 
argue, corporate management and large shareholders could possibly benefit disproportionately 
when the issuer is repurchasing its shares with inside information.1048  They further point out 
that corporate boards, when authorising share repurchases on the basis of undisclosed 
information, act in the best interests of long-term shareholders, rather than of short-term 
shareholders.1049  The preference for the interests of long-term shareholders, if applied to inside 
information repurchases, would support board policies for the repurchasing of shares based on 
inside information.1050 
None of the South African authorities on share repurchases deals, in any material way, with 
whether corporations should be recognised as insiders.1051  Cassim merely touches on the 
                                                 
1045  Ibid. 75. 
1046  Ibid. 
1047  Ibid. 
1048  Ibid. 
1049  Ibid. 76. 
1050  Ibid. 
1051  D Butler “`n Maatskappy se nuwe statutêre bevoegdheid om sy eie aandele te verkry: `n Vertrekpunt” 
(1999) 10 Stell LR 284 290; R Jooste “Issues relating to the regulation of distributions by the 2008 
Companies Act” (2009) 126 SALJ 627; H E Wainer “The New Companies Act: Peculiarities and 
Anomolies” (2009) 126 SALJ 806; K van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach in the 
Companies Act 2008” (2009) 3 TSAR 224; K van der Linde “The regulation of distributions to 
shareholders in the Companies Act 2008” (2009) 3 TSAR 484; K van der Linde “Share repurchases and 
the protection of shareholders” (2010) 2 TSAR 288. 
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subject.1052  The author wrote in 1999, prior to the amendment of the Insider Trading Act,1053 
that corporations are to be included in the definition of ‘insider’.  According to Cassim, it is 
important that companies be restricted from repurchasing their shares from shareholders at a 
time when they have inside information, whether or not the shares are listed.1054  Cassim does 
not provide any principle-based reasons for why this must be so. 
There are also academics in the United States who submit that an issuer should be held liable 
for insider trading.1055  They argued that, when a corporation buys back shares from certain 
shareholders, what it is doing in effect is taking away the opportunity to realise return from the 
selling shareholders and reallocating it to the non-selling shareholders.1056  This favouring of 
some of the shareholders over others is said to be inconsistent with the basic principles of 
corporate governance.  The argument holds, but it does not explain why a company should 
also be held liable as an insider under the terms of a prohibition on insider trading. 
It will be remembered that in Dirks1057 the United States Supreme Court wrote that insiders are 
forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate 
information to their advantage.1058  The prohibition lies against the insider personally 
benefiting, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.  Absent some personal gain, said the 
court, there has been no breach of duty that would found liability.1059  Although Dirks dealt 
with the extent to which persons, standing outside the corporation, could be held liable, the 
reasoning was thought to be an indication of a principle to the effect that no insider trading 
                                                 
1052  F H I Cassim “The New Statutory Provisions on Company Share Repurchases: A Critical Analysis” 
(1999) 116 SALJ 760 777. 
1053  Act 135 of 1998. 
1054  Cassim (1999) SALJ 777. 
1055  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 7 4/2009) 3-8. 
1056  Ibid. 3-8. 
1057  Dirks v SEC 463 US 646 (1983). 
1058  Ibid. 659. 
1059  Ibid. 664. 
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offence could be committed as long as information is used for a corporate purpose.1060  It 
follows that corporations cannot be held liable for insider trading as it is per se impossible for 
them to act for personal benefit.  This seems to have been the line of reasoning followed in 
some United States cases where it was held that a corporation could not be held liable for 
insider trading.1061 
In American General Ins. Co. v Equitable General Corp1062 it was held that an insider’s duty 
to disclose, the non-performance of which leads to his being banned from trading, arises only 
when he is purchasing shares for his own account and not when he is making purchases for the 
corporation.1063  In Jordan v Global Natural Resources Inc1064 the District Court of Ohio held 
that when a corporation repurchases shares from its shareholders, the erstwhile shareholders’ 
cause of action would lie against the company’s officers and directors who authorised the 
repurchase, but not against the company itself.1065  The court’s reasoning is based on the 
fiduciary duty doctrine.  It held that no fiduciary duty falls on a corporation, as opposed to its 
officers, in favour of its shareholders.1066 
The United States courts have also held companies liable as insiders in numerous cases.1067  In 
Castellano v Young & Rubicam Inc,1068 Castellano had a long-standing relationship with 
Young & Rubicam Inc (Y&R).  He was employed by the company for many years, culminating 
in his appointment as chief executive officer of its branch in Italy.  The relationship soured as 
a result of a criminal investigation into allegations that Castellano was involved in bribery to 
                                                 
1060  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 7 4/2009) 3-8. 
1061  Dirks v SEC 463 US 646 (1983) 3-9 note 3. 
1062  American General Ins Co v Equitable General Corp 493 F Supp 721 (ED Va 1980). 
1063  Ibid. 743–744. 
1064  Jordan v Global Natural Resources Inc 564 F Supp 59 (SD Ohio 1983). 
1065  Ibid. 67–68.  The court did, however, remark that a corporation could be ‘held vicariously liable’ for 
the acts of its officers and agents acting within the scope of their actual or apparent authority under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior. 
1066  Jordan v Global Natural Resources Inc 564 F Supp 59 (SD Ohio 1983) 68.  
1067  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 7 4/2009) 3-9. 
1068  Castellano v. Young & Rubicam Inc 257 F 3d 171 (2nd Circuit 2001). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  276 
secure more business for the company.  Although an internal investigation into Castellano’s 
conduct came to naught, the company persuaded him to resign. 
At the time of his resignation he was one of the largest shareholders in Y&R.  A shareholders’ 
agreement provided for a right of pre-emption in favour of the existent shareholders.  
Negotiations for the purchase of Castellano’s shares were undertaken.  Unbeknown to him, 
Y&R had begun merger negotiations and was planning a restructure that included a listed 
company.  This would potentially effect a substantial increase in Y&R’s share price.  
Castellano sued Y&R, asserting that his decision to resign as a result of the negotiations cost 
him $7 million.  The court held that it 
logically follows that just as knowledgeable corporate insiders have a fiduciary duty to 
disclose material facts when entering stock deals with outsiders, so do closed 
corporations buying their own stock.1069 
McCormick v Fund American Companies Inc1070 also presents the scenario of a corporate 
executive resigning and selling his shares.  The court held that the corporate issuer in 
possession of inside information, ‘like other insiders in the same situation’, should disclose the 
information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with them.  In Jordan v Duff & Phelps, 
Inc1071 it was held that ‘close corporations buying their own stock, like knowledgeable insiders 
of closely held firms buying from outsiders, have a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts.’  
In Smith v Duff & Phelps1072 it was held that the company bears a duty to disclose merger 
negotiations to an employee who departs voluntarily and sells his shares as a condition of 
termination.  In Kohler v Kohler,1073 after setting out the underlying principles of the insider 
                                                 
1069  Ibid. 179. 
1070  McCormick v Fund American Companies 26 F 3d 869 (9th Circuit 1994). 
1071  Jordan v Duff & Phelps Inc 815 F 2d 429 (7th Circuit 1987) 435. 
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trading provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act,1074 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit held that the 
underlying principles apply not only to majority stockholders of corporations and 
corporate insiders, but equally to corporations themselves when acting through their 
directors or agents. 
In Green v Hamilton Internat’l1075 the court dealt with what it termed an ‘interesting issue’: 
whether the redemption of convertible debentures could amount to insider trading.  Green 
owned convertible debentures in Hamilton.  The debentures provided that, at any stage before 
a specified time, the debentures could be converted into Hamilton common stock at $2.75 a 
share.  In the two weeks before the redemption date, Hamilton’s common stock was trading 
well below the conversion rate.  Green alleged that Hamilton was aware of the fact that he had 
intended to redeem the debentures rather than to convert them. 
On the day that Green redeemed his debentures, another company made a written proposal to 
Hamilton to acquire it by purchasing all of its outstanding shares for $4.00 a share.  This offer 
was made public a few days later.  At this time Green and his fellow plaintiffs had already lost 
the opportunity to participate in the merger and to receive the merger price.  They demanded 
rescission of the redemption transaction, but to no avail.  They instituted action and alleged, 
inter alia, that as Hamilton was an insider, there was a duty on it to disclose the material 
information about the merger transaction. 
The court found that the question was whether the timing of the merger transaction was 
deliberately orchestrated in order to deprive Green and his fellow debenture holders of material 
information.1076  This, in turn, led to the question whether Hamilton, as an alleged insider, 
                                                 
1074  The court set out these underlying principles by quoting Leahy J in Speed v Transamerica Corp 99 F 
Supp 808 (D.C. Del. 1951) 828–829. 
1075  Green v Hamilton Internat’l Corp 437 F Supp 723 (SDNY 1977) 728. 
1076  Ibid. 729. 
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owed a duty to disclose.1077  The court, in referring to, among other authorities, Kohler held 
that: 
there can be no doubt that the prohibition against insider trading extends to a 
corporation.  It was said early of the [Securities and Exchange Act] philosophy that it 
applies not only to majority stockholders of corporations and corporate insiders, but 
equally to corporations themselves when acting through their officers, directors and 
agents. 
And, interestingly, that ‘by redeeming its own debentures, [Hamilton] “traded” in its own 
securities’.1078 
In Rogen v Ilikon Corp1079 Kohler was again followed in as far as it held that a corporation is 
an insider when it buys back its own shares.  The judgment bears out the frustration on the part 
of corporations encumbered by insider trading regulations in trying to repurchase their own 
stock.  Ilikon was a corporation doing business research and development in engineering and 
science.  Rogen was a key individual in the company: he was its president, secretary, and its 
largest shareholder.  He had also conceived of an idea of developing products of aluminium 
by blowing gas under pressure through a nozzle submerged in molten aluminium.  He 
developed the general concept and supervised its development into a marketable product. 
Rogen’s colleagues had, however, become dissatisfied with his performance for various 
reasons.  Among them counted his extended absenteeism, a continuing shortening of his 
workday, an embarrassing consultation with a client, and a disproportionate ownership of 
shares.  He was consequently removed as president and secretary and his employment was 
terminated.  He remained a director.  Three months after he had been dismissed as president 
and secretary, he agreed to sell his shares in Ilikon.  It is in those three months that he alleged 
certain facts material to the sale of his shares had not been disclosed to him.  His submissions 
could be summarised under three heads: that there was a nondisclosure of the revival of certain 
                                                 
1077  Ibid. 
1078  Ibid. 729–730. 
1079  361 F 2d 260 (1st Cir 1966). 
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negotiations for the marketing of the product, which Rogen had initiated; that there was 
nondisclosure of the continuing technological progress made on the project; and thirdly, related 
to his charges in relation to insider trading, that Ilikon and his former colleagues had made 
false representations to him about the market for Ilikon shares, which led to a lowering of his 
asking price for the shares. 
The court found that there was enough reason for it to reverse the judgment of the trial court 
granting summary judgment, and remanded the action for further proceedings.  In the conduct 
of the appeal, the defendants made an argument evidencing the logical frustration on the part 
of corporations who may feel that they are unjustifiably restrained by the law in repurchasing 
their own shares.  The court wrote as follows: 
Defendants have a reasonable query: what is a company to do in circumstances such as 
these when delicate preliminary but serious negotiations are being conducted at a time 
when it is desirable to try to buy out a disaffected stockholder?  The options seem to us 
to be: (1) to refuse to disclose and refrain from buying during negotiations; (2) to 
disclose and attempt to buy during negotiations; and (3) if it clearly appears that the 
selling stockholder is in no way relying on non-disclosure, to take a chance on 
litigation…  If these options seem inadequate, the basic answer is that the law has 
deliberately tried to equalize bargaining power between the individual and the 
corporation.  The fact that during the critical negotiations the scales may be weighted 
in favour of the departing stockholder is part of the price paid.1080 
These frustrations, especially when viewed outside the context of the equal access to 
information theory, are not baseless.  If a share buy-back is aimed at promoting, say, 
consolidation with a view to entering into new expectedly profitable endeavours, would the 
buy-back not per se be based on inside information?  In other words, if a company were to 
plan certain steps in order to render it more profitable, would it not per se be guilty of trading 
with inside information, if it does not disclose its intended future course of conduct before 
                                                 
1080  Ibid. 268. 
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performing the buy-back?  For the company knows, or at least expects, that it will be more 
profitable in future as it makes the buy-back. 
As a result of these difficulties, the European Union has since 2014 recognised that trading in 
securities or associated instruments for the stabilisation of securities’ prices, or trading in some 
shares in buy-back programmes, can be legitimate for economic reasons.  It was decided that 
these trades should in certain specified circumstances be exempt from the prohibitions against 
insider trading.1081  The application of the exemption is made conditional upon whether the 
actions are carried out transparently and the relevant information about the stabilisation or buy-
back programme is disclosed.1082  The European Union further recognises that a corporation 
trading in its own shares in buy-back programmes or to stabilise a financial instrument, which 
would not benefit from the exemptions under its regulatory scheme, should not of itself be 
deemed to constitute market abuse.1083 
A further matter pertinent to issuers being held liable for insider trading, is how other legal 
requirements of disclosure of information applicable to listed companies correlate with the 
insider trading prohibitions.  For example, firstly, the South African Companies Act 
determines that an initial public offering can be made only if it is accompanied by a registered 
prospectus.1084  The prospectus must contain all the information that an investor may 
reasonably require to assess the securities being offered, and the assets and liabilities, financial 
position, profits and losses, cash flow and prospects of the relevant company.1085  Secondly, 
the Financial Markets Act provides that an exchange may require an issuer of listed securities 
                                                 
1081  Par. 11 of the Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on market abuse (2014 European Regulation). 
1082  Par. 11 of the Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on market abuse (2014 European Regulation). 
1083  Par. 12 of the preamble to the 2014 European Regulation. 
1084  Section 99(2) of the Companies Act. 
1085  Section 100(2) of the Companies Act. 
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to disclose to the exchange any information at the issuer’s disposal about the securities, or 
about the affairs of the issuer, if the disclosure is necessary to achieve one or more of the 
objects of the Financial Markets Act.1086  An exchange may also require the issuer to disclose 
that information to the registered holders of the securities.1087  When an issuer discloses 
information to the registered holders of securities that may influence the price of the securities, 
the issuer must make the information available to the public.1088 
At least part of the rationale behind these types of disclosures is that they are a means to curb 
trading on inside information.1089  It is believed, logically so, that there is a close relationship 
between the extent of trading on inside information in a market and the timely disclosure of 
material information by listed companies selling their securities in that market.1090  There are 
more opportunities for insider trading if companies fail to disclose material information to the 
market in a timely fashion.  It is accepted that trading on inside information could, at least in 
part, be prevented by requiring public issuers to continuously disclose inside information.  The 
requirements lessen the opportunities of those in the know to benefit from their information 
advantage.1091  Would a company still fall foul of the insider trading provisions on the 
satisfaction of the disclosure requirements of these Acts?  The answer must be that each set of 
legislative provisions must be complied with in its own right. 
 
                                                 
1086  Section 14(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Act. 
1087  Section 14(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Act. 
1088  Section 14(2) of the Financial Markets Act. 
1089  New Zealand Law Commission Report 8. 
1090  Ibid. 
1091  Ibid. 9. 
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4 4 2  Institutional investors 
There has also been debates about whether institutional investors, whether they be insurance 
companies, commercial banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, endowment funds or pension funds, 
should not be allowed to trade on inside information.  Along the same lines as the argument 
that insider trading profits are due compensation to controlling shareholders for monitoring 
management, it is argued that insider trading acts as an incentive for institutional investors to 
undertake this monitoring function.1092  In other words, the profits that insider trading gives 
rise to are justified compensation for the monitoring function that institutional investors 
undertake.1093  Accepting that the monitoring of management by institutional investors would 
be beneficial to the economy and that there is a lack of incentives, and indeed some 
disincentives, to engage in performing these services, it has been proposed that institutional 
investors must be allowed to conclude a monitoring agreement with the firm.  According to 
this agreement, they would have the obligation to actively monitor the firm while being entitled 
to trade on inside information relating to the firm.1094 
There are certain factors that work against institutional investors fulfilling the monitoring 
function.  When they perform the function, they incur all the costs of monitoring without 
                                                 
1092  S Thurber “The Insider Trading Compensation Contract as Inducement to Monitoring by the 
Institutional Investor” (1994) 1 Geo Mason L Rev 119 119. 
1093  Thurber (1994) Geo Mason L Rev 119.  At that time the author specifically pushed for further 
supervisory duties for the institutional investors as it was thought that the market for corporate control 
did not sufficiently provide this service (see specifically at 124).  For a discussion of the role played, 
and to be played by institutional investors in the companies in which they invest, see R J Gilson & R 
Kraakman “Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors” (1991) 43 
Stanford L Rev 863.  For articles dealing with the market for corporate control as a corporate governance 
tool see J C Coffee “Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender 
Offer’s Role in the Market for Corporate Governance” (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 1145; M C Jensen & R 
S Ruback “The Market for Corporate Control” (1983) 11 J Fin Econ 5; F H Easterbrook & D R Fischel 
“Corporate Control Transactions” (1982) 91 Yale LJ 698; H G Manne “Our Two Corporations Systems: 
Law and Economics” (1967) 53 Va L Rev 259; H G Manne “Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control” (1965) 73 J Pol Econ 110. 
1094  Thurber (1994) Geo Mason L Rev 119. 
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receiving all the benefit.1095  All other shareholders of a company will also benefit from the 
institutional investors’ monitoring endeavours, without doing any monitoring themselves.  
This is known as the collective action problem.1096  It gives rise to an incentive for other 
shareholders not to monitor the corporation and its management, but rather to wait and take a 
free ride on the benefits of another’s efforts.  The collective action problem discourages the 
rational shareholder from monitoring management and gives rise to what one author calls 
‘rational apathy’.1097 
Institutional investors also hold a large market share and often operate under the assumption 
that they dominate the market and that they primarily deal only amongst each other.1098  This 
is said to result in a belief that the market cannot be beaten and in the setting up of portfolios 
to reflect the market.1099  Accordingly, many small equity positions are taken, lessening the 
incentive to monitor as the cost of monitoring each small investment and how the relevant 
company is managed, is not justified by the possible benefit it presents.  In addition, 
institutional investor’s investments are highly research driven.  A security is held only for the 
amount of time that the market research predicts it is profitable to do so.1100  When an 
institutional investor employs this method of investing, a specific security is never held long 
enough to justify the cost of doing intense monitoring in a specific firm.1101 
These disincentives to monitoring, it is argued, could be offset by the profits that trading on 
inside information provides.  The profits act as a catalyst for institutional investors to perform 
                                                 
1095  Ibid. 125. 
1096  Ibid. Also see E B Rock “The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism” (1991) 79 Geo L J 445. 
1097  Ibid. 
1098  Ibid. 126. 
1099  Ibid. 126. 
1100  Ibid. 127.  Also see B S Black “Agents Watching Agents: the Promise of Institutional Investor Voice” 
(1992) 39 UCLA L Rev 811 881 and J C Coffee “Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor 
as Corporate Monitor” (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 1277 1288.  
1101  Thurber (1994) Geo Mason L Rev 127. 
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a more active monitoring role in the economy.1102  The institutional investor is rewarded for 
playing a more active role in the firm, in which it monitors the firm’s performance, and takes 
part in formulating and implementing plans to improve it.  If these plans are successful, the 
firm’s value increases and so does the investor’s investment’s value.1103 
4 4 3  Underwriters 
The floatation of shares or the issuance of bonds could either be underwritten by a natural 
person or a corporation.  The Companies Act recognises as much.1104  It is uncontentious to 
say that underwriters will normally be companies (mostly investment banks) or, indeed, a 
group of companies.  Interesting questions arise about underwriters’ activities and, 
specifically, which of their activities could be recognised as insider trading. 
The first important distinction is the conclusion of the underwriting agreement (which is not a 
trade on a stock exchange) and the actual marketing of securities, which came to the fore in 
Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Brothers Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd.1105  
Inside information about a company called Email was shared with Barings Brothers to procure 
the latter’s services as an underwriter.  Barings Brothers shared the information with other 
parties and entities in an effort to market the shares and to procure sub-underwriters.  One of 
these entities, Hooker, sought a restraining order against Barings Brothers, and against the 
other defendants, to stop them from contravening the insider trading provisions of the old 
                                                 
1102  Ibid. 129. 
1103  Ibid. 
1104  Section 100(7) of the Companies Act. 
1105  (1986) 10 ACLR 462, and on appeal Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners 
Securities Ltd (No 2) (1986) 5 NSWLR 157.  For further discussions of this case see A Black “The 
Reform of Insider Trading Law in Australia” (1992) 15 UNSWLJ 214. 
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Australian insider trading regime.1106  Hooker had to show that the three underwriters were 
persons connected to the issuer. 
The first issue the court had to address was whether the legislation struck bodies corporate.  It 
was faced with a definition of ‘person’ that included a ‘body politic or corporate as well as a 
natural person’.1107  The court reasoned that it was only a very specific type of person who was 
prohibited from dealing in securities with inside information: one ‘who is or has been 
connected with a body corporate.’1108  It held these words to provide an exhaustive statement 
of the circumstances in which persons could be connected to a body corporate.  And, as is 
evident from the court’s reasoning, ‘who’ connoted only natural persons.1109 
In respect of the sharing of inside information with Barings Bothers, the court distinguished 
between the conclusion of the underwriting agreement and the subsequent sale of the shares.  
It held as follows: 
It was then argued that section 128(1) precluded not only the entering into of an 
underwriting agreement in respect of the shares but also any subsequent sale of the 
issue shares on the market.  However, the “dealing” which is a question in the present 
case is the underwriting of the shares.  An offence is committed . . . only if a person 
underwriting the shares was in possession of information that was likely materially to 
affect the price of that proposed issue and the underwriting of the proposed issue was 
                                                 
1106  The relevant provisions as they are found in the Securities Industry (New South Wales) Code are as 
follows.  Section 128(1) read: 
 A person who is, or at any time in the preceding 6 months has been, connected with a body 
corporate shall not deal in any securities of that body corporate if by reason of his so being, or 
having been, connected with that body corporate he is in possession of information that is not 
generally available but, if it were, would be likely materially to affect the price of those securities. 
 Section 4 explicitly defines ‘dealing’ as including ‘acquiring, disposing of, subscribing for or 
underwriting the securities, or making or offering to make, or inducing or attempting to induce a person 
to make an offer or offer to make, an agreement—(a) for or with respect to acquiring, disposing of, 
subscribing for or underwriting the securities’. 
1107  Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (No 2) (1986) 5 
NSWLR 157 161B. 
1108  Ibid. 161C. 
1109  Ibid. 161C–162D. 
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prohibited . . . . [The section] only precludes the body corporate from “dealing in those 
securities” which the officer of that body corporate is precluded from dealing in.1110 
The court held further that:1111 
Accordingly, it seems to me that one approaches section 128 with the idea that it is 
directed to people who are trading in the market place and are involving themselves in 
a transaction where a price could be affected by information and the purpose of the Act 
is to prevent one person having an unfair advantage over another.  On this basis the 
present action would appear to be misconceived because in various different ways it 
asserts that by involving an underwriter to make a placement of unissued shares and by 
communicating estimates of profit for the current year to that underwriter, which 
forecast the underwriter will pass on to a sub-underwriter, that there is a breach of 
section 128 which breach would permit the plaintiff as the equitable owner of certain 
shares to restrain the allotment by an injunction [as sought]. 
Whether the activities of entities such as investment banks and underwriters fall foul of an 
Act’s insider trading provisions, will depend on the specific conduct prohibited by the 
operative provisions of the regulatory scheme.  However, and as far as this work is concerned, 
there is no reason why, as a general proposition, an investment bank or an entity underwriting 
an initial public offering, should be allowed to deal with inside information.  Underwriters are 
bound to be incorporated.  They are also likely to have access to all the information the issuer 
itself would have access to, because the issuer would have to make extensive disclosures to 
the underwriter to procure its services.  If underwriters are to market shares on stock 
exchanges, they must be recognised as insiders. 
4 4 4  Chinese walls 
A further difficulty in holding companies liable as insiders arises from  the fact that companies 
are materially different from natural persons.  The relevant difference is that companies may 
be made up of divisions.  There is, for instance, a widespread practice among financial 
                                                 
1110  Ibid. 162E–G. 
1111  In agreeing with what was said by Young J in the court below. 
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conglomerates to combine advisory business with equities trading.  Commercial and 
investment banks, insurance companies, and securities firms, for instance, engage in ‘multi-
service activities’.1112  Each service is provided by a different division.  Each division focuses 
on its activity and the information relevant to it.  And, it may be that one division has 
information about which another knows nothing.  If the latter makes a trade in securities about 
which the former has inside information, the company is strictly to be held guilty of insider 
trading.  In other words, the information known to the one division, is to be attributed to the 
company as an entity.  The Chinese wall defence seeks to address this situation. 
A Chinese wall is defined as: 
policies and procedures that are designed to stop the passage of information, especially 
price-sensitive information, operating between departments within a firm or a financial 
group.1113 
It is an information barrier within a corporation, which seeks to leave different departments or 
sections of the business on ‘opposite sides’ of the ‘wall’.  It is created by the implementation 
of administrative and organisational arrangements and structures, which are designed to stem 
the flow of information between the different parts of the corporation.1114 
The use of Chinese walls is a favoured technique of large financial institutions to deal with 
conflicts of interest.1115  They are widely used by corporations in Australia, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.1116  It has been accepted by the courts of these 
                                                 
1112  H N Seyhun “Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in Securities Firms” (2007) 4 J L 
Econ & Pol’y 369 370. 
1113  Ibid. 369. 
1114  R Cranston Principles of Banking Law (1997) 31–2. 
1115  ASIC par. 308. 
1116  ASIC par. 308 and Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222 (Prince Jefri Bolkiah) 238. 
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jurisdictions that Chinese walls ‘manage’ conflicts;1117 they do not eliminate them.1118  
Whether a Chinese wall is effective in a particular case, has been held to be a question of fact 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis.1119 
For the defence to succeed, the wall must be an ‘established part of the organisational structure’ 
of a corporation.1120  The following organisational arrangements are ordinarily considered in 
determining whether the wall in the specific case was effective:1121 the physical insulation of 
different departments from one another; the education of employees to emphasise the 
importance of guarding against improperly or inadvertently divulging information; the 
determination and strict application of procedures to be followed in an instance where the wall 
is to be crossed or lowered, including the careful keeping of records of such instances; 
employing a programme that continuously monitors the efficacy of the wall; and employing 
disciplinary sanction where the wall is breached. 
A few examples of the application of Chinese walls in the investment banking sphere will 
suffice.  Investment banks are typically divided into three divisions: investment banking, asset 
management, and trading.1122  The investment banking division arranges debt, equity, and 
convertible instrument financing for corporations and governments.  It also advises 
                                                 
1117  ASIC par. 310 and Prince Jefri Bolkiah 238. 
1118  Indeed Bryson J, in D & J Constructions Pty Limited v Head & Ors trading as Clayton Utz (1987) 9 
NSWLR 118 123, expressed his doubts on whether Chinese walls could serve to prevent improper 
information flow in certain situations as follows: 
 …it is not realistic to place reliance on such arrangements in relation to people with opportunities 
for daily contact over long periods, as wordless communication can take place inadvertently and 
without explicit expression, by attitudes, facial expression or even by avoiding people one is 
accustomed to see, even by people who sincerely intend to conform to control. 
 Also see the Supreme Court of New South Wales judgment in Asia Pacific Telecommunications Limited 
v Optus Networks Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 350. 
1119  ASIC par. 318. 
1120  Prince Jefri Bolkiah 239, quoted with approval in ASIC par. 318. 
1121  See ASIC par. 319 and Prince Jefri Bolkiah 238. 
1122  D P Stowell Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity 3ed (2017) 7. 
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corporations on mergers and acquisitions.1123  The asset management division offers equity, 
fixed income, alternative investment, and money market products and services to, mostly, 
individual clients.  For alternative investment products, the firms co-invest with clients in 
hedge funds, private equity, and real estate funds. 1124  The trading division sells and trades 
securities and other financial assets as an intermediary on behalf of institutional investing 
clients.  It normally operates in two business units: the equity and fixed income unit, and the 
currency and commodity unit.  The trading division also provides advice and market research 
to investing clients.1125 
In Re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith1126 Merrill Lynch employees made selective 
disclosures to certain of its brokerage clients of negative, material, non-public information 
learned from one of its investment banking clients.  While acting as an underwriter for a 
proposed offering of convertible debentures of Douglas Aircraft (Douglas), the investment 
banking division learned that there was a deterioration in Douglas’s business outlook.  Merrill 
Lynch did not trade on the information for its own account; the disclosure was made to one of 
its selected clients.  That client sold its Douglas stock just before the publication of the 
information. 
The Commission held that Merrill Lynch had failed to supervise its employees sufficiently.  A 
settlement agreement was reached according to which Merrill Lynch had to adopt a policy 
prohibiting the disclosure of material information obtained by its underwriting division and 
anyone outside the division other than senior executives, lawyers of the firm, and other persons 
                                                 
1123  Ibid. 
1124  Ibid. 
1125  Ibid. 
1126  Exchange Act Rel No 8459 [1967–69 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rep (CCH) 77 629 (Nov. 25, 1968) 
as cited by T A Levine, A Z Gardiner & L D Swanson “Multiservice Securities Firms: Coping with 
Conflicts in a Tender Offer” (1988) 23 Wake Forest L Rev 41 47. 
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with a need to know.  In essence the firm had to implement a Chinese wall between the 
underwriting division and the rest of the firm. 
In Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty 
Ltd,1127 also discussed above,1128 the defence provided in section 1043F of the Australian 
Corporations Act1129 was pleaded.  The section is found under the heading ‘Chinese wall 
arrangements by bodies corporate’.  It provides: 
A body corporate does not contravene subsection 1043A(1) by entering into a 
transaction or agreement at any time merely because of information in the possession 
of an officer or employee of the body corporate if: 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken on its behalf 
by a person or persons other than that officer or employee; and  
(b)  it had in operation at that time arrangements that could reasonably be expected 
to ensure that the information was not communicated to the person or persons 
who made the decision and that no advice with respect to the transaction or 
agreement was given to that person or any of those persons by a person in 
possession of the information; and 
(c) the information was not so communicated and no such advice was so given. 
At the time of Manchee’s trading,1130 Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd was the main 
operating subsidiary in Australia of an international banking and financial services company, 
Citigroup Inc.  Citigroup carried on various businesses in Australia, including an investment 
banking business, providing investment banking services within a division established 
specifically for that purpose.  Another division engaged in the trading of securities. 
The investment banking division provided Toll with financial advice and other investment 
banking services.  The services were sought specifically in relation to a proposed takeover of 
                                                 
1127  [2007] FCA 963. 
1128  See p. 165 above.  
1129  Corporations Act of 2001.  See R Tomasic, S Bottomley & R McQueen Corporations Law in Australia 
2ed (2002) 20-9-8.  
1130  See p. 165 above.  
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another listed company, Patrick Corporation Limited (Patrick).  Citigroup was one of two 
investment banks appointed by Toll for the takeover.  Citigroup’s investment banking division 
was separated from its trading division (and specifically its equity and fixed income unit) by 
various formal and other information barriers.  Manchee was employed in Citigroup’s equity 
derivatives division. 
During the day, the head of the team advising and acting for Toll, noticed that Citigoup had 
engaged in extensive trading in Patrick shares.  He, in the investment banking division of the 
company’s Chinese wall (the side privy to the inside information), phoned the head of 
Citigroup’s equities division, who in turn phoned the head of the company’s equity derivatives 
unit, on the public side (the side not privy to inside information) of the company’s Chinese 
wall.  It was the head of the equity derivatives unit who asked Manchee to step outside, where 
he was told to stop buying Patrick shares. 
Among the charges brought against Citigroup was that it, rather than its employee, had traded 
on inside information.  Two instances of insider trading were pleaded: the first was about the 
trading that took place after Manchee was warned not to buy any further Patrick shares.  It was 
common cause that Manchee had not been told that Citigroup was acting for Toll in the 
takeover of Patrick.  The charge rested on the allegation that Manchee held this supposition as 
a consequence of being warned simply not to purchase further Patrick securities. 
The alternative claim was that Citigroup was to be held liable for all the trading that happened 
on that day before the announcement had been made.  According to this charge, the Chinese 
wall defence was not available to Citigroup.  ASIC alleged that certain private side employees 
of Citigroup had been aware of its acting for Toll and that there was a substantial likelihood 
that Toll would announce its bid in what was at that time the very near future.  Therefore, the 
purchase and sale by Citigroup of Patrick shares, while some of its employees were in 
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possession of inside information, was said to be insider trading.1131  A central issue that arose 
in relation to this second charge, was whether Citigroup had made out its defence as required 
by section 1043 of the Australian Corporations Act. 
The functioning of the Chinese wall is well illustrated: the moment the Chinese wall is thought 
away, the inside information held by the investment banking division is attributed to the whole 
of Citigroup and more specifically, also to its equity derivatives division.  The court upheld 
Citigroup’s Chinese wall defence.  In coming to its conclusion, the court analysed whether 
Citigroup’s Chinese walls were adequate to prevent the flow of information from the private 
to the public side of the company, the side not exposed to the inside information.  Jacobson J 
wrote:  
[T]he communication between Mr Darwell and Mr Manchee, and indeed the earlier 
communications between Mr Sinclair and Mr Darwell, reveal the potential fragility of 
Chinese walls.  Mr Sinclair reacted very quickly, as a senior and responsible employee, 
to the news that the public side was trading, in large volume, in Patrick shares.  He 
realised immediately the possible impact of this on the reputation of Citigroup and took 
steps to find out what had happened.  Of necessity, this entailed crossing the Chinese 
Wall.  This very fact of the crossing and the words he used risked sending a tip to those 
on the public side, but this was unavoidable.  Ultimately, it seems to me that the risk of 
tipping the proprietary trading desk was avoided by the astute way in which Mr Darwell 
handled the situation and the discreet terms he used in his communication with 
Manchee.  But such a result may not always prevail in the pressurised environment of 
investment banking.1132 
An important question that had to be answered about the second insider trading claim against 
Citigroup was whether Citigroup had indeed employed ‘arrangements that could reasonably 
[have been] expected to [have] ensured that the information was not communicated’ from those 
in the know to the person who traded.  In other words, whether Citigroup had indeed employed 
a sufficiently efficient Chinese wall.  As is clear from section 1043F above, in order for 
defendants to make good their Chinese wall defence, they must convince a court, subsequent 
                                                 
1131  The court also had to deal with whether the information was ‘generally available’ and whether a 
reasonable person would have expected it to have a ‘material effect’ on the price of Patrick shares. 
1132  ASIC par. 522–525. 
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to a case of insider trading being made out against them, that the facts of application to the 
impugned transaction or agreement satisfy each of the three requirements in subsections (a) to 
(c).  In ASIC, it was not in issue that Citigroup satisfied the requirements in subsection (a) and 
(c).  The Securities Investment Commission took aim at Citigroup’s implementation of the 
requirement in subsection (b).  They argued that, firstly, Citigroup’s Chinese wall defence had 
to fail as it had no mechanism in place to have brought a trader such as Manchee ‘over the 
wall’.1133  This line of attack was supported by the ad hoc nature of what took place when the 
private side became aware of Mr Manchee’s trading.1134 
The court found in favour of Citigroup.  The company had policies in place that required 
private side employees not to communicate inside information to persons on the public side, 
without involving legal and compliance personnel to assess the materiality of the information 
and, when appropriate, to implement ‘wall crossing’ procedures.1135  The court further found 
that it was impossible to ensure that every conceivable risk is covered by company procedures 
and that they are followed by employees.1136  It held that section 1043F(b) did not require 
‘absolute perfection’, and that the standard was objective and related merely to ‘arrangements 
that could reasonably be expected to ensure that the information was not communicated’ across 
the wall.1137 
While the court in ASIC was willing to accept Citigroup’s arrangements as sufficient, the 
practical implementation of an effective Chinese wall may be difficult.1138  In especially the 
English courts and regulatory institutes, the concept of a Chinese wall has been met with some 
scepticism.  The scepticism is attributable to the defence’s reliance on human integrity and the 
                                                 
1133  Ibid. par. 586. 
1134  Ibid. par. 587. 
1135  Ibid. par. 589. 
1136  Ibid. par. 591. 
1137  Ibid. par. 591. 
1138  R Jooste “A Critique of the Insider Trading Provisions of the 2004 Securities Services Act” (2006) 123 
S African LJ 437 440–441. 
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ability of organs of corporate institutions to contain the flow of information.1139  The strongest 
judicial pronouncement to this effect is found in North and South Trust Co v Berkeley where 
it is written: 
How do you train anyone to act properly in such a situation?  What course of action can 
possibly be adopted which does not involve some breach of duty to one principle or the 
other . . . neither skill nor dishonesty can reconcile the irreconcilable.1140 
Some academic commentators have expressed equally harsh scepticism about the effectiveness 
of Chinese walls.1141 
The Financial Markets Act, notwithstanding the fact that it holds companies liable for insider 
trading, does not provide for a Chinese wall defence.  Indeed, the King Task Group initially 
excluded the possibility of corporations being liable as insiders for insider trading as a result 
of the lack of jurisprudence on such a defence in South Africa.1142  Not much thought went 
into the Task Group’s reasoning.  At the time that they considered the Chinese wall defence, 
insider trading itself was hardly mentioned in the law reports. 
Be that as it may, the legislature has now again broadened the scope of the term ‘insider’ to 
include corporations.  Jooste is of the opinion that the legislature has failed to apply its mind 
to the possibility of including the defence.1143  He sees the lack of the defence as a serious flaw 
in our legislative provisions.  He argues that the absence of the defence could be detrimental 
to the efficacy of the operation of financial institutions such as merchant banks and 
stockbroking firms.1144 
                                                 
1139  Jooste (2006) S African LJ 440. 
1140  [1971] 1 All ER 980.  As cited by Jooste (2006) S African LJ 440. 
1141  See Seyhun (2008) J L Econ & Pol’y 369 and Levine, Gardner & Swanson (1988) Wake Forest L Rev 
41. 
1142  King Final Report as cited by Jooste (2006) S African LJ 439. 
1143  Jooste (2006) S African LJ 440. 
1144  Ibid. 
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It could well be argued that, if the corporation is to be seen as just another trader in the financial 
markets, it cannot through a subdivision afford itself the benefit of a defence not available to 
other market participants.  In other words, the information obtained by one part of an institution 
must be regarded as information known by the institution as a whole.1145  Whereas it strictly 
falls outside the scope of this thesis, it must be said that there is no principle-based reason why 
the legislature has not or should not have provided for the defence.  The nature of a corporation 
as opposed to a natural person dictates that the defence is a necessary accompaniment to the 
possibility of corporate liability for insider trading.1146  Other than a natural person, there is 
more than one mind at work within a corporation.  Pragmatism requires a defence to be 
afforded to a corporation where the mind holding the inside information is properly separated 
from the mind that decides to initiate a trade.  This is reconcilable with the equal access 
theory’s premise that the wrongfulness of insider trading lies in knowingly trading with 
information to which the rest of the public cannot lawfully have access. 
4 4 5 Conclusion 
The Financial Markets Act rightly includes corporations within its definition of insider.  Yes, 
holding corporations liable for insider trading does present further difficulties legislatures must 
overcome in formulating what the prohibited conduct within an insider trading regime is to be.  
However, as is clear from the European Union’s nuanced approach to buy-backs and the 
recognition of the Chinese wall defence generally, those difficulties are not insurmountable.  
The Chinese wall defence addresses the difficulties presented by the fact that companies may 
be divided into divisions, each with its own store of knowledge.  Those difficulties are not 
sufficient reason not to hold companies liable as insiders.  As a starting point, companies must 
be recognised as insiders.  They must be subject to the insider trading prohibitions.  The 
principles of the equal access to information theory dictate that that must be so.  Its uniform 
                                                 
1145  Ibid. 
1146  Ibid. 
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application must trump any suggestion that companies should not adhere to the insider trading 
provisions. 
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4 5 Steps in the right direction: an insider is a person with inside information 
The Australian, New Zealand, and European Union legislatures have recently enacted definitions 
of ‘insider’, which takes a step toward basing the definitions of insider on the equal access theory.  
These are steps in the right direction.  The legislatures have, however, not completed the paradigm 
shift. 
4 5 1 Australia 
In Australia, certain aspects of the Percival v Wright rule were reversed in 1958,1147 with 
uniform legislation prohibiting trading on inside information by directors enacted by 1962.1148  
The focus was on directors.  They were prohibited from using information obtained by virtue 
of their offices.1149  The approach was followed in subsequent legislation.1150  The Australian 
securities market experienced a boom in the late 1960s as large deposits of iron, copper, and 
aluminium were found in the country.  Many a company issued securities, and the secondary 
market experienced high trading volumes.1151  With the heightened activity came a heightened 
rush for speculative short-run profits, and allegations of market malpractices, including trading 
by individuals with information ascendancies, abounded.1152 
                                                 
1147  Section 107 of the Victorian Companies Act of 1958. 
1148  Section 107 of the Victorian Companies Act of 1958 inspired section 124(2) of the Australian Uniform 
Companies Act of 1961. (Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 138 footnote 56.)  As the name suggests, the Act 
was the result of an effort to establish uniform company legislation for the whole of Australia.  By 
1962, every state in the Australian federation had passed a Companies Act based on the Uniform Act. 
1149  Section 124(2) of the Australian Uniform Companies Act of 1961 provided: ‘An officer of a corporation 
shall not make improper use of information acquired by virtue of his position as such officer to gain 
directly or indirectly an advantage for himself or for any other person or to cause detriment to the 
corporation’. 
1150  See section 229(3)-(4) of the Australian Companies Act of 1981 and section 232(5)-(6) of the 
Corporations Act of 1989. 
1151 Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 148. 
1152  Ibid. 148-9. 
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The federal government initiated a study into the legal regulation of Australia’s securities 
markets.1153  Four of the country’s states had enacted similar legislation aimed at regulating 
the securities industry by the end of 1971.1154  These legislative provisions, all still contained 
in company legislation as opposed to financial market legislation, were still firmly grounded 
in the fiduciary doctrine.1155 
The United Kingdom’s misappropriation approach had a strong influence on Australian 
securities law for historical reasons.1156  The approach provided the foundation for many 
Australian legislative provisions.1157  Prosecutors struggled to establish that trader’s learned 
inside information in their capacities as connected persons.  This failure, to establish a link 
with the issuing company in cases where the accused knew inside information at the time of 
the trade, gave rise to results irreconcilable with the promotion of the integrity of the capital 
markets.  One example, Darvall v Lanceley,1158 will suffice.  
                                                 
1153  Ibid. 149 at note 111 notes that the federal response was prompted by allegations of insider trading 
involving a mining company called Poseidon NL.  It had announced significant findings of nickel and 
copper at its mines in Western Australia.  The complaints came to the attention of the leader of 
Australia’s official political opposition at that time who tabled a resolution for an inquiry into setting 
up a securities and exchange commission aimed at acting against trading on inside information.  The 
committee submitted its final report in 1974 under the title Australian Securities Markets and their 
Regulation: Report from the Senate Select Committee on Securities and Exchange. 
1154  Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 149.  
1155  For instance, a new section 124A(1) was added to Victorian Companies Act of 1971.  It provides:  
 An officer of a corporation who in or in relation to a dealing in securities of the corporation by 
himself or another person makes use to gain directly or indirectly an advantage for himself or 
another person of specific confidential information by virtue of his position as such an officer which 
if generally known might reasonably be expected to affect materially the value of the subject matter 
of the dealing is liable to a person for loss suffered by that person by reason of the payment by him 
of a consideration in respect of the securities greater than the consideration that would have been 
reasonable if the information had been generally been known at the time of the dealing. 
1156  See Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 151.  Loke uses the phrase ‘information approach’ for what this thesis 
describes as the misappropriation theory. 
1157  See section 112 of the New South Wales Securities Industry Act of 1975; section 112 of the 1975 
Victorian Securities Industry Act of 1975; section 128 of the Commonwealth’s Securities Industry Act 
of 1980; and section 1002 of the Corporations Law of 1989. 
1158  See for example Darvall v Lanceley (1986) 10 ACLR 893. 
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In Darvall injunctive relief was sought to restrain the plaintiff from contravening the relevant 
insider trading provisions.1159  The relief sought arose from two competing takeover bids.  
Darvall had made offers to his fellow shareholders of a company called Norbrik to purchase 
all or any of their shares for $10 each, subject to certain conditions.  Three days after this, 
Lanceley made an unconditional offer to Norbrik’s shareholders to purchase their shares for 
$12 each.  Seeking the relief against him, Lanceley alleged that Darvall was breaching the 
relevant insider trading prohibition and should therefore be, in South African legal terms, 
‘interdicted’ from dealing with Norbrik’s shares.1160  The basis upon which the relief was 
sought was that Darvall, as a shareholder of Norbrik, had had access to information about a 
joint venture agreement into which the company was about to enter.  It was common cause 
that Darvall had obtained the information in the process of bringing a court application against 
one of Norbrik’s directors. 
The court found that as the information had come into his possession in the process of making 
the application, and not by reason of his status as a shareholder of Norbrik, the relief sought 
against him could not be granted.1161  The court found that Darvall was not associated with the 
company and, for that reason, there was no case against him.1162  According to the court, 
Darvall would have been perfectly within his rights to purchase all his fellow shareholders’ 
shares, notwithstanding the fact that he was in possession of inside information.  He was not 
prohibited from doing so for the reason that he had not received the information in a capacity 
identified by the relevant legislation as being prohibited from trading on inside information.1163 
The legislative provisions dealt with in cases like Darvall were found to be unsatisfactory 
largely as a result of their complexity.  According to the Australian Griffiths Committee’s 
                                                 
1159  The relief was sought in terms of a counterclaim. 
1160  Ibid. 723G. 
1161  Ibid. 725A–B. 
1162  Ibid. 725D–E. 
1163  Ibid. 725D–E. 
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(Griffiths Committee) 1989 report, with the self-explanatory title ‘Fair Shares for All: Insider 
Trading in Australia’ (Fair Shares for All), this complexity was brought about by the 
misappropriation theory’s straddling of two legislative worlds.1164  This, together with public 
outcries over perceived insider trading during and before the bursting of a stock market bubble 
in Australia in the 1980s, called for action.1165  Fair Shares for All resulted in an emphasis shift 
in trading on inside information regulation in Australia.  It provides that: 
The offence of insider trading must have its genesis in the use of information derived 
from within the company.  The existing prohibition requiring a person to be connected 
to the corporation which is the subject of the information unnecessarily complicates 
the issue.  It is the use of the information, rather than the connection between a person 
and a corporation, which should be the basis for determining whether insider trading 
has occurred.  Concurrently, it should be placed beyond doubt that the provisions 
extend to corporations as well as to natural persons.1166  (Emphasis added.) 
The report recommended that the insider trading provisions be amended to provide that: 
‘a person (including a corporation) who is in possession of inside information, and who 
knows or ought reasonably to know that it is inside information, shall not use that 
information to trade in or subscribe for the securities of the company which is the 
subject of the information.’1167 
The Griffiths Committee held that the fiduciary duty doctrine and the misappropriation theory 
were redundant for the purposes of regulating insider trading.  It stated that: 
insider trading legislation should not be based on any theory which may limit the scope 
of the prohibition, either by some concept of fiduciary duty or a theory of 
misappropriation. . . .  Rather, it must be emphasised that the basis for the regulation of 
insider trading is the need to guarantee investor confidence in the integrity of the 
securities markets.  Accordingly, the Committee confirms the principles adopted in 
1981 by the Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System (the Campbell 
Committee) as a basis for the prohibition on insider trading:  
                                                 
1164  Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs (the 
Griffiths Committee) Fair Shares for all: Insider Trading in Australia (November 1989) (Griffiths 
Report) par. 4.3.5. 
1165  Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 152.  For another discussion of insider trading regulation in Australia up to 
1987 see K J Bennets “Regulation of Insider Trading: The Australian Experience” (1987) 3 Canterbury 
L Rev 254. 
1166  Griffiths Report XV. 
1167  Ibid. 
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The object of restrictions on insider trading is to ensure that the securities market 
operates freely and fairly, with all participants having equal access to relevant 
information.  Investor confidence, and thus the ability of the market to mobilise savings, 
depends importantly on the prevention of the improper use of confidential 
information.1168 
The recommendations of the Griffiths Committee were in large part accepted by the Australian 
Government1169 and the Australian Corporations Act was amended accordingly.1170  In essence, 
as one would expect from an equal access to information approach, the insider trading 
provisions were amended to remove the requirement for a person in possession of inside 
information to be connected to the company to which the information relates; corporations 
                                                 
1168  Griffiths Report 17. 
1169  M Duffy Government Response to the Report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs entitled ‘Fair Shares for All: Insider trading in Australia (October 11, 
1990.).  Also see Loke (2006) Am J Corp L 153.  In an Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill 
(Explanatory Memorandum) circulated under the Authority of the Attorney General of Australia the 
following was said at par. 34–37:  
34. Insider trading has become a matter of increasing concern within the securities industry 
and amongst the wider community, contributing to the deterioration of public 
confidence in the securities markets more generally.  
35. The report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Constitutional and 
Legal Affairs (the Griffiths Committee) “Fair Shares for all: Insider Trading in 
Australia” in November 1989, recommended significant reform in relation to the 
legislation and administrative actions regarding the enforcement of the existing insider 
trading provisions.  The Government response to the Report, tabled on 11 October 1990 
accepted the majority of the Committee’s recommendations for legislative 
amendments, and in December 1990 draft legislation and an accompanying explanatory 
paper was released for public exposure. 
36. The provisions in this Bill represent the outcome of the Government’s consideration of 
that report in the light of the public submissions on the exposure draft. 
37. The key elements of the provisions are that: the definition of an ‘insider’ will encompass 
corporations as well as natural persons; and there will be no need for the prosecution to 
establish a connection between the person in possession of inside information and the 
company to which the information relates: instead the proposed provision will prohibit 
any person, including a tippee, who is in possession of inside information using it to 
trade in or subscribe for securities in the company; a statutory definition of inside 
information is to be included, based on a “reasonable person” test: information will be 
defined as being generally available where it is disclosed in a manner which would, or 
would be likely to, bring it to the attention of persons who commonly invest in securities 
of a kind whose price or value might be affected by the information, and where a 
reasonable period of time for the dissemination of information has elapsed. 
1170  See section 8 and schedule 4 of the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991. 
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were included in the definition of insider; and the definition of inside information, onto which 
the focus shifted, was fine tuned.1171 
The enactment of the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act of 1991 was a consequence 
of the adoption of several recommendations made in Fair Shares for All.  The insider element 
had been removed from the law relating to trading on inside information.1172  Section 1002G 
of the Australian Corporations Act as it then read provided: 
 (1) Subject to this Division, where: 
(a) a person (in this article) called the ‘insider’ possesses information that is not 
generally available but, if the information were generally available, a 
reasonable person would expect it to have a material effect on the price or 
value of securities of a body corporate; and 
(b) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that: 
(i) the information is not generally available, a reasonable person would 
expect it to have a material effect on the price or value of securities 
of a body corporate; and 
(ii) if it were generally available, it might have a material effect on the 
price or value of those securities. 
The Australian courts initially were reluctant to recognise the equal access to information 
approach inherent in their legislature’s new definition of insider.  In Exicom Pty Ltd v Futuris 
Corporation1173 the Supreme Court of New South Wales was confronted with a scenario in 
which inside information was exchanged between companies in order for the one to raise 
further capital.  Exicom was thought to be undercapitalised and it was decided that it needed a 
new injection of equity capital.  It sought advice and possible offers for taking up shares in the 
company from various entities.  Those entities used the information gathered to purchase 
                                                 
1171  See Explanatory Memorandum par 37.  On the evolution of the thinking on insider trading in Australia 
see A Black “The Reform of Insider Trading Law in Australia and the Scope of Section 128 of the 
Securities Industry Code” (1992) 15 New South Wales LJ 214. 
1172  See R Baxt, A Black & P F Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law 6 ed (2003) 503–504. 
1173  (1995) 123 FLR 394. 
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shares on the open market.  The court was approached by Exicom to stop further use of the 
inside information. 
The court held that the Australian Corporation’s Act’s provisions were aimed at protecting 
members of the public taking part in the financial markets against insiders.1174  Referring to 
what it called the ‘1933 laws in America’ it held that the approach of those laws, like the 
Australian provision, has been primarily to ‘prevent, as much as possible, ingenious schemes 
being concocted by entrepreneurs to escape regulation’.1175  The enactments before the court, 
held Young J, continued in the tradition of the previous Australian provisions.1176  He wrote 
further: 
Mr Jucovic QC sought to address the mischief to which the division was directed.  The 
vice, he said, is that a person who has information is dealing in the market with a person 
who does not have the information.  It seems to me that this is the correct way of 
approaching the construction of [the section].  Again, it must be remembered that the 
theory behind insider trading is breach of fiduciary duty.  (Emphasis added) 
Young J erred.  Still influenced by the old regime, Young J found that there was no breach of 
the Australian insider trading provisions as they were based on the fiduciary duty doctrine.  He 
also held that a company cannot be an insider of itself as ‘the whole genesis of this aspect of 
the law from the law of fiduciary obligation shows that one does not owe a fiduciary obligation 
to oneself’.1177 
In R v Firns,1178 the court continued down the same path.  Mason P acknowledged that ‘[t]here 
is an involved philosophical debate about the object of regulating insider trading’ and that, 
                                                 
1174  (1995) 123 FLR 394 397. 
1175  Ibid. 
1176  In making this statement, the court referred to the case of Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Brothers 
Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 462, and on appeal Hooker Investments Pty Ltd 
v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (No 2) (1986) 5 NSWLR 157. 
1177  Exicom Pty Ltd v Futuris Corporation (1995) 123 FLR 394 399. 
1178  (2001) 38 ACSR 223. 
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because of this, ‘care needs to be taken to ensure that a judge does not unconsciously read his 
or her own philosophy into the enactment and then use it as a basis for construing the enactment 
consonant with that philosophy’.  Then Mason P did just that.  He wrote that, ‘in my opinion 
the market fairness/equal access paradigm cannot be invoked as the sole basis for interpreting 
the criminal offence’.  Mason P erred in following judgments handed down prior to Fair Shares 
for All and the enactment of what was then the new Australian provisions. 
Sections 1043A–1045A of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 are now, in any event, clear.  
Section 1043A(2) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 now provides as follows: 
(2) Subject to this Subdivision, if: 
(a) a person (the insider) possesses inside information; and 
(b) the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters 
specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of inside information 
in section 1042A are satisfied in relation to information; and 
(c) relevant Division 3 financial products are able to be traded on a financial 
market operated in this jurisdiction; 
the insider must not, directly or indirectly, communicate the information, or 
cause the information to be communicated, to another person if the insider 
knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the other person would or would be 
likely to: 
(d) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, 
or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant 
Division 3 financial products; or 
(e) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant 
Division 3 financial products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, 
acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products. 
The Australian legislature’s intention has been fully accepted and placed beyond doubt.1179  
The Supreme Court of Western Australia has held that the labelling of a person as ‘the insider’ 
                                                 
1179  R v Mansfield (2011) WASCA 132 par. 56–57 where some of the recommendations of the Griffiths 
Report and the Explanatory Memorandum are discussed. 
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in section 1043A(1)(a) has the potential to mislead,1180 and that the Australian insider trading 
provisions apply to all persons, regardless of whether the inside information was obtained by 
or from a person connected with the corporation whose securities are traded in the impugned 
transaction.1181  The equal access to information theory is now employed to protect the capital 
markets of Australia.  There are, however, still judgments emanating from the Australian 
courts that show evidence of fiduciary doctrine influence. 
In R v O’Brien1182 the accused was employed first by a Computershare Investor Services (Pty) 
Ltd, a firm that was engaged in a range of investor services to corporations and shareholder 
groups.  During the time of committing his offence, he was transferred to a subsidiary of 
Computershare, Georgeson Shareholder Communications Australia (Pty) Ltd, where he a held 
a senior position as director of business development until his employment was terminated.1183 
Georgeson specialised in providing strategic shareholder consulting services to corporations 
and shareholder groups, particularly in relation to ‘extraordinary transactions’,1184 such as 
mergers and acquisitions, takeovers, corporate restructures and capital raising.1185  O’Brien, 
being the director of business development, was responsible for identifying and procuring sales 
opportunities, either through the existing client base or by offering services to companies 
identified through announcements on the Australian Securities Exchange.  His role included 
communicating directly with existing or prospective clients about relevant extraordinary 
transactions.1186  The proposals Georgeson submitted to its clients for the use of Georgeson’s 
services included standard terms and conditions where Georgeson and its employees 
                                                 
1180  R v Mansfield (2011) WASCA 132 par. 8. 
1181  Ibid par. 8. 
1182 R v O’Brien [2011] NSWSC 1553. 
1183  Ibid. par 6. 
1184  Ibid. par 8. 
1185  Ibid. par 8. 
1186  Ibid. 
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undertook to ‘keep confidential’ and not use for any purposes other than the provision of those 
services, information gained from a client.1187 
The court found that it was by virtue of O’Brien’s position at Georgeson (including his 
attendance of meetings, reading a shared network drive folder, and communicating with 
clients) that he routinely acquired information about what was at the time ‘proposed 
forthcoming extraordinary transactions’,1188 which, if carried out, would have an effect on the 
price of the financial products concerned.1189  Certain facts weighed with the court as relevant 
to a consideration of the seriousness of O’Brien’s conduct.  Among these were, first, the fact 
that O’Brien was the director of business development in Georgeson and could therefore be 
regarded as a ‘true insider’.1190  Second, the fact that O’Brien was at all relevant times aware 
of his obligations of confidentiality and that his conduct could be properly characterised as a 
breach of trust.1191 
From the court’s reasoning it seems as if insider trading that includes a breach of a fiduciary 
duty is seen as a more serious offence than any other ‘type’ of insider trading.  For the court 
held: 
I would assess the objective seriousness of these offences to be at the lower end of the 
range for offences of this kind.  I have reached that conclusion for a number of reasons.  
While the offender was a “true insider” the level of his involvement was significantly 
less than, for example, that of a director of one of the participating companies in the 
transaction.1192 
                                                 
1187  Ibid. par 9. 
1188  Ibid. par 10. 
1189  Ibid. 
1190  Ibid. par 51. 
1191  Ibid. 
1192  Ibid. par 67 
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The court’s reasoning finds no basis in the statutes before it.  The prohibition in section 1043A 
applies to all persons regardless of whether the inside information was obtained by or from a 
person connected, directly or indirectly, with the corporation whose securities are traded.1193   
The Australian legislature has kept in its insider trading provisions the concept of tipping.1194  
This is perplexing.  Where does tippee liability fit into the equal access to information doctrine?  
According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, New South Wales, in Khoo v The Queen1195 under 
a regime in terms of the equal access to information theory ‘tipping is arguably a more serious 
threat to the integrity of the securities market than actual trading. . . .  [F]or the more 
widespread it becomes the greater will be the potential for trading’.1196  Tipping, says the court, 
is the more ‘open-ended violation’ as opposed to an insider entering the market, who trades on 
his own account and then leaves the market.1197  It was further said that the harm of tipping 
lies in the fact that it further causes an unequal dissemination of information.1198 
The line of reasoning was maintained in the bail application reported as R v Khoo.1199  The 
main argument was that the tipping offence is in some way to be regarded as falling within a 
lesser class of offence.1200  The court in principle accepted the fact that a tippee does not in a 
specific case make a financial gain for himself, and that this is relevant at the sentencing stage 
of a tipping prosecution.  However, the argument that tipping was somehow a lesser offence 
was, as it had been before the sentencing court, again rejected.  Tipping, said the court, is more 
serious than trading on inside information.  The court held: 
                                                 
1193  Ibid. 
1194  See p. 310 above. 
1195  [2013] NSWSC 323. 
1196  Ibid. par 7. 
1197  Ibid. par 8–9. 
1198  Ibid. par 10. 
1199  [2013] NSWCCA 1518. 
1200  Ibid. par 30. 
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The sentencing Judge took into account (in my view correctly) that a particular 
mischief of tipping is that it places the tippee in the position of having information 
with the potential for it to be further communicated to others.  If a person in the 
Applicant’s position engages in insider trading, that may be the extent of the actual 
damage done.  However, here the tipper is communicating information in a way 
which places the market at direct risk (at the hands of the tippees).  And undermines 
the integrity of commercial arrangements.  This conduct also exposes the market to 
further risk if the tippees share the information with others.1201 
This line of reasoning is unconvincing.  It could just as easily be argued that tipping creates a 
more equal dissemination of information as more people are privy to the inside information.1202  
It is more correct to say that tipping in all probability causes more trades in which one party is 
unfairly advantaged. 
In R v Fysh1203 it was recognised that the insider trading provisions in the Australian 
Corporations Act were enacted with the object of promoting fair, orderly and transparent 
markets for financial products.1204  It is simply the acquisition or disposal of shares by people 
having the unfair advantage of insider information that is inimical to promoting fair, orderly 
and transparent markets for financial products.  It is that conduct which has the capacity to 
unravel the public trust that is the lifeblood of the market.  A clear exposition of the equal 
access to information is given in the judgment where it is said:1205 
The rationale for criminalising insider trading is simple.  A predicate of a fair and 
transparent market is equal access to price sensitive information.  Access to inside 
information is, of its nature, unequal.  The vice of unequal access to price sensitive 
information is not removed by the existence of an independent motive or ‘previously 
identified strategy’ that prompts the acquisition of the relevant financial products.  
Public trust in a fair and transparent market can only be served by immunising the 
                                                 
1201  Ibid. par 37. 
1202  Ibid. par 74. 
1203  (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 1587. 
1204  Ibid. 
1205  Ibid. par 47. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  309 
market from the prospect of any trading by people on the inside, who have the unfair 
advantage of knowing something the market cannot know. 
4 5 2 New Zealand 
The New Zealand courts, without the intervention of the legislature, recognised that the rule 
in Percival v Wright does not reflect modern thinking on the regulation of directors’ conduct.  
The jurisdiction has also been on the forefront of recognising insider trading as a market 
wrong. 
In Coleman v Myers1206 the facts are briefly as follows.1207  The plaintiffs were the minority 
shareholders in a small private company.  They reluctantly sold their shares to Myers, the 
company’s managing director.  Myers had made a takeover offer in terms of which he would 
acquire the company’s entire equity capital.  As soon as Myers became the sole shareholder, 
he liquidated some of the company’s surplus assets and declared a dividend, which more than 
reimbursed his acquisition expenses.  The plaintiffs contended that their shares had been 
acquired by Myers at a gross undervaluation through a scheme by which the true value of the 
company’s shares was concealed.  One of the assertions made in the statement of claim was 
that Myers and his co-director should have disclosed ‘all the relevant information in their 
possession having a bearing on the fair price of the shares’.1208  Myers and his co-director 
sought to rely on the fact that Percival v Wright had never been questioned in New Zealand.  
In the trial court Mahon J held that Percival was wrongly decided.  The judge wrote as follows: 
In the present case, which is the case of a private company with unlisted shares, it seems 
an untenable argument to suggest that the shareholders on offer to buy their shares are 
not perforce constrained to repose special confidence in the directors that they will not 
                                                 
1206  The judgment of the court of first instance (the Supreme Court of Auckland) is reported at [1977] 2 
NZLR 225 (‘Coleman a quo’) and the judgment of the court of appeal (the Court of Appeal Wellington) 
at [1977] 2 NZLR 297 (‘Coleman appeal’).  For a discussion of the case see B A K Rider “Percival v 
Wright. Per Incuriam.” (1977) 37 Mod L Rev 471 471–472. 
1207  The facts are stated here as they were confirmed by the court of appeal. 
1208  Coleman a quo 266. 
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be persuaded into a disadvantageous contract by non-disclosure of material facts.  In 
my opinion, therefore, there is inherent in the process of negotiation for sale a fiduciary 
duty owing by the director to disclose to the purchaser any fact, of which he knows the 
shareholder to be ignorant, which might reasonably and objectively control or influence 
the judgment of the shareholder in forming his decision in relation to the offer.  The 
application of the rule so assumed to exist must necessarily be confined to private 
companies and to such transactions of compliance with the duty of disclosure.  Thus in 
the case of stock exchange purchases and sales the regulation of insider trading must 
be left to the legislature. 
. . . . 
Applying such considerations to the problem at hand, I reach the unhesitating 
conclusion that the decision in Percival v Wright, directly opposed as it is to prevailing 
notions of correct commercial practice, and being in my view wrongly decided, ought 
no longer to be followed in an impeached transaction where a director dealt with 
identified shareholders.  I accordingly accede to the submission of Mr Wallace that on 
the facts of this case, where the director of a private company made an offer to 
shareholders to purchase their shares, he had a duty to disclose to such shareholders 
any material fact of which to his knowledge they were unaware, and which reasonably 
might, from an objective viewpoint, materially affect the decision of those shareholders 
as to whether they would sell or as to the terms of sale.1209 
On appeal, the judgment of the court a quo was overturned to a certain extent.  The court of 
appeal, while noting that it was unclear whether Mahon J indeed did so, found that it was 
unnecessary to lay down a general rule applicable to, at least, directors of private companies 
with unlisted shares.1210  It held that a fiduciary duty is something that arises out of the 
particular circumstances of a specific case.  As a result of the specific facts in Coleman, found 
the court of appeal, the directors did owe a fiduciary duty to, and were prohibited from trading 
with, the shareholders.1211  These facts were the familial character of the company, the position 
of the buyer of the shares in the company, the extent of the inside knowledge in possession of 
the buyer, the way in which the takeover was executed, the way in which the shareholders 
were persuaded to sell their shares, and the fact that the only director that could stand in the 
                                                 
1209  Coleman a quo 278 and 280. 
1210  Coleman appeal 330. 
1211  Ibid. 330. 
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way of the takeover was removed from the board before the formal take-over offer was 
made.1212  The court found that: 
at all material times the respondent directors had, and emphasized that they had, inside 
knowledge of the company’s affairs; while the son certainly and the father probably 
had intimate knowledge of the detailed plan of acquisition and all its advantages and 
implications.  In the light of the history and character of the company and their offices 
as chairman and managing director. . . they were in a position where confidence had to 
be placed in them.  And in the negotiations and recommendation they invited that 
confidence.  Any suggestion that in the matter of selling shares to the shareholders they 
were able to negotiate effectively at arm’s length would be unreal.1213 
The court held that directors in general were free to profit from their positions, as there was 
nothing in principle that prohibited directors from profiting in the dealings with their 
shareholders.1214  As to the obligations that rested on directors, it was held that: 
in the setting here there must be an obligation not to make to shareholders statements 
on matters material to the proposed dealing which are either deliberately or carelessly 
misleading.  And in my opinion there must at least be an obligation to disclose material 
matters as to which the director knows or has reason to believe that the shareholder 
whom he is trying to persuade to sell is or may be inadequately informed.1215 
The court defined ‘material matters’ broadly, holding that they are considerations that can 
reasonably be said to be likely materially to affect the mind of one of the parties to the 
transaction.1216 
The court of appeal, like the court a quo, found for the sellers of the shares, but on a much 
narrower basis.  The judgments were a recognition of a common law cause of action allowing 
a shareholder, in certain circumstances, to recover losses from a director of a company, where 
the director purchased shares from the shareholder while having inside information not 
available to the shareholder.  One of the material facts required in terms of the cause of action 
                                                 
1212  Ibid. 330 - 331. 
1213  Ibid. 331. 
1214 Ibid. 333. 
1215  Ibid. 333. 
1216  Ibid. 333. 
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is, however, that there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties to the transaction, and 
this relationship would arise only on the special facts of the case. 
Until the enactment of the Securities Amendment Act of 1988 there was no specific legislative 
provisions on New Zealand’s statute books that dealt with insider trading.  The New Zealand 
government became concerned about the state of its securities markets in the 1980s.1217  Its 
first insider trading legislation adhered to the fiduciary duty doctrine, requiring a connection 
between the insider and the public issuer of the shares.1218  The New Zealand legislature was 
initially influenced strongly by United States jurisprudence.1219 
The 1988 New Zealand Act defined an ‘insider’ as meaning: 
in relation to the public issuer, 
- the public issuer itself;  
- a director or employee or substantial security holder of the public issuer who has 
inside information about the public issuer or another public issuer by reason of their 
position with the public issuer; or 
- a person who receives in confidence insider information about the public issuer or 
another public issuer from any of the persons referred to above (or from a person 
who has received the information in confidence from any of the persons referred to 
above). 
The New Zealand regime, in this way, defined a primary insider as a person who has a 
relationship with the issuer and who has information by reason of that relationship.  Secondary 
                                                 
1217  New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development Reform of Securities Trading Law: Volume One: 
Insider Trading: Fundamental Review (Discussion Document) (2002) (“New Zealand Review”) 21. 
1218  Ibid. 21. 
1219  Ibid. 
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insiders, or tippees, were defined as, and limited to, persons who obtained inside information 
in confidence from either a primary or a secondary insider.1220 
In 2002 New Zealand’s Ministry of Economic Development published a discussion document 
proposing certain reforms in their securities trading law.  It specifically dealt with a 
fundamental review of their laws dealing with insider trading.  The review was prompted by a 
perception that, amongst other things, there were problems with the substantive legislation 
contained in the New Zealand Securities Amendment Act of 1988.1221  Specifically, it was felt 
that the legislative regime did not capture the type of behaviour that was perceived by the 
public to be wrongful insider trading and that a review going right to the basis of insider trading 
regulation was necessary.1222  It further found that the definitions of primary and secondary 
insiders were long and overly complex.  This resulted in technical arguments being made by 
defendants.  It created loopholes for dealers with inside information to avoid the 
prohibitions.1223 
The New Zealand legislature therefore found their insider trading law, including the 
requirement that the insider must have a relationship with the public issuer, to be complex, 
difficult to enforce, and leaving many opportunities to avoid the prohibition.1224  It adopted a 
regime similar to that of Australia, focusing on the threat that trading on inside information 
poses to confidence in the market and its integrity, rather than on a breach of duty owed to an 
issuer.1225  The proposal was aimed at applying to any person who trades in shares having 
information that is not generally available to the public.1226  It proposed a new section 8A, 
creating a new definition for the term ‘information insider’.  The new definition shifts the 
                                                 
1220  Ibid. 29. 
1221  Ibid. 7. 
1222  Ibid. 
1223  Ibid. 29. 
1224  Explanatory note to the Securities Legislation Bill 2006 (2006 NZ Securities Legislation Bill) 3. 
1225  Ibid. 3. 
1226  Ibid. 
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emphasis to the information that the insider possesses, rather than the position the insider 
occupies.  An information insider is now anybody with the requisite knowledge.  The insider 
may be a person with no connection to the public issuer in question.1227 
Section 8A of the New Zealand Securities Markets Act,1228 under the heading ‘[w]ho is an 
information insider’, now quite simply provides: 
(1) A person is an information insider of a public issuer if that person— 
(a) has material information relating to the public issuer that is not generally 
available to the market; and 
(b) knows or ought to know that the information is material information; and 
(c) knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is not generally 
known to the market. 
(2) A public issuer may be an information insider of itself. 
4 5 3 The European Union 
Article 2 of the European Insider Dealing Directive of 1989 provided as follows:1229 
1. Each Member State shall prohibit any person who: 
- by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of the issuer, 
- by virtue of his holding the capital of the issuer, or 
- because he has access to such information by virtue of the exercise of his 
employment, profession or duties, 
possesses inside information from taking advantage of that information with full 
knowledge of the facts acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the 
account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, transferrable securities of 
the issuer or issuers to which that information relates. 
2. Where the person referred to in paragraph 1 is a company or other type of legal 
person, the prohibition laid down in that paragraph shall apply to natural persons 
who take part in the decision to carry out the transaction for the account of the 
legal person concerned. 
                                                 
1227  Ibid. 14. 
1228  Securities Markets Act 234 of 1988. 
1229  Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 O J L334/30 (1989 Directive). 
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3. The prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply to any acquisition or 
disposal of transferable securities effected through a professional intermediary. 
Article 4 of the 1989 Directive also provided that: 
Each Member State shall also impose the prohibition provided for in Article 2 on any 
person other than those referred to in that Article who with full knowledge of the facts 
possesses inside information, the direct or indirect source of which could not be other 
than a person referred to in Article 2. 
Persons who possess non-public information were divided into two categories:1230 primary 
insiders and secondary insiders.  Primary insiders were defined as those persons who had 
acquired inside information as a result of their employment or other direct positional access to 
the source of the information.1231  Secondary insiders were defined as those persons who had 
obtained the inside information, but not as a result of a special relationship, from a source who 
was a primary insider.1232 
Primary insiders were prohibited from either trading or tipping, whereas secondary insiders 
were prohibited from trading but not from tipping.1233  At the time Hazen remarked that this 
was probably due to the practical difficulties of detecting and successfully prosecuting remote 
tipping of non-public information.1234  The different tipping rules may have reflected an 
attempt to balance the need for effective insider trading enforcement against the risk of 
establishing too broad a prohibition.  He submitted that consistency requires extending the 
tipping prohibition to remote parties, at least to those who knowingly made selective disclosure 
                                                 
1230  Hazen (1992) Law & Contemp Probs 236. 
1231  Article 2(1) of the 1989 Directive. 
1232  Article 4 of the 1989 Directive. 
1233  Hazen (1992) Law & Contemp Probs 236. 
1234  Ibid. 
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of information that they knew originated from a corporate insider and that they knew was 
inside information.1235 
The inclusion in the definition of primary insider of persons possessing inside information 
through access by virtue of the exercise of their ‘employment, profession or duties’, lead Hopt 
to conclude that the clause netted all employees, regardless of whether their access was regular 
or occasional.1236  The definition would include professional insiders such as accountants and 
attorneys and outsiders such as stock exchange employees, government officials, creditors and 
suppliers, union leaders, journalists and even legislators.1237  To this had to be added the 
secondary insiders category, which would include anybody possessing inside information, as 
Warren remarks, ‘from the primary insider’s sister-in-law to a taxi driver’.1238 
The European regulatory framework for regulating insider trading changed markedly in 
2003.1239  The directive (logically) dealt with market abuse in general. 1240  Illogically, however, 
it retained fiduciary and misappropriation aspects in its insider definition.  The 2003 European 
Union Directive1241 defined persons who fall foul of its insider dealing prohibition in Art 2.  It 
provides that: 
1. Member States shall prohibit any person referred to in the second subparagraph 
who possesses inside information from using that information by acquiring or 
disposing of, or by trying to acquire or dispose of, for his own account or for 
the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, financial instruments 
to which that information relates. 
The first subparagraph shall apply to any person who possesses that 
information: 
                                                 
1235  Ibid. 
1236 K J Hopt “The European Insider Dealing Directive” (1990) 27 Common Mkt L Rev 51 63–64. 
1237  Ibid. 63–64. 
1238  Warren (1991) Washington and Lee Law Review 1065. 
1239  Langevoort on insider trading (Rel 7 4/2009) 14-3. 
1240  For the formulation of the revising directives see J L Hansen “A New Proposal for a European Union 
Directive on Market Abuse” (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 241. 
1241  Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider 
dealing and market manipulation. 
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(a) By virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of the issuer; or 
(b) By virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer; or 
(c) By virtue of his having access to the information through the exercise 
of his employment, profession or duties; or 
(d) By virtue of his criminal activities. 
2. Where a person referred to in paragraph 1 is a legal person, the 
prohibition laid down in that paragraph shall also apply to the natural 
persons who take part in the decision to carry out the transaction for the 
account of the legal person concerned. 
The fiduciary and misappropriation theories are strongly entrenched in paragraphs 1(a), (b) 
and (c), with an interesting addition being found in paragraph (d).  A person is also liable if he 
possesses the information by virtue of his criminal activities.  It was perhaps a laudable 
addition as it at least recognised that there are persons to be held accountable for insider trading 
outside the categories based in the fiduciary and misappropriation theories.  Here at least was 
a recognition that persons may be liable to sanction where they owe no fiduciary or quasi 
fiduciary duty to an issuer or other third party to the trade.  However, it is still an addition, 
which is the result of the shortcomings of the two theories; it does not give effect to an 
independent theory with the ability to cover all trades perceived as wrong. 
Fundamental to a new inclusion in its definition of insider, the 2014 European Regulations 
recognise expressly that the essential characteristic of insider dealing is that of an unfair 
advantage being obtained from inside information to the detriment of third parties who are 
unaware of such information.1242  It recognises that the undermining of the integrity of financial 
markets and investor confidence lies in that characteristic.1243  The European Parliament and 
the Council for the European Union decided that the question whether a person has infringed 
the prohibition on insider dealing or has attempted to commit insider dealing, should be 
analysed in the light of the purposes of this Regulation.  That purpose is to protect the integrity 
                                                 
1242 2014 European Regulations, par. 23 of the preamble. 
1243 Ibid. 
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of the financial markets and to have investor confidence, which is based, in turn, on the 
assurance that investors will be placed on an ‘equal footing’.1244  Therefore it was determined 
that the prohibition lies simply against ‘a person who knows, or ought to have known, that the 
information constitutes inside information’.1245  The Regulation further recognises that both 
legal persons and any natural person who participates in the decision-making of the legal 
person can be held liable for insider trading.1246  Article 8 deals with ‘insider dealing’.  Article 
8(4) provides as follows: 
4. This Article applies to any person who possesses inside information as a result 
of: 
(a) being a member of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies 
of the issuer or emission allowance market participant; 
(b) having a holding in the capital of the issuer or emission allowance market 
participant; 
(c) having access to the information through the exercise of an employment, 
profession or duties; or 
(d) being involved in criminal activities. 
This Article also applies to any person who possesses inside information under 
circumstances other than those referred to in the first subparagraph where that 
person knows or ought to know that it is inside information.  (Emphasis added.) 
4 5 4 An incomplete paradigm shift 
The Australian, New Zealand, and European Union legislatures have enacted definitions of insider, 
each of which takes a step toward the equal access theory.  In Australia a person is an insider if 
he is in possession of inside information and he knows that he has inside information.  There 
is no requirement of some sort of information connectedness for an insider.  In the European 
Union’s definition, much like in its South African counterpart, there are fiduciary and 
misappropriation categories of insider and a catchall category.  The difference between the 
European Union’s catchall and the South African tippee insider category lies in the fact that 
                                                 
1244 Ibid. par. 24. 
1245 Ibid. par. 26. 
1246 Ibid. par. 40 and article 8(5). 
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the South African version requires knowledge of the fact that the source of the information 
was a primary insider, whereas the European Union requires knowledge of the fact that the 
information is inside information.  In New Zealand a person is an insider of a public issuer if 
he has inside information relating to that issuer.  The knowledge requirement contained in the 
New Zealand definition, like that of the European Union, also requires the insider to know that 
he has inside information.  These are steps in the right direction.  The legislatures have, however, 
not completed the paradigm shift. 
Broadly, the approach internationally has been to include within the definition of insider 
further persons or categories of persons as it was realised that a definition fails to cater for 
some traders who have access to inside information.  Of this the United States is the supreme 
example.  When the fiduciary doctrine was deemed insufficiently broad, the misappropriation 
theory was developed.  As the two theories are insufficiently broad, tippee liability was 
developed.  And as it was realised that there may still be insiders not covered with these three 
different bases of liability, special dispensations were created to address senators’ trading with 
congressional information1247 and in respect of mergers and acquisitions.1248  With each added 
category, person or special dispensation, the question is always: so who then is left?  Who then 
may trade with inside information? 
Comprehensive and inclusive definitions of the term ‘insider’, like that of the Financial 
Markets Act, also inevitably lead to that question.  The South African definition arguably 
contemplates a final category of traders who may freely trade with inside information.1249  This 
category would be made up of those traders who knowingly have inside information, who are 
not primary insiders and who do not have knowledge of the information’s source.  It could also 
be argued that the primary insider category is couched in such broad terms that it would be 
                                                 
1247  See above p. 251. 
1248  See above p. 247. 
1249  Cf Warren (1991) Washington and Lee Law Review 1065. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  320 
never be possible for someone with inside information not to be included in the definition.  If 
no group of traders exist who may trade with inside information, the definition has no role to 
play, but to leave the legislative scheme more complex.  If such a group does exist, the 
legislative scheme does not pass the lowest test for legislation to pass constitutional muster:1250 
the legislative scheme would be unreasonable.  As the culpability of insider trading in the 
financial markets lies in knowingly trading with inside information, leaving some market 
participants free to trade with inside information would amount to a legislative regime that 
does not treat equally culpable conduct equally.  For the definition to pass constitutional 
muster, the distinction between those who may trade on inside information and those who may 
not must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.1251  There is no reason why the distinction is justifiable, no less 
so because one cannot even properly identify who may and who may not trade on inside 
information.  In any event, as it has been argued,1252 the only definition that would form the 
basis for a legislative regime that treats equally culpable conduct equally, would be the equal 
access to information theory. 
The definition of insider should be removed from the regulatory scheme.  As the Supreme of 
Western Australia has held, the term ‘insider’ has the potential to mislead.1253  In my 
submission, in an equal access regime, it can serve only to mislead. 
                                                 
1250   Cf Ronald Bobroff & Partners Inc v De La Guerre 2014 (3) SA 134 (CC) par. 7. 
1251   Section 36 of the Constitution. 
1252   See p. 127 above. 
1253  See p. 310 above. 
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5 CONCLUSION AND A PROPOSAL 
In 2006 Jooste wrote that the definitions of the terms ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’ in 
South African law are, while of vital importance, cumbersome, counter-intuitive and circular, 
leaving insider trading regulation fundamentally incoherent.1254  The definitions of insider and 
inside information in the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 remain central to the regulation of 
insider trading, and Jooste’s criticism still obtains. 
The South African legislature has failed to undertake and act in accordance with the most 
fundamental enquiry in formulating a coherent regulatory scheme aimed at prohibiting 
supposedly wrongful conduct: identifying a single theory of wrongfulness upon which to base 
its prohibitions.  Instead, the definitions evidence elements of all possible regulatory bases for 
insider trading, including those having as their object the protection of proprietary rights in 
information and born out of the fiduciary doctrine.  The definitions remain rooted in company 
law theory, which requires them to include patchwork additions to regulate a financial market 
wrong.  Patchwork additions do not make for a coherent regulatory scheme. 
The legislature must formulate the definitions strictly in accordance with the rights and duties 
at play in the financial markets and the objectives with the regulation of those markets.  Those 
objectives are the promotion of the fairness of and the public’s confidence in the South African 
financial markets.  The rights and obligations relevant to the inner-workings of companies or 
the ownership of information are, if at all, only tangentially relevant to the regulation of trading 
on inside information in the financial markets.  The fundamental basis for the regulatory 
scheme must be the rights and obligations between participants in the financial markets inter 
se.  The market theories of regulation recognise as much.  There are two:  the parity of 
information theory and the equal access to information theory.  The regulatory scheme required 
                                                 
1254  R Jooste (2006) 123 S African LJ 438.  See p. 9 above, where the relevant portion of the article is quoted 
in full. 
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by the parity information theory will be detrimental to market liquidity.  The theory has as its 
object a practically unworkable egalitarian utopia.  It would unreasonably restrict trade in 
securities. 
The equal access theory is the regulatory basis best suited to the object of promoting 
confidence and fairness in the financial markets.  The theory is reconcilable with Pothier’s idea 
of affording traders just rewards and it fits well into the South African Constitutional legal 
landscape.  The theory gives rise to definitions directly and coherently connected to the 
wrongfulness inherent in insider trading: that it is wrong for market participants to trade with 
information their fellow market participants cannot lawfully have access to. 
It dictates that inside information has two characteristics.  First, the information must not be 
lawfully accessible to the public.  Second, on the information becoming so accessible, it must 
have an effect on the price of a security listed on a regulated market.  The requirements, 
currently included in the definition, which go to the capacity in which and the means by which 
the information was learned, are to be removed.  As to the ‘non-public requirement’, the ‘not-
lawfully accessible to all’ requirement replaces it.  There is no need to have an additional non-
public requirement within the definition of inside information.  The non-exhaustive list 
provided by the legislature of situations in which information would be non-public is also to 
be removed.  In respect of the requirement going to the information’s source, it is not be a 
requirement in and of itself.  The fact that the information originated from a non-public source 
is merely one fact that goes to whether the information in question was accessible to the public 
at the time of the trade. 
The current definition of inside information’s requirements that go to the substantive 
characteristics of the information, merely serve to muddy the waters of what the enquiry in 
terms of the equal access theory should be.  The requirement that the movement in the 
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security’s price must be material is superfluous.  A requirement that there must be a movement 
in the security’s price would suffice.  That requirement, to my mind, performs the same 
function as the requirements that the information is to be specific and precise.  The specificity 
and preciseness requirements just serve to confuse the enquiry.  In any event, information that 
is imprecise and unspecific may in certain situations move market prices.  The specificity and 
preciseness of the information may affect a market price, but they are not the only indicators 
to that effect.  The price-sensitivity of information may be proved in a myriad ways.  There is 
no reason, based in the equal access theory, why specificity and preciseness should be elevated 
to self-standing requirements.  The specificity and preciseness requirements are to be removed 
from the definition.  The word ‘information’ is, however, to be retained. 
The definition of inside information should be amended to read as follows: 
‘inside information’ means information that— 
(a) is not lawfully accessible to the public; and 
(b) on becoming so accessible would have an effect on the price or value of 
securities listed on a regulated market or of any derivative instrument related to 
such a security. 
As to the definition of insider, there are various arguments made that some individuals and 
corporations should be allowed to trade on inside information.  They fail to convince, 
especially when viewed in the context of the objects of the Act and the equal access to 
information theory.  In my view, once inside information has been defined, the rule must be 
that no one should be allowed to deal with inside information.  Accordingly, a definition of a 
group of people who are hit by the regulatory regime, is superfluous.  The definition of insider 
is to be removed.  This will be in accordance with the paradigm shift seen in various other 
jurisdictions, where the focus on trading by insiders has moved to trading on inside 
information. 
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